THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN EUROPE

1453-1939

Sir J. A. R. Marriott

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THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN EUROPE, 1453 to 1939

PART I

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE DAWN OF THE MODERN ERA

Some Outstanding Dates

1436. Invention of Printing.
1453. Turks capture Constantinople.
1453. End of Hundred Years' War.
1464. Cosmo di Medici founds Platonic Academy at Florence.
1492. Columbus discovers the West Indies.
1492. Spaniards capture Granada.
1493. Bull of Pope Alexander VI.
1494. Italian expedition of Charles VIII.
1496. Colet (1466–1519) lectures at Oxford.
1497. John Cabot discovers Newfoundland, etc.
1498. Vasco da Gama discovers Cape Route to India.
1516. Dean Colet founds St. Paul's School.
1516. Erasmus (1466–1536) publishes his edition of the *New Testament*
1516. Sir Thomas More (1478–1535) publishes *Utopia*.
1517. Luther's Theses at Wittenberg (see also Chap. VI).
1565. Revolt of the Netherlands (see also Chap. IX).
1577–80. Drake sails round the world.

SCOPE OF THE BOOK

WHAT does the average reader want to know about European history? What should an intelligent examiner require of an examinee? The adult reader does not want to follow—the young student should not be expected to learn—the tortuous details of a diplomacy barren of permanent results; nor the details of military campaigns; nor the ramifications of dynastic relationships. Not that these things

are devoid of historical significance. On the contrary, only the ill-informed sneer at what is contemptuously described as 'drum and trumpet history,' or underrate the significance of the work of 'diplomacy,' or ignore the reaction of personal and family affections, or the reverse, upon the course of politics. War has played an immensely important part in moulding the history of States, in determining the destinies of mankind. So, also, have the ambitions, the passions, and even the caprices of kings, and queens, and statesmen. So also has the conduct of diplomacy. Even an historical outline must, accordingly, register the results of diplomacy and wars. The detailed study of tactics and strategy is, however, the appropriate business of the specialized military historian. Similarly, diplomatic negotiations, though a proper object of research for the specialist, are practically important only in so far as they produced definite results which can be recorded and registered.

The main purpose, then, of this book is to explain how the Europe of to-day has come into existence. Europe now consists of some thirty-five political units—independent States—some large, some small, but each under a Government of its own. It is not important, for example, to know why Monaco, now mentioned for the first and last time in this narrative, or San Marino, or even Lichtenstein, has survived as a 'State.' But it is evidently important to have this information about the Papal State, the Vatican, though the jurisdiction of the Pope, as a Temporal Sovereign, now extends only to 109 acres. It is still more important to know why Italy came into existence as a united kingdom so late as 1871, while France and Spain attained the same goal in the sixteenth century, and England in the eleventh? Similarly, though the political status of Lichtenstein, or even of Luxembourg, is not a matter of great significance, it is vitally important to know why the unification of the German people, like that of the Italians, was delayed till near the end of the nineteenth century. Again, why does Switzerland exist at all—in defiance it would seem of every political canon of ethnography and geography, in spite of differences among her people, of race, religion, and language? Why do Holland and Belgium form two separate States in spite of many things which might have drawn them together?

Why are there six separate States in the Balkan peninsula? Or three kingdoms in Scandinavia? Twenty years ago, the catalogue of European States contained twenty-seven items. A century and a half ago there were more than three hundred States in Germany alone.

The political process of modern Europe might therefore be described as one of integration and disintegration; and both processes, curiously enough, have been to a great extent dominated by the same force—that of *Nationality*. What precisely 'Nationality' means is a question which, though important, must be postponed. It is, however, unquestionable that it has operated, now to bring together under a single Government States that were at one time divided and independent, as in the recent cases of Germany and Italy; now to break up States which were formerly one, such as the Hapsburg or the Ottoman Empire, into several independent States.

This book will not attempt to survey the whole of European history. It is concerned only with *modern* Europe. The division of history into ancient, medieval, and modern, is manifestly artificial—the dividing lines are necessarily blurred, but the device has the sanction of long usage, and, what is more important, of practical convenience. Yet the delimitation of the dividing lines is not easy.

What, then, is the scientific and appropriate starting-point for a history of Modern Europe? With rare unanimity historians have agreed that the modern era opens in the fifteenth century. If unwisely pressed for a precise date, they indicate, though reluctantly, the year 1453.

A NEW ERA

The fifteenth century does unquestionably mark a new historical era. All periods are, indeed, 'transitional'; but some seem more definitely than others to mark a change from an older state of things to a new. Among such periods, the 'fifteenth century' stands out pre-eminent. But we must not define that or any other historical 'century' too narrowly. 'Nature,' as Mr. Balfour once wittily remarked, 'does not exhibit her uniformity by any pedantic adherence to the decimal system.' So we must elongate our 'century' sufficiently to include in it the work not only of Dante (1265–1321) and Petrarch (1304–1374), but that of Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton;

not only the historic voyages of Columbus (1492), John Cabot (1497), and Vasco da Gama (1498), but those of Drake (1577) and the other Elizabethan sea-dogs.

These names irresistibly suggest that if the shape and form of the world itself were not actually undergoing transformation, man's outlook upon it was changing. To this period, accordingly, historians have attached a convenient label. They call it the 'Age of the Renaissance.' The term 'Renaissance' has been employed to denote, on the one hand, a period or stage in historical evolution, on the other a phase or movement in the development of human thought. In truth it may legitimately mean many different things to different minds. But though there is diversity of manifestation, there is an underlying unity of spirit, and it is this that we must endeavour to discern. To describe the Renaissance as the 'new birth of learning' is to concentrate attention on an exceedingly important but still partial aspect of the whole movement. To regard it as marking the 'new birth of modern nationalities' is to recall another very important aspect of the general movement. We may think of it again—quite legitimately—as the 'new birth of art'—of art in its many manifestations, plastic, architectural, and pictorial. We may apply the term to the new birth of geographical discovery or of mechanical invention. All these things are chronologically coincident, and the coincidence points unmistakably to a common impulse, if not a common origin. Can we discover it? Summarily one may say that the Renaissance meant the opening of a new heaven and a new earth. And this is true, both literally and metaphorically. The great scientific work of the astronomers, of Copernicus and Tycho Brahe, of Kepler and Galileo, is clearly complementary to the terrestrial discoveries of Christopher Columbus and Bartholomew Diaz, of Vasco da Gama, and the Cabots.

But more than this. The Renaissance meant the opening of a new heaven *on earth*. It recalled the gaze of man from the exclusive contemplation of the life beyond the grave to the manifold beauties and infinite possibilities of the life on earth. The movement has in this aspect been described as a 'Pagan reaction,' and to the coarser minds the Renaissance did mean a relapse into Paganism, a revolt

against all restraint, whether of the intellect, the passions, or the will, and a careless assertion of the liberty that is synonymous with licence. But to the finer minds, to minds like that of Sir Thomas More, the new heaven opened to the gaze of man by the Renaissance meant, in very truth, a vision of God on earth ; it meant a call, definite and insistent, to an attempt to realize upon earth the kingdom of God.

This message, we must admit, was to the finer spirits only. To the average man the Renaissance signified rather the emancipation of the human intellect and the human will from the restraints of external authority, an invitation to enter upon a splendid but strictly mundane inheritance. Individual freedom, self-realization, were the dogmas of this new gospel. Such was the general idea underlying the spirit of the Renaissance.

We may now examine, in more detail, some of the more important manifestations of this new spirit. From the point of view of political history, unquestionably the most important was the renewed curiosity about the world in which we live, resulting in the great geographical discoveries of the later fifteenth century. The world on which men looked out in the sixteenth century was utterly different from that which confronted them at the beginning of the fifteenth. Down to the last decades of the fifteenth century, man's geographical horizon was bounded by Europe, Asia, and the coasts of Africa as far south (roughly) as the Equator. When the century actually closed they knew that the African Continent did not extend beyond the Cape of Good Hope, that India could be reached by a continuous sea voyage, that Columbus had reached an archipelago which he named the West Indies, and that Cabot had landed on coasts which, later on, were known to be those of the American Continent. Plainly, the next generation would be born into a new world.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISCOVERIES

Dates are, in this connexion, highly significant. Columbus sailed on his first voyage of discovery from Spain in 1492. In 1493 Pope Alexander VI issued his famous Bull, assigning the new world exclusively to Spain and Portugal, and defining their respective spheres. In 1497, John Cabot sailed from Bristol and reached Newfoundland.

In 1498 Vasco da Gama crowned a long series of discoveries made by the Portuguese by sailing round the Cape of Good Hope to India.

How are we to account for this simultaneous and (except in the case of Portugal) sudden manifestation of maritime activity on the part of three countries on the Atlantic seaboard? What were the mariners and merchants of Venice and Genoa about? Another date may supply a partial answer. In 1453, the Ottoman Turks, having for exactly a century been steadily advancing towards a complete conquest of the Balkan peninsula, finally extinguished the last remnants of the Eastern or Byzantine Empire and made themselves masters of the capital city of Constantinople. Before another century had been completed nearly the whole of the Levant, its islands and coasts, Northern Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Arabia had passed under the domination of the Ottomans. Their empire extended from Buda to Basra, from the Caspian to the Western Mediterranean; the Sultan Suleiman (1520–1566) could boast without exaggeration that he was 'master of many kingdoms, the ruler of three continents, and the lord of two seas.'

How did the Ottoman conquests affect world-history?

THE BLOCKING OF THE OLD TRADE-ROUTES

For thousands of years the important trade between Asia and Europe had followed three main routes. Of these, the Syrian—familiar to all students of the Old Testament—was the oldest. For countless centuries the wares of India and the Far East had found their way into Europe by the Persian Gulf, and thence across the desert to the shores of Phoenicia. The Mongol and Turkish conquests had gravely impeded this route in the fifteenth century, and it was virtually closed by the Turkish conquest of Syria in 1516.

A more northerly route, which came from Central Asia by way of the Oxus, the Caspian, and the Black Sea, was commanded by Constantinople. Constantinople fell into the hands of the non-commercial Turks in 1453. By a third route the wares of the East reached Egypt by sea, were brought down the Nile, and arrived in European waters by way of Alexandria. Sultan Selim I (1512–20) made himself master of Egypt.

From Constantinople, Alexandria, and the coasts of

Phoenicia, goods found their way into Europe by way of Venice and Genoa. For centuries Venice was the most important entrepôt of European trade. The Turkish conquests and the consequent obstruction to the old trade-routes left Venice and Genoa high and dry, and reduced the Mediterranean—so long the main stream of European trade—to the position of a backwater.

Europe thus found itself faced by two alternatives: either to forgo all the luxuries of the East—the spices and gems, the gold and the silks—and to lose all the profits of the trade in such articles, or to discover new sea-paths which the Turks could not obstruct.

Economic motives—the desire for trade and wealth—were not, however, the only ones which inspired the maritime enterprises of the Spaniards and the Portuguese. Encouraged by their famous Prince Henry, the 'Navigator' (1394–1460), the Portuguese had, for nearly a century, been engaged in researches in the science of astronomy, and continuous experiments in the art of navigation. They were inspired partly, no doubt, by a desire to extend the frontiers of knowledge, partly by the lust of commercial gain, but much more by their secular antagonism to the Crescent and their enthusiasm for the Cross. It was mostly proselytizing and missionary zeal that took the Portuguese to India. 'We come to seek Christians and spices.' So said the first of Vasco da Gama's sailors to land in India. If they could not find Christians there, they were prepared, as their subsequent proceedings showed, to make them. Spain also, like Portugal, had been carrying on an age-long crusade against the Moslem, and was inspired by a like passion to extend a knowledge of Christianity among the heathen.

Such were the forces operating in this period to revolutionize man's knowledge of the earth on which he dwelt.

An extended knowledge of the heavens assisted him greatly in his terrestrial adventures. The Science of Astronomy proved a powerful aid to the art of navigation. If racial antagonisms, religious enthusiasm, and commercial ambition supplied the stimuli, science provided the instrument. The invention of the mariner's compass made possible the voyages of the great

SCIENCE AND INVENTION

seamen of that epoch. But the discoveries thus facilitated were something more than geographical.

'The dark curtains,' wrote Sir Sidney Lee, 'which had hitherto restricted man's view of the physical world to a small corner of it were torn asunder, and the strange fact was revealed that that which had hitherto been regarded by men as the whole sphere of physical life and nature was in reality a mere fragment of a mighty universe of which there had been no previous conception. . . . The maritime explorations . . . unveiled new expanses of land and sea which reduced to insignificance the fragments of earth and heaven with which men had hitherto been familiar. . . . Such discoveries were far more than contributions to the science of geography. They were levers to lift the spirit of man into unlooked-for altitudes.' [1]

Those words may serve to remind us that the spirit of the Renaissance operated in many other spheres besides those of commercial and maritime adventure.

THE REVIVAL OF LEARNING

Perhaps its most characteristic manifestation was in the domain of learning, art, and literature. To many people, indeed, the 'Renaissance' is synonymous with the revival of humanist learning, the rediscovery of the treasures of the ancient world.

All through the Middle or 'dark' Ages (as some call them), the treasures of ancient learning had been the exclusive possession of a handful of scholars. Some of these were to be found in the great abbeys, but most of them were collected at Constantinople. The capture of that city by the Turks gave an impulse almost as strong to the Literary as to the Geographical Renaissance. So long as there survived even a shadow of the old Eastern Empire at Byzantium the scholars clung to the shores of the Bosphorus. At the coming of the Turk they fled, carrying with them their manuscripts, to the University towns of Italy. Italy yielded itself with rapture to the spirit of humanism; and from Italy the torch of learning was borne to France, from France to England. Paris and Oxford began to rival Bologna, Pisa, and Florence, and all Western Europe was bathed in the light of the new learning.

[1] *Great Englishmen of the Sixteenth Century*, pp. 8–10. But does not Sir Sidney Lee in this generalization improperly ignore Dante?

What that meant to letters and learning it is the business of the literary historian to tell, but we may guess something of it by recalling the names of a few of the great men of this era. The new learning gave to England men like Grocyn (1446–1519), Linacre (1460–1524), John Colet (1446 or 7–1519), Erasmus, if we may temporarily claim him as an Englishman (first visit to England, 1498), and Sir Thomas More (*b.* 1478); a little later it gave us Sir Walter Raleigh (*b.* 1552), and Sir Philip Sidney (*b.* 1554), Spenser (*b.* 1552), and Bacon (*b.* 1561), Marlowe (*b.* 1564), Shakspeare (*b.* 1564), and the Great Elizabethan dramatists: it gave to France Ronsard (*b.* 1524), and his companions of the Pléiade, Montaigne (*b.* 1533), and Rabelais (*d.* 1553); to Italy Machiavelli (*b.* 1469), and Bandello (*b.* 1480), Tasso (*b.* 1544), and Ariosto (*b.* 1474), whose 'Orlando furioso' one great scholar has selected as 'the purest and most perfect extant example of Renaissance poetry.' Germany during the same period could boast of Johann Reuchlin and Ulrich von Hutten, Melanchthon, and Martin Luther, names which suggest irresistibly Sir Richard Jebb's conclusion that 'the paramount task which the New Learning found in Germany was the elucidation of the Bible'; Portugal, of Camoens; and Spain, of Calderon and Cervantes.

Of the men mentioned in this rather haphazard list, most of the Germans and several of the Englishmen are more closely associated with the movement which we know as the Reformation than with that of the Renaissance. But in England, as in Germany, the two movements were, especially in the earlier phases, inextricably intermingled. It was not so everywhere.

THE REFORMATION

The manifestation of the new humanist spirit, as already indicated, varied greatly in different countries. In Italy it was frankly pagan, and the moral effects were, for the time being, almost wholly bad. In Germany and in England it was otherwise. In the two great Teutonic nations the revival of learning was from the first closely associated with new methods of biblical exegesis, with new spiritual ideals, with a renewed moral earnestness.

THE RENAISSANCE AND THE REFORMATION

Of this association between the revival of learning and the reformation of morals there are no better or more typical examples than John Colet and his fellow-workers Erasmus and

Sir Thomas More. But such men were typical only of the earliest, and in some respects the noblest, phase of the English Reformation. Ecclesiastically their ideal was reform without revolution. Intellectually they were the exponents of the 'Higher Criticism' of their day. In place of the time-worn scholastic method, with its dry formalism, its narrow pedantry, they sought to initiate a system of biblical interpretation based upon sound historical methods. Colet's Oxford Lectures anticipated much of the method, and not a few of the conclusions, of the 'Higher Criticism' of to-day. The letters to Radalphus [1] on the *Mosaic Account of the Creation* distinctly enunciate the doctrine of 'accommodation,' the principle which is familiar to modern critics as that of 'Progressive Revelation.'

THE REFORMATION (*a*) IN ENGLAND

Colet was, moreover, a zealous reformer in the sphere of morals. But with the political reformation, as effected by Henry VIII and Thomas Cromwell, with the complete repudiation of Papal authority, and with the assertion of the Royal Supremacy, Colet and his fellow-workers would have had little sympathy; even less perhaps with the doctrinal and liturgical reformation of the Edwardine zealots. But these topics must not detain us now.

Meanwhile, we may note briefly the strikingly divergent course taken by the Reformation movement in England, in Germany, and in France. In England, so long at any rate as the Tudors ruled, the movement was eminently legal, constitutional, and monarchical: ecclesiastical changes were carried through without political or social revolution. In Germany they involved both. The Peasants' War was indeed abortive; but when the din and dust of a century of fighting had at last subsided we see Germany politically transformed. The Emperor has become the mere shadow of a mighty name; the territorial princes have achieved virtual independence, and Germany has become to all intents and purposes a loose confederation of Electorates and Duchies, of Bishoprics and Cities, under the more or less nominal authority of an hereditary president.

(*b*) IN GERMANY

[1] Cf. Dean Colet's *Letters on the Mosaic Account of the Creation*, ed. J. H. Lupton (1876), and Marriott: *Life of John Colet.*

In France, also, Protestantism allied itself with the forces of political disruption: but the centralizing monarchy had got too long a start. The work of Louis XI, of Charles VIII, and of Francis I had not gone for nought. Consequently in France the centripetal principle triumphed over the centrifugal. Great nobles, like the Condés, the Rohans, and the Colignys, might espouse the Huguenot cause; they might even extort an Edict of Nantes. But the triumph of the disruptionists, though brilliant, was brief; Richelieu made it clear that the principle of religious toleration would not be permitted to cover the schemes either of feudal reactionaries or of disloyal provincials. The Huguenots might worship as they pleased,[1] so long as they proved themselves loyal to the lately consolidated monarchy of France.

(c) IN FRANCE

Thus we come by a natural transition to another outstanding feature of the period before us—the work of national consolidation and the formation of the modern States-system.

During the Middle Ages the European system was essentially unified, resting, as it did, upon the dual-unity of the Holy Roman Empire and the Holy Catholic Church. Modern Europe is based upon the principle of national individualism. The binding force of the medieval system was derived from a common appeal to a common superior. The existing system rests upon the implication of an equilibrium among free, independent, compact, homogeneous, self-contained, and nominally co-equal States. Whether the idea of nationalism is not obsolescent, whether the existing order or disorder is not already giving place to a new order based upon the principle of internationalism, is a question which the mere historian is not called upon to answer. It is plain, however, that the question could not have emerged had not Europe passed through the era of nationalism with which these pages are concerned.

NATIONAL CONSOLIDATION

Anyway, the sixteenth century marks the period of transition from the old system to the new, and thus we bring into logical association the two outstanding events of 1453:

[1] Permission even to worship was somewhat limited. Cf. *infra*, Chap. X.

the fall of Constantinople and the final expulsion of the English from France. Both contributed, not remotely, to the great transition. The capture of Constantinople by the Turks not only involved the extinction of the Byzantine Empire, but actually introduced a new nation into the European system. The close of the Hundred Years' War added the finishing touch to the work of national consolidation in England, and powerfully contributed to the same work in France. The internecine strife of Burgundian and Armagnac was at last hushed; the foreign armies were expelled; the outlying Duchies and Counties were one by one absorbed by the Crown—this by marriage and that by conquest; and, finally, on the ruins of the old feudal aristocracy there was built up a compact and homogeneous State under the aegis of a powerful monarchy.

Spain was engaged simultaneously upon the same task. Closely parallel with the expulsion of the English from France is the expulsion of the Moors from Spain. In 1492 Granada was taken and the secular crusade of Spaniard against Moor was at last at an end. That great and eagerly anticipated triumph may be regarded as at once the first-fruits and the seal of national consolidation in Spain. Thus France and Spain came into being as strong, compact, consolidated nations, in each case under highly centralized monarchies. For the attainment of the same stage Germany and Italy had to wait until 1870.

SPAIN

National consolidation quickly led to international rivalry and war.

The Italian Expedition of Charles VIII in 1494 marks the beginning of a new era in international politics. In the Middle Ages there were no international wars because there were no nations. There were bundles of feudal principalities loosely bound together by the tie of a common obedience to a feudal suzerain, as in France; there were City Republics, as in Italy; there were petty kingdoms, as in Spain. But, with the exception of England and Hungary, there were no nations. Europe might almost be said to have consisted of an agglomeration of buffer states. But the sixteenth century changed all that. With national consolidation there came the definition of external boundaries; with territorial definition

RIVALRY OF FRANCE AND SPAIN

international disputes, and thus we come upon another of the keys wherewith to unravel sixteenth-century politics—the rivalry of France and the Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs.

It is beyond the scope of this introductory chapter to discuss details; it must suffice to have indicated broad outlines. Meanwhile we must notice two further complications. The first is ecclesiastical, and the second economic.

Both the great protagonists were fighting with their hands tied behind their backs. France had her Huguenots, Germany had her Lutherans, and Spain was soon to find herself face to face with the determined revolt of the Dutch Calvinists. That led, or might have led, to a cross division of parties. Politically, there was still the keenest rivalry between the King of France and the heads of the Austro-Spanish House. Ecclesiastically, they were at one in their anxiety to crush the pestilent Protestant heresy within their borders. There were similar cross-currents observable among the people. Religion, says Mr. Armstrong,[1] 'was becoming more than nationality. The Chancellor L'Hôpital opened his speech to the Estates General of Orleans by saying that there was now more love between an Englishman and Frenchman of the same religion than between two Frenchmen of different forms of faith. The Huguenots brought the English to Havre and promised Calais; they deluged France with Reiters and Lanzknechts; they agreed to surrender to the Palatinate the one great conquest of Henry's reign, the Three Bishoprics, the military keys of Lorraine. The Catholic Grandees from the first intrigued with Spain, and ended by wellnigh dismembering France.' The danger to the lately consolidated state was undoubtedly serious, but, as we shall see, it was overcome. The triumph of the Counter-Reformation—the movement which we know as the Catholic reaction—is the most remarkable feature of the second half of the century. It would have been more complete but for the political rivalry of France and Spain, the stubborn resistance of the Dutch, and the consummate diplomatic skill of Queen Elizabeth. In the long run, however, political antagonisms proved too strong for ecclesiastical affinities. To this fact the United Provinces owed their existence and Elizabethan England its escape.

But the struggle between Spain and the Netherlands on

[1] *French Wars of Religion*, 1st ed., p. 85.

the one side, and Spain and England on the other, not only led to the birth of a new and important European nation, but enormously enlarged the horizon of European politics. We can mark clearly the stages of evolution. Beginning as a dynastic contest between the Houses of Aragon and Anjou, the prize had been supremacy in Italy. Enlarged into a contest between France and Spain, the prize was supremacy in Europe. In the European contest England had interfered only spasmodically and intermittently. But a new phase of the struggle was opening. The material strength and resources of the competitors were still strikingly disproportionate. Neither for France nor Spain was England a match. Had they been able to combine against us we could hardly have escaped absorption or destruction. But the rise of the Dutch republic brings a new factor into the problem and leads to an extraordinary extension of the arena. The arena is no longer confined to Italy or even to Europe, it becomes world-wide.

Hence, another outstanding characteristic of the new era—the interaction of Economics and Politics, the beginning of the struggle for Colonial and commercial supremacy.

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

It is a commonplace to observe that there was no Science of Political Economy in the Middle Ages. This was due partly to the absence of Nations (πόλεις), partly to the fact that the economic relations of man and man were determinated not by contract but by 'status.' John Smith cultivated the land of Henry de Bohun not because Bohun had contracted to pay him a penny a day, but because John Smith was the son of William (a villein), and Bohun was the son of his father, William, a lord. Political definition was, however, very soon followed by Economic definition. Scientific speculation followed close in the wake of practical necessity. The mercantile theory was the natural complement of national consolidation. International wars, as we have seen, sprang directly from the growth of nationalities. But wars need money; statesmen began to appreciate the value of commerce, and kings concluded alliances with merchants. More than this, men began to inquire as to the causes of national prosperity. The first answers to the inquiry were, as we should expect, in part at any rate fallacious. The

imposing preponderance of Spain, the fact that she commanded the mines of the new world, led men to identify wealth with the precious metals. The more significant fact that Spain commanded also the looms of the Netherlands was for the moment ignored. But with the fallacies or half-truths of Mercantilism we are not now concerned, though we must appreciate the beginnings of the interaction of Economics and Politics, and the consequent extension of the fighting arena.

Spain and Portugal enjoyed for close upon a century a virtual monopoly of the commerce of the new world and the Indies. The absorption of Portugal by Spain (1580) synchronized with the acute stage of the struggles between Spain and England, and Spain and the Netherlands. Hence the commerce and shipping and colonies, not of Spain only, but of Portugal, were opened to the attacks of her audacious enemies. Colonial and commercial rivalries were superadded to political and religious antagonisms. From Europe the struggle extended to the Far East and the Far West. The Dutch with surprising rapidity supplanted Portugal in her commercial supremacy in the East Indies: England was foremost in annihilating the sea power of Spain:—

> Drake nor devil nor Spaniard feared,
> Their cities he put to the sack;
> He singed his Catholic Majesty's beard
> And harried his ships to wrack.

The ultimate contest for colonial and commercial supremacy —that between England and France—will come later, but the first ties in the tournament were already being played off. Holland was drawn against Portugal; England against Spain. In the next round England will meet Holland; the final will lie between France and England. But these things are in the future.

That future later sections of this book will disclose.

CHAPTER II

PHYSICS AND POLITICS

THIS book is concerned with *political* history--the history of the States (πόλεις) of Europe, and of their relations with each other. But Politics is ever closely associated with Physics; geography is the basis of history. It would seem well, therefore, to indicate, in a general way, some of the outstanding physical features which have so largely governed the political development of Europe during the last four centuries.

The most characteristic and conspicuous achievement of that period has been, as we have seen, the development of the idea of the Nation-State, the parcelling out of the whole of Europe into a number of Sovereign States, each independent of the other, and most of them roughly corresponding to those differences of race, religion, language, and tradition which go to make up what we call 'nationality.' Nationality, then, is the assumed basis of the modern state. But nationality itself is largely the creation of physical geography.

ENGLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN

Of the great nations of modern Europe England was the first to attain to national unity and national self-consciousness. Among the many causes which contributed to her 'precocious' development (as Frenchmen term it), geography was perhaps the most potent. The effects of her insular position upon her political development are indeed the commonplace of every schoolboy essayist, and need not detain us. Had the Plantagenets and Lancastrians maintained their hold on the continental possessions of their Norman and Angevin predecessors—had they not failed to retrieve them—the effects of the insular position of Britain might have been neutralized. Had they extended their French possessions and become as effectually kings of France as they were kings of England, England might have become nothing more than an insular

appendage to a great continental Empire—relatively almost as insignificant as Ireland.

As things turned out, her insular position was an exceedingly important factor in her national development. But if it contributed to precocity in a political direction, it greatly retarded economic and commercial development. Stress was laid in the preceding chapter upon the significance of the geographical Renaissance of the fifteenth century. Important to the world at large, important to Europe as a whole, it was pre-eminently important to our own island.

THE THALLASIC AGE AND THE OCEANIC

Down to the end of the fifteenth century England might still be accurately described as 'that farthest corner of the West.' She enjoyed, like Spain, the advantage of frontiers exactly defined; her insularity gave her a measure of security which, other conditions being favourable, conduced to rapid progress in the attainment of political unity; but commercially and intellectually she was exceptionally backward. All that was most advanced in the world of letters, of art, and of commerce found a natural centre in the lands bordering on the great highway of the Mediterranean There was the heart of civilization; little wonder if the circulation had become somewhat sluggish before the blood could reach the north-western extremities.

The geographical discoveries of the late fifteenth century changed all that. In conjunction with other circumstances already noticed, they left the Mediterranean cities high and dry; the centre of political gravity shifted from the inland sea to the Atlantic Ocean; as Constantinople, Alexandria, Venice, and Genoa waned, Lisbon, Bordeaux, Bristol, London, and Amsterdam waxed. England, so long the *ultima thule* of the civilized world, became, in the literal geographical sense, its centre.

POSITION OF ENGLAND

The geographical revolution found England unprepared to assume the new rôle which nature seemed anxious to assign to her. When the battle of Bosworth (1485) placed the Crown of England on the head of Henry Tudor, England, though politically overgrown, was socially and economically anaemic. Her population, not yet recovered from the ravages of the bubonic plague in the fourteenth century, was scant and

scattered; the shortage of labour due to the plague had indeed stimulated the development of sheep breeding and farming, and the sale of wool to the manufacturing cities of the Low Countries was bringing considerable wealth into the pockets of the agriculturists, though Sir Thomas More, Bishop Latimer, and other social reformers lamented the decay of the countryside and the eviction of peasants from their homes. But England had in those days little save wool to sell abroad, and her foreign commerce was on a very small scale. Her people had a natural aptitude for the sea, and in-shore fishing was a national industry; but she had no regular navy, and few merchant ships; an annual voyage to Bordeaux for wine and to Iceland for cod represented the limits of her maritime activity. Such luxuries as she imported came to her either in Venetian ships, or more regularly viâ Bruges and Ghent, the nearest termini of the main continental trade-routes.

Other causes contributed to commercial backwardness.

A strong executive is essential to economic prosperity; but never was the central Government in England less efficient than under the Lancastrian kings. As in Italy during the half-century that followed the attainment of unity, so in the England of the fifteenth century, it was manifest that the development of the constitutional machinery had gone too fast. Parliamentary Government is the very worst form of Government unless a people are ready for it. The English Parliament, as a great historian has observed, was not, at that time, ready 'for the efficient use of the liberties it had won. . . . Constitutional development had outrun administrative order.'[1] The result was seen in the lawlessness of the baronial oligarchy, in the social anarchy of which the Wars of the 'Roses' were the characteristic symptom.

Under such conditions commerce could not prosper. But those conditions underwent, in the sixteenth century, profound modification. Whatever else may be said of the Tudors, it cannot be denied that they gave the country strong Government, the discipline and repose essential to political and social recuperation. The effect was seen in the national efflorescence, which threw lustre on the Elizabethan era.

[1] Stubbs, *Constitutional History*.

Meanwhile, the lead in geographical adventure and imperial expansion was taken by the nations of the Iberian Peninsula. Geography indicated their right to leadership. A Papal Bull did but confirm it. Portugal is, indeed, as has been truly said, 'in the eyes of Geography a standing anomaly'; but the pre-eminence enjoyed for a century by Portugal, though well deserved, was transient, and could not, in view of her position and circumstances, have been otherwise. A wiser policy might indeed have postponed, it could not have averted, the decadence of Portugal. As regards the Iberian Peninsula as a whole, nature clearly intended it to enjoy independence, and to take its place among the countries of Europe as a political entity. Yet a single state it has never formed except for sixty years (1580–1640), and then only under the stress of force; nor has it ever achieved more than superficial unity. For this, Geography must share with History the responsibility. A strong and persistent provincialism is the outstanding political characteristic of Spain, and provincialism, evidently dictated by the fact that the whole peninsula is cut up by a series of mountain chains, was accentuated by the prolonged contest with the Moors. Only bit by bit was the soil of Spain retrieved for Christianity, and each bit, as it was cleared of the 'infidel,' tended to establish itself not merely in independence, but in isolation. To the secular Crusade against the Moors we must also ascribe the fervour of Spanish Catholicism. But of that more must be said presently.

THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

The effect of geography upon political development is irresistibly suggested by a glance at a physical map. The prolongation of the Pyrences along the southern coast of the Bay of Biscay cuts off the Asturias and Galicia from the rest of Spain; separated by the valley of the Douro from that of the Tagus, the long chain of the Sierra de Guadarrama runs right across the peninsula; to the south of the Tagus runs the shorter chain of the Sierra Toledo, and further south again the much loftier Sierra Morena, almost completely cutting off Andalusia from the provinces to the north of it. It would have been little less than a political miracle had provinces so divided by nature been united by statesmanship; and in statesmanship Spain has not been prolific.

SPANISH PROVINCIALISM

The subsequent course of this narrative will disclose the persistence of geographical and historical forces as affecting politics. The marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, though it prepared the way for the union of the two principal Crowns of Spain on the head of Charles I, failed to unite the Castilians and the Aragonese. Two centuries later, the War of the Spanish Succession proved that even time, the great healer of political antagonisms, had not wrought the miracle for Spain. In that war, Castile supported the French candidate, Philip of Anjou; Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, mainly, if not entirely for that reason, declared for the Archduke Charles, the Hapsburg candidate.

A century later, in the Peninsular War, Napoleon's failure to conquer Spain was due hardly less to the invertebrate organism with which he found himself in conflict, than to the support afforded to the Spaniards by Wellington's genius and British bayonets. From the day when Caesar's Commentaries on his Gallic campaigns were first given to the world, it has been a commonplace of military criticism that 'a barbarous country is less easily conquered than a civil.' The Normans conquered England almost at a single blow; they never conquered Ireland; but the tribal organization of the Irish, if it averted conquest, weakened resistance. It is much easier to kill a man than a jelly-fish, though a man can resist attack more effectively than a jelly-fish: the lower the political organism the less efficient is it in resistance, but the more difficult is it to conquer. The occupation of Madrid by Napoleon did not mean the subjugation of Spain any more than the establishment and conquest of the 'Pale' by the Anglo-Normans led to the conquest of Ireland, or the occupation of Pretoria by Lord Roberts involved the submission of the Boers. Ultimately, it is true, Lord Kitchener did wear down the resistance of the Boers; the marvel was that between combatants so unequally matched the struggle was so prolonged. The looseness of political organization was, with the geography of the country, largely responsible for its prolongation.

But we anticipate the sequence of events. In retracing our steps one further observation seems to be demanded. The superb coast-line of Spain, with its sheltered outlook to the Mediterranean, and its open face to the Atlantic,

might have been expected to give it an advantageous position in commerce and shipping. For a brief space it did. Down to the end of the fifteenth century no Spanish port could indeed, as regards position, compete with Venice, Genoa, or even Brindisi. Genoa was the entrepôt, not only for Italy, but for the Rhone valley and indeed the whole of France; Venice was the natural gate to the whole of Germany, to Austria, Poland, and, by the Rhine route, to the Hanseatic cities, to the Low Countries, and thence to Britain and to Scandinavia. Owing to the Pyrenees barrier a Spanish port could only serve Spain.

After the discovery of America and the Cape route to the East, Spain had a magnificent opportunity; and for nearly a century she redeemed it. But after the close of the sixteenth century she began to yield pride of place as an Empire-builder to more vigorous rivals. Her failure as a colonizing power was, however, due to a combination of causes, economic, racial, ecclesiastical, political, not in any sense geographical. The analysis of those causes must, therefore, be reserved for a later chapter.

Italy, both in its geography, and, up to a recent period, in its history, presents many points of resemblance to Spain.

ITALY

Like Spain, Italy is protected by a great mountain barrier from external attack on her landward side, less completely, however, than Spain, since the Alps can be much more easily pierced than the Pyrenees. On the other hand, but for the passes in the eastern Alps and the Corniche road, Venice and Genoa could never have become the great commercial entrepôts they were. The Alps prolonged southward, into the Apennines, cut Italy throughout its whole lanky length into two halves. Yet the early efflorescence of the Italian cities was due to the prominence of that long peninsula in the Mediterranean world. If it be dangerous to lay exclusive stress upon geography as determining the fortunes and destiny of Italy, it must nevertheless be allowed that geography played in its history a dominating part. Geography was at least partly responsible for the isolation and antagonism during long centuries of the Italian cities; it made the Lombard Plain the cockpit for the rival armies of France and the Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs; it drew Napoleon in his first

great campaign on to the same battlefield. While making it impossible (as the common saw went) for the House of Savoy to act as honest men, it gave them a commanding position in the western Alps, it eventually led to their championship of the cause of Italian independence, and helped them to the throne of a united Italy.

Yet another contradiction. If geography must bear the blame, or a large share of it, for the long-delayed achievement of Italian unity, it must in fairness have the credit for bringing to Italy, in 1919, the long-desired *Italia Irredenta.*

THE BALKAN PENINSULA

Not less conspicuous is the part which geography has played in moulding the destiny of the third of the Mediterranean peninsulas—the Balkan. The effect of the configuration of the country upon the political structure of Ancient Greece—the impediments it offered to the union of the isolated City-States—has become one of the commonplaces of history and need not detain us. Nor is it pertinent to the present subject.

It has exercised not less influence upon the modern history of the peninsula.

But as compared with the history of Italy and Spain it is much less easy to discern. The physiographic map of the Balkans is indeed, at first sight, hopelessly confused. Nearly the whole peninsula is covered by mountain ranges which appear to be subject to no law save that of caprice, starting from nowhere in particular, ending nowhere in particular, now running north and south, now east and west, without any obvious purpose or well-defined trend.

Similarly the river-system of the peninsula seems, at first sight, equally capricious and confused. Why, for example, does the Danube, after a prolonged, regular, orthodox, west-to-east course from Belgrade to beyond Silistria, make a sudden tilt due north as far as Galatz before it is content to empty itself like a respectable river into the Black Sea? Its only purpose seems to be the purely malicious one of involving Roumania and Bulgaria in disputes over the unattractive marshes of the Dobrudja. If the Danube had only persevered a little longer in its eastward course and had reached the sea—as the railway line from Bucharest does—at the port of Constanza, there would be practically nothing

to prevent unbroken amity between the Roumanians and their Bulgarian neighbours. But that again would be so contrary to every Balkanic principle and tradition that perhaps, after all, the Danube, under an outer cloak of perversity, is only attempting to preserve spiritual conformity with the circumstances of its political environment.

Farther south, the Maritza plays an almost identical trick, and with political results hardly less embarrassing. This great river drains the valley which intervenes between the Balkans proper and the Rhodope block of central uplands; it maintains a south-easterly course from Philippopolis to Adrianople, and then, instead of continuing its orthodox course to the Black Sea, or even to the Sea of Marmora, takes a sudden turn to the south and finally, by a course decidedly south-westerly, reaches the Aegean at Enos. The curious deflection of this great river-system is due to the geological process known as 'river capture.'[1] The sinking of land below what is now the surface of the Aegean Sea—a process the incompleteness of which is manifested by the existence of the Aegean archipelago—has increased the velocity and therefore the erosive power of the streams flowing southward to such a degree that the watershed has been thrust northward, and the Aegean streams have 'captured' the head-waters of systems which did not originally belong to them. Geologically the Aegean has thus excited a very powerful attractive force. The Maritza, the Mista, the Struma, to say nothing of the Vardar and the Vistritza, all flow into the Aegean. Politics have followed the lead of Physics. Men, like streams, have been attracted towards the Aegean littoral, and thus Macedonia has become the 'key to the history of the whole peninsula.' Geography has made it easier for the northern peoples to come south than for the southern peoples to push north. Therein, perhaps, we may discern the cause of the outbreak of the Second Balkan War in 1913, though, in that instance, the monitions of nature were powerfully assisted by the promptings of diplomacy.[2] Quite apart, however, from this

[1] On this subject in particular, but also on the whole subject of Balkan geography, Cf. Miss Newbiggin's illuminating book, *Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems.*

[2] See *infra*, Chap. XXXV

particular instance, history demonstrates the continuous attraction of the Aegean littoral for the different peoples of the peninsula.

Again, the destiny of the Southern Slavs has been powerfully affected on the one hand by the 'Albanian gap' between the southern terminus of the Dinaric Alps and the northern terminus of the Albanian mountains; on the other by the 'corridor' between the west-coast mountain-system and the central uplands. This corridor opens at the northern end into the Hungarian plain; at the southern, into the lower Vardar valley, thus connecting Belgrade with Salonica, and drawing the southern Slavs toward the Aegean and involving them in conflict with the Greeks.

Further illustrations of the influence of physiography upon history in the Balkans must, however, be sought elsewhere.[1] Here it must suffice to say that in such a country it would be vain to expect the establishment of a strong centralized state, such as was possible in England, and still more obviously in France. Nor, in fact, has there ever been such a state in the Balkans. The Greek City-States represent the antithesis of centralization, and neither Macedon nor Rome was foolish enough to attempt the impossible. The Ottoman Empire, though in a sense despotic, has never been a centralized despotism. Centralization is indeed absolutely prohibited by nature. Geography points imperiously to a congeries of relatively small states, and the geographical presuppositions are re-enforced by the principle of ethnography.

Apart from the British Isles and the three Mediterranean peninsulas, the historical geography of Europe focuses on the following units: the Rhine Valley; the Rhone Valley, Switzerland and the Low Countries, standing respectively guard over the source and the delta of the Rhine; Central Europe, radiating from the four corners of Bohemia; the great northern plain extending from the Rhine delta to the Ural Mountains; and Scandinavia with the adjacent Baltic lands.

With the Rhone and Rhine regions it will be more convenient to deal in the next chapter; with Central

[1] e.g. in Miss Newbiggin's book or in Marriott's *Eastern Question*, chap. ii.

Europe and the Northern Plain in subsequent chapters dealing with the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns respectively; with the Low Countries in connexion with the Revolt of the Netherlands. It remains only to say something here of the Baltic region and of Switzerland.

SCANDINAVIA AND THE BALTIC REGION

The Baltic region must be taken to include the three Norse kingdoms and the states such as Finland, which were recently incorporated in Russia, but, since 1919, have become independent. The Baltic region does not, despite geography, include Prussia.

The northern kingdoms would have played a greater part in history could they have overcome their mutual jealousies and have come together, if not under a unitary constitution, at least in a federal bond. Why Switzerland should to-day form a single federal state and Scandinavia be split up into three kingdoms is one of the outstanding conundrums of modern history. There was nothing whatever to forbid Scandinavian unity. Geography, ethnography, community of creed and tradition—all pointed in that direction. The mountain backbone which to-day divides Norway from Sweden, though suggesting a convenient frontier, if a frontier was desired, is no more of an obstacle to political unity than the Apennines. Norway has been united with Denmark (1450–1814) and with Sweden (1814–1905), but once only in their long history have the three countries been united under one crown—the famous Danish Queen Margaret, under an instrument known as the Union of Calmar (1397), which provided for a single elected monarchy, local autonomy for each of the units, and a combination for common defence. The union lasted only half a century: the Danes elected a separate king in 1448; in 1449, the union between Sweden and Norway (never much more than a 'personal union') was dissolved, and though the Union of Calmar was renewed in 1483, and again in 1513, it was only spasmodically effective, as one king or another established his power against the noble oligarchies which exercised the real domination in all three countries. It finally came to an end in 1523.

Meanwhile, an element which proved to be disintegrating entered into Scandinavian history. In 1460 King Christian,

Count of Oldenburg—the last sovereign to reign over the three northern kingdoms—was elected Duke of Schleswig and also of Holstein by the estates of those duchies. Holstein has always been a German duchy inhabited by Germans, and forming an integral part of the Germanic body, though from 1460 to 1863 it was united, in personal union (like Great Britain and Hanover), with the Crown of Denmark. Schleswig is partly German and partly Danish (as the plebiscite of 1920 proved); but, unlike Holstein, was legally a fief of the Danish Crown. The union of these German duchies with the Danish Crown did not make for Scandinavian unity.

In 1523 a great revolution took place in Denmark, as a result of which Gustavus Ericson, a Swedish noble, established the independence of his country, under the Vasa dynasty. That dynasty lasted until the death in 1818 of Charles XIII, who adopted as his heir and successor Marshal Bernadotte, one of Napoleon's marshals, who ascended the throne, still happily retained by his descendants, in 1818.

Under the general post effected by the diplomatists at the close of the Napoleonic wars, Norway, torn from Denmark, was handed over to Sweden which, a century earlier, had lost Finland and her Baltic provinces to Russia. The union of Sweden and Norway was merely a union of the crowns—a 'personal union,' as it is technically called. Such unions are invariably precarious, and despite the efforts of King Oscar II (1872–1907), who, though descended from a French peasant, was conspicuous among contemporary sovereigns for his kinglike bearing, for eminence in art and letters, and for his gracious personality, the union was in 1905 dissolved. A separatist agitation had been for many years in progress, and in that year the Norwegian Storthing declared that the King of Sweden had ceased to reign in Norway, and Norway was created a separate kingdom under a Danish prince.

There is no more conspicuous illustration of the nemesis which waits on the defiance of nature than that afforded by the Scandinavian countries. Strikingly contrasted are the happy results of man's victory over every natural obstacle in the case of Switzerland.

SWITZERLAND

In the general polity of Europe the Helvetic Confederation

is a phenomenon as completely anomalous as it is unique. It exists in apparent defiance of all the accepted canons of political science: not only geography and ethnology, but language and creed, history and traditions would seem to forbid the banns of political union among those twenty-five states or cantons which to-day make up the federal republic of Switzerland.

Closer examination accentuates the sense of anomaly. Of the twenty-five cantons, eighteen are exclusively German and mainly Protestant, five are French and mainly Catholic, one is Italian, and in one (Graubünden or the Grisons), one-third of the people speak Romansch. Why should Graubünden not have added one more to the heterogeneous elements which were, for centuries, combined under the rule of the Hapsburg Emperors? Why should Ticino not form part, Italians may well ask, of a happily united Italy? Geography seems to veto union with Switzerland; race and language point to union with the rest of Italy. How came the old 'Confederation of High Germany,' looking towards the Rhine, to unite, even in a federal bond, with the French cantons of the Rhone Valley? What compelling force has brought together geographical unities at once internally homogeneous and externally heterogeneous? Such questions baffle the scientific historian. But the fact remains. Out of German-speaking folk and Frenchmen, out of Romansch-speaking people and Italians, there has been gradually built up a 'power' which, though small, is not unimportant; a state whose continued independence is as assured as that of any other state in Europe; and more than a *state*, a nation, which, though conglomerate, is perfectly coherent.[1]

Only one explanation, and that a partial one, can the historian offer. Since 1648 the independence and the neutrality of the Helvetic Republic has been guaranteed by Treaties to which all the more important Powers of Europe are parties. But though that might account for the continued existence of an independent Swiss State, it cannot account for the evolution of a coherent Swiss nationality, and the cynic is entitled to suggest that Treaties are sacrosanct

[1] For explanation of terms cp. Marriott, *Mechanism of the Modern State*, especially chaps. i and iv, from which I have borrowed a few sentences.

in proportion as they coincide with political convenience. Switzerland has unquestionably proved itself to be a political convenience; so convenient that man has agreed to maintain it even in defiance of nature. Politics have, for once, triumphed over Physics.

FOR FURTHER READING

H. B. George: *Relations of Geography and History*, Oxford, 1910. Himly: *Formation territoriale des États de l'Europe Centrale*, Paris. Freeman: *Historical Geography*

CHAPTER III

THE MAKING OF FRANCE

Outstanding Dates

481 (*circa*). Teutonic Conquest of France.
768–814. Charlemagne, King of the Franks.
843. Treaty of Verdun.
987–1328. House of Capet rules France.
1096. First Crusade—Eighth, 1270.
1302. *Parliament of Paris* organized by Philip *le Bel.*
1302 (*circa*). *States-General* organized by Philip *le Bel.*
1337–1453. Hundred Years' War.
1491. Marriage of Duchess Anne of Brittany with Charles VIII.
1562–94. French Wars of Religion.
1594. Accession of Henry IV—1610.
1598. Edict of Nantes.
1624–42. Ministry of Cardinal Richelieu.

IN the history of continental Europe no country has played a part so continuously great as France. The history of the sixteenth century revolves, in large measure, round the contest between the kings of France and the Hapsburg Emperors, lords of Spain, of Austria, and of the Low Countries. The seventeenth century (1648–1714) is accurately described as 'The Age of Louis XIV.' In the eighteenth century France did, indeed, manifest obvious symptoms of decadence, but from 1789 to 1815 she again supplied the focus of European politics, and from 1815 to 1870 it was France who, by her frequently recurring revolutions, gave the signal for simultaneous disturbances in most of the states of continental Europe. From 1870 to 1918 the hegemony of the continent passed from Paris to Berlin, but since 1918 France has had no real rival among continental powers.

It is a remarkable record. The subsequent narrative will show that France has had to pay a heavy price for European

primacy; her efforts to maintain that position were in part responsible for the surrender of world-ascendancy to Great Britain in the eighteenth century; but, if the survey be confined to continental Europe, the pre-eminence of France is indisputable.

The purpose of the present chapter is to trace the stages by which France attained to this proud position, and to indicate some of the causes which contributed to its attainment.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF FRANCE

France has been singularly favoured by nature. Even before 1918, France was not devoid of mineral wealth, though she was much less rich than England; she has an excellent climate and a soil exceptionally fertile; while, in relation to the modern world, she is in geographical situation inferior only to England, and perhaps Spain. With a seaboard facing the English Channel, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean, she is admirably situated both for defence and for commerce, and her harbours, though less numerous and less convenient than our own, are neither few nor bad. She has good navigable rivers, and in artificial inland navigation she was, thanks mainly to Colbert, far ahead of England. The Pyrenees give her an almost impregnable barrier to the south, and to the south-east the Alps form a frontier only slightly less obvious, if more debatable. Much more debatable, and indeed persistently debated, is the eastern frontier of France.

ANCIENT GAUL AND MODERN FRANCE

Between the crest of the Cevennes and that of the Alps and the Jura lies the Rhone-land which so long formed the middle kingdom of Arles or Burgundy. But the difficult and disputable question comes when we pass from the Rhone basin to the Rhine basin, and attempt to define the natural or geographical limits of France on the east and north-east. To whom does the great Rhine basin properly and scientifically belong?

On the French side there is a very natural temptation to claim it. To make the frontiers of modern France coterminous with those of ancient Gaul was the passionate ambition and the declared policy of Cardinal Richelieu. 'It was,' he wrote, 'the supreme object of my ministerial career to restore to Gaul the frontiers designed for her by

nature, to restore to the Gauls a Gallic king, to identify Gaul with France, and in all the lands which had belonged to old Gaul, there to re-establish the new.'

The appeal to history was, in fact, dangerous and ambiguous. The frontiers of 'ancient Gaul' varied greatly, if indeed they were ever precisely defined. Richelieu and other Frenchmen have understood by 'Ancient Gaul' the whole of the territory bounded by the Ocean, the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean, the Alps, and the Rhine: that is to say, the whole of modern France, the whole of Belgium, Luxembourg, a strip of Holland, a great part of Rhenish Prussia, Lorraine, Alsace, and the Palatinate. That was virtually the frontier which Napoleon could have retained for France had he accepted the terms of Metternich in the autumn of 1813. Whether it had been well for Europe and for France if Napoleon had accepted those terms is a question not to be discussed or determined here. It must suffice to say that, had Napoleon retained this frontier, he would have realized the ambition of Cardinal Richelieu, and would have given substance to the dream which has never wholly faded from the vision of patriotic Frenchmen: the dream of identifying modern France with 'Ancient Gaul.' But never, except under Napoleon, has France been within measurable distance of making the Rhine from source to delta the eastern boundary of her dominions.

Nor is it absolutely certain that nature intended that she should. A German might be tempted to insist, as in 1814 Hardenberg did, that nature indicates the Jura and the Vosges as the scientific frontier of France, or even perhaps the line of the Cevennes and the Argonne. North of the Vosges, even north of the Argonne, nature, it must be confessed, has given no very precise indication of her intentions. Consequently, the Rhineland has always been debatable ground, and more than one attempt has been made to solve the difficulty by erecting therein a middle kingdom—a buffer state—interposed between Germany and France, in the hope of preventing collision and strife. The Valois Duchy of Burgundy had, however, a brief span of life in the Middle Ages, and still briefer was the existence of the kingdom of the Netherlands, created by Lord Castlereagh and the diplomatists of Vienna in 1815.

Besides the tradition of Roman Gaul there is another, not less persistent, which has loomed large over the page of French history. It is the tradition of the Carolingian Empire: the personality and achievements of the Emperor Charles the Great:

CHARLEMAGNE

'La politique française avait été dessinée par la géographie; l'instinct national la suggéra avant que la raison d'Etat la conseillât. Elle se fonde sur un fait: l'empire de Charlemagne. Le point de départ de ce grand procès qui occupe toute l'histoire de France, c'est l'insoluble litige de la succession de l'Empereur. C'est là que les rois trouveront le motif de leurs ambitions, c'est là que les légistes trouveront l'origine des droits, c'est là que tout d'abord trouve sa source la tradition populaire qui conduira les rois à élever les prétentions et les légistes à rechercher les droits . . . A mesure que le temps s'éloigne, l'image du grand Empereur s'élève et prend des proportions colossales. De Philippe-Auguste à Napoléon, elle plane sur l'histoire de France.' [1]

These are the words of one of the most philosophical of French historians, and M. Sorel states an indisputable fact. Scholars of the Teutonic school may disdainfully decline to speak of Charlemagne; they may insist on spelling the Emperor's name with a K; but it will not in the slightest degree affect the accuracy of M. Sorel's statement. The tradition may be historically worthless; it is not the less vital and valid politically. Charles the Great, bearing sway from the Oder to the Atlantic, from the Pyrenees to the Danube, from beyond the Tiber to the English Channel, may have been a Teutonic Emperor. That is a question both complex and controversial. It is enough that this great Emperor has been regarded by Frenchmen throughout the ages as king not merely of the Franks but of the French; that the tradition of his Empire has been through countless generations an abiding possession among the peoples who dwelt in the valley of the Seine, the valley of the Loire, and the valley of the Garonne, not less than among the people of the Rhone-land and the people of the Rhine-land. With a tradition of this kind we may quarrel as we will; it matters nothing. The tradition has persisted; it has

[1] Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, i. 246.

inspired policy; it has aroused and sustained ambitions. The past from which it derives may be hazy and disputable; the future to which it points may be none the less realizable. It was actually realized, to all intents and purposes, by Napoleon in 1810. He was, in his own eyes and in those of France, the new Charlemagne; he was, in fact, a veritable Emperor of the West.

Neither before nor since Napoleon I has any ruler of France ever attempted to embody the Carolingian tradition; to extend the borders of modern France to the Danube or the Oder. The Rhine frontier was another matter. To king after king that was a definite and not too fantastic ambition, and no ruler of France could have afforded to surrender it.

Yet not for many centuries after the death of Charlemagne could the Lords of Paris in any real sense claim even to be Kings of France. Before that claim could be completely vindicated a secular struggle, lasting, roughly, six hundred years, had to be waged between the nominal King of France and the great feudatories, among whom the western portion of the Carolingian Empire was partitioned.

The history of that struggle is the history of medieval France and is outside the scope of this book, but it may be convenient to indicate briefly the stages by which there has emerged in Europe a geographical and political entity to which the name *France* can properly be applied.

The entity known to the Roman world as Gaul need not detain us. Gallia belongs to the history of ancient Rome, not to that of modern France. Suffice to say that for more than four centuries Gaul was under the domination of the Roman Empire. So indeed was Britain. Upon both countries Rome bestowed the gift of strong government and orderly administration. But while Britain never became completely and fundamentally Roman, Gaul did. Except in the extreme north-west, Celtic civilization was utterly wiped out. The Roman rule was both beneficent and mild; the Gauls retained a large measure of local autonomy; their nobles were permitted to aspire, and in some cases to attain, to seats in the Roman Senate, and assemblies of native notables were called by Augustus to meet at Lyons. Nevertheless, in language, in

ROMAN GAUL

law, in political institutions and social usages, in land tenure and agricultural practice, in industrial organization, in education, in taxation, in trade—in a word, in all the apparatus of civilization—Gaul accepted the ideas and the practice of Rome. Under a common sovereign and a centralized administration the Celtic tribes for the first time attained to unity, and for the first time appreciated the meaning of government and law. The great cities of the south became centres of commerce—Marseilles, Narbonne, Lyons, Nîmes, Avignon, Carcassonne, &c.; schools were established; libraries were founded; splendid monuments were erected; temples, palaces, amphitheatres, aqueducts, testified to the material prosperity and the artistic sense of the great Roman Province, and Marseilles supplanted Athens as the centre of Greek culture. In the wake of the Roman rulers and the Roman traders came the Christian missionaries. The organization of the Roman Church was not less complete than that of the Roman Empire; the Gauls were transformed, not only into Romans, but into Christians. The Roman Empire in Gaul subsisted in its prosperity for about three hundred years (50 B.C.–A.D. 250). During that period the land had peace.

THE TEUTONIC CONQUEST, *C.* 481

The next stage is marked by the Teutonic Conquest. The pressure of the Barbarians began to be felt in Gaul about the middle of the second century; but for a hundred years the invading Teutons were held at bay. From the middle of the third century the decay of the Roman Empire was rapid; before the end of the fifth its power was at an end. To the Roman Empire in Gaul there succeeded that of the Teutons. The same thing happened in England, but with results vastly divergent. After two hundred years of Teutonic invasion Britain had become England. After a similar, but shorter process, Gaul remained Roman. Saxons and Angles swept Britain clear of Roman civilization. The Gauls imposed upon Clovis and his Frankish followers the manners, the culture, the language, and the creed they had themselves learnt from Rome. To take only one illustration of the contrast. The great cities of southern France have a continuous history, an unbroken record, an uninterrupted civilization, derived from Roman days. Of not one English

city can this with certainty be said. There are Roman remains, of course, at York, at Bath, at Colchester, at Chester, and elsewhere. None of these towns possesses to-day the civic organization imposed upon it by its Roman rulers. The Celtic Britons were either obliterated altogether, or accepted from their Saxon and Angle conquerors the laws, customs, and language which the latter brought with them from their German homes.

Over the five hundred years which separate the fall of the Roman Empire from that of the Carolingians we may pass lightly. Yet there are one or two landmarks in this period which have permanent significance, and which refuse to be ignored.

The first of these is the Treaty of Verdun, by the terms of which the Frankish Empire was finally partitioned among the sons of Louis the Pious, the successor of Charles the Great. Under this arrangement, Charles was to have the western slice, extending from beyond the Pyrenees to the modern Flanders; Lothaire got a narrower, but longer strip, extending from the Tiber to the mouth of the Rhine, or rather of the Weser; Louis got the eastern portion which lay between the Rhine and the Oder. Here, then, we get our first glimpse of two kingdoms, very roughly corresponding to modern France and modern Germany, but divided and kept apart from each other by the middle kingdom of the Rhone-land and the Rhine-land.

TREATY OF VERDUN

The intermediate partition of 870 we may ignore; but that of 887 brings a fourth kingdom into being—that of Italy. Carolingia—the western kingdom—remains much as before, but the eastern or Teutonic kingdom is enlarged by the acquisition of Lotharingia or Rhine-land; Italy is now bounded on the west by the Alps, but includes the north-eastern shore of the Adriatic on the east; the kingdom of Burgundy is cut down to the Rhone-land.

From the enlarged Teutonic kingdom, the western kingdom, Carolingia, stands clearly apart. May we dare to begin to call it *France*?

We may, if we are careful to remember that the term properly applies as yet to a duchy and not to a kingdom, only in fact to the strip of land between the Loire and the Seine.

Between the end of the tenth century and the end of the fifteenth, this duchy of France was gradually expanded into the modern kingdom.

THE CAPETIAN MONARCHY (987–1328)

In the year 987 Louis V, the last direct descendant of Charlemagne, died, and in his place the great nobles elected as their king Hugh Capet, Duke of the Franks. Hugh Capet was only one of the many great nobles into whose hands power had fallen under the weak rule of the later Carolingians. Ever since the partition of Verdun, France had been a prey to feudal anarchy. Taking advantage of her weakness the Scandinavian pirates had made into France, as into England, a series of incursions, and at last had permanently established themselves on the soil of France, thus founding the Duchy of Normandy. The settlement of the Northmen in the lower valley of the Seine seriously circumscribed the domain of which Hugh was immediate lord. For the Duchy of Normandy was carved out of the *Duchy* of France. Out of the same Duchy were carved also the counties of Anjou, Maine, and Champagne. But Hugh had his compensations. He was no longer a vassal but a King. Immediate lord only of the circumscribed Duchy of France, he was feudal overlord of all the lands that stretched from Flanders to beyond the Pyrenees, from the Atlantic to the Jura. Over the Duchy of Brittany he and his successors exercised only the most shadowy superiority. The Dukes of Brittany owed and paid allegiance to their powerful neighbours in Normandy. Of the immediate vassals of the French Crown the most powerful were the Dukes of Burgundy, Normandy, and Aquitaine, the Counts of Anjou, Flanders, Toulouse, and Champagne.

The history of France during the next five hundred years is the history of the absorption of these great feudal principalities into the Kingdom of France. This achievement, essential to the unity and greatness of France, was partly the result, partly the cause of the increased power of the Crown. The monarchy made France. Out of a loosely compacted bundle of feudal duchies and counties the Crown created a compact, coherent, and centralized state. It did more than create a unified State; it brought to the birth the French nation.

But if the strengthening of the monarchy made France,

the making of France increased and consolidated the power of the monarch. The two processes act and react on each other. To the growth of the French monarchy we now turn.

The English student of French history will not fail to observe a significant contrast. No candid critic can fail to appreciate the value of the services rendered to the English people by the Norman and Angevin kings. To the circumstances of the Norman Conquest, to the character of the Conqueror, and to the administrative genius of the early Plantagenets, we owe the establishment of an exceptionally powerful monarchy at an exceptionally early stage in our political evolution. To the power of the monarchy we owe that precocious sense of national unity which found expression in the constitutional fabric of the thirteenth century.

FEUDALISM AND THE CROWN

But notwithstanding this obvious debt, no one would dream of asserting that the Crown was the all-important factor in the making of England. Many other things contributed to hasten and consolidate the process. In France, on the contrary, the Crown unquestionably was the main factor. King and people found in the feudal noble a common foe. In England all classes united against the Crown: the national will found expression in a parliament; in France in a monarch. The immunity of England from foreign interference accentuated the contrast. In a time of political disorder the English people could seize the opportunity of asserting their liberties against the Crown. To seize such an opportunity in France would have meant the loss of national independence; to preserve independence it was necessary to forgo the luxury of political liberty. Hence the identification of the interests of the Crown and the interests of the nation.

There were other substantial reasons for the victory of the Crown. Not the least important was the fact that the House of Capet produced a succession of great rulers: three of them, Philip Augustus (1180–1223), Louis IX, 'St. Louis' (1226–70), and Philip IV, 'the Fair' (1285–1314), must take rank among the most astute and sagacious statesmen of the Middle Ages. And these kings had an enormous advantage over the preceding dynasty. The Crown of France had at last become definitely hereditary. From the deposi-

tion of Charles the Fat (887) down to the accession of Hugh Capet it had been alike in theory and in fact elective. Lothaire (954–86), the last but one of the Carolingian sovereigns, initiated the practice of getting the heir elected and crowned during the lifetime of his predecessor. This practice was followed by the Capetians, but so rapidly did the hereditary principle gain on the elective that before the accession of Philip Augustus (1180) it was deemed superfluous to continue the practice. By that time the monarchy had become definitely and finally hereditary.

THE CRUSADES

The power of the Crown was further strengthened by its alliance with the Church. This alliance operated in a variety of ways. The establishment of a 'Truce of God' did something to abate the prevalence and persistence of private wars; the institution and development of the several Orders of Chivalry effected a sensible amelioration in the manners and customs of feudal society, while the Crusades drained the strength of the feudal nobility. On the one hand the Crusades diverted the energies of the great vassals to distant warfare, and induced to a wholesale sacrifice of life and fortune; on the other, by a far more subtle process, they undermined the foundations upon which the whole superstructure of feudalism rested. They introduced new, almost revolutionary, ideas; they stimulated both commerce and learning; they necessitated new methods of taxation and brought into prominence new classes. In a word, they dealt a fatal blow alike at feudalism as an institution and at the persons and the fortunes of individual feudatories. Feudalism emerged from the Crusades broken, wasted, and undermined, the Crown emerged with increased authority and enhanced prestige. To the Crown the new classes looked for protection and encouragement. Scholars and merchants alike sought royal patronage. Thus the Crown found in the development of commerce and in the growth of towns fresh allies against the feudal nobility.

ROMAN LAW

The Crusades contributed to the increase of the Royal power in yet another way. From Constantinople the Crusaders returned with renewed reverence for the Justinian Code, and increased readiness to accept the maxims of the Roman law. The French kings

were quick to improve the opportunity. St. Louis had the *Digest* translated into French, and by the application of the maxims of Roman law, and the adoption of improved methods of procedure, he dealt a series of blows at feudal principles and practice. He limited the right of private war; abolished the privilege of private coinage; imposed non-feudal taxation, and raised a non-feudal army. Henceforward the King of France was not a mere *primus inter pares*; he was more even than a suzerain over feudal vassals; he was a real sovereign: sovereign in jurisdiction, sovereign in taxation, sovereign in legislation.

To this new sovereignty two new institutions very powerfully contributed. The first was the *Parlement de Paris*; the second the *States-General*.

THE PARLIAMENT OF PARIS

The Parliament of Paris bears for Englishmen a misleading title. It was not an elected assembly, nor were its functions parallel to those of the English Parliament. Originally it sprang from the Curia Regis, the Court or Council of the King, and performed duties, fiscal and administrative, as well as judicial, similar to those of the Curia Regis in England. Like the English Curia, it consisted of the great vassals of the *domaine royale*, Prelates, and great officers of State. In 1302, however, Philip le Bel gave to the Parliament a regular constitution, and organized it as the Supreme Court of Justice. Its financial and administrative functions were handed over definitely to other bodies, and the Parliament was strictly confined to judicial business. The great vassals ceased to attend, and their places were taken by trained legists, who in their turn became an hereditary body, and formed an important element in the social and administrative hierarchy, as the *noblesse de la robe*. In the Middle Ages the lawyers helped the Crown to curb the power of the Baronage and the Church; in the seventeenth century they aspired to a political rôle, and attempted to impose some restraint upon the omnipotence of the Crown. But though the attempt was a signal failure, the *noblesse de la robe*, tenacious of privilege and intensely conservative in temper, opposed a serious obstacle to the reforming energy of ministers and kings.

Another institution—also dating from the reign of Philip

the Fair—was the States-General. The States-General, not the Parliament of Paris, offered the real parallel to the English Parliament, and during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries seemed destined to fill a place in the history of France hardly less important than the Parliament in England. That place it never attained, and the States-General is here mentioned only because the institution of a central representative body contributed one more stone to the edifice of the centralized monarchy. If, to Englishmen, this statement should sound paradoxical, it is because they forget that the English Parliament was successful in restraining the power of the Crown, because in England nobles and burgesses were drawn and held together by the connecting link of the Knights of the Shire, and so offered a united opposition to the king. In France there was no class corresponding to the English squirearchy; the burgesses were by tradition and by instinct the allies of the monarchy, and allowed themselves to be made the instruments of the monarchy, in destroying the power of a disruptive feudal oligarchy.

THE STATES-GENERAL

Feudalism was necessarily disruptive; the tendency of the Crown was centripetal. Had the feudal principle triumphed, France, like Germany, would have consisted of a number of virtually independent states. The victory of the Crown meant the making of a centralized and unified state. To that end nothing contributed so much as the actual territorial annexations of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. No reign was so fruitful in this respect as that of Philip Augustus (1180–1223). The Counties of Amiens and Vermandois were added to the royal domain in 1183, and the County of Valois in 1185. Still more important were the annexations in the later years of the reign. In 1152 Henry Plantagenet had married Eleanor of Aquitaine, the divorced wife of Louis VII of France. That marriage split the kingdom of France in twain and reduced the actual dominion of the French king to a narrow and ill-situated strip. In his own right King of England, Henry II was also Duke of Normandy and Count of Anjou and Maine. By his marriage with Eleanor he succeeded to the great Duchy of Aquitaine and to rights, more or less contested, over the County of

TERRITORIAL CONSOLIDATION

Toulouse. The marriage of his son Geoffrey with the heiress of Brittany brought that duchy also into his powerful grasp. From the Grampians to the Pyrenees he exercised continuous lordship, and the whole Atlantic seaboard from the Solway Firth to the Bay of Biscay was in his hands. The power of the French king—his nominal suzerain—was reduced to a shadow.

Under Philip Augustus, however, the recovery was rapid. His acquisitions in the north-east have already been mentioned. By a convenient process of law all the fiefs held by John Lackland were declared forfeit (1202–5), and in that way Normandy, Maine, Anjou, and Touraine passed to the French Crown. Half a century later (1258), Henry III of England made formal surrender of these territories to Louis IX. To Louis IX (1226–70) belonged also the distinction of notable acquisitions in the south. Narbonne passed to the Crown in 1229 and the great County of Toulouse in 1270. Nearly a century later (1361) the incorporation of Champagne brought the French Crown for the first time into immediate contact with Lorraine.

The growth of the French kingdom in the thirteenth century had thus been extraordinarily rapid. But a time of fierce trial was now at hand. In 1328 the direct line of the Capetians became extinct, and the fourth dynasty—that of the Valois—succeeded to the throne. Nine years later there broke out that conflict, sanguinary, uncertain, and protracted, known in the history of England and of France as the 'Hundred Years' War.'

THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR

The first effect of that war was summarily to arrest both processes which we have seen in operation during the preceding century and a half. Between 1180 and 1328 France, as we have seen, had been transformed from a loose aggregation of feudal principalities into a compact homogeneous national monarchy. The great Duchy of Brittany was still virtually independent; the even greater Duchy of Aquitaine was still united to the Crown of England; but territorially the French kingdom had made enormous strides, while the French king had firmly established the Royal authority on the broad base of permanent political institutions. Between the monarchy of Philip the Fair and that of

Louis XIV there seemed, in logic, but a single step. In time, there was an interval of three centuries and a half. The accession of the Valois kings (1328) initiated a reaction, and not for a hundred years, not until the accession of Charles VII (1422–61), can we pick up again the broken threads of national development.

Meanwhile, one feature of the Hundred Years' War calls for notice. It was less a national struggle between England and France than a civil war; a continuation and enlargement of the 'private wars' which had been so conspicuous a feature of the earlier feudal régime. This was more especially the case when the English Duke of Aquitaine was in alliance with the Duke of Burgundy against the House of Orleans. By the Peace of Bretigny, which closed the first period of the war in 1360, the Duke of Aquitaine was released from all obligations of homage, and Edward III retained the duchy, together with Calais, Guisnes, and Ponthieu—the last remnants of the Norman inheritance—in full sovereignty. But his triumph was short lived. Within a few years the whole of the English possessions in France were lost except a few coast towns—Calais, Bordeaux, and Bayonne. Then, by another turn of the wheel of fortune, Henry V more than recovered the lost ground, and the Treaty of Troyes (1420) saw the English king in possession, not only of the Duchies of Normandy and Aquitaine, but also of the Crown of France. The coronation and consecration of Henry V in Paris marked the nadir of the humiliation of France—a humiliation due not merely to foreign conquest but to internecine domestic divisions. Again the English triumph was short lived, and the reign of Henry VI saw England stripped of every possession in France, with the single exception of Calais.

The Hundred Years' War exercised an immense and permanent effect upon the evolution of France.

Territorially it meant the enlargement of the French kingdom by the permanent incorporation of the great Duchy of Aquitaine. Constitutionally it meant the final annihilation of the pretensions of the feudality, the ultimate triumph of the Crown.

During that prolonged conflict France had indeed suffered most terribly. The land itself had been laid waste; noble

was at war with noble; province with province; city with city; castle with castle. Every class and interest were damaged in fortune and prestige. The nobles never recovered from the blows which, at Creçy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, were inflicted by the English yeomen upon the chivalry of France. The towns lost both in political liberty and trade; the Church, the Judges of the Parlement, the University of Paris, merchants and lawyers, scholars and peasants—all were involved in a common ruin. The monarchy alone emerged from the welter and chaos politically strengthened by the destruction of domestic rivals, and territorially enlarged by the absorption of fiefs and by conquests from the foreigner.

The process of conquest and absorption was not, however, yet complete. There were still outstanding the two great duchies of Burgundy and Brittany.

THE BURGUNDIES

To the term 'Burgundy' there attaches a confusion which it is important to clear up. The *Kingdom* of Burgundy must be distinguished from the duchy. The *Kingdom* of Burgundy or Arles corresponded, though its boundaries were perpetually fluctuating, to the *Rhone-land*, i.e. the land between the Rhone, the Saône, the Alps, and the Mediterranean. This *kingdom* was subdivided into two portions:—

(*a*) Southern Burgundy, the old Provincia Romana, or Provence; and

(*b*) Northern Burgundy or *Regnum Jurense*, the Jura region to the north of the city of Lyons.

The old *Duchy* of Burgundy, corresponding to the French Province of Burgundy, including the modern Departments of Yonne, Côte d'Or, Saône et Loire, and Ain, had been, from time immemorial, a fief of France.

The southern part of the old kingdom, i.e. *Provence*, France gradually absorbed during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Thus the great city of Lyons was annexed by Philip the Fair in 1310; the Dauphiné of Vienne was absorbed by purchase in 1343; the City of Vienne in 1448; the County of Valence in 1446; and finally the great County of Provence in 1481. There still remained—remnants of the sometime independence of the

ancient Roman Province—the City of Avignon, the County of Venaissin, and the Principality of Orange, which were not absorbed by France until after the outbreak of the Revolution (1791). So much for Provence, or the southern part of the *kingdom*.

The northern part was subdivided into (1) the County Palatine of Burgundy, Franche Comté; and (2) Lesser Burgundy, including Western Switzerland and Northern Savoy. Since the acquisition of Savoy by Napoleon III (1860) the latter has been divided—apparently finally—between Switzerland and France and need not trouble us further.

The former, the County Palatine or Free County, after many vicissitudes and changes of masters, was eventually conquered by Louis XIV from the Hapsburgs (1674) and took its place in the chain of French provinces as the *Jura*. Thus the Jura became for the first time the eastern frontier of France.

The acquisition of the Free County was, however, a luxury—a conquest from the foreigner. The absorption of the duchy was a domestic necessity if the King of France was ever to be master in his own house. In 1363 this very important fief, which had fortunately lapsed to the Crown in 1361, was re-granted by King John, with extraordinary improvidence, to his son Philip the Bold. Philip, therefore, was the first of the Valois Dukes of Burgundy. The power of the Valois House in Burgundy increased with startling and fatal rapidity during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and at one time threatened, if not to overpower, at any rate to rival the parent House on the throne of France. In 1369 Philip the Bold married Margaret of Flanders, with whom he got the Counties of Flanders, Artois, Rethel, Auxerre, and Nevers—all held in fief of the Crown of France. He also got the Free County-Palatine of Burgundy, which he held in fief of the Emperor. In the latter part of the Hundred Years' War, Burgundy threw in its lot with England, and by the Treaty of Arras (1435) was rewarded by the acquisition of important towns on the Somme: Boulogne, Ponthieu, Amiens, and Vermandois. Philip's son Charles the Bold made Burgundy, for the moment, one of the Powers of Europe, but on his death (1477) the duchy reverted

to France, together with Philip's recent acquisitions in north-eastern France. Thus the *Duchy* of Burgundy was reunited to France, never again to be disjoined.

After the reconquest of the Burgundian duchy there remained outstanding only one of the great feudal principalities. Both Ferdinand of Aragon and Henry VII of England were under special obligations, personal and political, to sustain the independence of the Duchy of Brittany. In September 1488 the Duke Francis of Brittany, the last male of his house, died, leaving the duchy to his daughter Anne. In 1490 the duchess was married by proxy to Maximilian of Hapsburg, and in the same year the latter concluded with Henry of England and Ferdinand of Aragon a league for the protection of his wife's inheritance. But in 1491 the young duchess cut the ground from under the feet of her not too disinterested protectors by espousing the young King Charles VIII of France. In this manner was the last great feudal principality definitely and finally annexed to the Crown.[1]

BRITTANY

With the annexation of Brittany the long-drawn story of the territorial unification of France was at last practically completed. There was a little rounding off to be done on the Pyrenean frontier. That was done partly by Henry IV who brought to the Crown of France the Kingdom of Béarn, or the northern half of Navarre, and partly by Louis XIV when by the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) he acquired Roussillon and Cerdagne. Two centuries later (1859) Napoleon III gave timely help to Victor Emmanuel in his effort to lift the Austrian yoke from the neck of Italy; but as the price of his assistance demanded and received Savoy and Nice. Of other acquisitions of France, notably Alsace and Lorraine, mention must be made in later chapters.

By the end of the fifteenth century France was made—mainly by its kings,—by the victory of the centripetal principle represented by the monarchy over the centrifugal and disruptive tendencies manifested by the feudal oligarchy. But feudalism died hard. The nobles got a chance of winning back some of their own in the ecclesiastical strife of the sixteenth century. Nor did

THE REFORMATION

[1] See note p. 49.

they neglect it. French Protestantism, like French feudalism, was essentially disruptive. But as regards patriotism, the Catholic nobles were little better than the Protestants. Protestants and Catholics alike thought more of their class privileges than of their country. Catholic as well as Protestant entered upon negotiations with foreign Powers, and, if successful, would have broken up again the newly won unity of France. Thus the Crown was fighting not only on behalf of monarchy, not only on behalf of Catholicism, but, it would seem, on behalf of France. The Edict of Nantes (1598) gave the Huguenots privileges which, from the point of view of religious liberty, were obviously excessive. It established them as a State within a State, and very seriously compromised the political unity of the kingdom.

Cardinal Richelieu was quick to perceive the dangers to be apprehended from the political triumph of the Huguenots. With relentless severity he crushed their separatist aspirations; their religious opinions he respected; their civil rights he scrupulously protected. What he would not tolerate was their claim to maintain an independent political organization.


And as with the Huguenots, so with the recalcitrant remnants of the feudal oligarchy. With the social privileges of the nobility he did not interfere. All their rights and exemptions he respected. But he was determined that never again should they have the chance of dividing and dismembering France. They were no longer permitted to function as governors of provinces; their fortified castles were destroyed; private war and even duelling were prohibited. All administrative power was concentrated in the hands of the Crown and of royal officers. Agents of the Central Government — *Intendants* — were sent to superintend local administration, in place of the deposed aristocracy.

Detailed treatment of all these matters must be deferred. For our present purpose it is enough to have indicated in outline the main stages in the evolution of France. When Louis XIV ascended the throne the process was complete. To the rich inheritance accumulated by a series of great kings Louis XIV was heir, and in his reign (1642–1715) France reached the zenith of its greatness.

FURTHER READING

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Note.—Britanny was not formally annexed to the Crown of France until 1532—by Francis I who married the eldest daughter of Duchess Anne of Britanny by (2nd) Louis XII.



SPAIN IN 1491 AND 1560

CHAPTER IV

THE SPANISH MONARCHY

Outstanding Dates

521–710. Visigoths in Spain.
711–14. Moors conquer Spain.
1169. Cities represented in Cortes of Castile.
1230. Union of Castile and Leon.
1469. Marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella.
1474. Isabella elected Queen of Castile.
1479. Ferdinand succeeds to Crown of Aragon.
1492. Capture of Granada completes reconquest of Spain (711–1492)
1492. Columbus sails on his first voyage from Palos.
1493. Bull of Pope Alexander VI.
1493. Roussillon and Cerdagne acquired by Spain.
1495–1517. Cardinal Ximenes, Chief Minister in Castile.
1500. Cabral discovers Brazil.
1504. Naples annexed to Aragon.
1504. Death of Isabella.
1506. Death of Archduke Philip of Hapsburg.
1512. Ferdinand conquers (Spanish) Navarre.
1513. Balboa crosses Isthmus of Panama.
1516. Death of Ferdinand.
1516. Accession of Charles I unites Spain.
1519. Cortez conquers Mexico.
1519. Charles I (of Spain) elected Emperor (Charles V).
1519. Magellan's voyage of discovery.
1521. Magellan annexes the Philippines.
1532. Pizarro conquers Peru.

THE 'DAYS OF THE GRANDEUR OF SPAIN'

THE sixteenth century is frequently characterized as 'the days of the grandeur of Spain.' But the description is only partially justified. That a certain 'grandeur' attached to Spain in that period is undeniable; but it was largely fortuitous and wholly transitory. It accrued to Spain partly from the romantic exploits of Cortez and Pizarro in Mexico and Peru; partly from the abundant stores of silver and gold which poured into the coffers of her kings


from the mines of those countries; partly from the fine discipline of the Spanish soldiery; but most of all from the vast agglomeration of dominions brought together by a series of marriages under the sceptre of a single sovereign, the Emperor Charles V. A grandson on his father's side of the Emperor Maximilian I, the head of the House of Hapsburg, and of Mary, daughter and heiress of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy and Lord of the Netherlands; a grandson, through his mother, of the 'Catholic Sovereigns,' Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile; the first king of a united Spain; king of the two Sicilies and of Sardinia; wearing by election the triple Crown attached to the Holy Roman Empire, this Charles held a position even more imposing than that held by Charlemagne himself. The 'grandeur' of Spain was thus, in large part, an emanation from the grandeur of its king. Yet of all his vast dominions, Spain was the one with which Charles was least identified and least in sympathy. If he had a nationality at all, Charles V was a Fleming; Flanders was the land in which he was educated; Flemish was the tongue of his familiar speech; but it was in Germany that his political interests centred. Nevertheless, though Spain was little to him, save as a source of wealth, he was, in a sense, everything to Spain. His reign and that of his son, Philip, covering between them the years 1516 to 1598, marked the apogee of her 'grandeur.'

Not, indeed, until the accession of Charles (I of Spain, 1516) had Spain, as a united Nation-State, come into existence. About the influence of geography in retarding national unification in Spain something has been said already. Of the influence of successive tides of invasions something must be said now.

THE EVOLUTION OF SPAIN

The earliest invaders, the Phoenicians and the Greeks, made some settlements on the south-eastern and eastern coasts, but into the interior of Spain they hardly penetrated. The Carthaginians founded two great towns, Barcelona and Carthagena; but Carthaginian supremacy lasted a very short time—only about thirty years—and was succeeded by that of Rome (200 B.C.–A.D. 476). The Roman Conquest was, in a military sense, fairly complete, but in a cultural sense Rome got far more from Spain than Spain got from

THE CROWNS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL



Rome. The Visigoths destroyed the power of Rome, but otherwise their occupation (*circa* 521–710) left little trace upon the Spanish land or people, though it was in their time that Spain was converted to Christianity (*circa* 600).

Apart from the conversion to Christianity, a notable landmark in the history of any people, the only really decisive event in the history of medieval Spain was its invasion and conquest by the Moors from North Africa (A.D. 711–14).

THE MOORISH CONQUEST

The Mohammedan occupation lies altogether outside the scope of this volume, but the impress, both negative and positive, which it left on the history of Spain, justifies a brief quotation from a highly qualified Spanish writer: 'From the ninth to the eleventh century the civilization of our world is Islamic. Christendom is in the dark while Islam shines in Baghdad and in Cordoba with all the lights of science, art, politics, culture, and refinement. Northern Spain is divided up into petty barbarian kingdoms on whom the mighty and refined Khalif of Cordoba looks down very much as the President of the French Republic looks down upon Moroccan tribes. Islamic Spain gives the world her philosophers, astronomers, mathematicians, mystics, poets, historians.' [1]

So much for the positive influence of the Moslems. Their negative influence was not less important.

RECONQUEST

From the eighth century to the fifteenth the slow reconquest of the country from the Moslem intruders supplied the central thread of Spanish history, and left an ineffaceable mark upon the character of the Spanish people. The great mass of the peasantry settled down after a while and accepted the far from intolerant rule of the Moorish conquerors. The nobles, on the contrary, either abandoned the country altogether, or found a refuge in the mountain fastnesses of the Pyrenees and the Asturian hills. Braced by poverty and adversity, they issued forth from those fastnesses to wage a secular crusade against the 'infidel.' Bit by bit their former land was reconquered, but so slowly that it was a century and a half before the reconquest reached the Douro, and over 400 years before the crusaders had penetrated as far as the Tagus. Toledo was reoccupied in 1085, Lisbon in 1147; the age-long

[1] Madariaga, *Spain*, p. 28.

achievement was finally crowned, under the 'Catholic' Sovereigns Ferdinand and Isabella, by the conquest of the last surviving Moorish Kingdom of the Peninsula—that of Granada in 1492.

The Anti-Moslem crusades, protracted through so many centuries, combined with the physical configuration of the peninsula to fix for ever the destiny of the country. As this bit of country or that was recovered from the Moors, a new and independent kingdom was set up. The kings of these circumscribed kingdoms had little power. Elected by the nobles, they were hardly removed from them by superiority in wealth. Real power lay in the hands of the nobles, whose swords had reconquered the land, and in that of the cities, to which immense privileges were conceded on condition that they provided for their own defence.

Both in Castile and Aragon, not to mention the lesser kingdoms, representative institutions, as well as municipal and aristocratic privileges, were early developed.

THE CORTES

A municipal charter was granted to Leon by Alfonso V as early as 1020, and the cities were represented in the Cortes of Castile (1169), just about a century before they were summoned by Simon de Montfort to the English Parliament of 1265.

Premature development does not generally make for permanence. Neither the Castilian nor the Aragonese Cortes functioned after the sixteenth century. For this decadence of parliamentary institutions in Spain there were several reasons, but one stands out pre-eminent. The parliamentary structure rested on a class foundation. The excessive privileges of the nobles and the cities respectively discouraged union between them. Nor would the clerical estate combine either with the cities or with the nobles. There was, in a word, no parliamentary solidarity. Consequently, the Crown was able, by allying itself with the cities against the nobles, or with the nobles or the clergy against the cities, gradually to increase its own exiguous powers, and, finally, to erect an unlimited autocracy upon the ruins of a parliament which had never been truly national in character.

In Spain, as in France, the monarchy represented, more

truly than the representative body, the nation as a whole. If in neither case the monarchy entirely deserved the victory it won, the States-General and the Cortes, each insistent on the promotion of sectional interests, thoroughly deserved the defeat they severally incurred. A similar fate might well have overtaken the English Parliament but for the presence of the knights, representatives of the shires, and elected like the burgesses in the shire-courts. In England there was, indeed, another factor operating. The refusal of the lower clergy to come into a national system, their preference for class representation in Convocation, doubtless contributed to the evolution of the bicameral structure of the English Parliament; though the determining and differentiating factor in that development was the association of the lesser nobles or 'knights of the shire' with the humbler burghers who represented the towns. Together they formed the Commons House of Parliament, a House which had no counterpart in the history of Parliamentary institutions either in France or in Spain.[1]

More national than the Cortes, the Crown never succeeded in uniting Spain as completely as the Crown united France.

CONSOLIDATION OF SPAIN

Yet such unity as Spain has known it has owed to its monarchy. By the middle of the fifteenth century the many kingdoms of Spain had, by intermarriages and gradual conquest, been reduced to four: Castile, Aragon, Navarre, and Granada. Castile had by that time absorbed, in addition to Old and New Castile, Leon, Biscay, the Asturias, Galicia, Estramadura, Murcia, and Andalusia; Aragon included Catalonia and Valencia.

In 1469 Ferdinand, heir to the Kingdom of Aragon, married Isabella, the daughter of John II of Castile. Her brother, Henry IV, made himself very unpopular, and on his death in 1474, the Cortes of Castile set aside his daughter, Joanna, and elected her aunt, Isabella, in her place. In 1479 Ferdinand succeeded his brother John II as King of Aragon, and thus the whole of Spain, with the exception of the kingdoms of Granada and Navarre, was brought under the rule of a single household—if not of a single sovereign.

[1] Until the nineteenth century. On the whole subject cf. Marriott *The Mechanism of the Modern State.*

The partnership was singularly successful. Isabella supplied the spiritual force; Ferdinand was pre-eminently a shrewd politician—perhaps the prototype of Machiavelli's *Prince*. In 1481 the Catholic sovereigns renewed the crusade against the Moors of Granada, and in 1492, as already noticed, the last Moslem kingdom in Spain was absorbed. In 1493 Roussillon and Cerdagne were acquired from Charles VIII of France; in 1504 Ferdinand, already in possession of Sardinia and Sicily, added to them Naples, and in 1512 acquired Spanish Navarre as well. Thus the whole peninsula was, with the exception of Portugal, united. Nor were the Catholic sovereigns by any means disposed to allow even that exception to survive. In order to end it, they pursued a marriage policy at once extraordinarily pertinacious and extraordinarily complicated. They first married their elder daughter Isabella to Prince Alfonso, heir to the throne of Portugal. On his death without issue, Isabella married his brother, Emanuel, who reigned as King of Portugal from 1495 to 1521. Isabella also died childless, and on her death King Emanuel married Mary, a younger daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, by whom he had several children. One of them, Isabella, a daughter, married the Emperor Charles V, who, as grandson and heir of the Catholic sovereigns, had become the first king of a united Spain (as Charles I) in 1516. The Emperor Charles V, with a persistence equal to that of his grandparents, married his daughter Joanna to Prince John of Portugal, and at last, on the failure of heirs-male in Portugal, the fruits of all this dynastic prescience were reaped when, in 1580, Philip II succeeded by right of his mother to the throne of Portugal. Sixty years later, however, Portugal elected John Duke of Braganza to the throne, and so reasserted an independence which it has maintained to the present day.

POLICY OF FERDINAND AND ISABELLA

Territorial consolidation formed only a part of the policy pursued by Ferdinand and Isabella. Not even the mountain chains divided Spain more hopelessly than the selfish pursuit of class interests by the nobles, the clergy, and the cities. The first care of the joint sovereigns was to curtail the overgrown powers and abridge the extravagant privileges of the aristocracy. The Cortes was summoned as seldom as possible; a free use was made

of *Pragmaticas*, or Royal ordinances; greater state was introduced into Court ceremonies, but by practising reasonable economy, the sovereigns were able to 'live of their own' without much recourse to parliamentary taxation. The cessation of parliamentary sessions is a cheap price to pay for immunity from taxation, and although on the death of Isabella the Castilian aristocracy attempted to reassert constitutional liberties and to regain some of their privileges, their efforts were forestalled by the vigilance of Ferdinand and his great minister Cardinal Ximenes.

Ximenes (1436–1517) was an outstanding example of the new type of Minister employed by the autocratic monarchs of his new era to build up their administrative systems on the ruins of the disestablished aristocracies. Like Wolsey, Ximenes was a man of humble birth who, endowed with great abilities, attained to the highest place in Church and State. In Spain, much more than in England, the great nobles exercised a disruptive influence fatal to the establishment of a strong and highly centralized administration. The destruction of the power of the feudal aristocracy was, accordingly, in Spain as elsewhere, an essential preliminary to the achievement of national unity. Only the Crown could destroy it.

After the catastrophic overthrow of the *ancien régime* in France, autocracy, as a system of government, went out of fashion. Historians followed the prevailing mode, and failed to estimate accurately the debt which their several countries owed to the autocratic sovereigns of the period now under review. France, as we have seen, was literally made by the Valois and Bourbon kings. Spain owed less to her kings, but Spain could never have attained even such a measure of unity as she did save for the work of the Catholic Sovereigns and their immediate successors. To that work Cardinal Ximenes largely contributed.

NEW SPAIN

Important, however, as was the work of national consolidation at home, still more imposing and not less contributory to the building up of the autocratic monarchy were the achievements of the mariners and adventurers, Columbus, Cortez, and Pizarro. Columbus found a discerning and generous patron in Queen

Isabella. Cortez, Magellan, and Pizarro conferred further distinction upon the memorable reign of Charles I.

Columbus, though more successful as a pioneer than as an administrator, gave the West Indies to Spain. There as elsewhere, however, the Spaniards proved themselves to be ill-fitted for settlement and colonization. Like many other people they regarded wealth as synonymous with the precious metals, and consequently they concentrated their energies on the quest for gold and silver, to the neglect of other sources of wealth less glittering, but more enduring. 'It was,' says Adam Smith in a famous passage, 'the sacred thirst of gold that carried Ovieda, Nicuessa, and Vasco Nugnes de Balboa to the isthmus of Darien; that carried Cortes to Mexico, Almagro and Pizarro to Chili and Peru. . . . Every Spaniard who sailed to America expected to find an El Dorado.' And characteristically he adds: 'Of those expensive and uncertain projects which bring bankruptcy upon the greater part of the people who engage in them there is none perhaps more perfectly ruinous than the search after new silver and gold mines.' In adventure and conquest the Spaniards were, however, at this period unsurpassed. In 1513 Balboa crossed the Isthmus of Panama, and in 1519 rumours of great stores of gold in Mexico led to the dispatch of an expedition under Hernan Cortez. With about 500 men he landed at Vera Cruz, took the Emperor Montezuma prisoner, and assumed the government of the city in the name of King Charles. After two years of strenuous fighting, he made himself master of the Aztec Empire, and Mexico began to pour streams of gold and silver into the Spanish treasury.

Some five years later (1532) Francisco Pizarro, with less than two hundred followers, made himself master of Peru. He met with much less opposition from the gentler Incas than Cortez had encountered from the warlike Mexicans. The less excusable, therefore, were the horrible cruelties inflicted by the Spanish *conquistadors* upon the inoffensive inhabitants. That they were inflicted in the name of religion only adds to the horror. Peru, however, proved an even richer find than Mexico, and from Peru the Spanish Empire was extended southward into Chili and thence across the Andes into the basin of the River Plate. Thus the whole

of Central and Southern America, with the exception of Guiana—subsequently occupied by the Dutch, and Brazil, which fell to the Portuguese, passed under the dominion of Spain.

To Cortez, as to Columbus, Spain showed its gratitude by allowing him to die in poverty and neglect. Once, in despair, he attempted to interview Charles V. 'Who is this man?' asked the emperor. 'It is the man,' replied Cortez, 'who has given your Majesty more states, than your ancestors left to you towns.' The service remained unappreciated by the emperor.

That Spain derived much less advantage from her overseas empire than she should have done was due to a combination of causes which, since Adam Smith's day, have become the commonplace of critics. Great fighters, with an immense capacity for conquest but little for government, fanatically devoted to their own creed but ruthless in their treatment of 'heretics,' the Spaniards were consistently unsuccessful in administering the vast empire which came to them so quickly and, on the whole, so easily.

COLONIAL POLICY OF SPAIN

A mixed race themselves, the Spaniards in South America, unlike the English throughout their overseas empire, showed themselves apt to assimilate the peoples they had conquered. But intermingling and intermarriage led to the rapid deterioration of the conquerors in mind and body. The concentration of interest on the gold and silver mines tended in the same direction. Nor did the policy of the Home Government help to correct the errors or restrain the vices of the colonists. On the contrary, all that was worst in the Old Spain was reproduced in the New. Little as the state had done to assist or encourage the initial enterprise, it claimed to monopolize all the resulting benefits. The hand of the Government lay as heavily on the New Spain as on the Old. It regarded the new empire as an estate, or rather a mine, to be worked for the exclusive benefit of the Crown.

The mine was, indeed, a rich one; but although, for some years, it yielded a great abundance of gold and silver, it proved to be a precarious source of wealth. Meanwhile, trade was strangled by a number of minute regulations

rigidly enforced. Lest any of the profits should find their way into private pockets, the colonial trade was limited to a certain number of ships, and to a single port of the homeland, first to Seville and afterwards to Cadiz.

In a similar spirit, and with results not less disastrous, the land-system of Old Spain was transported wholesale to the new colonies. Feudalism, a plant not unsuited to its native soil, was an exotic in a new land, and served only to foster the growth of weeds and to choke all healthy development. The system of entail could have no justification under colonial conditions; yet it was strictly enforced, and resulted in the gradual absorption of the smaller proprietors and the concentration of the whole landed property in the hands of a few great nobles, mostly absentees.

Nor was the hand of the Church less heavy than that of the State on the colonies. In New Spain, as in other parts of the 'heathen' world, the Jesuit missionaries did magnificent work among the natives, but to establish in New Spain in all its pride and pomp the Roman Catholic Church, much more to transport all the machinery of the Inquisition, was a policy as misguided as the transportation of a feudal land-system. Between the feudal lord on the one side and the Catholic Church on the other, the land was drained to the last peseta, the people were reduced to a condition of mental subservience as hopelessly complete as their material impoverishment. From the swaddling-clothes in which the infant colonies were wrapped in infancy they never really escaped. Consequently, when the time of storm and stress came, they fell away from a motherland which had never given them an independent life.

But this is to anticipate much later events.

To return to Old Spain. The joint reign of the Catholic sovereigns, despite the narrowness, the craft, and the crookedness of Ferdinand, was a great period in the history of Spain, and in particular of Castile and its dependent kingdoms. But in 1504 Queen Isabella died. She left to Ferdinand the Grand Mastership of the three Military Orders and half the revenues of the Indies, and nominated him as regent of Castile until their grandson Charles should come of age. But she bound him by a solemn oath not, by a second marriage or by any other means, to attempt to

deprive the posterity of Joanna of any of the lands which had acknowledged the sway of the Catholic sovereigns.

Ferdinand at once renounced the crown of Castile, and proclaimed Joanna and her husband the Archduke Philip as sovereigns, but induced the Cortes to acknowledge him as regent on their behalf. To this arrangement many of the Castilians were, however, stoutly opposed; nor would the Archduke Philip assent to it. Ferdinand, therefore, despite his oath, decided to strengthen his position by a second marriage. Only the opposition of his son-in-law, Emmanuel of Portugal, where the lady was immured in a convent, prevented his marriage with Joanna, a daughter of Henry IV of Castile.

Since Joanna's declared illegitimacy had opened the way to the accession of Isabella, the project was a crazy one; yet it throws light on the persistence and ambition of Ferdinand. Baffled in that quarter, Ferdinand turned to France, and in 1506 obtained the hand of a young and beautiful bride, Germaine de Foix, a daughter of the Vicomte of Narbonne and granddaughter of Louis XII of France. For diplomatic reasons, to be explained presently, the latter assented to the marriage in 1509. Germaine bore Ferdinand a son, but the child died in infancy. Had he lived, the great Austro-Spanish Empire of the sixteenth century would never, in its integrity, have come into existence.

Meanwhile, the Archduke Philip, having successfully asserted in Castile his rights and those of his Queen Joanna, died in September 1506, after a reign of only three months. The death of her husband reduced Joanna, always feeble-minded, to complete imbecility, and Ferdinand, despite the opposition of the young Charles's other grandfather, the Emperor Maximilian, regained the Regency. On his death in 1516, however, he bequeathed all his dominions to his young grandson the Archduke Charles.

Of the tortuous diplomacy of Ferdinand, and his relations with his continental neighbours, more must be said in a later chapter.

Meanwhile a tribute must be paid to the preparatory work of the Catholic sovereigns. Isabella was a good woman; Ferdinand was as unlovely as his contemporary and rival, Henry VII of England. Yet none can deny him the title

of a great ruler. Between them, Ferdinand and Isabella completed the making of Spain, and laid the foundations of her resplendent if fleeting grandeur.

FOR FURTHER READING

Madariaga: *Spain.* Prescott: *Ferdinand and Isabella.* Buckle: *History of Civilization,* chap. viii. R. B. Merriman: *Rise of the Spanish Empire.*

CHAPTER V

THE ITALIAN WARS

FRANCE *V.* THE HAPSBURGS

OUTSTANDING DATES

1395. John Galeazzo Visconti vested with Duchy of Mila
1434. Rule of the Medici in Floren
1453. Alfonso V of Arago lished in Two Sicilies.
1469–92. Lorenzo de Medici ru Florence.
1492. Treaty of Étaples (Charles V and Henry VII of Englan
1493. Treaty of Barce with Spain.
1494. Italian Wars (first ser 1520.
1494. Charles VIII invades It 1496.
1498. Accession of Louis XII.
1499–1504. French expeditions o Italy.
1504. Naples annexed to Aragon
1506. Charles of Hapsburg succ to Netherlands, &c.
1508. League of Cambrai.
1509. Louis XII annihilates pc er of Venice at battle of A dello.
1509. Accession of Henry VIII.
1511. Pope Julius II forms the ' ly League.'
1515. Francis I King of France—1547.
1515. Francis I wins Marignano.
1516. Charles I succeeds to Spanis Kingdoms, &c.
1516. Francis makes Concordat wit Leo X.
1516. Treaty of Noyon.
1519. Election of Charles V as En peror.
1520–59. Italian Wars (second series
1520. Meetings between Henry VI and Francis I (Cloth of Gold and Charles V.
1525. Battle of Pavia.
1526. Treaty of Madrid.
1527. Sack of Rome.
1529. Treaty of Cambrai.
1536–8. Third Italian War.
1542–4. Fourth Italian War.
1546. Boulogne taken by England.
1547. Death of Francis I. Accessio of Henry II.
1552–6. Fifth Italian War.
1556. Treaty of Vaucelles.
1556. Abdication of Charles V. A cession of Philip II.
1556–9. Sixth Italian War.
1557. Battle of St. Quentin.
1557. Calais taken from England.
1559. Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis.

THIS narrative has reached a critical point. If are to adhere strictly to the purpose and met announced in the first chapter, no fact may be lown unless it has contributed to the evolution of Europe that we know.

What, then, shall be said of the wars in Italy, which generally fill so large a space in the histories of sixteenth-century Europe? That they are commonly treated at a length wholly incommensurate with their intrinsic importance seems to be indisputable; yet to ignore them is for several reasons impossible.

The story of those wars, and of the conditions under which they were fought, illuminate the causes which retarded for so many centuries the attainment of national unity in Italy. Italy still bears the scars of the wounds inflicted upon her in the wars of the sixteenth century. Further, those wars throw a lurid light upon the development of that theory of the 'Balance of Power' which has played so great a part in the evolution of the European polity. During the earlier period (1494–1515) the principle was illustrated only on a small scale. It was among the petty states of Italy that the 'balance' was to be maintained. In the later period (1519–59) it was the balance of power in Europe that was at stake.

Nor did the long struggle end with the conclusion of the Treaty of Cateau Cambrésis in 1559.

Until the day on which Spain finally accepted a Bourbon King (1714), the rivalry between France and the Austro-Spanish House supplied the main thread of international politics in Europe.

ITALY

The protracted duel was fought mainly in Italy. For the selection of the battle-ground many reasons were responsible. The geographical position of the rivals combined with physiographic conditions in Italy to indicate the choice as natural, if not inevitable. That point has already received attention; but there were others. From the fifth century to the later years of the nineteenth, Italy, as a political entity, did not exist. It was no more, as Metternich truly though cynically observed, than a 'geographical expression.' Great parts were, indeed, played on the stage of medieval history by the City-States of Italy, by Rome and Florence, by Milan, Genoa, Venice, and the rest; but with the history of the Italian cities this narrative is not concerned. Many of those States did indeed survive far beyond the fifteenth century, but they were stripped of all that had rendered them illustrious in the

Middle Ages. Venice and Genoa retained their position as independent republics until the advent of Napoleon. The Pope, though twice driven from the Holy City (1798 and 1848), did not surrender the bulk of the Papal States until 1861, and still (1932) retains his sovereignty over the few acres which constitute the Vatican State. Florence had, before the middle of the fifteenth century, passed under the control of the Medici, the great merchant princes with whose fortunes that city was for three centuries to come so closely associated. The great Lombard City of Milan, formerly a somewhat turbulent Republic, had in 1395 been converted into a Duchy and Imperial fief by John Galeazzo Visconti, whose dynasty in the male line ended with the death of Philip Maria Visconti in 1447. Philip left no legitimate children, but the succession was claimed by Francesco Sforza, the husband of his illegitimate daughter, Bianca. Sforza, a successful soldier of fortune, the protegé of Pope Eugenius IV, and the friend and ally of Cosmo de Medici, was not, however, the only nor the most important candidate to the Duchy of Milan.

The Emperor Frederick III claimed the Duchy, in default of heirs, as a lapsed Imperial fief. Charles, Duke of Orleans, claimed it on the ground that his mother, Valentina Visconti, was the eldest sister of the late Duke Philip. Alfonso I of Naples (V. of Aragon) also put in a claim, on the ground that the Duchy had been bequeathed to him by the late duke. The last three claims are important, mainly by reason of the sustenance they subsequently afforded to the pretensions of the Kings of France (by virtue of their descent from Charles, Duke of Orleans) and of the Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs, as heirs in title to Alfonso.

By 1454 Sforza had definitely established himself in the Duchy, but we are concerned with the rapidly changing fortunes of these Italian States only as they reacted upon those of the two great rivals for ascendancy in Europe.

NAPLES AND SICILY

The Southern Kingdom of Naples and Sicily was, like the Duchy of Milan, a pawn in the game played, throughout this period, by the Kings of France and the Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs. The House of Anjou, from whom the Capetian Kings of France derived their claim to Naples, was first established in that

kingdom under a donation of Pope Urban IV in the middle of the thirteenth century, not, however, without protest from Pedro III of Aragon. Pedro failed to get Naples, but did obtain Sicily and transmitted it with Sardinia to his posterity.

Naples remained until the fifteenth century more or less faithful to the House of Anjou. Disputed successions, recurrent revolutions, turmoil and anarchy—these things made up the history of Naples for centuries, but in 1453 Alfonso V, King of Aragon, after a struggle which had lasted since 1435, finally made good his position in Naples (as Alfonso I), and from that time until the close of the War of the Spanish Succession (1714), both Naples and Sicily remained, together with Sardinia, in the hands of the House of Aragon, and their successors in title, the lucky Hapsburgs.

From the standpoint of general European history the unhappy condition of the Italian peninsula is important only because it offered a tempting bait to the cupidity of the two dominating powers, and supplied them with a duelling ground. For the rest it need only be said that the Italian wars initiated by Charles VIII were entirely barren in permanent results for France. They could not be otherwise. France had and has no business to the south of the Alps. When, under the Emperor Charles V, the Crowns of Spain, Naples, Sicily, and Germany were united with the Imperial Crown on a single head, when the same man was also Lord of the Netherlands and Archduke of Austria, France might reasonably, perhaps, be afraid of encirclement at the hands of an overmighty neighbour and rival. With the help of England and the brave burghers of the Northern Netherlands, France ultimately dispelled the danger of Hapsburg domination. The wisest of French statesmen from Richelieu onward have been content to obtain security for France; not even the most ambitious of them have desired that France should overstep her 'natural frontiers' (as Richelieu termed them)—the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine. Richelieu was, however, anxious, as we have seen, if not to overstep these frontiers, at least to reach them; if not to keep the doors open, at least to have the keys in his own pocket. Hence his persistent endeavour to obtain some fortress at the foot of the Alps, such as Pinerolo (obtained

1630), and to keep on good terms with the Duke of Savoy-Piedmont, who held the Western passes, and with the Grisons who commanded the broad valley of the Valtellina. But Richelieu had no more desire to extend the permanent frontier of France to the south of the Alps than to the south of the Pyrenees.

The ambitions of Charles VIII and his three successors [1] were less rational and restrained. The two main objects at which they aimed were the acquisition of the great Kingdom of Naples and the assertion of French claims on the Duchy of Milan. Except for the purpose of converting the Mediterranean into a French lake, France had no business in Naples or Sicily. Nor, indeed, except to achieve the same ambition, had Aragon.

In order to clear the ground for his attack on Southern Italy, Charles VIII concluded a series of treaties. By the Treaty of Étaples (1492) he purchased peace with Henry VII of England, partly with hard cash—always acceptable to Henry of Richmond, partly by the expulsion from France of the Pretender, Perkin Warbeck. By the Treaty of Barcelona or Narbonne (January 1493) he ceded Roussillon and Cerdagne to Ferdinand of Aragon, and by that of Senlis (May 1493) he restored Artois and the Free County of Burgundy (Franche Comté) to Maximilian. Thus, in order to effect distant conquests, to assert fantastic family claims, or rather perhaps to impress Europe with the strength and splendour of the French Monarchy, he abandoned provinces of much greater and more immediate importance to France. But he had, at any rate, facilitated his contemplated invasion of Italy.

ITALIAN WARS (1494–1515)

In June 1494, Charles VIII set out at the head of a magnificent army, descended by the pass of Mont Genèvre on Piedmont, where he was welcomed and fêted by the Duchess Blanche of Savoy; was admitted into Florence by Piero de Medici (November), marched without resistance, though unwelcomed, through the Papal States, and in February 1495 occupied Naples. The march through Italy had been little more than a magnificent procession.

[1] Charles VIII, 1482–98; Louis XII., 1498–1515; Francis I, 1515–47; Henry II., 1547–59.

Nevertheless, the position of the French in Italy was utterly insecure. A month after the entry of Charles into Naples, a League—the League of Venice—was formed by the Pope Alexander VI, Ferdinand the Catholic, Maximilian, and the Duke of Milan, negotiated and cemented by the Republic of Venice. Nominally directed against the Turks, it was really designed to chastise and expel the French invader of Italy. Charles, afraid of being trapped in southern Italy, hastened north, and was thankful to get back to France (September 1495), at the cost of no more than a single battle fought at Fornovo in July. In 1496 the French troops, left behind by Charles to garrison Naples, were driven out by King Ferdinand II. The first Italian expedition had ended in failure, if not humiliation.

Nevertheless, Louis XII, who, in 1498, succeeded his cousin, Charles VIII, was determined to renew the enterprise.

MILAN

He concluded alliances with the Republics of Venice and Florence, with Borgia, Pope Alexander VI, and with Philibert II, Duke of Savoy. Thus fortified, he launched his attack on Milan.

Milan was the key of the position. With its strongly fortified citadel, planted in the middle of the Lombard plain, yet commanding the exit from the central passes of the Alps, Milan could offer or refuse access for Swiss or German troops to Central and Southern Italy. Milan, accordingly, far more than Naples, was the objective at which the rivals aimed. But the period of intense rivalry between France and the Hapsburgs was yet to come (1522–59).

Meanwhile there was a period of great confusion (1499–1515), only to be disentangled if we grasp the fact that the policy of the Italian cities and princes, generally following the lead of the Papacy, was to preserve some sort of equilibrium in Italy, to combine against any one who seemed likely to establish predominance, and, in particular, against the domination of France.

Thus, at the end of five years' fighting and negotiation (1497–1504), we find the French firmly established, as it would seem, in possession of Milan, and Ferdinand the Catholic (thanks to his timely marriage with Germaine de

Foix and his bargain with Louis XII), in undisputed rights over Naples.

Then comes another turn in the wheel of diplomacy. In 1508, largely at the instigation of Pope Julius II, the three great continental sovereigns — Ferdinand, Maximilian, and Louis XII—laid aside their mutual jealousies, and combined in the League of Cambrai for the annihilation of the power and the partition of the territories of the proud republic of Venice.

LEAGUE OF CAMBRAI

The great days of Venice were over, but that truth was hidden alike from the Venetians and from their enemies. To most of her neighbours the Republic had given cause of offence. By the acquisition of territory on the mainland, she had encroached upon the rights of Maximilian and of the Milanese. She had also expanded at the expense of the Papacy and of Naples. In the course of 1509, however, Pope Julius II recovered Faenza, Rimini, and Ravenna; Ferdinand annexed Otranto, Brindisi, and the other Apulian ports to Naples; while in north Italy Louis XII, by a decisive victory over the Venetians at Agnadello (14th May 1509), not only made himself master of Milan, but annexed the Venetian territory up to the Mincio. 'In one day,' as Machiavelli wrote, 'the Venetians lost all that they had acquired during eight hundred years of strenuous effort.' Exaggerated though that statement may have been, the victory of the French was sufficiently complete to alarm their confederates in the League of Cambrai.

His allies feared that Louis XII would make himself 'lord of Italy and monarch of the world.' In particular, Pope Julius II was alarmed at the success of his own handiwork. Having summoned the foreigners—French, German, and Spaniards—into Italy to crush Venice, he now offered to help Venice to expel the foreigner. He absolved the Republic from the ban of excommunication he had pronounced against it, broke up the League of Cambrai, and concluded an alliance with the Swiss Confederation against France. Louis XII retorted by putting forward a demand for a General Council and the deposition of the warlike Pontiff. This false move gave the Pope a chance which he was quick to seize. In October 1511 he induced Maximilian and Ferdinand, the

Venetian Republic and the Swiss Confederation, to join him in a 'Holy League,' with a threefold object: to defend Holy Church, avert the threatened schism, and drive the intruding Frenchmen, bag and baggage, out of Italy.

By adroit diplomacy, Henry VIII, young, ardent, ambitious, was drawn into the League, and spent much of the wealth accumulated by his father on futile expeditions to Guienne (for the exclusive benefit of his father-in-law, the foxy Ferdinand) and to Picardy. Henry's victories in Picardy alarmed his father-in-law who, having secured Navarre, came to terms with Louis XII. Henry VIII was filled with righteous indignation at such trickery; but Wolsey, now rapidly advancing in his master's favour, was ready with his countermove. In January 1514 Louis XII lost his queen, Anne of Brittany, and though an elderly debauchee of fifty-two, at once sought another bride. Wolsey promptly offered him the hand of Mary Tudor, a lovely and high-spirited girl of seventeen. The marriage was celebrated in October 1514. In the following January the gay bridegroom died, and his queen was free to bestow her hand on a husband of her own choice—Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk.

A year later (January 1516) Ferdinand the Catholic died, and his grandson Charles succeeded to the Spanish kingdoms and their dependencies. Ever since his father's death (1506) he had been in possession of his Burgundian inheritance (the Netherlands and the Free County of Burgundy). In 1519 the death of Maximilian opened to him the succession to the Archduchy of Austria and the other hereditary dominions of the Hapsburg House. It also left vacant the Imperial throne. His territorial position was already magnificent; but the Empire was still an elective dignity, and for the Imperial crown there were other candidates. The only serious one, however, was the young King of France.

Like Charles V, Francis I had succeeded to a splendid inheritance; it was not so extensive as that of his rival, but much more compact and manageable. Moreover, thanks to the policy of his four immediate predecessors, to the administrative centralization and territorial consolidation which marked

FRANCIS I (1515–47)

their reigns, Francis was master of all the resources of his kingdom, to a degree denied to Charles.

His first act was to invade Italy and retrieve the loss of Milan. This he did by his brilliant victory at Marignano (1515). For the third time the French were masters of Lombardy. Peace was promptly concluded with the Swiss at Freiburg, and an important treaty was concluded with the Medicean Pope Leo X at Bologna (1516). Francis promised to support Lorenzo de Medici in Florence, and Parma and Piacenza were restored to Milan. But the most important sequel to the victory of Marignano was the Concordat concluded between the French king and the Pope. Under this arrangement the *Pragmatic Sanction* of Bourges (1438), which had secured the independence of the Gallican Church, was cancelled ; Francis restored to the Papacy the annates, or first year's revenue on each fresh incumbency of benefices the Pope handed over to Francis the rights of patronage, and thus made the Crown supreme over the clergy, as it was already supreme over the State in France. The *Concordat*, in fine, crowned the edifice of royal autocracy.

Absolute master of France, dominant in north Italy, might not Francis reasonably aspire to the highest position open to a layman in Christendom ?

The treaty with the Pope was supplemented by a treaty concluded at Noyon between France and Spain, and to this Maximilian also was obliged to adhere.

These treaties close the first period of the Italian wars. So far as those wars had any intelligible significance, they represented an effort to maintain a balance of power among the Italian States. The second series of wars between France and the Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs (1520–59) were also Italian in origin, though less often fought on Italian soil, and in scope and significance they were far more extended. It was the balance of power in Europe that was at stake.

This second series consists of six wars, the first four of which were fought between Charles and Francis ; the fifth between Charles and Henry II, and the last between Philip II and Henry II. It will simplify the subsequent narrative to summarize them at once.

The first war followed almost immediately on the election

of Charles to the Empire (1519) and lasted from 1520 to 1526. It was preceded by meetings between Henry VIII and Francis on the Field of the Cloth of Gold (June 1520), and between the former and the young Emperor at Gravelines in July. Both the Emperor and the French king were anxious for an alliance with England, which, in a sense, held the balance; Henry preferred the imperial alliance, but his intervention in the war gave his ally no help. On the eastern front (Picardy and Burgundy) Charles made no headway against France, but in Italy the balance of advantage was decidedly with the Imperialists, and at Pavia (1525) Francis suffered a crushing defeat and was himself taken prisoner. He regained his liberty by the Treaty of Madrid (1526), but at the price of the surrender of the Duchy of Burgundy and the renunciation of all his claims on Milan and Naples and on Flanders and Artois.

(I) 1520–6

Once at liberty, Francis repudiated the treaty, and joined the Pope and the Italian Princes in the League of Cognac. Pavia and the resulting Treaty of Madrid had threatened the European equilibrium. The Treaty of Cambrai (1529), which ended the second war, partially restored it. Of the war itself the most outstanding feature was the Sack of Rome (1527) by the Imperialist troops, after the death of their general in the assault. Pope Clement VII was compelled to surrender himself a prisoner, a humiliation which reacted upon the fortunes of his kinsmen in Florence when the Republic was re-established. The Peace of Cambrai restored the Duchy of Burgundy to Francis, but left the Emperor supreme in Italy.

(II) 1526–9

France was evidently hard pressed by the Hapsburgs, and the seven years' interval between the close of the second and the outbreak of the third Italian wars was profitably employed by the king. He entirely reorganized his army, and by a series of treaties formed a strong coalition against the emperor. He concluded alliances with the German Protestants—now organized in the Schmalkaldic League against their Emperor (1531), with Henry VIII (1532); with Gustavus Vasa, King of Sweden, and with Pope Clement VII (1533), and with the Turkish sultan, Suleiman the Magnificent (1535).

In the third war France acquired Savoy and Piedmont, but the fourth, ended by the Treaty of Crespy (1544), was entirely barren of results. In 1547 Francis I died. His last years were occupied in fighting Henry VIII; but the only result was the loss of Boulogne to England.

(III) 1536–8
(IV) 1542–4

By this time the struggle between France and the Hapsburgs had become hopelessly intertwined with that between the Catholics and Protestants in Germany. During the next hundred years, the rulers of France, while sternly suppressing Protestantism in their own realm,[1] found it to their political advantage to encourage 'heresy' among the subjects of their neighbours. Henry II, who succeeded his father in 1547, pursued the policy with such success, that by the Truce of Vaucelles, which brought the fifth war to an end in 1556, he secured the three Lorraine bishoprics—Metz, Toul, and Verdun—thus establishing upon that borderland a grip which was not relaxed until 1871—though not until 1766 did the Duchy of Lorraine, as a whole, pass into French keeping.

(V) 1552–6

In 1556 Charles V, tired of politics and war, abdicated in favour of his son Philip II, and it was between him and Henry II that the last of the long series of wars was fought. Philip, as the king-consort of England, could count on the wholehearted support of his wife's subjects against the French. They contributed to the victory won, under the command of Emmanuel Philibert Duke of Savoy, at St. Quentin (1557); but that victory was more than counterbalanced by the capture of Calais by Francis Duke of Guise. The acquisition of the last English stronghold in France was the only noteworthy incident in a war which, with brief intervals, had dragged on for more than thirty years.

(VI) 1556–9

Peace was finally concluded at Cateau-Cambrésis, on the Belgian frontier, in April 1559. France restored Piedmont and Savoy to Emmanuel Philibert, and surrendered, except for a few frontier fortresses, all her claims on Italy. Spain kept Lombardy and Naples. France retained the three bishoprics of Lorraine. The treaty was sealed by two marriages:

THE TREATY OF CATEAU-CAMBRÉSIS

[1] Henry IV alone diverged from this traditional policy.

Emmanuel Philibert, the victor of St. Quentin, married Margaret, sister of Henry II; Philip II, for a second time a widower and rejected by his sister-in-law Queen Elizabeth, contented himself with Elizabeth, daughter of Catherine de Medici.

Frenchmen grumbled at the terms of peace, but France had in fact emerged from the long struggle not merely territorially intact, but strategically strengthened. The Hapsburgs retained their grip upon Italy, but Charles V gained nothing from these wars, except, maybe, a realization of the fact that the Austro-Spanish-Burgundian Empire was a burden too heavy and clumsy for any one man to carry. Consequently, on his abdication, he handed over Austria and its neighbour lands to his brother Ferdinand; to his son Philip, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands. Neither property was unencumbered: the Germanic inheritance the more heavily. Between the Germans of Austria, the Czechs of Bohemia, and the Magyars of Hungary there was nothing in common. The Empire was distracted by the Protestant heresy. The Moslem Turks (in curious alliance with Catholic France) had not merely overrun Hungary, but had battered (1529) the gates of Vienna. The Spanish inheritance looked less unpromising; but the 'ramshackle' empire, which was ruled from Vienna, was destined to outlive by centuries the empire which centred at Madrid.

For Europe at large, the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis was an important landmark. The threat of a Hapsburg hegemony was scotched; it was killed in the Armada fight. Half a century of wars, primarily dynastic in origin, was closed: during the next hundred years religion was to be the main cause of strife.

FOR FURTHER READING

A. J. Grant: *History of Europe, 1494–1610.* H. Lemonnier: *Lavisse's Histoire de France,* vols. v. vi. F. A. Mignet: *Rivalité de François I et Charles V.*

CHAPTER VI

GERMANY AND THE EMPIRE

THE REFORMATION IN GERMANY

Outstanding Dates (and for Chapter VII)

800. Coronation of Charles the Great by Pope Leo III.
962. Coronation of Otto the Great.
1273. Election of Rudolph of Hapsburg.
1305–78 Papacy at Avignon.
1378–1417. The Great Schism.
1381. Wyclif denies Transubstantiation.
1452–98. Savonarola in Florence.
1409–49. General Councils.
1517. Sale of Indulgences in Germany.
1519. Luther's Ninety-Five Theses.
1519. Election of Charles V.
1520. Luther excommunicated.
1521. Diet of Worms.
1522. Luther publishes New Testament in German.
1522. Diet of Nuremberg.
1524–5. Peasants' War.
1524–31. Reformation in Switzerland.
1526. Battle of Mohacs.
1526. First Diet of Spires.
1527–36. Reformation in Sweden and Denmark.
1529. Second Diet of Spires.
1530. Charles V crowned at Bologna by Pope.
1530. Confession of Augsburg.
1536. Calvin (*b.* 1509) publishes his *Institutes*.
1541–64. Calvin's rule at Geneva.
1546. The Schmalkaldic League.
1547. Defeat of Protestants at Mühlberg.
1552. Treaty of Friedewalde (Henry II and German Protestants).
1552. Turks invade Hungary.
1552. Treaty of Passau.
1555. Peace of Augsburg.

FOR the religious wars Germany provided the main though not the only battle-field; but of Germany we have so far seen nothing. The omission is forgivable, for Germany as a Nation-State only came to the birth in 1871, but it must now be repaired.

Why did the evolution of the German State lag so far behind that of England, France, and Spain? In the answer to that question lies the clue to the problem of German history.

The primary reason is geographical. As compared with France, still more with Spain or England, German territory was wide-stretching, loosely compacted, devoid of natural frontiers, internally broken and topographically fragmentary. Such a land did not naturally lend itself to the formation of a strong and centralized administration. No one looking at the map of the lands which we know as Germany could doubt that the centrifugal forces, the principle of localized Sovereignties, would be overcome, if at all, only by a sustained, patient, and persistent policy on the part of the Crown. Secondly, Germany has from time immemorial consisted of a congeries of provinces with a distinct history, both as regards rulers and peoples. Thirdly, while in England and France the power of the Crown steadily increased until the nation was out of swaddling-clothes, in Germany the authority of the king, once imposing and effective, became more and more attenuated. The hand of the central authority became weaker and weaker. Offices, once dependent upon the appointment of the king, became virtually hereditary. The authority of Count or Duke replaced for all practical purposes that of a distant monarch. In a word, the forces of disintegration triumphed over those of centralization.

WHY 'GERMANY' TARRIED

There were other reasons, but all these combined sink into insignificance when set against the fatal connexion between the German kingship and the Roman Empire. The development of the German monarchy, and therefore of the German nation, was sacrificed to the dream of a universal empire, the dream which assumed something of corporeal substance in the fascinating but elusive institution known to history as the Holy Roman Empire.

THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

The coronation of Charles the Great, King of the Franks, by Pope Leo III (A.D. 800) was one of the most significant events in world history. But even more significant —from a German standpoint—was the coronation as Emperor of Otto the Great, King of Germany, by Pope John XII (A.D. 962). His coronation finally cemented the connexion between the German kingship and the Holy Roman Empire, and thus sealed the doom of Germany for nearly a thousand years. The election to the Empire

carried with it the Crown, not only of Germany, but of Italy and Burgundy also. The German kings were consequently tempted to make their dominion in Italy a reality, and thus, while elsewhere the monarchy was consolidating its authority, the German kings dissipated their strength in fruitless struggles on the Lombard plain, or in the Neapolitan marshes.

Again, while elsewhere the kingship tended to become more definitely hereditary, in Germany it remained elective, and each election gave recurring opportunities for interference not only to the Popes (by whom the election had to be confirmed), but to great princes, lay and ecclesiastical, in Germany, and in particular to the seven princes to whom the right of election came to be gradually confined.[1]

The long contest between the Emperors and Popes further weakened the position of the former, and gave the German princes an opportunity, not neglected, of consolidating their power.

THE HAPSBURGS

A new phase of German history opens with the election as Emperor of Rudolph, Count of Hapsburg, and Landgrave of Alsace. Elected to the Empire, in 1273, Rudolph defeated and killed Ottocar, King of Bohemia, in 1275, and four years later invested his sons, Albert and Rudolph, with part of the conquered lands, the Duchies of Austria and Styria. These Duchies formed for centuries the nucleus of the Hapsburg Empire. To these were added, in the fourteenth century, Carinthia and part of Carniola (1335), Tyrol (1363), and parts of Istria and Trieste, and in the fifteenth century the Crowns of Hungary and Bohemia (1438) came to the Hapsburgs by the marriage of Albert with Elizabeth, daughter of the Emperor Sigismund. Hungary and Bohemia were temporarily lost to them in 1457, but early in the sixteenth century another fortunate marriage brought them back. Ferdinand, the only brother of the Emperor Charles V, married, in 1521, Anne, daughter of Ladislaus, King of Hungary and Bohemia. His childless brother-in-law, King Louis, was killed at the battle of Mohacs (1526), and Ferdinand, already Archduke

[1] The 'Electors' were the Prince-Archbishops of Mainz, Trier, and Köln, the King of Bohemia, the Duke of Saxony, the Count Palatine of the Rhine, and the Margrave of Brandenburg.

of Austria, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, became King of Bohemia in 1526, and twelve years later succeeded in making good his possession of part of Hungary.

Meanwhile, as we have seen, Maximilian had married Mary, heiress of Charles the Bold of Burgundy, and their son, the Archduke Philip, had married Joanna, the heiress to the Spanish kingdoms and their vast dependencies. Philip predeceased his father. Maximilian's death (1519) created a vacancy in the Empire. To his hereditary dominions his grandson Charles, already King of Spain, Lord of the Netherlands, of Milan, Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, succeeded without question. It was his natural ambition to add to his hereditary Crowns that of the Empire. The Hapsburgs had by this time established a strong presumptive claim, but theoretically the Empire was, as already said, elective. The matter of the succession had been eagerly canvassed during the last months of Maximilian's life. Lewis, King of Bohemia, and Joachim, Elector of Brandenburg, were not without hopes; Frederick of Saxony was a strong candidate; Henry VIII of England was mentioned. Maximilian had made strenuous efforts to get Charles elected King of the Romans, but as Maximilian himself had never been crowned Emperor, he was still technically King of the Romans, and two kings were not to be thought of. The matter was, therefore, still open when he died.

The only serious competitor of Charles was Francis I of France. There were many points in his favour. Francis was young and wealthy (he was ready to pay 3,000,000 livres, cash down, for the Empire), and his dominions, if less extensive than those of his rival, were much more compact. His brilliant victory at Marignano (1515) had not only given him possession of Milan, but had enabled him to conclude favourable treaties with the Swiss, with Pope Leo X, and (at Noyon, 1516) with Charles I and the Spaniards. The new Pope Leo X, himself a Medici, was said to favour his candidature, and he had a strong party among the Rhenish electors, who were more afraid of his vengeance, if resisted, than of any certain succour from the other side. Two Hohenzollern brothers, *both Electors, Joachim of Brandenburg and Albert, Archbishop of Mainz,*

FRANCIS I

were ready to sell their votes to the highest bidder—for cash. For all that, the position of Charles was a strong one. The Electors, even if venal, were all Germans. The Renaissance movement in Germany was intensely national; the literary revival, both learned and popular, had aroused strong patriotic feelings, and Charles was at least more of a German than Francis, and was indisputably a Hapsburg. Francis might talk of leading a crusade against the Ottomans, but who so fitted to lead it as an Archduke of Austria? The Swiss Diet, after considerable vacillation, decided to use its influence for Charles. The Electors of Mainz, Cologne, and Saxony, the Elector Palatine, and the King of Bohemia were ultimately won over. On 20th June 1519 Charles was unanimously elected.

On 23rd October 1520 the Emperor was crowned with stately ritual at Aix, and swore to defend the Pope and the Roman Church, and maintain the rights of the Roman Empire.

The sincerity of his words was soon put to the test; three months after his coronation the Diet of the Empire assembled at Worms.

DIET OF WORMS (1521)

Charles found himself confronted thus early in his reign by two problems of the highest significance: one was the future of Germany, the other the future of Christendom.

Germany, distraught by perpetual quarrels between the ecclesiastical and secular authorities, was in a condition of constitutional and social chaos. Feudalism, in the absence of any effective central authority, had run riot. The great princes had established States, which were virtually sovereign and independent. Hardly less powerful and independent of the Emperor were the Archiepiscopal Electors of Mainz, Trier (Tréves), and Cologne, and other great Prince-Bishops, such as the Prince-Bishop of Munster. Altogether there were over 350 Sovereign States in Germany.

Maximilian had attempted to carry out constitutional reform, but with little permanent result. Charles renewed the attempt at the Diet of Worms.

To Worms, however, the Emperor had summoned not only the Princes and Prelates of Germany, but a man who had already made history, and was destined to make more

Two days before the election of Charles there had been affixed to the door of All Saints' Church in the Saxon town of Wittenberg, a document which announced to Germany, and to the world, the advent of one of the great moments of human history. The document contained ninety-five theses or propositions, which the author was prepared to maintain in public debate. The challenge was put out by 'the Reverend Father Martin Luther, of the Order of the Augustins, Master of Arts, Master and Lecturer in Theology, who asks that such as are not able to dispute verbally with him, will do so in writing.' So the document began.

Born in 1483, of a peasant family in Saxony, Luther became a monk in the Augustinian Order, and in 1508 was appointed theological lecturer in the University lately founded at Wittenberg by the Elector of Saxony. Deeply read in the works of St. Augustine, he was powerfully attracted by his central doctrine of 'justification by faith.' A mission to Rome in 1510 opened his eyes to the abuses of the Roman system of that day, and when in 1517 Friar Tetzel appeared in Germany, Luther strongly opposed him. Tetzel came as the agent of Pope Leo X, and the vendor of Indulgences. Purchasers of Indulgences could obtain a remission of penalties for their own sins, and those of their friends and relations already in Purgatory. The profits were to go towards the rebuilding of the new St. Peter's in Rome. This traffic was the occasion of Luther's protest and challenge, and the immediate prelude to the Reformation.

The causes of historic movements must, however, be carefully distinguished from the occasion.

CAUSES OF THE REFORMATION

The movement known as the *Reformation* was the result partly of causes common to Europe as a whole, partly of circumstances peculiar to this country or that. It was at once political in character, intellectual, and spiritual. It represented, on the one hand, a revolt of the human intellect against restrictions imposed by authority upon freedom of thought; on the other a political revolt, due to the growing self-consciousnes of individual nations, against external interference. Hence it was a protest against the authority of

the Pope, both in the spiritual and the secular sphere; a demand for the reform of abuses which had crept into the administration of the Catholic Church; and, to a more limited extent, a demand also for a modification of certain doctrines maintained by the Church and held by it to be essential to the salvation of men.

Two things in particular rendered revolt against Rome almost inevitable. On the one hand, the Papacy had become a Temporal Power, attempting to make use of ecclesiastical authority and spiritual weapons to promote its political and territorial interests. On the other, secular princes were expanding and consolidating their kingdoms, and were at the same time giving to their people a consciousness of national individuality. Political Catholicism was, in fact, doomed from the moment that the nationality principle began effectively to emerge.

REVOLT AGAINST PAPAL AUTHORITY

The œcumenical authority of a Pope might well coexist with that of an Emperor, claiming universal obedience; but it was bound to conflict with the spirit of nationality. The Papacy, even in its best days—in those of Hildebrand, of Innocent III, and Boniface VIII—had found itself in conflict with the precocious national spirit of England. Its authority was further undermined by the seventy years' captivity at Avignon (1305–78), which dealt a serious blow at an Institution which claimed to be supra-national. A Pope residing at Avignon could hardly escape the suspicion of French sympathies.

The Babylonish captivity was, moreover, coincident with the appearance of the learned critics of Roman doctrine. The famous Schoolman, William of Occam, was among the first to question the claims of the Papacy to infallibility; Marsiglio of Padua attacked the primacy of the Roman See. John Wyclif, beginning with an attack upon the practical abuses of the Papacy, proceeded to an assault upon the sacramental doctrines of the Catholic Church. Oxford students carried Wycliffite doctrines to Prague; and Bohemia was for twenty years distracted by the Hussite Wars (1415–36). Huss himself was burnt as a heretic at Constance (1415), and the revolt to which he gave his name was stamped out in blood.

Nor was Italy itself immune from the infection of reform.

In Florence, Girolamo Savonarola (1452–98), a Dominican friar who became Prior of St. Mark's, initiated a great crusade for the reformation of morals and the purification of the Church. He made no attack upon Catholic doctrine, nor upon Papal authority. He would have reformed the Church from within, and only when excommunicated by Pope Alexander VI did he appeal to the secular sovereigns to demand the summoning of a General Council. But the established Powers were too strong for him. Like Huss, Savonarola sacrificed his life for the people he hoped to save from their sins, and for the Church of which he was a faithful son.

The Avignon captivity had been promptly followed by the Great Schism (1378–1417), when, as Macaulay wrote:

THE GREAT SCHISM

'Two popes, each with a doubtful title, made all Europe ring with their mutual invectives and anathemas.'

Several attempts were made in the fifteenth century to heal the schism which was causing such pain to Christians and such scandal to their Church. A General Council held at Pisa (1409) was followed by a second at Constance (1415–8), and a third at Basle (1431–49). The object of these Councils—notably that of Constance—was to restore unity to a distracted Christendom; to reform the Church in Head and members, and to purge it of erroneous doctrines. The Council of Constance healed the Schism by the election of Pope Martin V, but both there and at Basle the Papal party succeeded in frustrating the efforts of the reformers, and thus rendered ultimately inevitable the break-up of Catholic unity and the division of Europe into hostile religious camps.

GENERAL COUNCIL

Both in England and in Germany the revival of learning was, as we have seen, closely connected with Theology. To men like Colet and Erasmus a knowledge of Greek meant primarily a new and potent instrument for a better understanding of the New Testament—a 'closer walk with God.' The application of the historic method to the interpretation of the Scriptures could not fail to modify the attitude of scholars towards Catholic doctrine, but neither Colet nor Erasmus would have approved a breach with Rome. Luther

did not desire it. His attitude was essentially conservative. He wanted reform, not revolution.

Would the Pope dare to embark on reform? Could the Emperor afford to encourage it? The first Diet of the new reign was to give the answer to these questions. Nor did the Councils grapple with the gross abuses which for a long time past, and increasingly in recent years, had deeply offended the conscience of plain Christian folk. The financial extortions of Rome; the misuse of spiritual weapons such as excommunication; scandals connected with clerical privileges and immunities not a few; the evil lives of monks and clerks; the absenteeism of bishops and parish priests; the immense wealth acquired by prelates and other pluralists—these and similar abuses which could have been reformed without any infringement of Papal authority, or any intrusion upon the domain of doctrine, had brought the Church into contempt with laymen, and had driven devout clerics like Bishop Grosseteste of Lincoln to despair.

THE DIET OF WORMS (JANUARY 1521)

The desire for doctrinal reform was another matter. It operated within a much narrower sphere; but it threatened, if successful, to inflict yet more fatal injury upon the fabric of Catholicism.

CATHOLIC DOCTRINE

Luther found powerful allies in such men as Johann Reuchlin (1455–1522), a profound Hebraist, Melanchthon, a great theologian, and Ulrich von Hutten (1488–1523), a brilliant satirist. These names are typical of the alliance between the 'New Learning' and the religious Reformation. But Luther's most potent ally was the new printing-press which Gutenberg had set up at Mainz in 1435. With its aid the books and pamphlets of Luther and Erasmus, not to mention the satirical sallies of men like Sebastian Brandt[1] and Ulrich von Hutten, circulated by thousands in every town, if not in every village, in Germany. The noteworthy point, as a great historian has observed, is that the 'one characteristic common to all the popular literature of that day was hostility to the Church of Rome.'

[1] e.g. his *Narrenschiff* ('Ship of Fools'), 1494; cf. also Rosenblüt, *Fastnachtspiele* ('Carnival Sports'), 1498.

Luther had need of all the allies he could find. Rome had brought out all its weapons against him, culminating in a Papal Bull of excommunication (1520). Luther, however, had a strong protector in the Elector Frederick of Saxony, though his action in publicly burning the Papal Bull at Wittenberg (20th December 1520) somewhat alarmed the more cautious Erasmus.

Summoned under a safe conduct to Worms, Luther was required to recant his heresies. He refused in words which have become historic. 'Unless I am convinced by witness of Scripture or manifest reason . . . I neither can, nor will, recant anything. . . . Here stand I; I can no otherwise; God help me. Amen.' Human authority he defied; religion was a matter between the conscience of the individual and his God.

DIET OF WORMS

The Emperor refused to violate his safe conduct. Luther was immured in the castle of the Wartburg for his own safety, by his protector, the Elector Frederick of Saxony. But Pilate and Herod concluded their alliance; the Edict against Luther was issued by the Emperor (26th May), and though Luther might be the hero of his countrymen, he was in the eyes of the law an outlaw. The reasons for the Emperor's decision are not far to seek. He was himself a sincere Catholic; he had no sympathy either with the religious Protestantism of Luther or with the political antagonism against the Papacy, so strongly felt by many of the German princes and their peoples. After the Diet at Worms he left Germany, and did not revisit it for nine years. Moreover, the political situation in Europe, and especially in Italy (already described), made alliance with the Papacy essential to the Emperor. What mattered the condemnation of a German monk?

Detention in the Wartburg gave Luther leisure for his translation of the Bible, and his New Testament (published in 1522) was acclaimed by the German people as a trumpet-call to action. Meanwhile, Luther had emerged from his retirement in order to calm the excitement of his more violent disciples who, following the lead of Carlstadt and the prophets of Zwickau, were demanding not reform but revolution. By his influence order was temporarily restored, and in 1522 the Diet of Nuremberg bluntly informed the new

Pope, Adrian of Utrecht (Adrian VI), that any attempt to enforce the ban against Luther would provoke civil war in Germany. Germany was, indeed, in restless mood. In 1523 a League of Knights, led by Ulrich von Hutten and Franz von Sickingen—a great soldier with a strong following—was organized to force the hands of the Emperor and the princes in resisting Papal exactions. But the movement threatened anarchy: Luther frowned upon it, and the princes suppressed it (1523–4).

THE PEASANTS' WAR

Much more serious was the insurrection of the peasants (1524–5). This was directed partly against the burdens imposed upon them by their feudal lords, partly against the exactions of Rome. Warned by the disaster to the Lollard movement in England, wrought by the Peasant Revolt of 1381, Luther denounced the movement, which soon assumed a Communist character. The revolt was suppressed, 100,000 peasants perished, and their emancipation was postponed until the nineteenth century.

Nevertheless, the insurrection, first of the knights and then of the peasants, reacted prejudicially upon Luther and the cause of German Protestantism. Sharp divisions began to manifest themselves; but the lines of division were not clear. Not all Protestants were opposed to the Emperor; some Catholics were not wholehearted in support of the Papacy. The Diet of Spires (1526) recognized the fact that religious unity was for Germany a thing of the past, and decided, that until a General Council could meet, 'each state should act in such wise as it could answer to God and the Emperor.' Neither creed was to triumph over the other; the principle of *cujus regio, ejus religio*, that each prince should decide the religion of his state, was definitely accepted.

Three years later a Second Diet of Spires (1529) revoked this decision. The Emperor had in the meantime made peace with the Pope and had agreed to stamp out the Protestant heresy in Germany. The Protestants, however, refused to submit, and civil war was averted only because the Turk was at the gates of Vienna, and Protestants and Catholics united, therefore, to oppose the progress of Mohammedanism.

In 1530 the Emperor, fresh from his coronation by the

Pope at Bologna, revisited Germany, and attended the Diet at Augsburg (1530). The Protestants formulated their creed in the *Confession of Augsburg*, an historic document which, drafted by Melanchthon, established the doctrinal basis of Lutheranism. The *Confession* was conspicuous for its moderation of tone, but the Emperor's reply was to order the Protestants to abandon their Faith. They refused and formed the League of Schmalkalde to oppose the League of the Catholic Princes formed at Ratisbon. Civil war seemed imminent. But once again the advance of the Turks averted it, and the Interim Edict of Nuremberg issued by the Emperor in 1532 accorded to the Protestants a temporary and provisional toleration.

During the next ten years Protestantism made steady progress. Efforts were made in a series of conferences to reach a compromise between the two creeds, and at Ratisbon (1541) there seemed a hope of it, but it faded. The differences were, in truth, irreconcilable. In 1544 the Treaty of Crespy between Charles and Francis provided for a joint effort to suppress Protestantism in their respective countries, and the Emperor determined to fulfil his part of the pact.

The death of Luther (1546) was followed immediately by the outbreak of war; the Protestants suffered a terrible defeat at Mühlberg (1547) and the Schmalkaldic League was crushed. By the *Interim* of Augsburg (1548) the Emperor attempted to impose his own compromise on both parties, but failed to effect their reconciliation. Many German princes, friendly to Catholicism, were deeply incensed by the harsh ejection of the Elector Frederick from Saxony, and the brutal treatment accorded to Philip of Hesse and other Protestant princes. All Germany resented the presence of Spanish soldiery by whose aid German Protestantism had been crushed. Maurice, Duke of Saxony, to whose adhesion the Emperor's success in 1547 was largely due, led the princely revolt against him, entered into a treaty with Francis II, occupied Augsburg, and restored Lutheranism in that great Imperial and Catholic stronghold. The Emperor took refuge in Italy, and Maurice concluded peace with the Archduke Ferdinand at Passau. The Elector Frederick and the other imprisoned princes were to be released and complete liberty of conscience to be conceded.


Three years later a final settlement was reached and embodied in the Peace of Augsburg (February 1555). The basis of this settlement was not liberty of conscience for individuals, but *cujus regio, ejus religio*. Each prince was to dictate the creed of his own subjects. Lutheranism, as defined in the Confession of Augsburg, was the only recognized form of Protestantism; Zwinglians and Calvinists were excluded from the settlement. The possession of ecclesiastical lands 'secularized' (i.e. which had passed to laymen) before 1552 was guaranteed to the present holders, but any ecclesiastical prince henceforth going over to Protestantism was to forfeit his lands. This clause, known as the 'Ecclesiastical Reservation,' was a fertile source of disputation in subsequent years, and was one of the main causes of the Thirty Years' War.

PEACE OF AUGSBURG (1555)

The settlement, though not in accord with modern notions, was a momentous one for Germany. Lutheranism had obtained a legal footing alongside the 'old religion,' and though fresh seeds of strife were sown, the land enjoyed for a full half-century a measure of peace.

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NORTHERN EUROPE IN 1592

CHAPTER VII

THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION

SCANDINAVIA AND SWITZERLAND

LUTHER and Melanchthon gave to Germany a pre-eminence among the countries in which Protestantism took root. But the revolt against Rome was not confined to Germany. To say nothing of England or Scotland, which the present narrative only touches incidentally, or France where Protestantism achieved little success, it spread to Scandinavia, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. With the Netherlands a future chapter will deal. The present one is concerned with Scandinavia and Switzerland.

REFORMATION IN SWEDEN

The Union of Calmar by which, as we have seen, the three Scandinavian countries were brought under the rule of a common Sovereign, had from the first a precarious existence, and survived, with considerable intervals, only until 1523. In 1513 there ascended the throne Christian II, a man of great ambition and considerable ability, but treacherous character. His ambition was to make the Crown hereditary and the union a reality. But the Swedish nobles were impatient of Danish rule and made several attempts to end it. After more than one unsuccessful attempt to assert his authority over Sweden, Christian thought to cow his opponents into submission by one act of atrocious cruelty. On the morrow of his coronation in Stockholm (4th November 1520), nearly one hundred nobles and prelates, the leaders of Swedish nationalism, were suddenly arrested and put to death, their bodies being burnt. The memory of the 'Nero of the North' and the 'Stockholm Bath of Blood' has never faded from the minds of the Swedish people, and has made for ever impossible a Scandinavian union. One of the victims of Christian's cruelty was the father of Gustavus Vasa, who had been

carried off to Denmark as a hostage in 1517, but had escaped to Sweden in 1520. He raised an army of peasants, took Westeräs and Upsala, but failed to expel the Danish garrison from Stockholm. In 1523, however, an insurrection in Denmark drove Christian from the throne, and transferred it to his uncle, Frederick Duke of Schleswig-Holstein. The Danish garrison was then withdrawn from Stockholm, and Gustavus Vasa, already Regent, was elected King, and by a treaty concluded with Frederick I of Denmark the independence of Sweden was acknowledged.

All real power was, however, vested in the clergy and the aristocracy. The Crown was impotent; the country was burdened with debt. Gustavus, therefore, determined to adopt Lutheranism with the twofold object of increasing the power of the Crown and transferring to the Royal Treasury at least a portion of the wealth of the clergy. Lutheran preachers, teachers, and literature were cautiously introduced into the country, and in 1527 there met at Westeräs a Diet or Riksdag, where representatives of the citizens and peasants appeared for the first time along with the nobles and clergy.

That Diet marks the birth of Sweden as a European Power. After a stubborn fight on the part of the clergy, all ecclesiastical property was put at the disposal of the king, who, after making reasonable provision for the work of the Church, shared the spoils with the nobles. The Church thus became entirely dependent on the Crown. Obedience was withdrawn from Rome; the Confession of Augsburg was adopted as a basis of doctrine, but Episcopacy was retained, and little change was made in the liturgy and ritual to which the people were accustomed. It will be noticed that the Reformation settlement in Sweden closely resembled that in England; the relations between the two Churches have from the first been consistently friendly and close, and it is from the Swedish Episcopate that the Anglican Church in the United States derives its claim to Apostolic Orders.

Other results flowed from the Reformation. Hitherto, Sweden had been commercially dependent on the Hanseatic League, and in particular owed a heavy debt to Lübeck. The confiscated wealth of the Church enabled Gustavus to

discharge the debt and to put an end to the Hanseatic monopoly.

Finally, the Diets of 1540 and 1544 abolished the elective kingship, and entailed the Crown on the descendants of Gustavus. Thus did Gustavus avert from the Swedes the fate which awaited the Poles, and prepare the way for Sweden's rise to eminence under the 'Lion of the North.'

THE REFORMATION IN DENMARK

The Reformation in Denmark was begun by Frederick I. At the Diet of Odensee (1527) the Papal power was curtailed; liberty of conscience was decreed, the marriage of priests permitted, and the Church subordinated to the Crown.

Frederick, however, died in 1533, and his son, Christian III (1534–59), though elected to the throne in 1534, had to make good his position against a menacing coalition. The peasants and towns rose in rebellion, and found a leader in the Count of Oldenburg, a kinsman of the exiled King Christian II, and proclaimed the latter king. Supported by Lübeck where the democratic party had obtained power, they maintained an intermittent struggle for some two years, but Christian III, with the help of the nobles and of Gustavus of Sweden, gradually established his authority.

Charles III was a zealous Lutheran, and in 1536 summoned representatives of the nobles and cities and peasants to a Diet, by which, in the absence of the clergy, the final stages of the Reformation were rapidly carried through. The bishops were deprived of their authority, but practically retained their spiritual functions under the new title of *Overseers*. Church property was placed at the disposal of the king, who used most of it to reward the nobles for their support; and an Ecclesiastical Ordinance, the terms of which were approved by Luther, was issued for the regulation of faith and discipline. In Denmark, as in Sweden, the services were conducted much as they always had been. The new ecclesiastical system was subsequently imposed upon Norway and Iceland.

Throughout Scandinavia the Protestant Reformation was primarily political in origin and in results. In Sweden the profits accrued mainly to the Crown; in Denmark to the

He was induced to remain, and proceeded to impose his strict discipline upon the city. Except for three years, 1538–41, when his enemies drove him into banishment, Geneva was ruled by him until his death in 1564.


Calvin's rule in Geneva was the nearest approach to a Theocracy that the modern world has known. The Church was the State; the State was the Church. Citizenship was conditional upon Church membership, and Church membership meant acceptance of the Confession of Faith, and obedience to the ordinances of the Church. Supreme authority was vested in a Consistory of six clergy and twelve laymen. The minutest details of individual conduct—food, dress, and so forth—were subject to regulation. The rules of social life, based on the Word of God, were enforced by spiritual penalties—penance, confession, and exclusion from communion—with ultimate recourse to the civil arm. Sin was synonymous with crime. A breach of the Commandments brought the offender into conflict with the law. Heresy was treason. In 1547, Gruet, who had held high office in the city, was executed for unbelief; in 1553, Servetus, a Spaniard who disputed Calvin's Theology, was burnt as a heretic.

It is easy to denounce such a rule as tyrannical; the unlovely side of Calvinism is illustrated in Nathaniel Hawthorne's masterpiece, *The Scarlet Letter*. But let those who would cast a stone at Calvin read Froude's essays on Calvinism;[1] let them reflect on the contribution which the Scotch have made to the building of the British Commonwealth, and to the evangelization and civilization of mankind. Calvin was a Protestant Pope. 'New Presbyter is but Old Priest write large.' Be it so. But where would Milton's 'Chief of men' have been without Calvin? Who but Calvin nerved the Dutch burghers to resist Philip II and the Inquisition? But for the faith derived from Geneva would the Pilgrim Fathers ever have embarked on the *Mayflower*? Could the Puritan colonies have come to the birth?

[1] 'Calvinism,' and 'The Influence of Calvinism upon the Scottish Character,' *Short Studies on Great Subjects*.

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THE NETHERLANDS

CHAPTER VIII

THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION

THE COMPANY OF JESUS, THE INQUISITION, AND THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

OUTSTANDING DATES

1482. Reorganization of the Inquisition in Spain.
1520 (*circa*). Foundation of The Oratory of Divine Love.
1525. Capuchins founded.
1530. Barnabites founded.
1534. Foundation of Jesuit Order.
1534–50. Paul III, Pope.
1540. Paul III grants Charter to Company of Jesus.
1541. Conference at Ratisbon.
1542. Inquisition established at Rome by Paul III.
1545. Council of Trent meets.
1547. Council transferred to Bologna.
1551–2. Second Session of Council of Trent.
1555–9. Paul IV, Pope.
1556. Accession of Philip II—1598
1559. First *Index* drafted by Paul IV.
1559–65. Pope Pius IV.
1562–3. Third Session of Council.
1568–70. Suppression of Moriscoes Final expulsion from Spain (1609).
1585–90. Sixtus V, Pope.

HAPPILY it is no longer necessary, in order to appreciate the greatness of the Protestant Reformers, to disparage the work of the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, nor to ignore the significance of the reforms effected by that Church in the sixteenth century. In all the history of religion there is, indeed, nothing more remarkable than the recovery made by Catholicism after the rapid progress of the Protsetant Reformation. 'Fifty years after the Lutheran separation, Catholicism could scarcely maintain itself on the shores of the Mediterranean. A hundred

years after the separation Protestantism could scarcely maintain itself on the shores of the Baltic.' Macaulay did not in this case sacrifice accuracy to antithesis. Before half a century had passed after the Diet of Worms, Protestantism had established itself in Saxony, Prussia, Hesse, Wurtemburg, and the Palatinate, in several Cantons of Switzerland, in the Northern Netherlands, in Scandinavia, England, and Scotland. Only in Spain, Portugal, and Italy had Catholicism stood firm. The allegiance of the rest of Europe was in the balance. At the end of the sixteenth century the doubt had in all the doubtful countries—in France, the Southern Netherlands, Poland, Bohemia, and great parts of Germany—been resolved in favour of Catholicism. Since that day the frontiers of the two creeds have remained fixed.

CAUSES OF RECOVERY

The Catholic recovery was due to several converging causes: to the foundation of new religious Orders, and the revival of old ones; to the potent instrument of the Inquisition; to the reform of morals and discipline, and the redefinition of Catholic doctrine at the Council of Trent; to the influence of a succession of great and good Popes; and not least to the weaknesses which gradually revealed themselves in the armour of Protestantism.

RELIGIOUS ORDERS

Even before 1520 a society, known as 'The Oratory of Divine Love,' was founded at Rome by men who combined the spirit of the New Learning with religious fervour and practical philanthropy. In 1525 the Capuchins were founded to restore the old discipline of St. Francis of Assisi, and about the same time Caraffa (afterwards Pope Paul IV) founded the Theatine Order, not as a monastic Order, but to assist the secular clergy in preaching, administering the sacraments, and visiting the sick. In 1530 the Barnabites were founded at Milan, and later on the Oratorians at Rome, chiefly for the education of the poor. St. Angela of Brescia, a foundress of the Ursulines, and St. Theresa in Spain, proved that women also were prepared to take their part in the revival. All these Orders, however, were almost insignificant compared to that famous Order, which owed its foundation, its inspiration, and its organization to a young Spanish soldier, Don Iñigo Lopez de Recalde.

THE COMPANY OF JESUS

Born at the Castle of Loyola, in Guipuzcoa (1491), Ignatius Loyola (as the world knows him) took service under Charles V, but was so badly wounded at the Siege of Pampeluna (1521) that he was lamed for life. He determined, therefore, to enlist in the army of the Cross, and brought to the new service the same courage and zeal as had distinguished him in the old. Rejected by the Franciscans as lacking experience and learning, he devoted himself for six years (1528–34) to theological study at the University of Paris, and there, with the help of Francis Xavier and five other friends, he founded the Company of Jesus (1534). In 1540 Paul III granted a Charter to the Company, which by the middle of the century numbered no fewer than 1,500 members.

The new Order was organized as an *army*, under the command of a general, who, though invested with absolute authority, was supervised by an Adviser and Council of six persons, representing the six great Catholic provinces. At the head of each of the provinces in which the work of the Jesuit Order was organized was a *Provincial*, and under him the Fathers and Brothers. Still lower in the Jesuit hierarchy were the *spiritual coadjutors* and *scholastics*, who devoted themselves to education, and the *secular coadjutors*, who did manual work. Admission to the highest ranks involved no less than sixteen years' training, including a six-years' educational course. In addition to the three ordinary vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, the Jesuits were specially pledged to absolute obedience to the Pope.

The activities of the Jesuits were varied and world-wide; but they devoted themselves particularly to preaching (especially in the mission field), to confession, and above all to the education of the young. By 1550 they had established no fewer than thirty-six colleges, and were educating 6,000 students.

THE INQUISITION

Two years after the granting of the Charter to the Jesuits, Pope Paul III established at Rome the 'Holy Office of the Universal Church.' Six cardinals (including Caraffa) were appointed Inquisitors-General, with power to try all cases of heresy, to censor books, to imprison suspects, to extort confession by torture,

and to inflict the penalty of death. This terribly potent instrument was borrowed from Spain, where it had been revived and reorganized by the Catholic Sovereigns (1481). The Inquisition was primarily intended to extirpate heresy among Catholics, and to prevent backsliding among Jews and Moslems who had embraced Christianity. So effective was its operation in Spain, that in the first fifteen years of its existence it had burnt over 10,000 persons and inflicted penalties on 90,000 more. Among the earlier victims were many Jews and Moors, but the former were expelled from Spain in 1492 and the latter in 1499. The Moriscoes—Moors who had conformed to Christianity and been permitted, therefore, to remain in Spain—were suppressed in 1568–70, and the remnant were finally expelled from the Peninsula in 1609. The Inquisition did its work thoroughly in Spain, practically exterminating all 'Jews, infidels, and heretics.' It was not formally and finally abolished until 1820. In Italy also it succeeded, but north of the Alps—except for a brief space in the Netherlands under Philip II—it was ineffective.

Very different were the results of the Council of Trent, to which the genesis of a purified and regenerated Roman Catholicism must be traced.

THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

For some time past Charles V had been pressing the Papacy to summon a General Council to deal with the Reformation, but not until 1545 did a Pope (Paul III) consent to do so. As a means of effecting a reconciliation with the Protestants, the Council was a complete failure. It met only on the eve of the religious wars in Germany, and the Protestants refused to attend it. It magnificently succeeded, however, in reforming many of the abuses in the Catholic Church, and in redefining its doctrines.

The first session, lasting from December 1546 to September 1549, was troubled by the outbreak of religious war in Germany and by the suspicions felt by the Italian prelates as to the motives of Charles V. In 1547 the Pope accordingly transferred the Council to Bologna. A second session was held under Pope Julius III at Trent (May 1551–April 1552), but it accomplished little and was broken up by the advance of Maurice of Saxony on Innsbruck (1553) and the precipitate

flight of the Emperor into Italy. The sessions were wholly suspended during the brief Pontificate of Paul IV (Caraffa) (1555–9), but Pius IV again summoned it to Trent for its third session (January 1562–December 1563). The Emperor Ferdinand I (1556–64) still desired a reconciliation with the Protestants and urged some restriction of Papal autocracy—that the clergy should be allowed to marry, and that the laity should receive bread and wine at the Holy Table. He was supported by French and German bishops, but the Italians defeated them. The Reformation was by this time accomplished; the schism in Christendom was past healing; but the Italians were determined that even if the sphere of Roman Catholicism were restricted, it should within the circumscribed area be maintained in all its integrity and purity.

They reaped the reward of persistence. The absolute authority of the Holy See was reaffirmed; the Pope was to be the sole judge in matters of discipline and in interpretation of canon law, and infallible in matters of faith. Absenteeism and pluralities were forbidden. The State was to be subordinated to the Church; princes to be obedient to the Papacy. At the same time the Church was to be thoroughly reformed in Head and Members. Pope and Cardinals, Bishops and priests were henceforward to live up to their high professions, and abjure the sins, and even the pleasures, permitted (under penance) to the laity.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALS

Catholic doctrine was reaffirmed in its integrity: the appeal from Scripture to the Church, the Seven Sacraments, the doctrine of Purgatory, the invocation of Saints, the worship of images, the supremacy of the Holy See, and the rest.

DOCTRINE

A succession of Popes, remarkable for personal saintliness as well as for reforming zeal, gave reality to the Decrees of the Council, and crowned the work of the Catholic Reformation. The advancing tide of Protestantism was definitely arrested. A Catholic Church, reformed, purged, united in obedience to a single head, superbly organized, reinforced in missionary effort by the zeal of the Jesuits and other Orders, could now confidently confront the divided hosts of the 'heretics.' Lutherans, Zwinglians, Calvinists, and Anglicans, with their

internecine quarrels, might hold the ground already won, but the separate National Churches were hopelessly handicapped in their contest with an organization which knew nothing of national boundaries and took its orders from a single head. Only the expansion of the British race throughout the world, with some help from the Scandinavians and the Dutch, has averted the complete triumph of Rome.

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CHAPTER IX

THE BIRTH OF THE UNITED NETHERLANDS

OUTSTANDING DATES

1555 Philip II becomes Lord of the Netherlands
1559 Margaret, Regent
1566 League to resist Inquisition
1567 Alva arrives
1572 The 'Beggars' take Brill
1572 William Stadtholder
1572 Confession of Dordrecht
1574 William raises siege of Leyden
1577 Don John of Austria arrives
1576 Sack of Antwerp (The 'Spanish Fury')
1576 Pacification of Ghent
1577 States-General depose Don John
1578 Death of Don John. Alexander Farnese of Parma succeeds him
1579 Union of Utrecht.
1581 Northern Provinces declare independence
1583 Anjou sacks Antwerp.
1583 William accepts sovereignty of Holland and Zealand
1584 William murdered. Maurice of
1585 Elizabeth sends army to Netherlands under Leicester
1586 Battle of Zutphen
1588 Spanish Armada defeated
1593 States-General organized by Barneveldt
1604 Ostend taken by Spinola.
1609 Twelve Years' Truce

WHILE the Great Council was still sitting at Trent things were moving, in the Low Countries, towards a crisis charged with high significance for Europe and for the world. A new Nation-State was coming to the birth, under circumstances which have gripped the imagination of mankind. It was sponsored by men of heroic stature: William the Silent, Prince Maurice, Prince Frederick, Henry van Olden Barneveldt. They nursed into life a state destined to girdle the world with dependencies in the West Indies and the East, in America, North and South, in South Africa, Ceylon, and the Malayan Archipelago. For England, the birth of the Dutch Republic had a special interest by reason of their comradeship in the struggle first against the domination of Spain, and later against that of France, to say

nothing of the contest between them for commercial and maritime ascendancy in the intervening period. For New England also it had high significance, as affording the first model of federal government in the modern world. Nor can the student of political institutions forget that the greatness of Holland waned almost as rapidly as it had waxed: a brilliant sunrise, a splendid meridian, and then the sudden oncoming, if not of darkness, at least of twilight; nor neglect to analyse the causes thereof.

ORIGINS

The birth of the Dutch Republic was on this wise. The low-lying countries around the deltas of the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Rhine had originally formed part of the great middle kingdom, which, stretching from the North Sea to the mouth of the Tiber fell, in the partition of the Carlovingian Empire (A.D. 843), to the Emperor Lothar: from whom the land got its title of Lotharingia, or Lorraine.

As years went on, Lower Lorraine broke up into a number of feudal principalities, the Duchy of Brabant, the Counties of Flanders, Hainault, Holland, Gelderland, Limburg, and Luxemburg, with the two Prince-Bishoprics of Utrecht and Liège. But in the twelfth century onward the feudal lords were faced by the rivalry of commercial cities, such as Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres, which grew rapidly in power and wealth.

CONNEXION WITH BURGUNDY

The connexion of the Netherlands with the Duchy of Burgundy dates from the marriage of Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, with Margaret, heiress of the counties of Flanders and Artois. But the great concentration took place in the times of his grandson, Philip the Good (1419-67), who, by marriage, inheritance, purchase, or conquest, was lord of Flanders and Artois, of Holland, Zealand, Hainault and Friesland, of Namur, Luxemburg, of Brabant and Limburg. One of his illegitimate sons he made Bishop of Utrecht, another Bishop of Liège, and a half-brother Bishop of Cambrai.

Even in those days there was perceptible some tendency toward the grouping which, accentuated by the events of the sixteenth century, is now represented by the modern kingdoms of Holland and Belgium. The north-eastern States on the Rhine delta and along the Frisian coast were

Teutonic in race and speech, and politically subject to the Empire; the south-western States spoke the French tongue, and the most important of them, such as the Countries of Flanders and Artois, were fiefs of the crown of France. But despite obvious differences of race and speech, in political institutions and social customs, despite the fact that some owned the suzerainty of the Empire, and others that of the French king, these principalities had enough in common with their neighbours to encourage the hope that they would some day unite in a single State under a single ruler. It was not to be.

THE STATES GENERAL

A step towards unification was, however, taken by Charles the Bold, who, in 1465, summoned all the Provincial 'Estates' to meet in a central assembly - or *States-General* at Brussels. Under Charles V and Philip II the States General met regularly - a practice which, as facilitating taxation, was encouraged by those sovereigns.

THE 'GREAT PRIVILEGE'

On the death of Charles the Bold (1477) the lordship of the Netherlands passed to his daughter as heiress Mary, who in the same year married the Emperor Maximilian. She it was who conceded the Charter of Liberties known as the 'Great Privilege,' which, like our own *Magna Carta*, was rather a recital and reaffirmation of existing rights than a concession of new ones. Mary was accidentally killed in 1482, transmitting her rights to her young son Philip 'the Handsome,' who in 1494 took over the reins of power from his father Maximilian. In 1496 Philip married Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella. Charles V was their son.

Philip the Handsome ruled the Netherlands as a national prince; he re-established their cohesion, employed native officials, and under him the Provinces enjoyed unprecedented prosperity. Antwerp, thanks to the shifting in the centre of commercial gravity from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, became one of the great entrepots of world-trade, and the centre of world finance.

The premature death of Philip (1506) threw the Netherlands once more into confusion. Maximilian again claimed the Regency, but left the actual government in the hands of his twice-widowed daughter, Margaret. As 'Governess'

Margaret ruled the country with conspicuous tact and success, first on behalf of her father and then of her nephew Charles V, until her death in 1530.

Born at Ghent in 1500 Charles V was a true 'Burgundian,' not merely by the accident of birth, but in policy and affection.

CHARLES V

His Burgundian inheritance was indeed a noble one. Duke of Brabant, Gelderland, Limburg, and Luxemburg; Count of Flanders, Artois, Holland, Hainault, Zealand, Zutphen, and Namur; Lord of Friesland, Mechlin, Utrecht, Overyssel, and Groningen; Margrave of Antwerp—seventeen Provinces in all, containing one of the bravest and most enterprising people, and some of the wealthiest cities in the world.

The tie which united these States was as already indicated, almost entirely personal, but Charles V, despite his many preoccupations, made strenuous attempt, on the one hand, to weld these provinces into a closer union, and on the other, to [illegible] organic relation with the Empire of which he was the head. The States General was summoned with greater frequency, a central Court of Justice was erected at Mechlin; three Central Councils were established for foreign affairs, for finance, and for justice and police, the privileges of the all-powerful cities were curtailed, and in each province a Stadtholder was nominated by the Emperor.

In theory the Stadtholder never became more than a provincial officer, but after the office became elective several provinces would elect the same person, and so the Stadtholder came to represent the United Provinces in relation to foreign states, as well as to control the armed forces of the Republic.

To the Stadtholderate of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht Charles appointed, in defiance of the terms of the 'Groot Privilege' of 1477, a foreign noble, René of Chalons, Prince of Orange. René died in 1544,

WILLIAM OF ORANGE 1533–84

bequeathing his title and his territories to a young cousin, William of Nassau. The Emperor insisted that the prince should be brought up at Brussels, and, though his parents were Lutherans, as a Catholic. William rose rapidly in the favour of the Emperor, and it was on his shoulder that the Emperor leant at the magnificent ceremony

which marked his formal abdication of the Empire (1555).

Charles V handed over the Netherlands to his son Philip, who showed no less favour to William. He employed him to negotiate the Treaty of Cateau Cambrésis (1550), and on his return from France made him a Knight of the Golden Fleece, and appointed him Stadtholder of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht. But between the two men a coolness soon developed, and coolness deepened into hostility.

PHILIP II. (1555–67)

Philip II, unlike his father, was a foreigner in the Netherlands, a Spaniard of the Spaniards. He was determined to reduce his Burgundian inheritance to the status of a Spanish province, and to impose upon all his subjects therein—nobles, burghers, and peasants alike—the creed in which he was himself an ardent believer.

The Protestant 'heresy' had already made considerable progress under Charles V, despite a series of Edicts designed to 'exterminate the root and ground of this pest.' The Inquisition, encouraged to activity by the Emperor, claimed 50,000 victims before he abdicated. Yet in spite of all that Charles and his Pope Adrian VI (of Utrecht) could do to arrest its progress, Protestantism gained more and more adherents. Dutch Protestantism was heterogeneous in character. The teaching of Wyclif and Huss had found a ready response in the Netherlands. Erasmus, Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin all had their disciples. Munster was the centre of the Anabaptist rising in 1535, but it was to Geneva that the young nobles flocked for education, and it was Calvinism which was finally accepted in the Confession of Dordrecht (1572).

PROTESTANTISM IN THE NETHERLANDS

Meanwhile much had happened. Philip II had in 1550 said good-bye to subjects with whom he had no sympathy, and never saw again. He left the government in the hands of his half-sister Margaret, Duchess of Parma, who ruled the Netherlands for eight years (1559–67); but with none of the understanding which had endeared the two preceding governesses to the people.

MARGARET OF PARMA (1559–67)

Many things contributed to swell the gathering discontent: the rapid increase of unconstitutional taxation, the violation of municipal liberties; the persistent defiance

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of local customs; the appointment of Spaniards to all the higher offices; the presence of Spanish soldiery; the multiplication of bishoprics far beyond the needs of the country, and above all the religious persecution remorselessly applied by the Inquisition. In 1560 Philip appointed to the Archbishop of Malines, with the title of Primate, Cardinal Granvella. For four years (1560–4) he ruled the Netherlands with a heavy hand, but in 1564, in deference to the advice of Margaret and a strong protest from leading nobles, Granvella was dismissed. The main authors of the protest were William of Orange and the Counts of Egmont and Horn.

Philip II momentarily yielded only to strike harder. He would not reign over heretics: discontent should be crushed.

ALVA

A large force was accordingly dispatched to the Netherlands under the command of the Duke of Alva. Alva was no statesman, but as a soldier had won distinction on many fields, and he arrived at Brussels (August 1567) bent not on conciliation but on conquest. He lost no time. A 'Council of Blood' was set up. A reign of terror was inaugurated. Within a few months it counted 1,800 victims. Egmont and Horn were among the first to be arrested, and in June 1568 were executed at Brussels.

William of Orange, still protesting his loyalty to the Spanish sovereign, then took up arms, not against his king, but against the cruel and tyrannical soldier who was dragooning the Netherlands into submission. He was no match for Alva in the field, and in 1569 was compelled to withdraw from the Netherlands. 'He may be considered as a dead man,' wrote Alva to Philip. Alva's triumph though apparently complete was delusive.

Crushed on land the 'Confederates,' defiantly accepting the designation of 'the Beggars' derisively applied to them,

THE BEGGARS'

took to the sea and captured Brill and Flushing in 1572, and a little later seized the Lisbon fleet, with much treasure aboard, off Walcheren. In the Southern States Alva's power was unbroken, but 'the Beggars' maintained their superiority at sea. Even Philip began to perceive that the situation demanded statesmanship as well as force. In 1573 Alva was dismissed and succeeded by Don Louis de Requesens. But neither Requesens nor his 60,000 troops could quell the spirit of the Northern States. In 1574

Leyden, after a six months' siege heroically sustained, was heroically saved by the cutting of the dykes. A famous university still commemorates this deed. Hardly less splendid, though less successful, was the siege of Haarlem (December 1572–July 1573). In March 1576 Requesens died suddenly, and to him there succeeded the most brilliant captain of the age, the victor of Lepanto, Philip's half-brother, Don John of Austria.

Before his arrival, however, two things had happened to accentuate his difficulties. The Spanish garrison, whose pay was hopelessly in arrear, refused to accept orders from the Council of State, broke into open mutiny, and sacked and plundered some of the wealthiest cities of the Netherlands. For three days Antwerp was delivered over to the Spanish fury, and the most Catholic capital of the most Catholic province no longer hesitated to make common cause with the Calvinistic North.

THE SPANISH FURY

The opportunity of William of Orange had at last come.

His position had been greatly strengthened (April 1576) by the federation of the two provinces of Holland and Zealand. This *Union of Delft* was the nucleus of the United Provinces. The two seaboard provinces agreed to 'indissoluble union,' constituted William 'Sovereign *ad interim*' with supreme control, civil and military. He on his part undertook, while promising complete toleration for other creeds, to uphold the reformed religion, and passionately appealed to the other provinces to join the Union.

THE UNION OF DELFT (APRIL 1576)

The Union of Ghent was an answer to his appeal. All the seventeen provinces came into line, and while affirming their loyalty to Philip proclaimed their own solidarity and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Spanish troops and the summoning of a States-General. Don John, on his arrival (1577), accepted the Pacification and induced Philip to embody the terms in his *Perpetual Edict* (17th February 1577). In September William made a triumphant state-entry into Brussels.

THE PACIFICATION OF GHENT (NOVEMBER 1576)

But his triumph was brief. Between the Southern and Northern Provinces there was no real unity. Don John adroitly took advantage of the jealousy between them, and

in January 1579 some of the Southern Provinces and cities seceded and formed the Union of Arras. That Union was the nucleus of the Spanish (later to be the Austrian) Netherlands, and so of Belgium.

William then accepted the *Union of Utrecht*. Philip had, in the meantime, outlawed him and put a price upon his head. In the *Union of Utrecht* the five (subsequently seven) Northern Provinces formed themselves into a federal union against a 'foreign oppressor,' and drafted an elaborate but clumsy Constitution.[1] Two years later they proclaimed themselves independent as the Dutch Republic.

THE UNION OF UTRECHT (JANUARY 1579)

Meanwhile (1578) Philip had appointed Alexander Farnese, a son of Margaret of Parma, as Viceroy. He was the ablest of the series, but neither his firmness nor his moderation could do more than retain the Southern Provinces for Spain. In 1580 the stadtholderate of the Northern Provinces was accepted by Francis Duke of Anjou, a son of Catharine de Medici and the brother and heir of Henry III of France; in 1581 he invaded Cambrai at the head of a French army; and in 1582 entered Antwerp in triumph. But the triumph was short. He attempted a royalist and Catholic *coup d'etat*; but though the Frenchmen attacked with shouts of 'Tue, Tue! Vive la Messe!' the citizens withstood this 'French Fury,' and the Duke sought safety in France, when on 10th June 1584 he died. Exactly a month later (10th July) William was assassinated at Delft. But his work was accomplished; he had won independence for a new nation-state.[2]

He was succeeded as stadtholder by his son Maurice; but the fortunes of the young Republic were becoming more and more closely involved in those of their neighbours.

The English Protestants had hailed the revolt of the Netherlands with enthusiasm. The feelings of their queen were more restrained. Elizabeth disliked Calvinism and regarded rebellion as the sin of witchcraft. Still, Philip was her enemy, and she could not regret the troubles that fell on him. She took

QUEEN ELIZABETH IN THE NETHERLANDS

[1] For details and criticism, see Marriott, *Mechanism of the Modern State*, vol. ii, p. 397, *seq.*

[2] This view is seriously questioned by the most recent authority, Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands.*

good care, therefore, that the rebellion should not be too easily repressed. She encouraged her seamen to attack Spanish ships and Spanish towns; she allowed her subjects to volunteer for service in the Low Countries, and sent money to William of Orange—all this privily.

The death of William somewhat forced Elizabeth's hands. She refused, indeed, the proffered sovereignty of the Netherlands, but she openly sent them money, and in 1585 sent her old favourite Leicester at the head of a large force to their assistance. Leicester incurred her grave displeasure by accepting the title of stadtholder, but his expedition, though barren of results, either political or military, was rendered memorable by the battle of Zutphen and the death of Sir Philip Sidney (1586).

In 1587 Mary Queen of Scots was executed, and in 1588 Philip, driven to frenzy by the attacks of Drake and other 'sea-dogs,' launched his great attack upon England. The defeat and dispersal of the Armada marked a great epoch not only in the history of England but in that of Europe, and not least in that of the Dutch Republic. Before the death of Alexander of Parma (1592) the Southern Netherlands had completely returned to obedience, and until the French Revolution, when they were annexed to France, they remained an appanage of the Hapsburg House, until 1702 of the Spanish, and later of the Austrian branch.

The Armada set the seal upon the independence of the Dutch Republic. Philip survived that disaster for ten years; but in 1585 he had appointed his son-in-law Albert (son of the Emperor Maximilian II) 'sovereign' of the Netherlands; but Albert's sovereignty was in fact confined to the Southern Provinces, and even there was incomplete. For three years (1601–4) the Spaniards besieged Ostend but failed to take it; and, though the war nominally dragged on until 1609, the death of Philip in 1598 relieved the Northern Provinces of all real apprehension.

In 1609 a twelve years' truce was concluded between Spain and Holland, which virtually acknowledged the independence of the Dutch Republic. It was formally acknowledged in 1648 by the Treaty of Westphalia.

Never was success better deserved. The 'rebels' had, indeed, many points in their favour. Philip, though a relent-

less antagonist, was remote from the scene of operations, and his line of communications was rendered insecure by the English seamen. And while the English privateers served the Dutch cause well, their mistress would, if necessary, have made a real sacrifice to prevent the Dutch being crushed by Philip. In regard to France, too, fortune was kind to the Dutch. Had there been a cordial alliance between the two great Catholic Powers nothing could have saved the Dutch; but France, even apart from the Huguenots, had several other political skeletons in her own cupboard, and was not too anxious to remove all difficulties from the path of Philip. Nevertheless, political complications would have availed the Dutch patriots little, but for their own sturdy and indomitable spirit, the brilliant inspiration which led them to transfer the duel to the sea, and the splendid leadership of a great statesman.

REASONS FOR SUCCESS OF THE DUTCH

FOR FURTHER READING

P. J. Blok: *History of the Netherlands.* J. L. Motley: *Rise of the Dutch Republic,* and *United Netherlands.* W. H. Prescott: *Philip II.* H. Pirenne: *Belgian Democracy.* H. Vander Linden: *Belgium* (Oxford, 1920). F. Harrison: *William the Silent.* R. Putnam: *William the Silent.* P. Geyl: *The Revolt of the Netherlands.*

CHAPTER X

CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS IN FRANCE

THE WARS OF RELIGION; HENRY IV AND THE EDICT OF NANTES

OUTSTANDING DATES

1535. The Fête of Paris.
1536. Calvin's *Institutio*.
1545. Massacre of Vaudois.
1551. Henry II issues Edict of Chateaubriant
1559 Protestant Synod at Paris.
1559 The Guises in power.
1560. Conspiracy of Amboise.
1560 States-General of Orleans
1561. Edict of July.
1561 Conference at Poissy.
1562 Edict of Toleration (January).
1562. Massacre at Vassy.
1562–93. Civil Wars.
1563. Murder of Duke of Guise.
1563 Peace of Amboise (March).
1570. Treaty of St. Germain.
1572 Massacre of St. Bartholomew.
1573 Edict of Rochelle.
1576. Peace of Monsieur
1576. The Catholic League.
1585–9 War of the Three Henries
1589. Assassination of Henry III ends Valois line.
1589 Accession of Henry IV (Bourbon).
1589 Battle of Arques.
1590 Battle of Ivry.
1593. Henry IV becomes a Catholic.
1594. Henry IV enters Paris.
1597. Sully, Minister of Finance.
1598. Edict of Nantes.
1610. *The Great Design.*
1610. Murder of Henry IV.

FROM the angle adopted in this book the Reformation movement in France was of little significance compared with the parallel movements in Germany, England, Switzerland, Scotland, the Netherlands, and even Scandinavia. The story of the so-called 'Wars of Religion' is, moreover, complicated and tiresome. They shall be treated as summarily as possible.

Yet the subject cannot be wholly ignored. France, for reasons already explained, has played and plays so great a part in European history that nothing which has affected her internal unity or her influence abroad can be dismissed as trivial.

Of the general causes[1] tending throughout Europe to undermine the position of Roman Catholicism one was conspicuously absent in France, another was exceptionally potent. In French Protestantism there was no element of nationalism. On the contrary, it was emphatically provincial, and gravely threatened national unity. But it was pre-eminently an intellectual revolt. The connexion between the Renaissance and the Reformation was in France particularly close. Such typical works as Erasmus's *Praise of Folly*, and Sebastian Brandt's *Ship of Fools*, were widely read in French translations. A translation of the *New Testament* published in 1523 by Jacques Lefèvre gave a powerful impulse to a study of the Scriptures. The University of Paris had been in the forefront of the Conciliar movement of the fifteenth century, and consistently anxious for a reform of morals and discipline. But until Francis I announced his intention to punish all heretics with death, and himself initiated the infamous Fête of Paris (29th January 1535), there was nothing revolutionary in French Protestantism. On the contrary, there seemed every likelihood that the Gallican Church would carry through reform from within, without any breach of Catholic continuity or any revolt against the spiritual Primacy of Rome.

FRENCH PROTESTANTISM

That hope was shattered by the purely political attitude of the Crown, veering in this direction or in that, according to the cross-currents of the political situation, internal and external, by the violence of a few Protestant zealots, and by the outbreak of persecution which that violence provoked.

Among the witnesses of the horrors perpetrated at the Fête of Paris was John Calvin, who, as already mentioned, fled from France, and in 1536 published his *Institutio*. That great work provided the French Protestants with a Confession of Faith and a scheme of Church Government. In May 1559 a General Assembly representative of the Huguenot congregations in all parts of France was held in Paris, and there the Calvinist system was formally adopted. From that Synod the French Protestant Church as an organized body may, indeed, be dated. The *Confession of Faith* drawn up at Paris was epitomized from the *Institutio*, its fundamental

[1] Cf. *supra*, p. 82 *seq.*

article being that Holy Scripture was to be taken as the supreme rule of life, and the sole criterion of truth. The government of each local church was vested in the body of ruling elders (the Consistory), which was to call the minister and provide for church services. A veto on all appointments was, however, reserved to the congregation. There were to be Local Conferences, consisting of the minister and one elder from each church in the district; Provincial Synods were to meet periodically in each of the sixteen provinces, and once a year a National Synod composed of two ministers and two elders representing each Provincial Synod was to meet. This scheme, closely following the principles laid down by Calvin, was entirely democratic, emphasizing the equality of clergy and laymen in Church government, the derivation of all power from the will of the people, and the assertion of that will by representation based on manhood suffrage.

Meanwhile, the horrors of the Fête of Paris were re-enacted on a still larger scale among the Protestant Vaudois of Provence (1540–5), and in 1551 the Edict of Chanteaubriant ordered that all heretics should be put to death, and that schools, hospitals, and even cemeteries should be open only to those who could produce a certificate of orthodoxy. Special committees known as *chambres ardentes* were set up in connexion with the Parliaments to administer the laws against heresy, and in 1557 by order of Paul IV the Inquisition was extended to France.

THE GUISES IN POWER

Henry II was in 1559 accidentally killed in a tournament, leaving three young sons who became successively Kings of France: Francis II (1559-60), Charles IX (1560–74), and Henry III (1574–89). With the death of Henry III in 1589 the Valois dynasty came to an inglorious end. In the meantime France was distracted by thirty years of civil war and by the ceaseless struggle of the Queen Mother (Catharine de Medici) and the powerful family of the Guises, to acquire or retain political ascendancy.

The Guises were one of those border families whose position was semi-royal. They ruled Lorraine as Dukes for many centuries until, under the Treaty of Vienna (1735), they exchanged Lorraine for Tuscany, and Lorraine was

absorbed into the kingdom of France. A younger branch of the family held the French Duchy of Guise, and only with them this narrative is concerned, and in particular with Francis, Duke of Guise, the brilliant defender of Metz and captor of Calais, and his brother Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine. Their European position was much strengthened by the marriage (1558) of Francis II to their niece Mary Stuart, but they were not without enemies and rivals at home. Of these the most important were the Bourbon Princes, Anthony, King of Navarre, and his brother the Prince of Condé. In 1560 the latter consented to lend his great name to a foolish project for seizing the persons of the King and the two Guises with a view to emancipating the former from the tutelage of the latter. The plot, known as the Conspiracy of Amboise, hopelessly miscarried and only gave the Guises an excuse for taking a terrible revenge on the Huguenots. The sudden death of Francis II (1560) temporarily upset the plans of the Guises; and Catharine de Medici, who became regent for her young son Charles IX, accepted the advice of the new Chancellor, Michel de l'Hôpital, to summon a States-General (1560). This body, meeting at Orleans, urged a policy of toleration, and in July 1561 an edict was issued which, while forbidding public worship to the Calvinists, granted some modified toleration for private worship. A conference held at Poissy (September 1561) attempted to reach a compromise, and in January 1562 an edict gave the Huguenots liberty to worship in public anywhere except in towns; but these concessions served only to exasperate the Catholics and to encourage the more extreme Protestants to outrages upon Catholics.

CONSPIRACY OF AMBOISE (1560)

The massacre of a Protestant congregation at Vassy (March 1562) was the immediate prelude to the outbreak of the civil wars, which lasted with intervals until 1593. No fewer than eight of them, with as many treaties, are commonly distinguished by the chroniclers, but it were tedious to follow them in detail. The first series of (four) wars culminated in the massacre of St. Bartholomew and was ended by the Treaty of Rochelle. During this period the outstanding figure on the Huguenot side was the 'Admiral' Gaspard de Coligny, a convinced

THE WARS OF RELIGION (1562–93)

Protestant and a distinguished soldier. His assassination in 1572 was one of the tragic incidents, if not the occasion, of the massacre.

THE MASSACRE OF ST. BARTHOLOMEW

About the massacre itself historians are still hotly disputing, as to how far it was deliberately planned and premeditated, and what was the number of the victims. Modern criticism tends, on the whole, to the view that though the assassination of the leaders, and, in particular, of Coligny was planned, the general massacre was due to the fact that the Parisian mob, not for the first nor for the last time, got out of hand. As to the extent of the massacre Sully estimated the number of victims at 70,000. Lord Acton[1] puts the number at 5,000 for the whole of France, including 2,000 in Paris. At Rome, where a *Te Deum* was sung and a medal was struck in celebration of the events, the number was put at 60,000 for Paris alone. Reports, brought to England by refugees, put it at 100,000. All that is certain is that Paris was crowded with Huguenots who had come to the capital for the marriage of Henry of Navarre and Margaret of Valois, the king's sister, and that the Catholics slew all on whom they could lay hands.

THE *POLITIQUES*

It was a revolting deed, and it has resounded down the ages, but the results of it were curiously insignificant. It naturally excited great indignation among the Protestants in other lands, but no Protestant ruler was in a position to send any effective help to the Huguenots; most of them had skeletons in their own cupboards. The French Huguenots were not cowed into submission. La Rochelle was a veritable city of refuge, and held out against all attempts to take it. The most notable result of the St. Bartholomew was to strengthen a middle party in France, neither Roman, Genevan, nor Lutheran, but French; disgusted with the self-seeking Guises and the alliance between the great feudal lords and the municipal democracy of Paris, which was the basis of the Catholic League; hardly less disgusted by the violence of some Protestant zealots; anxious only to promote the unity and peace of France. It was plain that, as things were, it was only through the Crown that they could attain these objects. *Les Politiques*, therefore,

[1] *Lectures on Modern History*, p. 162.

were ardent supporters of the monarchy against the disintegrating forces of an ultramontane Church, a feudal aristocracy, and a Protestant democracy. Of this middle party the Chancellor l'Hôpital was the leader and outstanding representative.

A less direct but not less important effect of religious persecution was to raise in the minds of thoughtful men questions as to the ultimate basis of political authority. From the question, 'What right has a ruler to dictate the religion of his subjects?' it was an easy step to the broader question, 'By what right do rulers rule?' Languet's *Vindiciæ Contra Tyrannos* was only one of many works which showed how the leaven of revolutionary thought was working.

POLITICAL THEORY

To resume. The first period of the civil wars was ended by the Treaty of Rochelle (1573), which conceded liberty of conscience to all, but permitted Protestants to meet for public worship only in La Rochelle, Nîmes, Montauban, and in the houses of certain Protestant nobles. These concessions were further extended by the Peace of Monsieur, which brought the next 'war' to an end in 1576. The terms of this Treaty anticipated those of the Edict of Nantes. The Huguenots were to be free to worship publicly anywhere except in Paris; to garrison eight 'cities of refuge'; and were to have equal representation with the Catholics on the Chambers of Justice. Some of these concessions were, however, shortly afterward withdrawn at the instance of the States-General, which met at Blois in December 1576, and showed itself unexpectedly opposed to the Huguenots.

Another question was now coming to the front. Charles IX died in 1574 childless like his elder brother, and was succeeded by one of the most despicable of French kings, Henry III. Should he, too, die without male issue there was only the Duke of Anjou, also childless, between Henry of Navarre and the throne. In 1584 Anjou died. Great perturbation arose in the Catholic camp. The Catholic League, recently reorganized by the Guises (of the second generation), proclaimed as heir the Cardinal of Bourbon, uncle of Henry of Navarre. In 1585 Philip II joined the League, and the Pope published a Bull against Henry of Navarre and his cousin Henry, Prince of Condé. The war of the 'Three Henries'

(Henry III, Henry of Navarre, and Henry, Duke of Guise) broke out and lasted until the assassination of Henry III in 1589. The murder of Henry III was no more than a just retribution for the treacherous murder of Henry of Guise ordered by him in 1588. Thus the Valois line came to an end in bloodshed and ignominy.

HENRY IV

Henry IV was one of the greatest statesmen who ever wore a crown. The part which he had played in the civil wars was not indeed heroic; but in times so confused, amid cross-currents so strong and so baffling, heroism was not perhaps the most appropriate or most useful quality. Henry of Navarre (in more than one sense) kept his head; and that in itself was, under the circumstances, no mean achievement. It is objected that the man who could purchase Paris with a mass could have had no strong religious convictions. If religion consists in adherence to a particular ecclesiastical system that is true. Henry IV was, like Queen Elizabeth, a *politique*. A Philip II might prefer to resign a crown rather than reign over heretics. Not so an Elizabeth or a Henry IV. They demanded in their subjects only good citizenship. So long as Catholics and Protestants were loyal to the Crown, and did not threaten the safety of the State, they should dwell in peace. Rebellion must be relentlessly crushed.

Henry IV succeeded to the throne in 1589, but it was nearly five years before he was master of his capital. After the murder of Henry of Guise (1588) and the death in the same year of Louis (II), Cardinal of Guise, the leadership of the party devolved on their brother Charles, Duke of Mayenne, who in September 1589 attacked, unsuccessfully, the King's camp at Arques, near Dieppe. After nearly a fortnight's fighting the Leaguers were driven off, and the king, reinforced by 5,000 Englishmen sent to his assistance by Elizabeth, marched on Paris. But Paris was prepared for him, so he turned aside to besiege Dreux, and at Ivry inflicted a crushing defeat on Mayenne who was marching to its relief (March 1590). Again Henry advanced on Paris; but Henry's success had alarmed Philip II, who sent an army from Flanders under Alexander of Parma to relieve Paris. Henry was robbed of his triumph. 8,000 Spaniards were thrown into the French capital. Paris was saved.

Failing Paris, Henry would take Rouen. The story of Paris was repeated. Henry, on the verge of success, was again baffled by Parma, but for the last time. On 2nd December 1592 Parma died of a wound received outside Rouen.

France was in a terrible state. The Leaguers could hold Paris only by the help of Philip II, who had designs on the French crown. The king's troops were largely recruited from England, Holland, and Germany. What could save the unhappy land? France was Catholic to the core. No Protestant could be king of more than a small minority of Frenchmen. Henry decided that, at any cost, France must be rescued from its pitiable plight. On 25th July 1593 he was received into the Catholic Church at St. Denis; in February 1594 he was crowned at Chartres; one after another the great provincial cities opened their gates to him; one after another the great nobles were bought; in March 1594 he entered Paris.

TREATY OF VERVINS (1598)

Philip II was still unappeased. In 1595 Henry declared war on him. It continued until 1598 when at Vervins a peace of exhaustion was concluded. The terms confirmed those of Cateau Cambrésis. Europe was at last at peace.

EDICT OF NANTES

The year which witnessed the restoration of peace to Europe was memorable also for restoring peace to France. The Edict of Nantes commenced by an acknowledgement that God was adored and worshipped by all the people of France, if not under the same forms, with the same intention, and 'with such order that it may cause no trouble or tumult.' All were to enjoy liberty of conscience. The Protestants were to have the right of public worship in certain specified towns in each province and in the castles belonging to the great nobles; to have state endowments reckoned as worth £20,000 a year; equal civil rights with Catholics; eligibility to all offices; access to schools, colleges, hospitals, and charities; the right to hold national synods; and, for a term of years, exclusive possession of some 200 fortified towns. Thus 'were the people of France to be united and the state restored to its former splendour.'

The terms secured to the Protestants, though observed as long as Henry lived, were resented by the Catholics, and it is

arguable that they were too generous, that the position accorded to the Protestants was in fact a menace to the state. That, as we shall see, was the opinion of Richelieu. Anyway, Henry gave France what France most needed, external and internal peace. 'Both France and I want,' he said, 'a breathing space.' They got it.

Thirty years of civil war had left France exhausted. Finance, commerce, industry, and agriculture all demanded reorganization. For this work Henry gathered round him a group of active and able ministers, of whom the greatest was Maximilian de Bethune, Baron of Rosny—known to history as the Duke of Sully. A distinguished soldier, Sully was called in 1594 to the chief place in the council of the king. Like his master he was inspired by a 'grand passion' for the greatness of France. By strict economy in expenditure, by recovering from the great nobles alienated revenues, by devising new taxes, such as the *Paulette* (a tax imposed on the hereditary lawyers of the parliaments), by the punishment of malversation, most of all by the encouragement of trade and industry (notably the manufacture of silk and glass), order was restored to the finances, and a large measure of prosperity to France. Roads were improved, the construction of canals begun, but it was on the improvement of agriculture that Sully lavished most attention. Pasturage and tillage are the gold mines of France, the twin sources of French nourishment. Such was Sully's precept; he applied it in practice, and France responded to his encouragement. Commercial treaties were concluded with England and Turkey, and a French Colony was established by Champlain at Quebec. Sully's programme was an ambitious one, and more than one generation was needed to carry it out. Nor would a generation have sufficed had Louis XIV not found in Colbert a minister as great as Sully.

REFORMS OF HENRY IV AND SULLY

No such programme could, however, be attempted much less carried through except by a king armed with absolute power. France was far from being politically united. It consisted of thousands of republics, aristocratic and ecclesiastical. The social privileges of the feudal nobles no statesman could with impunity have touched, nor would nobles or clergy have tolerated a proposal

ABSOLUTISM

for equal taxation: but a beginning was made in the reorganization of local government; the hand of the central government made itself felt in the provinces; steps were taken toward administrative uniformity — but all this tentatively and cautiously.

Yet cautious as was the advance it was sufficient to arouse the suspicion and antagonism of certain nobles who in 1602, under the leadership of the Duc de Bouillon and Maréchal de Biron, entered into treasonable negotiations with Spain and Savoy for a partition of France. Henry struck hard at the leading conspirators: Biron was executed others fled abroad or were imprisoned in France, and in 1606 Henry, at the head of an army lately reorganized, made a progress through the disaffected districts of the south-west, destroyed castles and, after trial by special tribunals, put to death the leaders of the recent conspiracy.

FOREIGN POLICY

With Savoy he had already dealt. As previously mentioned the Dukes of Savoy-Piedmont held the key-position in the long struggle between France and the Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs. That position they cleverly exploited by frequent changes of side. Francis I punished their adhesion to Charles V by occupying Savoy, but by the Treaty of Cateau Cambrésis Charles Emmanuel recovered his duchy, with the exception of certain fortresses retained by France. One of them, Saluzzo, Savoy recovered, and despite the terms of the Treaty of Vervins, stuck to it. In 1600 Henry got a divorce from his first wife, Margaret of Valois, who was childless, and strengthened his position by a marriage with Mary de Medici, daughter of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Mary bore him the longed-for heir and other children. A year later, having overrun Savoy, he concluded in 1601 a peace with the young Duke which left Saluzzo to Savoy, but ceded to France the two small duchies of Bresse and Bugey, which gave France the command of both banks of the Rhône from Geneva to its mouth.

SAVOY

A few years later (1609) a disputed succession to the border Duchies of Cleves, Jülich, and Berg on the lower Rhine gave Henry the opportunity of forming a strong league against the Emperor Rudolph, and with contingents supplied by England

and the Dutch Protestants, of occupying the three 'Duchies.' At that moment, however, Henry was assassinated by Ravaillac (1610). The outbreak of the great conflict that was to decide the fate of Europe for generations to come was postponed for nearly a decade.

THE 'GREAT DESIGN'

According to Sully's *Memoirs*, Henry left behind him a scheme for securing the permanent pacification of Europe, and uniting all the nations in an indissoluble bond of amity. Whether the 'Design' originated with Henry himself, with Sully, or with Queen Elizabeth, we know not; nor whether Henry or Sully ever heard of it. Anyway its significance consists solely in the fact that it was the first of an interesting series, and that on it all subsequent projects for the organization of perpetual peace have been based. Down to the Reformation the Papacy had given to Europe a semblance of unity, and had provided the rulers of different countries with a Court of Appeal. Europe was now headless, and for more than a century the nations had been almost continuously at war. Was war to be henceforth the normal condition of things? Might not a European Federation guarantee perpetual peace?


According to the 'Great Design' Europe was to form a Christian Commonwealth composed of fifteen federated states, Catholic and Protestant, monarchical and republican. The affairs of the Commonwealth were to be administered by a senate, renewable every three years, and presided over by the Emperor. The senate was to consist of sixty-four plenipotentiaries, representing the federated states, and was to be competent to decide all disputes between them, and to determine any questions of common import. Thus would the equilibrium of Europe, political and ecclesiastical, be preserved, and war be eliminated.


Whatever the parentage of this scheme, it has begotten a numerous progeny, and the latest born has not yet reached maturity. It would be pleasant to believe that Henry's was the brain that conceived it, for among contemporary sovereigns he stands apart. He gave France a peace based upon the principle of religious equality; had his life been spared he might have bestowed a similar gift upon Europe.

FOR FURTHER READING

E. Armstrong: *Wars of Religion in France.* J. H. Bridges: *Richelieu, Mazarin, and Colbert.* P. F. Willert: *Henry of Navarre.* L. Ranke: *Civil Wars in France.* C. T. Atkinson: *Michel de l'Hôpital.* L. Romier: *Les Origines politiques des guerres de religion* (and other works). Sir J. Stephen: *Lectures on History of France.* E. C. Lodge: *Sully, Colbert, and Turgot.*

HOUSES OF LORRAINE AND GUISE





FRANCE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

CHAPTER XI

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Chief Dates

1608. Evangelical Union formed
1609. Cleves-Julich succession
1609. The (German) Catholic League.
1609. Bohemian *Majestatsbrief.*
1610. Death of Henry IV.
1617. Ferdinand II, King of Bohemia.
1618. Insurrection at Prague.
1618. Outbreak of Thirty Years' War.
1619 Ferdinand II, Emperor.
1619 Frederick V, Elector Palatine, elected King of Bohemia
1623. End of 'Bohemian' or 'Palatinate' War.
1624 Richelieu becomes first Minister in France.
1625–8 Siege of Rochelle.
1625. Wallenstein raises army.
1625 Christian IV of Denmark intervenes
1627. Christian IV defeated by Tilly at Lutter.
1627. Wallenstein occupies Mecklenburg.
1628-9. War in Italy.
1629. Edict of Restitution issued.
1629. Treaty of Lübeck ends 'Danish' War.
1630 Gustavus Adolphus intervenes.
1631. Treaty of Barwalde (France and Sweden)
1631 Gustavus defeats Tilly at Breitenfeld.
1632 Tilly defeated and killed at passage of the Lech (14th April)
1632. Gustavus killed at Lutzen (16th November)
1634 Wallenstein assassinated (25th February)
1635 Peace of Prague.
1635 France declares war against Spain.
1637. Death of Ferdinand II Accession of Ferdinand III.
1640 Insurrection of Catalonia.
1640 Independence of Portugal.
1642 Death of Richelieu.
1643 Enghien's victory at Rocroy
1644 Battle of Freiburg.
1645 Battle of Nordlingen (second)
1648 Treaties of Westphalia.
1657. Alliance of Mazarin and Cromwell.
1657. Victory of the Dunes. Dunkirk to England.
1659. Treaty of the Pyrenees

THE dagger of Ravaillac postponed the outbreak of the great war, but only for eight years. It came in 1618 and raged continuously for thirty years. In the causes and results of this war we have an epitome of the political and

ecclesiastical history of the preceding century. The Treaty of Westphalia, with its supplement the Treaty of the Pyrenees, brings to a close the period of the Renaissance and the Reformation, and marks an important stage in the prolonged contest between France and the Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs.

In this, as in other great wars, it is important to distinguish between the underlying or fundamental causes and the immediate provocations of the war. The general causes are writ large over the preceding narrative. They are to be found in the political condition of the Empire and Germany, in the unsatisfactory character of the Peace of Augsburg, in the wonderful recovery made in the latter half of the sixteenth century by the Roman Catholic Church, and in the hopes and ambitions aroused thereby in the minds of Catholics. If, when Luther first raised his protest against Indulgences, there had existed in Germany a strong and representative central authority such as the Valois monarchy provided in France and the Tudor monarchy in England, the Reformation might have taken a very different course. But, as we have seen, Charles V was in no sense a national King in Germany, nor indeed was there a German *nation*. Differently guided, the Reformation might have gone far to create one.

GENERAL CAUSES

The ecclesiastical compromise embodied in the Peace of Augsburg reflected the political condition of Germany. The religious settlement was not national, but particularist. Each of the 350 odd sovereigns in Germany was to decide the creed of his subjects: but only as between two creeds—Lutheran and Catholic; Calvinism was ignored. Nor was any provision made for future changes. The situation as it existed in 1552 was to be stereotyped. Plainly, the settlement was pregnant with the possibilities of disputes in the future.

Difficulties were not long in revealing themselves. A Catholic Archbishop of Cologne turned Protestant and married. Under the 'ecclesiastical reservation' he thereby forfeited his office. That was natural. But the 'reservation' could not possibly be applied where a Protestant chapter elected to the see a Protestant bishop. That

happened in eight cases in north Germany. Nor could the secularization of Church lands be stopped in the Protestant states. In the Palatinate alone the lands of at least one hundred monasteries were secularized, and the same thing happened constantly also in north Germany.

Evidently the Peace of Augsburg could not furnish the basis of a permanent settlement.

IMMEDIATE CAUSES

Among the proximate causes of the war several stand out prominently. In 1607 Maximilian of Bavaria, by far the ablest and most energetic among the Catholic princes, was authorized by the Imperial (Aulic) Council to enforce the ban of the Empire against a Protestant city, Donauwörth, where an attack upon the monks had been provoked by a public procession. His forcible restoration of Catholicism there aroused fear and anger among all the Protestants of south Germany, and in 1608 the *Evangelical Union* was formed under the leadership of Frederick IV, the Elector Palatine, Christian of Anhalt, and many other Calvinist princes. The Elector of Saxony and other Lutheran leaders held aloof from the Union, partly because it was predominantly Calvinist, and partly because it was avowedly aimed against the Empire, and favoured the complete independence of the territorial princes.

In 1609 a number of Catholic princes—mainly ecclesiastics—united in a *Catholic* League under the leadership of Maximilian of Bavaria. The Calvinists looked for alliance with France and Holland: the Catholics looked to Spain.

Plainly, the disputes in Germany were already assuming an international character.

CLEVES-JÜLICH SUCCESSION

Even more directly international was the dispute which arose, on the death in 1609 of Duke William, about the succession to his Duchies, Cleves, Jülich, and Berg. Their geographical position gave those Duchies an importance out of proportion to their size, and the various claimants had, consequently, no difficulty in enlisting outside support. Thus John Sigismund, Elector of Brandenburg—perhaps the strongest claimant—was supported by Henry IV of France and by the Dutch Republic. Prince Louis, Duke of Neu-

burg, was supported by the Spaniards, while the Emperor Rudolph favoured the claims of the Elector Christian II of Saxony who, though a Lutheran, was a loyal Imperialist. French support of the Hohenzollern candidate was only part of an ambitious scheme devised by Henry IV for a combination of Protestants and Catholics to wrest the Empire from Ferdinand, and secure the election of Maximilian of Bavaria, a Catholic indeed but not a Hapsburg. Henry's murder put an end to the scheme, and the Spaniards in 1614 occupied part of the Duchies on behalf of the Neuburgs; the Dutch occupied the rest in the name of John Sigismund. So matters rested until the expiration of the twelve years' truce [1] in 1621, when the local quarrel became merged in the general war.

THE HAPSBURG DOMINIONS

That war was precipitated by the confusion in the hereditary dominions of the Austrian Hapsburgs. The direction of Hapsburg policy was at this time in the hands of Ferdinand II, though he did not become King of Bohemia until 1617 nor Emperor until 1619. Ferdinand was a zealous Catholic who had been educated by the Jesuits, and in accordance with their teaching was determined to extirpate the Protestant heresy at least in his own Hapsburg dominions, and if possible throughout the Empire. He has been well described as 'a German Philip II, in morals more austere but less sombre in aspect and more attractive in manners.' Not less ambitious than Philip, he was equally devoted to the Catholic cause. That Protestantism should of late have been spreading so rapidly in the Hapsburg dominions was gall and wormwood to this Catholic zealot. Hungary had become decidedly Calvinist in creed, Austria itself was largely Lutheran, while in Bohemia the Lutherans numbered at least four-fifths of the population. In 1609 the Czechs had extorted from the Emperor Rudolph the Bohemian Royal Charter (*Majestätsbrief*). This charter guaranteed to the Bohemians the free exercise of their religion, and under its protection the Bohemian Diet, though still maintaining that the crown was elective, was induced (1617) to accept Ferdinand II as king. It was the attempt to abrogate the Bohemian Charter and to repress Protestantism among the

[1] See *supra*, p. 113.

Czechs that led to the historic incident at Prague which lighted the flames of civil war in Germany.

On 23rd May 1618 the Bohemian Protestants decided to withstand the Austrian Emperor in arms. Headed by Count Thurn a party of them burst into the palace at Prague, and two of Ferdinand's Regents, Martinitz and Slavata, together with the Secretary Fabricius, were flung out of the window, but despite a fall of fifty feet were not much hurt. The conspirators then proceeded to set up a provisional government, and in 1619 elected as their king (August) Frederick V, the Elector Palatine, head of the Evangelical Union, and the son-in-law of James I of England and the immediate ancestor of our Royal line. Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian Crown was a palpable blunder: it confused the issue in Germany; it made it possible for the Catholics to represent the Protestants as enemies to the Empire and rebels against all constituted authority, and it enabled Ferdinand to gain the support of many Protestant princes who were still loyal to the Empire. The war thus started by the Bohemian Revolution falls into the following periods: (1) 1619–23, the Bohemian or Palatinate War; (2) 1625–9, the Danish phase; (3) 1630–65, the Swedish phase; and (4) 1635–48, a period in which the war developed into a duel between France and the Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs.

THE BOHEMIAN OR PALATINATE WAR

From the European standpoint the first phase is the least important. It was a struggle on behalf of German particularism and Protestantism against Hapsburg centralization and Catholic ascendancy. The Czechs were fighting not less on behalf of their national individualism than on behalf of their religion; but they obtained little support. Frederick V, though crowned at Prague on 4th November 1619, was not only chased out of Bohemia, where he reigned only as a 'winter king,' but was subsequently driven out of his hereditary dominions in the Palatinate as well, by the victorious General Tilly. Tilly was a native of the Spanish Netherlands who had been trained in the military tradition of Spain and had already had great experience of war. At the head of the Catholic troops he carried everything before him in Germany: the Bohemian insurrection was completely crushed; their Charter was forfeited; the leading Protestants were either executed or

driven into exile, and the population reduced by persistent persecution from about four millions to seven or eight hundred thousand. For the rest the Evangelical Union was dissolved in 1621 and Frederick's Electorate was transferred to Maximilian of Bavaria. The victory of the Hapsburgs and the Catholics was complete.

THE DANISH WAR

In the second period (1625–9), both the area and the significance of the war were greatly enlarged. The indifference of the North-German Protestants to the fate of Bohemia was considerably modified when they understood that the ambitions of Ferdinand extended much beyond the limits of his own dominions. In particular John George of Saxony was alarmed by the attack on the Palatinate and the transference of the Electorate to the leader of German Catholicism. The northern powers, Denmark and Sweden, also became alarmed by the success of the Jesuit Emperor and the Catholic League. Christian IV of Denmark was also Duke of Holstein. His son had secured the Bishopric of Verden and the reversion to the Archbishopric of Bremen. Those Bishoprics gave Denmark the command over the estuaries of the Elbe and the Weser, and if the Catholic victories extended from South to North Germany, the position of Denmark would be seriously menaced, not merely ecclesiastically but commercially. Denmark was both by geographical position and historical tradition the 'doorkeeper of the Baltic,' and was an eager competitor for the commercial supremacy in Northern Europe hitherto enjoyed by the cities of the Hanseatic League.

WALLENSTEIN

This second act of the drama brought other new actors besides Christian IV on to the stage. Of these the most important was Albert of Wallenstein. Wallenstein was a Bohemian noble of ancient lineage but small estate. He had, however, acquired a large fortune, partly by speculation in land and partly by two successive marriages. His ambitions were primarily political, but he was also a great soldier, and in 1625 he raised an army of mercenaries at his own expense, and offered their services and his own to the Emperor. His army, numbering about 100,000 men, was a medley of races and creeds. Czechs, Magyars, Germans, Dutchmen, Spaniards, Frenchmen, Scots and Irishmen; Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists were united only in

loyal devotion to their great captain. Some of his officers were Spaniards, some Italians, some French. Such was the instrument which Wallenstein decided to lend to the Emperor, and with which he proposed to bring about a unification of Germany under the hegemony of the Hapsburgs. Had he been able to persuade the Emperor to adopt his own tolerant policy toward religious opponents he might have anticipated the work of Bismarck and Moltke by more than two centuries. In fact, however, there was a profound divergence of policy between Wallenstein and the Catholic League. Maximilian of Bavaria and his colleagues desired the success of the Imperialists only so far as it was essential to the restoration of Catholicism; politically they were as particularist in their views as any of the Protestant princes. With Wallenstein, on the contrary, Catholicism was a bad second to Imperialism.

With two such generals as Wallenstein and Tilly, the Emperor could face with confidence the intervention of Denmark. In 1626 Christian IV suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Tilly at Lutter, and in 1627 Wallenstein, having cleared the Danes out of Silesia, took the offensive against them in Schleswig and Holstein, which before the end of 1627 were completely subdued. The Duchy of Mecklenburg was also occupied by Wallenstein, on whom it was afterwards bestowed as a Principality. But against the great fortresses of Stralsund and Glückstadt the assault of Wallenstein and Tilly was vain, with the result that in 1629 the Emperor was willing to conclude the Treaty of Lübeck, and so bring the second period of the war to an end. Christian IV recovered all his own hereditary territories, but renounced for himself and his sons the German Bishoprics and undertook to interfere no further in German affairs.

In Germany the Emperor was now entirely supreme and felt himself strong enough in March 1629 to promulgate the Edict of Restitution. This Edict restored the state of things prior to the Treaty of Passau (1552). This meant that no Protestants except the Lutherans were to be tolerated, while the Lutherans had to give up the two Archbishopries of Magdeburg and Bremen, and twelve important Bishoprics, including those of Minden, Camin, Verden, and Lübeck, and, in addition,

THE EDICT OF RESTITUTION

more than one hundred abbeys and other ecclesiastical foundations. The Edict of Restitution was highly distasteful to Wallenstein, who made no secret of his opposition to the policy it embodied. Accordingly, in 1630, Ferdinand was induced by the Catholic League to dismiss the great statesman from his councils. Once more Catholicism was triumphant.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS

Its triumph greatly alarmed Gustavus Adolphus, who, when only seventeen years of age, had succeeded his father on the throne of Sweden (1611). He found his kingdom distracted at home by the opposition of the aristocracy to the Crown, and threatened externally by the hostility of its neighbours, Denmark, Poland, and Russia. Since his accession he had entirely reconciled the nobles, he had promoted the economic prosperity of all classes of his subjects, and by his success against external enemies had established the position of Sweden as the dominant power in Northern Europe. Master of all the resources of his Swedish kingdom, victorious over Poland, Denmark, and Russia, Gustavus found himself in 1630 in a position to play a decisive part in the great German struggle. Though he deemed it vitally important to arrest the tide of the Catholic reaction in North Germany, his motives were not exclusively ecclesiastical. That he was a man of great personal piety with genuine zeal for the Protestant religion, is indubitable; but he was as tolerant as Wallenstein and did not seek to extirpate Catholicism either in his own country or in Germany. He was, however, determined to establish once for all the supremacy of Sweden on the Baltic, to succour the Protestants of Germany, and, maybe, to establish for himself an Empire of the North to counterbalance the Hapsburg Empire of the South.

Having made peace with Denmark in 1628 and with Poland in 1629, Gustavus Adolphus in September 1630 led an army of 36,000 men into Pomerania. The Swedish army was well equipped and splendidly disciplined. Twice a day, when in camp, they attended divine service; no looting was allowed; all provisions were punctually paid for. To Germans who for long years had been exposed to the violence of the adventurers who followed a Tilly, a Mansfeld, and a

Wallenstein, Gustavus and his Swedes appeared as angels from heaven.

The tactics of Gustavus were as brilliant and mobile as his discipline was severe, and carried him from victory to victory. But his career in Germany, though splendid, was brief. He compelled George William, Elector of Brandenburg, one of the weakest of the Hohenzollerns, to join him in 1631, and a year later concluded a treaty with John George of Saxony, who had at last been driven into opposition by the intolerance of his Emperor. On 17th September Gustavus won a great victory at Breitenfeld, and from there marched in triumph through south Germany and celebrated his Christmas at Mainz. In the New Year (1632) he won the battle of Lech (where Tilly was killed), and occupied Munich. The Emperor in panic recalled Wallenstein, and on 16th November that great general engaged the Swedes in battle at Lützen, near Leipsic. The honours of the battle rested with the Swedes, but the fruits of it were reaped by Wallenstein. The Swedes lost their king. 'Single-hearted, single-minded, and to the shame of Protestant Germany single-handed, his wise insight and his noble devotion triumphed over the concentrated forces and the miserable cowardice of his friends.' Such is the fine and discerning tribute paid by Dr. Bridges to Gustavus Adolphus. It is deserved.

After the battle of Lützen Wallenstein remained inexplicably inactive; the Emperor attributed his inaction, perhaps justly, to treachery. Wallenstein was undoubtedly pressing for the withdrawal of the Edict of Restitution, for concessions to the Swedes on the Baltic, and for large compensations—perhaps the Crown of Bohemia—for himself. At the instance of the Spanish and German Catholics, he was again dismissed from his command, and on 25th February 1634 he and his principal supporters were treacherously assassinated. A great victory won by the Imperialists at Nördlingen, near Ulm, made South Germany safe for the Catholics, and enabled the Emperor, for the third time, to conclude peace with John George of Saxony at Prague (May 1635). The Treaty of Prague gave favourable terms to the Lutherans, but provided no security whatever for the Calvinists. On such a basis there could be no permanent peace in Germany nor in Europe.

The deaths of Gustavus and Wallenstein and the Treaty of Prague brought France, for the first time, as a principal into the war. Richelieu saw that the moment had come when France must come to a final reckoning with the Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs.

FRENCH PERIOD (1635–48)

By birth a member of the lesser nobility, Armand Duplessis de Richelieu was born in Paris in 1585. Educated for the army he abandoned that career in 1605 in order to accept the bishopric of Luçon. From 1608–14 he lived in his diocese and devoted himself to its administration, and in 1614 was chosen as spokesman for the clergy at the States-General. Shortly afterwards (1616) he was appointed a Minister of State. In 1622 the Pope sent him a Cardinal's hat, and in 1624 he became the chief adviser of Louis XIII.

RICHELIEU.

With the internal affairs of France during his ministry a later chapter will deal. During the earlier years of his ministry he was hampered by the policy of the nobles and the Huguenots, who sought their selfish ends at the expense of the national unity of France. Nevertheless, though principally engaged in crushing the enemies of France at home, he was not unmindful of the danger involved to France abroad by the European situation. Like Henry IV he was anxious to see a European equilibrium established on the principle of religious toleration.

The equilibrium was disturbed by the ascendancy of the Hapsburgs. France itself was threatened with encirclement. In order to break the chain which united the Austrians and Spaniards Richelieu secured the Valtellina for the Grisons, a Protestant canton in the Swiss Confederacy. The Spanish right of way was specifically barred by the Treaty of Monzon (1621). By the Treaty of Cherasco (1630) he secured the Duchy of Mantua for the French protégé, Charles Duc de Nevers, thus virtually closing to the Hapsburgs the road through the Tyrol. Savoy was kept in check by the capture of Pinerolo, the frontier fortress between France and Piedmont. Thus he held the keys of the gates into and from Italy. So much he deemed essential to the security of France. At the same time he avoided the blunders of Charles VIII and Francis I. Italian possessions were to France a source not of strength but of weakness. On the

south-east the Alps were the natural frontier of France. Richelieu had no wish to cross them.

In Germany he was, until 1635, content to follow the traditional policy of France: to support the Protestant princes in their opposition to the Hapsburg Emperor. He had also encouraged the intervention of Gustavus, with whom in 1631 he concluded the Treaty of Bärwalde. Gustavus was to find the men, and Richelieu the money. Sweden was to be secured on the Baltic coasts; the Protestant princes were to be restored to their rights in the Empire, and the centralizing policy of the Empire to be resisted.

INTERVENTION IN GERMANY

The death of Gustavus, the defeat of the Swedes at Nordlingen, and the Emperor's thrice-repeated success, impelled Richelieu to direct intervention. Treaties were rapidly concluded with Oxenstiern, who as chancellor, after the king's death, had assumed control of Swedish affairs; with Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, the ablest successor of Gustavus in the field, and with other Protestant princes in Germany; with the Evangelical Union, lately revised and reconstructed; with the Dutch (with whom he proposed to divide the Spanish Netherlands); with the Duke of Savoy (who was to cede Savoy to France and receive Lombardy in exchange); with the Dukes of Mantua and Parma, and with the Swiss. Thus were the 'natural frontiers' of France to be secured, and her encirclement by the Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs averted.

War was formally declared on Spain in June 1635. The French were not consistently successful, but between 1637 and 1642 they steadily advanced to the conquest of the frontier provinces—Artois, Arras, and Alsace (on the north-east), and Roussillon (on the south-west). A rising in Catalonia and the reassertion of Portuguese independence (1640) had weakened Spain and made the French task easier.

Meanwhile, the cast of the great drama underwent rapid changes. Ferdinand II died in 1637; Bernard of Saxe-Weimar in 1639, and Richelieu himself in 1642. New actors were assuming the leading parts. Cardinal Mazarin succeeded to Richelieu's place, and was assisted in the field by two of the most brilliant soldiers of the age: the young Duc d'Enghien,

eldest son of the Prince of Condé, and Maréchal Turenne. Condé's brilliant victory at Rocroy (1643) dealt the death-blow to the military power of Spain, and gave France the mastery of the Netherlands; while victories at Freiburg (1644) and Nordlingen (1645) made them supreme in the upper Rhinelands. The Swedes, under Torstensson and Wrangel, marched right across Germany from the Baltic up to the gates of Prague, and almost to Vienna, and in conjunction with Turenne laid waste Bavaria. Beaten to the knees in Germany, in Alsace, in the Netherlands, in Tuscany, with Naples in revolt and Portugal independent, the Hapsburgs were at last ready to make peace.

Negotiations had been for some years in progress at Münster and Osnabrück, and on 24th October 1648 the treaty of peace was signed.

THE TREATIES OF WESTPHALIA

The results of the long series of wars, and reflected in the peace, were of profound significance for Germany, for France, for the Baltic Powers, and for Europe as a whole.

(1) The treaty ended a century of religious strife in Germany. It attempted to draw a permanent line of demarcation between Catholics and Protestants, who were to keep the positions respectively held in 1624. The Calvinists were to have the same privileges as the Lutherans. Catholics and Protestants were henceforward to be admitted equally to the Imperial Council.

(2) Politically, the treaty marked the virtual end of the Holy Roman Empire, though it survived as a ghost until 1806. The Emperor was henceforth nothing more than the president of a loose confederation of virtually independent states. The real sovereigns of Germany were the territorial princes, who acquired the right to be represented by their own envoys at foreign courts, to wage war and make treaties, provided their wars and treaties did not involve the rights of the Empire. The Diet, hitherto an Assembly of Estates, became practically a Congress of Ambassadors.

(3) The territorial changes in Germany were also important. Maximilian of Bavaria retained the Upper Palatinate and the electoral hat, but Charles Lewis, son of the Elector Frederick V, recovered the Lower Palatinate, and was created an eighth Elector. Thanks to the succession (in 1640) of the

great Elector, Frederick William,[1] Brandenburg emerged from the war with ill-merited success. She had to surrender Upper or Western Pomerania to Sweden, but retained Eastern Pomerania, and acquired in addition the bishoprics of Halberstadt, Camin, and Minden, and the larger part of Magdeburg. The smaller part went to Saxony.

SWEDEN

Sweden deservedly obtained very substantial compensations for her splendid effort in the war. Besides Upper Pomerania she obtained Stettin, the isle of Rügen, the splendid harbour of Wismar in Mecklenburg, and the bishopries of Verden and Bremen. She thus got a firm grip upon the three great German rivers, the Elbe, the Weser, and the Oder, with the right to three votes in the Diet of the Empire.

Switzerland at the source, and the United Provinces on the estuary of the Rhine, were recognized as independent republics.

FRANCE

France reaped the richest harvest of all. She acquired Breisach and the Austrian Alsace (the Free City of Strasburg being excepted until 1681); the three Lorraine bishoprics—Metz, Toul, and Verdun passed formally into her keeping; she was allowed to garrison Philippsburg, and between that fortress and Basle there were to be no works on the eastern bank of the river, and the Rhine navigation was to be free. In short, the Rhine, guarded at either end by the stout and independent bastions, and dominated throughout its middle length by France, had ceased to be a German river. Until 1871 Germany was at the mercy of France. From the Duke of Savoy France obtained Pinerolo—a door into Italy.

AUSTRIA

Disastrous to the Empire, the Thirty Years' War gave birth to modern Austria. The loss of Alsace and Lorraine, though damaging to Germany and to the Empire, meant little to the Emperor, who retained Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and the Tyrol. Plainly 'the Hapsburg gravitation towards Buda-Pesth' (to use Bismarck's phrase) had begun.

Spain had no part in the Treaty of Westphalia. Her war with France dragged on until 1659. She was saved from annihilation by the outbreak of the wars of the Fronde in

[1] See *infra*, p. 216

France, and the treason of Condé. But the alliance concluded between Mazarin and Cromwell in 1657, and the loan of 6,000 English Ironsides to Turenne, enabled that great general to capture Mardyke and Dunkirk, and to dictate terms of peace to Spain. By the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) Spain ceded to France Roussillon and Cerdagne in the south, and in the north Artois, and a number of fortresses in Flanders, Hainault, and Luxemburg. Condé was restored to his governorship in Burgundy. Peace was cemented by the marriage of Louis XIV with Maria Theresa, the elder daughter of Philip IV of Spain. The bride was to renounce for herself and her children all claims on the throne of Spain, on receipt of a dowry of 500,000 crowns. The dowry was never paid, a fact which, as we shall see, raised complicated questions later on.

SPAIN: THE TREATY OF THE PYRENEES

Important as marking an epoch in the history of Germany, of France, and other individual States, the Treaty of Westphalia is even more important as a landmark in the history of Europe as a whole. The wars of religion are over. The boundaries of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism are finally demarcated. The Church of Rome, which in the first half of the sixteenth century seemed to be threatened with extinction, remains in the middle of the seventeenth in possession not only of Spain and Italy (its strongholds throughout all its tribulations) but of Austria and her dependencies, of Bavaria and other South German states, of France and Belgium. Half Germany, half Switzerland, half the Low Countries, England, Scotland, and Scandinavia had become, and remain, Protestant. The ecclesiastical position was stereotyped. Christendom was permanently split in twain.


The dislodgement of the Papacy from its œcumenical position, and the virtual disappearance of the Empire, had another important effect upon international affairs. The legacy of unity bequeathed to the world by the Roman Empire was now finally dissipated. Europe was headless; there was no longer any common superior—a Court of Appeal for the adjustment of differences. International disputes could henceforth be settled only by an appeal to the sword. Religion as a source of strife was, after 1648, eliminated, but for the next century and a half the nations were to contend

about the 'balance of power,' about commerce and colonies, about the interests of this ruling dynasty and that. At the end of the eighteenth century the French republicans launched a crusade against the old order, and gave the nations something fresh to fight about.

The causes of wars might change; war persisted. Society seemed to be slipping back into that state of nature from which it had been rescued (as the older philosophers taught) by a mutual contract. A contract implies the supremacy of law. Could not the new nations find some new principle of cohesion? Hugo Grotius suggested that it might be found in international law. But law implies a sanction. Who was to judge between sovereign-states? What sanction could there be but the sword? The mere emergence of such questions, at first tentatively propounded but increasingly insistent, prove that Europe was entering upon a new era. To that new era we now pass.

BOOKS FOR FURTHER READING (SEE ALSO CHAPTER VI

Gindely: *Thirty Years' War.* S. R. Gardiner: *Thirty Years' War.* C. R. L. Fletcher: *Gustavus Adolphus.* Sir R. Lodge: *Richelieu.*



EUROPE IN 1659

PART II

CHAPTER XII

FRANCE UNDER RICHELIEU AND MAZARIN

THE FRENCH MONARCHY

CHIEF DATES (AND FOR CHAPTERS XIII AND XIV)

1610. Death of Henry IV. Regency of Marie de Medici.
1614. *States-General* meets (not again till 1789).
1621. Huguenot assembly at La Rochelle.
1622. Treaty of Montpellier
1624. Richelieu, Chief Minister—1642.
1625. Huguenot rising.
1626. Peace of La Rochelle.
1627. Siege of La Rochelle.
1627. English Intervention.
1628. Capitulation of La Rochelle.
1629. Peace of Alais.
1629. Mantuan Succession War.
1630. 'Day of Dupes.'
1631. Treaty of Bärwalde.
1631. Treaty of Cherasco.
1633–48. French intervention in Thirty Years' War.
1642 Death of Richelieu.
1643 Accession of Louis XIV.
1643. Mazarin, Chief Minister.
1648. Treaty of Westphalia.
1648. First Fronde War.
1649. Peace of Rueil ends 'Old Fronde.'
1650–3. New Fronde.
1657. French Treaty with Cromwell.
1658. Battle of the Dunes.
1658. League of the Rhine
1659. Treaty of the Pyrenees.
1660. Marriage of Louis XIV with Spanish Infanta.
1661. Death of Mazarin.
1661 Colbert, Minister.
1666. Persecution of the Huguenots
1667 War of Devolution.
1668. Partition Treaty between Emperor and Louis XIV.
1668 Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.
1670 Treaty of Dover.
1672–8. The Dutch War.
1674. Reconquest of Franche Comté.
1678. Treaty of Nimeguen.
1680. Louis XIV quarrels with the Pope.
1681. Huguenot emigration.
1681. Strasburg annexed to France.
1682. Gallican Church Articles.
1683. Death of Colbert.
1684. Louis XIV marries Madame de Maintenon.
1685. Revocation of Edict of Nantes.
1686. League of Augsburg.
1688. War of League of Augsburg.
1688. Devastation of the Palatinate.
1690. French expedition to Ireland.
1690. Battle of the Boyne.
1690. James II in France.
1695. Quesnel's *Moral Reflexions.*

1697. Treaty of Ryswick.
1698. First Partition Treaty.
1700. Second Partition Treaty.
1700. Death of Charles II of Spain.
1701. French occupy Belgian fortresses.
1701. Death of James II.
1701. Philip V enters Madrid.
1702–13. War of the Spanish Succession.
1702. Death of William III.
1704. Battle of Blenheim.
1706. Battle of Ramillies.
1706. Charles III (Archduke Charles) proclaimed King in Madrid.
1708. Battle of Oudenarde.
1709. Battle of Malplaquet.
1710. Destruction of Port Royal.
1713. Treaty of Utrecht.
1713. Clement XI issues Bull *Unigenitus*.
1714. Accession of George I.
1714. Treaty of Rastadt.
1715. Death of Louis XIV.

FROM a century and a half of war, almost continuous, France emerged pre-eminent if not paramount in Europe. So pre-eminent, indeed, that the seventeenth century may with accuracy be designated as *The Age of Louis XIV*. Under *le grand monarque* France reached the zenith of her greatness in Europe; under him the Crown reached the zenith of its power in France.

Louis XIV was the heir of the ages. The way had been prepared for him by a succession of great rulers, crowned and uncrowned. The last of the long line were the Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin. Richelieu, as we have seen, was admitted to the Council of State in 1616, but his first period of office lasted for only five months; it was not until 1624 that he became supreme in the council of the King. That supremacy he retained until his death in 1642.

RICHELIEU'S POLICY

The situation which confronted him was difficult, not to say perilous. It is thus described in the Preface to his *Testament Politique*:[1] 'When it pleased your Majesty to give me not only a place in your Council but a large share in the conduct of your affairs it is literally true that the Huguenots shared with you the government of the State; the great nobles behaved not as your subjects but as independent sovereigns; foreign affairs and alliances were neglected; private interests were preferred to public; in a word your authority was at that time torn to shreds . . . and in the confusion it was impossible to find any genuine trace of the

[1] Doubts have been cast on the authenticity of this work, but not on its historical value. The Preface is certainly Richelieu's own.

royal power. . . . I undertook to employ all my energy and all the authority with which it might please you to endow me, in destroying the Huguenot party, in humbling the pride of the nobles, in reducing all subjects to obedience to the Crown, and in exalting France to her true place among the nations of the world.'

Richelieu's analysis of the situation was accurate; his promise was precisely fulfilled. In his eyes the power of the Crown and the unity and greatness of France were inseparable. Only by exalting the Monarchy could the grandeur and even the security of the realm be assured. Only thus could the happiness and prosperity of the people be promoted. *Salus populi supremus rex.* To the service of his sovereign Richelieu brought a keen intellect, unflinching courage, and an indomitable will.

His immediate task was to abate the power of the nobles and the Huguenots. French Protestantism was, as we have seen, largely aristocratic, and Richelieu's policy toward the great lords and the Huguenots was, consequently, all of a piece. But it will conduce to lucidity to deal separately and first with the Huguenots.

THE HUGUENOTS

The position secured to them by the Edict of Nantes was, in Richelieu's judgement, inconsistent with the unity if not the safety of the state. That famous treaty, as Armstrong (*Wars of Religion in France*) has said, did not involve any 'general legalization of toleration. It did not admit the principle that a citizen's form of worship was indifferent to the state. It was rather a treaty between two powers comparatively equal. Privileges were accorded to a certain class generally, and to certain localities individually. Huguenotism was not absorbed in the states-system. Nay, rather its independence was accentuated.' The terms secured by the Huguenots were in a sense too good: the position in which they were entrenched was, even in their own interests, too strong. Largely drawn from the towns of the south, always jealous of the authority of the King of Paris, closely allied with an aristocracy always seeking opportunities for independence, flattered and caressed by the external enemies of France, the Huguenots became practically a federation of self-governing communities—to all intents and purposes inde-

pendent of the Crown. In alliance with Catholic Spain, or Protestant England, or any other foreign power willing to assist them, they wanted to set up, in the bosom of France, a republic on the model of the United Provinces.

In 1620 a Huguenot convention at Rochelle had promulgated a Constitution, known as 'the Fundamental Law of the Republic of the Reformed Churches of France and Béarn.' Under this scheme France was parcelled out into eight circles, each under its civil and military governor, and wherever Protestant influence predominated, the property of Catholics was confiscated. Help was then sought from England, Holland, and the German Protestants to enable the Huguenots to render their scheme effective.

Who can wonder that Richelieu, in the face of such pretensions, described the Huguenots as sharing with the King the government of France, and that he should have been determined to deprive them of the privileges they had so monstrously abused?

In 1625 the Huguenots themselves gave him the opportunity. They raised the standard of revolt under the leadership of two brothers, the Dukes of Rohan and Soubise. The moment was well chosen. Surrounded by spies and intriguers at Court, busied with the affair of the Valtelline, Richelieu was not yet firmly seated in the saddle. Early in 1625 Soubise swooped down upon the little port of Blavet in Brittany, and carried off the four vessels of war on which Richelieu relied as the nucleus of a fleet. But bold and successful as was the stroke, the triumph of Soubise was short-lived. Richelieu borrowed twenty ships from the Dutch, eight from the English, and with these and a few French ships of war, the Cardinal inflicted a crushing defeat on Soubise before the Isle of Rhé. Soubise fled to England, and Richelieu, to the amazement of the Catholics, granted easy terms to the defeated Protestants in the Treaty of Rochelle (1626). His time had hardly come, and no man knew better how to wait.

In less than eighteen months, however, the struggle was renewed. By this time Richelieu's own position was immensely strengthened. He had come to terms with Spain in the Treaty of Monzon; he had crushed more than one palace intrigue and had already begun to take strong measures against the great lords. The Duke of Buckingham, the vain-

glorious and incompetent favourite of Charles I, also played into his hands. Desperately anxious to gain a moment's popularity with the English Puritans, Buckingham raised a powerful squadron for the relief of the Rochellese, declared war on France, and himself assumed the command. Rohan raised simultaneously the standard of revolt in Languedoc.

Nothing could have been more ill-timed, mischievous, and disastrous to the Huguenots than Buckingham's intervention. He did, indeed, in July 1627 occupy the Isle of Rhé, but failed to capture the citadel of St. Martin. Richelieu, meanwhile, realizing the importance of the crisis, worked with superhuman energy. 'The Cardinal,' says Martin, 'was everywhere and everything—general, admiral, engineer-in-chief, chief of the commissariat and constable: something of his own fiery temper he communicated to every one with whom he came in contact.' In November Buckingham was compelled to return to England for reinforcements, and Richelieu, taking advantage of his absence, built a huge mole across the mouth of the harbour. 'It was a race against time, all depended on the question whether the mole could be finished before the English fleet re-appeared. Day and night, in spite of many blunders and some misfortunes, the huge mass slowly grew. . . . It was hardly finished when the English fleet was sighted. For fifteen days the English hurled themselves with renewed and despairing vigour against the fortifications, but without success. On the 18th of May they sailed home, and left La Rochelle to starve.' By October, 15,000 out of the 40,000 inhabitants of the devoted city had either perished from hunger or been killed, and on the 28th it capitulated. The Huguenot party as a political force was annihilated. The risings in the Cevennes under Rohan were speedily crushed; in 1629 Richelieu dictated to the Protestants, the terms of the Peace of Alais. The Protestants were deprived of their political and ecclesiastical organization, their right of synodical meeting, and their garrisoned towns; but they still retained liberty of worship, and freedom of conscience was respected. Heretics Richelieu was prepared to tolerate: rebels must be crushed. The Huguenots ceased to be politically formidable: they subsided into a harmless religious sect.

After the Huguenots, the nobles. It had, as we have

seen, taken many centuries to achieve the territorial consolidation of France. But though the king at last reigned throughout France, the great feudal lords still ruled a large part of it. Not until after the Revolution was France completely unified — politically, judicially, or fiscally. Richelieu aimed at unity, but so long as the nobles were governors of provinces, so long as they exercised special fiscal and judicial powers in their own districts, so long as province was cut off from province by tariff barriers, there could be no real unity, and no administrative efficiency. Feudalism was the obstacle to all reform ; feudalism, therefore, must be stamped out.

THE NOBLES

Before proceeding to that big task Richelieu had to deal with a court intrigue aimed at his life. The leaders of the cabal were Gaston d'Orleans, the contemptible brother of Louis XIII, the young Queen Anne of Austria, who detested Richelieu as the enemy of Spain and had little love for her husband, and the Queen Mother, Marie de Medici, who had raised Richelieu to power to do her bidding and was disgusted when she realized that he meant to rule. With them were associated Gaston's governor Ornano, the two Vendômes, sons of Henry IV and Gabrielle d'Estrées, and the Comte de Chalais, the King's chamberlain. Richelieu's only ally was the King himself. Overshadowed by his father and his son Louis XIII has been underrated. With a high sense of duty he combined intellectual power of no mean order : but he was indolent, weak, given to melancholy brooding. Yet he had one great quality : he could discern genius and submit himself to its dictation. With Richelieu at his elbow he gave strong support to the minister's policy : in his absence he was apt to encourage the enemies of the Cardinal.

The object of the Court cabal was to assassinate the Cardinal, to depose the King, and to put Gaston on the throne. The plot was widespread and influentially supported, but as soon as Richelieu detected it, he struck home. Chalais expiated his many conspiracies on the scaffold, Ornano died in prison at Vincennes, the two Vendômes, Madame de Chevreuse, and others were sent into exile ; Gaston made humble submission and was contemptuously pardoned.

Such prompt punishment inflicted on the highest in the land struck terror into the hearts of the nobles. Richelieu

followed up his first victory by two measures of great significance.

In 1626 he ordered the demolition of all fortifications, whether in castles or cities, not required for the defence of the realm against invasion or internal enemies.

DEMOLITION OF CASTLES

The 'Third Estate' had petitioned for this measure at three recent meetings of the Estates-General. Richelieu, realizing that the fortified castles were the strongholds of feudalism, and fortified towns the refuge of the Huguenots, was only too glad to give effect to their wishes.

Having destroyed the private fortresses, Richelieu's next step was to prohibit private wars. Of this cherished right duelling was the last surviving symbol. King after king had vainly attempted to abolish it. In 1627 Richelieu prohibited the practice. François de Montmorency, Comte de Bouteville, was the first to defy the edict; he was promptly arrested, and despite the intercession of powerful relatives was sent to the scaffold.

DUELLING

Laws were made to be obeyed. The same lesson was enforced by the swift punishment of the courtiers involved in the last of the palace conspiracies aimed at the Cardinal. The serious illness of the King in September 1630 had again aroused the hopes of Richelieu's enemies, but once more he proved more than a match for them. Among the conspirators in the so-called 'Day of Dupes' were the two Queens, Gaston of Orleans, and several highly placed nobles and courtiers. Not one of them escaped punishment. Marshal de Marillac, the chancellor, was executed; many ladies of the court were exiled; Anne of Austria was forbidden to hold any further converse with the Spanish Ambassador; Marie de Medici fled to Flanders, and after eleven years of miserable exile died at Cologne in 1643. France never saw her again. Gaston of Orleans, after vainly attempting to raise the provinces against the Cardinal, fled to Lorraine, where he secretly married the sister of Duke Charles III, the bitter enemy of France.

THE 'DAY OF DUPES,' 1630

With the help of his brother-in-law, of Spain, and of certain great nobles such as the Duc de Montmorency, Governor of Languedoc, Gaston organized an open rebellion in 1632.

Similar revolts broke out periodically throughout the remaining ten years of Richelieu's ministry, but none of them achieved even temporary success. In the rebellion of 1632 Montmorency was taken prisoner, and to the amazement of his peers and the people of France suffered death as a traitor. Among the rôle of Richelieu's victims were no fewer than five Dukes, four Counts, and a Marshal of France. 'Why should you strike,' said the Cardinal, 'at the little men? Small trees afford no shade: it is the big men you must keep in order.' The English Tudors pursued a parallel policy, and with similar objects in view—the repression of aristocratic disorder and the exaltation of the power of the Crown. 'When heads like Montmorency's were falling,' writes Michelet, 'the great nobles began to understand that they could not play with the kingdom and the law.'

RICHELIEU'S DICTATORSHIP

Richelieu, in fact, like the English Tudors, established a dictatorship. But unlike them he did not make the constitutional Legislature the legal instrument of the dictatorship. The States-General was never again summoned (until 1789), after the dissolution of 1615. The political ambitions of the *Parliament of Paris* were likewise sternly repressed. The claims of the *Parlement* were, as we shall see later, of doubtful validity, but valid or not, Richelieu, by an edict of 1641, forbade the *Parlement* to intervene in politics or finance, and ordered it to register the royal edicts without delay or debate. Even the judicial functions of the Parliament, hitherto unquestioned, he curtailed. Richelieu did indeed condescend to summon in 1626 and 1627 his two Assemblies of Notables to strengthen his hands against his foes, foreign and domestic. But among the fifty-five notables thus summoned there was not a single peer or provincial governor. Like the members of Signor Mussolini's Parliaments they were nominated not elected, and they came not to criticize but to confirm the policy of the dictator.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Nor did Richelieu spare the privileges of the Provincial Governors or of the Provincial Estates. Of the nineteen provinces, some were known as *Pays d'états*, but the majority as *Pays d'élection*. In the latter the assessment and collection of taxes were vested in royal officials—*élus*. The *Pays d'état*, which

included the greater and more recently acquired Provinces like Languedoc, Provence, Dauphiné, Burgundy, Normandy, and Brittany, still retained their representative institutions (*Estates*), and a considerable measure of local self-government and taxation. In the attempt to sweep them all into the category of *Pays d'élection* Richelieu was foiled; but the whole of France was redivided into thirty-two *généralités* or districts, over each of which Richelieu placed a royal officer known as the *Intendant*, who represented the central government much as the sheriff represented it in England. Of the nineteen noble governors whom he found in office in 1624 Richelieu got rid of no fewer then fifteen, replacing them by officials responsible to himself. Even Richelieu was unequal to the task of sweeping away the old system altogether. For that drastic step France had to wait until the Revolution; but all real power was vested in the *Intendants*—the 'Thirty Kings of France' as John Law later on described them.

The reforms in central and local government were crowned by the reorganization of the Royal Council upon which Richelieu imposed function after function, much as the Tudors did upon the Privy Council. But as in England there gradually emerged from the enlarged Privy Council an Executive Cabinet, so also in France there developed a small and confidential body known as the *Conseil d'état*, or *privé*.

THE *CONSEIL DU ROI*

Nor did Richelieu neglect the problem of defence. He reorganized the army and created both the navy and the mercantile marine. In order to suppress the Huguenots, Richelieu, as we saw, had been obliged to borrow ships from England and Holland. Before his death he had created a Mediterranean fleet of thirty-two men-of-war, and an Atlantic fleet of twenty-four. The fortifications of Toulon and Le Havre were strengthened, and at Brest he established a third naval base. Foreign trade was encouraged and charters were given to companies for the promotion of colonization. But though a beginning was made under Richelieu, it is to Colbert we must ascribe the real development of these latter activities. Richelieu was not a skilled financier; his financial administration was, indeed, grossly extravagant

ARMY AND NAVY

and he left the country deeply in debt. This was partly because he created a multitude of superfluous offices, with the sole object of selling them to the highest bidder, and partly because he never tackled the root problems of feudal privileges and fiscal immunities.

Feudalism as a system of government was destroyed by Richelieu; but though the Crown thus absorbed the political functions of the great nobles, their social and fiscal privileges remained, until the Revolution, intact. From all direct taxation they were immune; they still claimed as of old their feudal dues and tolls; still compelled all the peasants to grind their corn at the lord's mill, and crush their grapes at the lord's winepress; still exacted rights, some degrading and all burdensome, from dependents who were still socially serfs, even though in many cases they had become proprietors of the land they tilled. It was these and similar anomalies left untouched by Richelieu which precipitated the fall of the old régime.

Feudalism was tolerable so long as it was intact; to allow privileges to survive when the duties which had justified them had disappeared was to invite revolution.

Richelieu, soldier, diplomatist, reformer, did not forget that the pen is even greater than the sword. He patronized literature; he encouraged learning; he founded the French Academy; he established the *Gazette de la France*. Thus as a great French historian has said: 'He was the parent of the two great enemies whose conflict was to occupy the modern world—autocracy and the press.' [1]

Richelieu was not the original architect of French absolutism: but he did place the coping-stone upon the edifice. He was convinced that only a strong monarchy could give to France security abroad and unity at home. He was right. Critics, notably in England, have counted this to him for unrighteousness. They have blamed him for not developing representative institutions, for not educating the French people in the art of self-government. Such critics forget that a nation must learn to walk before it can run. Self-government is the attribute of nations. France was as yet only a nation in the making. Richelieu's dictatorship was one of the later stages in its political apprenticeship. The country

[1] Henri Martin.

which he bequeathed to Louis XIV was all but a nation. Louis's fatal mistake was to treat it merely as a State, and to identify the State with the monarchy : *L'état c'est moi.*

Richelieu died in 1642. Within twelve months Louis XIII followed his great minister to the grave. Louis XIV was a child of five when he succeeded his father. His mother, Anne of Austria, consequently became Regent, but fortunately Richelieu had left a successor not merely to his place but to his policy. Master and disciple were, however, strongly contrasted. Richelieu was a typical French aristocrat, strong, haughty, and overbearing. Giulio Mazarin was a typical Italian, a pupil of the Jesuit College in Rome, a trained lawyer, apprenticed to diplomacy in the service of the Papacy, not less determined than Richelieu in pursuit of his ends, but more subtle and pliable in his methods, a curious mixture of pettiness and greatness, one of those men who ' do great things without being personally great.'

MAZARIN (1602 61)

Richelieu's notice was first drawn to Mazarin in the negotiations about Mantua (1630) ; he came to France as Papal Nuncio in 1636 ; three years later he became a naturalized Frenchman and was taken into the service of the Crown. Richelieu bequeathed him as minister to Louis XIII, who in turn bequeathed him to Anne of Austria. To the general surprise the Regent accepted the bequest.

On the death of Louis XIII the remnants of the Court cabal, decimated and scattered by Richelieu, flocked back hopefully to Paris. These contemptible courtiers took themselves so seriously that they were nicknamed *Les Importants.* Disappointed to find Mazarin already established in the favour (if not the affections) of the Queen, they conspired for his murder, but the plot was discovered and the conspirators sent to Vincennes.

LES IMPORTANTS

For the first five years of his ministry (1643–8) Mazarin's energies were concentrated on the war. For the next five years he was involved in the domestic disturbances arising from the ' Revolt of the Fronde.'

THE FRONDE (1648–53)

Rarely, even in French history, has there been such a curious intermixture of grim tragedy, high comedy, trans-

pontine melodrama, and mere burlesque, as that provided in the serio-comic drama which was played in Paris during those years. Perhaps the Fronde belongs rather to the literary than the political history of France. But for the superb literary skill of De Retz, the demagogic cardinal, of La Rochefoucauld, the coiner of epigrams, of Mlle de Montpensier the fashionable amazon, of the Queen's favourites, of Madame de Motteville, and others who 'assisted' as actors or spectators in that curious episode, it would have bulked much less large than it does on the stage of French history.

Yet the Fronde had a real if limited significance, and consequently cannot be ignored by the political historian. In the mass of bewildering detail three main elements can be discerned: (i) the first, gravest and most important, was that of the *Parlement* of Paris, and the three other Sovereign-Courts (the *Grand Conseil*, the *Chambre des Comptes*, and the *Cour des Aides*) with which the Parliament was allied; (ii) the Princes of the Blood, the grand dames of the court, and the great feudal lords; and (iii) the populace of Paris. There were echoes of the Fronde in some of the Provincial Parliaments, notably that of Bordeaux, but even among French revolutions that of the Fronde was pre-eminently Parisian.

In the first and serious phase of the Fronde wars, the 'Old Fronde,' the lead was taken by the Parliament of Paris. The princes, courtiers, and nobles came in only as auxiliaries. This phase lasted from May 1648 to the conclusion of the Treaty of Rueil (2nd April 1649). Contemporary events in England lent gravity to this phase in Paris. Charles I was in 1648 a prisoner in Carisbrooke; Cromwell was inflicting defeat on the Scotch Covenanters in Lancashire (August); on 30th January 1649 Charles I was executed.

THE PARLIAMENTARY FRONDE

In historical fact the Parliament of Paris had nothing in common with the English Parliament save a remote ancestry in the *Curia Regis*, and a name. Between the two bodies there was, as Voltaire wittily remarked, 'as much difference as between a Roman consul, and an English consul at Smyrna or Aleppo.' Originally composed (like the *Curia Regis*) of great nobles and high officers of state, the Parliament of Paris now consisted entirely of lawyers. The lawyers, at first introduced into the *Parlement* as technical assessors and


secretaries, had gradually ousted the nobles, and transformed themselves into an hereditary corporation or caste, holding, transmitting, or selling their offices on the payment of an annual tax—the *paulette*. About their precise status and functions there was some dispute. It had long been customary for the king to register his edicts through Parliament, and though the function of its members was primarily, if not exclusively, judicial, they gradually asserted a right to discuss the edicts, to remonstrate against, and even to veto them.

The supersession of the States-General encouraged Parliament to assert as a check on the Crown the rights of remonstrance and rejection previously exercised in the interests of monarchy. Inadmissible as the claim was constitutionally, the lawyers of the Parliament might have persuaded themselves and others that under the circumstances of the hour they alone stood between France and unlimited autocracy.

In June 1648 they followed an English example by presenting to the King a Petition of Right wherein, among other things, they demanded that the *Intendants* and Farmers of the revenue should be abolished, that the *taille* should be reduced by 25 per cent., and no further impost levied without the consent of the Sovereign-Courts; that arbitrary imprisonment should be abolished, the principle of *Habeas Corpus* introduced, and personal liberty safeguarded.

PETITION OF RIGHT

These demands involved nothing less than a constitutional revolution. But on Mazarin's advice the Queen agreed to temporize, only, however, to retort, a month later, with a *coup de théâtre*. Condé's great victory at Lens (23rd August) was a godsend for the Government; on the 26th the victory was celebrated by a *Te Deum* in Notre Dame, and while the service was in progress Broussel, the parliamentary leader, and two of his colleagues were arrested. Paris bristled into resistance. Within a few hours two hundred barricades were erected in the city; a cry went up on all sides for the release of the parliamentary leaders: Mazarin lost courage and gave way; the court retired to Rueil (September). An accommodation was patched with the Parliament in October and the court returned to Paris. Mazarin was only biding his time. The signature of the Treaty of Westphalia (22nd October 1648) gave him 'an army and a general.' The court again left



FRANCE, 1643–1789

CHAPTER XIII

THE REIGN OF LOUIS XIV

BORN in 1638, Louis XIV came to the throne in 1643; he was declared to be of age in 1651; his personal rule began with the death of Mazarin in 1661; only his own death brought it to an end in 1715.

To the performance of his great task Louis XIV brought great abilities, a definite theory of government, and a high sense of the personal responsibilities of kingship. Lord Acton has described him as 'by far the ablest man who was born in modern times on the steps of a throne.' 'Louis XIV,' said Bolingbroke, 'was, if not the greatest king, the best actor of majesty that ever filled a throne.' That is indisputably true. Louis was 'every inch a king'; his perfect manners, his dignity and courtesy, the affability that never degenerated into familiarity—every contemporary remarked them. Like Frederick the Great he had a passion for work. 'It is,' he said, 'by work that one reigns; it is for work one reigns; it would be audacious ingratitude towards God and tyrannical injustice towards man, to desire to be a king, and decline the toil of reigning.' Every detail of the administration passed for years under his personal review, but though he was indefatigable in discharging the business of state, there is no trace of genius either in his administration or his legislation. Every feature of his character, as a shrewd critic has observed, 'might be traced to his Spanish or to his French ancestry. From Anne of Austria came the sublime and somewhat stolid pride; the Spanish dignity intensified by Austrian phlegm. . . . From his French grandfather came the nobler and more generous aspects. The shrewd Gascon sense of Henry of Navarre had left its traces. Something, too, Louis had inherited of his large views of policy, of the true patriotic instinct. . . . The conception of France, happy and prosperous at home; powerful and respected abroad; of France

as the centre of the European state-system ; . . . of France, lastly, as the leader of the movement of thought in Europe . . . this grand conception was not wholly wanting to him.'

His was a personal rule. The Crown was absolute. All the powers of the State had been absorbed by it. The States-General was silenced ; the *Parlement* reduced, politically, to impotence ; the provincial liberties strictly curtailed ; the nobles, though retaining the titles of governors of provinces, subordinated to the *Intendants*, the creatures of the Crown ; the Church bound to the Crown by the Concordat of 1516—with literal truth Louis XIV could say, *L'état c'est moi.*

Mazarin had no immediate successor. Asked by the Archbishop of Rouen to whom he should address himself now that the cardinal was dead, Louis promptly replied : *à moi. À moi*, adds a commentator, became the formula of the personal régime.

COLBERT

Nicholas Fouquet had become the Superintendent of Finance in 1653, and on Mazarin's death had hopes of succeeding the cardinal as First Minister. But that post had been assumed by the king, who, with the help of a vigilant civil servant had discovered that Fouquet, the darling of polite society, was a dishonest scoundrel. In 1661 Fouquet was suddenly arrested and, after trial by a special commission, was imprisoned until his death in 1680. The man who had discovered and disclosed his malversations was Colbert. Jean-Baptiste Colbert was the son of a prosperous merchant—perhaps of Scottish origin—at Rheims. Born in 1619, he had been in a banking house at Lyons, in a notary's office in Paris, and in 1651 had become steward of Mazarin's immense establishment. In that capacity he had the opportunity of learning everything that could be known of financial methods, public and private. Between the two there was no clear distinction. Mazarin, who left a fortune of £5,000,000, was well qualified to form a just estimate of Colbert's probity and ability, and bequeathed him to Louis XIV. With the modest title of chief clerk of the Council of Finance, Colbert was appointed in 1661 to succeed Fouquet. In 1665 he was appointed Comptroller-general of Finance, and in 1669 secretary of the Admiralty and the Colonies. Until his death, a disillusioned and broken-hearted man, in 1683 he was the

head of all departments, and indeed, in all but name, the first minister of France.

In the sphere of finance and commerce Colbert has had no superior among Frenchmen. Somewhat forbidding in aspect and austere in life, he devoted all his great talents and unremitting industry to the service of the king, the prosperity and greatness of the realm, and the well-being of all classes of the people. No more than Richelieu could Colbert abolish the fiscal privileges of the nobles. So long as they survived, there could be no radical reform of French finance, but within the limits thus imposed upon him Colbert worked wonders. On the one hand he brought order into financial administration; on the other he developed the sources of revenue and promoted, by every means in his power, the commercial prosperity of France.

On his accession to office Colbert found the finances in a desperate condition. This was due partly to the malversation of thieves like Fouquet, partly to the enormous expenditure incurred on a century of wars, but most of all to the antiquated fiscal arrangements of the country, and the wasteful and uneconomic system of taxation.

The fiscal system, though administratively indefensible, was historically interesting, since it bore the impress of the slow political evolution of France. The country was still divided into three divisions: (i) the 'five great farms' or *Domaine Royale* coextensive with the original kingdom of France; (ii) the 'Reputed Foreign Provinces,' which like Burgundy and Brittany had lately been absorbed; and (iii) the 'Real Foreign Provinces,' which like Alsace and the Lorraine bishoprics had, still more recently, been annexed. Between each of these there was a tariff wall and an army of custom-house officers. It was Colbert's task to unify France fiscally, as Richelieu had unified it politically. Like Frederick List, two centuries later in Germany, Colbert was an economic nationalist: internally a Free Trader, but as against the rest of the world a zealous Protectionist.

The revenue of the State was derived mainly from five sources: the feudal dues of the Crown; the indirect taxes—customs and excise—which were farmed out to a corporation of Farmers-General closely connected with the Parliament, occasional *vingtièmes*—a capitation tax—from which the

nobles, though not legally exempt, generally escaped; the *gabelle*, an obligation on every citizen to buy so much salt which, being a government monopoly, was sold at extortionate rates; and the direct taxes, of which the *taille*, a war tax voted to Charles VII by the States-General of Orleans in 1439 was incomparably the most fruitful and the most oppressive. From the *taille* as a war tax the nobles, by reason of their personal service, were exempt, as were the clergy. The *taille*, like the income-tax in England, though originally a temporary expedient to finance a war, became the mainstay of the French Treasury. Between the income-tax and the *taille* there was, however, this difference. The income-tax fell mainly upon the well-to-do; the *taille* fell entirely upon the poorer classes.

The French taxative system was wholly vicious; it was unequal in its incidence, wasteful in methods of collection, and profoundly and deservedly unpopular.

Colbert radically reformed the whole system. By the establishment of a special *Chambre Ardente* to punish financial peculation, by a 'conversion' of the debt, and by revoking false titles of nobility by which exemption from the *taille* had been claimed, he increased the net receipts from 32,000,000 livres to 77,000,000 (140 per cent.), while increasing the gross receipts by only 23 per cent.—from 84,000 to 104,000.

Even more important were the measures he took for the encouragement of trade. As already indicated, he abolished most of the barriers on internal trade, and at the same time carried through a scheme of tariff reform, imposing heavy duties on the export of corn and on the import of manufactured goods, and removing or diminishing the duties on the import of raw materials and the export of home manufactures. He improved the roads and cut canals; he gave bounties for the initiation of new industries and for shipbuilding; he established companies to trade with the East and West Indies; he promoted colonization, and gave a great impulse to the development of the French navy and to the mercantile marine, and by the establishment of free ports and the reduction of duties on goods in transit, to the entrepôt trade of France.

Purists may take exception to this item or to that in Colbert's comprehensive programme; that it was framed in

the spirit of economic nationalism, and that it preferred the interests of industry to those of agriculture, is obvious; but that it retrieved France from imminent bankruptcy, that it provided Louis XIV not only with the sinews of war, but with resources for lavish expenditure on palaces, public works, and other expensive luxuries, and that it gave France twenty years of unprecedented prosperity, is undeniable.

The years of Colbert's administration (1661-83) were incomparably the most brilliant in the history of monarchical France. Never had life in the capital been so full, so throbbing, so enchanting, and of this gay life the centre was the court of Louis XIV, the climax was the *grand monarque* himself.

In 1683 Colbert died, unregretted by an ungrateful master whose extravagance he had tried to restrain, and execrated by the people on whom the burden of that extravagance had fallen.

The Chancellor Le Tellier and his son Louvois, of hateful memory, became the chief ministerial advisers of the King. But Louis found a more intimate councillor in the lady whom in the same year he married as his second wife, though never publicly acknowledged as his Queen, Madame de Maintenon.

Françoise d'Aubigné was the granddaughter of Agrippa d'Aubigné, a well-known Huguenot. At the age of sixteen she embraced Catholicism, and presently married Scarron, the comic poet, and made his house the centre of a brilliant literary coterie. On his death she fell into dire poverty, and her friend, Madame de Montespan, the King's mistress, introduced her into the royal household as governess to her children. Her beauty and gentleness captivated Louis, but her gentle manner concealed an indomitable will. She repelled the King's advances, converted him to respectability, got her patroness, the reigning mistress, banished, reconciled Louis to his cruelly wronged wife, and on the latter's death succeeded to her place. For thirty-two years she ruled the King and the Kingdom: and Louis never suspected it.

To attribute to this devout and gracious but dominating lady the miseries which, in sharp and startling contrast with the splendours of the two preceding decades, marked the later years of the reign of Louis XIV, would be grossly unjust. Nevertheless, the year of his second marriage does mark the

dividing line between brilliant noonday and ever-deepening gloom. After 1683 the sun of prosperity was declining fast, and finally set amid lowering clouds which boded ill for the happiness of France and the tranquillity of Europe.

With the King's growing lust for territorial aggrandisement, and his neglect of the self-restraint shown in that matter by his immediate predecessors, the next chapter will deal.

More sinister was his deepening superstition, and his ever increasing anxiety to be master not merely of the goods and the bodies of his subjects, but of their consciences and souls.

Richelieu and Mazarin had completed the political unification of France; Colbert had made it one economically.

LOUIS XIV AND THE HUGUENOTS

Louis was resolved to establish spiritual and ecclesiastical unity. Sismondi observes that religion, as inculcated on Louis XIV by his confessors, was reducible to two precepts: 'Abstain from adultery; exterminate heresy.' A cynical commentator adds that 'if the King fell short in the first of these duties, he wrought works of supererogation in the second.' His confessors, however, advised him to proceed gradually. His policy toward the Protestants falls accordingly into two periods, dividing roughly at 1683.

During the earlier period no means were neglected of applying persuasion and gentle coercion. Bossuet's great

PERSUASION

work *The Exposition of the Faith*, by its gentle persuasiveness no less than by the rigidity of its logic, allured many Calvinists back to the ancient Faith, Turenne among them. Court favours judiciously bestowed; the quiet withdrawal of many of the privileges conceded by the Edict of Nantes; and the 'Bank of Conversions' (1677) all helped in the same direction—the last most effectively. One-third of the profits of all vacant benefices was set apart to form a fund employed to purchase converts. Pellisson, a converted Calvinist, was appointed Director of the Bank. Branches were established all over France. The tariff ranged from 100–500 livres, and lists of those miraculous conversions were regularly published in the *Gazette*. No fewer than 58,000 were published between 1577 and 1583. 'M. Pellisson,' wrote Madame de Maintenon (herself a convert from Calvinism), 'works prodigies. M. Bossuet is more learned but less

persuasive. Who would have dared to hope that conversions would be so easy ? '

Thus encouraged, Louis and his wife proceeded to sterner measures. A series of edicts inaugurated the period of active persecution. No Protestant was permitted to hold public office, or enter a profession, or be tutor or guardian to children, even his own. Any child of seven might legally abjure the Protestant religion ; the admission of a Protestant convert into a congregation rendered the pastor liable to banishment, but all converts to Catholicism were to be exempted for two years from the *taille*, and for three years to be secured against their creditors. In 1684, on the shrewd advice of Louvois, it was decreed that the soldiers should be billeted only on Protestants, and these soldiers, notably the dragoons, were not too considerate towards their hosts.

PERSECUTION

These ' dragonnades ' subjected Protestant families to unspeakable brutalities. An army corps was sent into southern France to perform the work of missionaries of the Faith, and so successful was their mission that Louvois reported that in the Bordeaux district the roll of Protestants had shrunk from 150,000 to 10,000. Many suffered death ; many more sought safety in flight. The emigration of Protestants was rigidly prohibited, but at least 300,000 managed to escape. Among them were nearly all the best sailors, many of the most thrifty, orderly, industrious citizens, the cleverest craftsmen, and the best farmers in France. They were cordially welcomed in London and Amsterdam, and they laid the foundations of the economic prosperity, and reinforced the army, of Brandenburg-Prussia. Finally in 1685 the Edict of Nantes was revoked. Protestant worship was forbidden : pastors who did not quit France within a fortnight and continued to preach were sent to the galleys for life ; those who ' conformed ' were handsomely pensioned ; emigrants were ordered to return to France within four months, if they did not, all their property was confiscated ; those who, after 1685, attempted to emigrate were sent either to the scaffold or the galleys.

For this brutal proscription there was no excuse. ' My grandfather,' said Louis, ' loved the Huguenots, and did not fear them : my father feared them but did not love them ; as

for myself I neither love nor fear them.' Louis XIV had no reason to fear them. Richelieu had drawn their claws.

RESULTS

Richelieu's action was taken against good Protestants but bad citizens. It was effective. In the troubles of the Fronde—tempting as was the opportunity—the Protestants had played no part. The men and women persecuted by Louis were the best of citizens. They had ceased to offend their neighbours, or to menace the State.

Louis's attack upon the Huguenots was entirely unprovoked, and it brought upon him a swift Nemesis. Socially, economically, and politically the results were disastrous. France lost any chance of becoming a great naval power, or of founding an oversea empire. Internal unity was purchased at the price of European primacy and world-dominion. The formation of the League of Augsburg followed swiftly (1686) upon the proscription of the Protestants. To this aspect of the matter we must return later.

Not only upon the Huguenots did the King's hand fall heavily. The Jansenists were hardly less odious to him than the Protestants. The Jansenists were 'the Calvinists of Catholicism.' Accepting from Cornelius Jansen, Bishop of Ypres (1585–1638), the Augustinian view of predestination, they strongly opposed the Jesuits both on grounds of morality and of doctrine. The Jesuits were 'men of the world': the Jansenists practised an unsocial austerity of life. And there were other grounds of difference between them. The Jesuits exalted the power of the Crown and preached submissive obedience to the Pope: the Jansenists denied the doctrine of Papal Infallibility, and, like the Protestant Calvinists, favoured the separation of Church and State and the limitation of the powers of the Crown. During the Fronde the Jansenists sided with De Retz. Small wonder that Louis XIV, on every ground, preferred the Jesuits.

THE JANSENISTS

Toward the end of the reign of Louis XIII the Jansenists established a community in a deserted convent at Port Royal near Versailles, where the brethren were busily engaged in works of charity, in education, and in research. The community attracted men of all sorts, nobles, scholars, priests, and retired soldiers. Racine was their pupil,

PORT ROYAL

Pascal, their most illustrious disciple. In 1653 the Jesuits procured from Pope Innocent X a decree condemning Jansenist doctrine, and in 1656 got their champion, Arnauld, expelled from the Sorbonne. In 1657 Pascal retorted with *Les Lettres Provinciales*—a crushing exposure from which the Jesuits never recovered; but a truce between the combatants was subsequently patched up by Clement IX.

THE GALLICAN CHURCH

But the King who could not tolerate Huguenots or Jansenists was no champion of the Roman Papacy. On the contrary he aspired to be Pope in France. His first quarrel with the Pope was about the *Régale* —the right of the Crown to the revenues of all vacant bishoprics and benefices. Pope Innocent XI, a strong partisan of the Hapsburgs, supported the party in France which questioned this right. Louis retorted by convoking a General Assembly of the French clergy. Following the lead of Bossuet, the French Church formulated the famous Declaration of the Gallican Church.

It firmly denied Papal Infallibility while asserting the independence of the Gallican Church, and the superiority of Councils over the Pope. The Declaration was embodied in the law of France, and was enforced upon the French clergy. Louis XIV was almost as much Pope in France as was Henry VIII in England.

The Pope Innocent XI protested, and the relations between King and Pope were further strained by a quarrel about the immunities of the French ambassador in Rome, and by the election of the French candidate (supported by French arms) to the Archbishopric of Cologne. Innocent XI retorted by joining the League of Augsburg against France. But these matters will be more properly noticed in the next chapter.

Toward the end of the reign the Jansenists again became active and Louis was persuaded by his wife and his confessor, Le Tellier, that he would never have peace so long as Port Royal, the centre of disaffection, was allowed to exist. In 1705, the Pope Clement XI issued a Bull against the doctrines of Jansen, and in 1709 Louis ordered Port Royal to be razed to the ground, and its inmates dispersed or imprisoned. These cruel and arbitrary proceedings evoked great indignation among the powerful patrons of Jansenism, and the feeling was accentuated by the action of the Pope. In 1713 Clement XI,

in the hope of getting the Declaration of 1682 revoked, issued the Bull *Unigenitus*, which explicitly condemned 101 propositions extracted from Quesnel's *Moral Reflexions on the New Testament*, a work exceedingly popular in France, and hitherto accepted as unimpeachably orthodox. Cardinal Noailles, the Archbishop of Paris, and many other bishops denounced the Bull, and the Parliament of Paris refused to register it.

Louis regarded this as rebellion not merely against the Roman Pope, but against the Crown—the Pope of France. The *Parlement* was suspended, and no fewer than 30,000 persons, including nobles, magistrates, clergy, and others were imprisoned by *lettres de cachet*. This persecution of the Jansenists—some of the most respected citizens of France—added another element to the gloom enshrouding the last years of the reign. Continuous and ruinous war; impending bankruptcy; famine, and plague; the sudden death of the Dauphin (1711), of the Duke and Duchess of Burgundy, and their eldest son (1712); all these things served to deepen it. On Burgundy, the pupil of Fénelon, the hero of Télemaque, and on his young wife, Princess Marie Adelaide of Savoy, the hopes of France had centred. The deaths of three successive Dauphins in three months left a child of two heir to the throne. That child unhappily survived and became Louis XV. The Duc de Berri, the third grandson of Louis XIV, was killed in 1714. His elder brother having become King of Spain (Philip V) renounced his rights to the French throne. There remained the two sons,[1] recently legitimated, of Madame de Montespan, the King's nephew, Philip, Duke of Orleans, and the Condés. The outlook for the dynasty was black. Louis named in his will a Council of Regency, with Orleans as nominal head, but all real power vested in Maine and the Maintenon party. The pains thus taken to perpetuate his policy were futile.


The old King himself died on 1st September 1715. The longest reign in French history was at an end. Had it ended in 1672, or even in 1683, it might have been regarded as the greatest. By 1683 the glory had departed. The men whose names shed lustre on the 'Age of Louis XIV' were mostly dead. Balzac (d. 1650), Descartes (d. 1650), Pascal (d. 1662), Poussin (d. 1665), Molière (d. 1673), De Retz (d. 1679), La

[1] Duke of Maine, and Count of Toulouse. See Table on p. 172.

Rouchefoucauld (d. 1680), Claude Lorraine (d. 1682), these had gone before 1683. Corneille died in 1684, La Fontaine in 1695, Racine in 1699; Bossuet survived until 1704, Boileau until 1711, and Fénelon until 1715. With such names to adorn it (and they are only a few of many), it cannot be denied that the Age of Louis XIV was great.

Was Louis himself great? Readers must answer that question for themselves. At least Louis XIV was, as Bolingbroke said, 'the best actor of majesty that ever filled a throne.'

HOUSE OF BOURBON



CHAPTER XIV

FRANCE AND EUROPE (1660–1715)

WHATEVER judgement be passed on the domestic policy of Louis XIV, it is undeniable that under him France attained to primacy, if not supremacy, in Europe.

The mere politician sees only the next move in the diplomatic game: it is the mark of great statesmen like Louis XIV, Bismarck, and Cavour to see many moves ahead. From the outset of his personal rule Louis had certain clear objectives in view. Richelieu and Mazarin had gone far towards realizing the traditional ambition of France: to identify the frontiers of modern France with those of ancient Gaul, to extend French territory to the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. But there was still a good deal of rounding off to be done. The Spaniards were still in Belgium and Luxemburg, and the French frontier on that side was very imperfectly protected. Turenne warned his master that 'so long as the Spaniards were in the valley of the Somme a hostile army could be at Paris in four days.' The Spaniards still held Franche Comté—again much too near Paris. Northern Alsace and all Lorraine except the three fortresses, Metz, Toul, and Verdun were still part of the Empire. So was Strasburg, which commanded the road from Vienna to Paris. There was much to be done, then, to make the eastern frontier of France safe. Savoy, a Naboth's vineyard to France while united with Piedmont, was not finally absorbed until the deal between Napoleon III and Cavour.

OBJECTS

But the ambitions of Louis looked much beyond the attainment of *les limites naturelles*. From the moment of his marriage with the Princess Maria Theresa of Spain his eyes were fixed on the whole Spanish inheritance. After 1659 Spain was evidently declining. The little King Charles

II of Spain was, at the time of his accession (1665), a sickly child of four. The Queen of France had, indeed, on her marriage renounced her claims on the Spanish Empire, but only on condition of receiving a large dowry which was never paid.

Still more. Louis XIV, like all the greatest of his predecessors, like the great Corsican who came after him, worshipped the golden image of the Emperor Charlemagne. What more fitting than that the Imperial dignity should fall to the lord of all western Europe?

In the opinion of Dr. von Döllinger, one of the most erudite of Germans, Louis XIV would certainly have been elected emperor had Leopold died before the policy of Louis had united Europe against France.

The League of the Rhine, negotiated in 1658 by Lionne under Mazarin's orders, and renewed and enlarged in 1661 and 1664, had been joined by the three Rhine Electors, by the Elector of Bavaria, and other German princes. Louis was already, therefore, half-emperor. The dispatch of an expedition against the Turks in 1664 was plainly in the interests of the Empire, not of France, to whose traditional policy such action was opposed. Versailles was planned as an imperial residence.

But the Spanish inheritance, the whole or part of it, was from first to last the pivot of Louis' policy. On the death of Philip IV (1665) Louis claimed the greater part of the Netherlands, Franche Comté, and Luxemburg, under the *Jus Devolutionis*, a local custom in Brabant by which property descended to the daughter of a first marriage as against a son of the second. It was a transparent excuse to cover a war of naked aggression. The war itself (1667–8) was a promenade. Condé conquered Franche Comté in three weeks; Turenne was master of Flanders within three months. Holland was greatly alarmed by the French advance in Belgium; she had made peace with England in 1667, and in 1668 the two powers combined with Sweden to snatch from Louis the fruits of his victories. By the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle he consented to restore Franche Comté (after dismantling the fortresses) to Spain, and retained only the fortresses in Flanders already conquered. In the same year (1668) he concluded with the Emperor Leopold a

THE WAR OF 'DEVOLUTION'

treaty by which the latter agreed to divide with France the Spanish Empire to which he was heir-presumptive.

The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was meant by Louis to be no more than an armistice. The insolent merchants of Amsterdam should learn what it was to thwart the ambition of a king of France.

HOLLAND

The United Provinces had thriven amazingly since their emancipation. England's domestic troubles (1640–60) were Holland's opportunity. Their fisheries, their manufactures, and their Colonial Empire (acquired partly at the expense of Portugal) brought them great wealth. Amsterdam, with its famous bank, became the financial capital of the world. Politically, however, there was a bitter feud between the House of Orange, supported by the nobles, the clergy, and the peasantry, and the burgher oligarchy which (except in Zealand) dominated the principal towns. In 1610 Maurice of Nassau (the eldest son of William the Silent) had compassed the judicial murder of John Olden Barneveldt, the leader of the Republicans. The crime was successful. For forty years the Orange stadtholders exercised unquestioned authority. In 1656 the stadtholder William II, husband of Princess Mary of England, decided to establish an hereditary monarchy, but suddenly died before his object was achieved. The Stadtholderate was suspended, and for twenty years the burgher oligarchy was supreme under the leadership of a great statesman—John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland (1653–72). The Republicans, weak in the army, were strong at sea, and the maritime war with England was waged with brief intervals and varying success from 1652 until the conclusion of the Treaty of Breda in 1667. In 1668, as already mentioned, the two countries combined to curb the ambition of France. The secret Treaty of Dover (1670) between Louis XIV and Charles dissolved the Anglo-Dutch combination. In 1672 England was on the side of France. But in 1674 Charles II was forced to make peace with Holland.

His attack upon the Dutch Republic is commonly held to mark a turning-point in the policy and career of Louis XIV. Reasons were given in the last chapter for dating the crisis rather from 1683. Yet Louis' conduct in 1672 had one result fatal to his chances of ultimate success. It brought to the front William III.

FRENCH WAR AGAINST HOLLAND (1672–8)

A French writer has said that Holland was saved by three things: revolution, inundation, and coalition.

That is true. Louis crossed the Rhine at the head of an army 120,000 strong. Panic seized the Dutch. More than eighty Dutch fortresses opened their gates to the French. At the Hague the populace, believing that the burgher oligarchy had betrayed the Republic, tore to pieces John de Witt and his brother Cornelius, the famous sailor. William III, suddenly called to power, could do little to stem the French invasion. The Dutch opened the dykes and the inflowing ocean did what no army could do. Checked in his advance in Holland, Louis sent Turenne to occupy Franche Comté. Meanwhile William, better as a diplomatist than a soldier, formed a strong coalition against France. England deserted France in 1674; in 1677 William married Princess Mary; in 1678 England threatened war on France. The League of the Rhine was broken up, and before he concluded peace at Nimeguen in 1678 Louis was at war not alone with Holland but also with the Empire and Prussia, as well as many other German States, including the Rhine Electorates, and with Spain. Only Sweden was on his side, and Sweden lost Pomerania to Prussia, but regained it, by the intervention of France, at the peace.

Holland emerged from the war virtually unscathed; Spain had to foot the bill. She had to surrender Franche Comté, now at long last finally incorporated in France, and a long line of strong fortresses stretching from Dunkirk to the Meuse, including Valenciennes, Cambrai, Saint Omer, and Ypres. The eastern frontier of France was thus immensely strengthened.

It was further strengthened in 1681 by the acquisition of Strasburg, a Free City, the position of which had been left indeterminate by the Treaty of Westphalia. Louis set up special tribunals, known as the *Chambres de Réunion*, to decide this and similarly disputed questions. Strasburg, which for two hundred years gave France a back door into Germany, was the most important fruit of their verdicts. Strasburg was occupied by the French on 30th September 1681. On the same day the French obtained, by purchase from the Duc de Montferrat, Casale, a fortress which commanded

CHAMBERS OF REUNION

the road between Turin and Milan. This transaction was rendered the more ominous by the occupation of Genoa (1684). Was Louis XIV, discarding the policy of the 'natural frontiers,' about to imitate the folly of Francis I? Luxemburg, seized in 1683, was a less ominous but more important acquisition.

War-time and peace-time thus equally served the ambition of Louis. But Europe was becoming seriously alarmed by the unbroken series of annexations, and Wlliiam III was able in 1686 to form the League of Augsburg. Formed for the purpose of maintaining the *status quo*, it included, besides the Dutch Republic, the Emperor, the Kings of Spain and Sweden, the Elector of Saxony, and the Elector Palatine and other German Princes. For reasons already given, Pope Innocent XI subsequently adhered to it, as did the Duke of Savoy-Piedmont.

THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG

More important even than the formation of the League was the deposition of James II, and the succession of Mary and William to the English throne. Macaulay's great 'Whig Epic' has perhaps tended to obscure the European significance of the English Revolution. In the constitutional aspect of the struggle between the English Parliament and the Stuarts, William took but a tepid interest.[1] He had as little love for Parliaments as his English grandfather. He wanted the help of English ships and English money in his crusade against Louis XIV, and with an army commanded by the greatest soldier England has produced they ultimately proved decisive.

THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

The struggle lasted, with no more than a breathing space, from 1689 to 1713. The first phase, lasting from 1689 to 1697, is known as the War of the League of Augsburg; the second (1702–13) as the Spanish Succession War. These are convenient labels. The point really at issue was whether France was to dominate Europe. England was determined that neither France nor any other Power should ever attain that position, and, in particular, that France should not absorb Belgium.

The Low Countries have been throughout the centuries the

[1] On the English aspect, cf. Marriott: *The Crisis of English Liberty* (Oxford, 1930), chap. xx.

continental frontier of England. Their independence has ever been her vital concern. Of the three great Powers which have aspired to control them, Spain, by reason of remoteness, was the least formidable ; but Drake and the Elizabethan seamen denied supremacy to Philip II. With the attempts of Napoleon and of Kaiser William II later chapters must deal. Our immediate concern is with Louis XIV.

Having begun the war by a gratuitously brutal attack upon the Palatinate, which he laid waste, Louis concentrated his attack upon Holland and England, though Marshal Catinat conducted a successful campaign against Savoy-Piedmont in North Italy. In the Netherlands the French went from success to success—never really checked until in 1695 William III, who had been heavily defeated at Steinkirke (1692) and at Neerwinden (1693), recaptured Namur.

Ireland, however, was the first battleground between William and Louis. On 12th March 1689 James II landed at Kinsale from France. Ireland was, naturally, enthusiastic in support of a Roman Catholic king ; the terrified Protestants, driven to take refuge in Londonderry, were besieged in that city for three months until, on 30th July, the English fleet, ordered at any cost to relieve it, broke the boom across the Foyle. Derry was saved ; the Catholic army, heavily defeated at Newtown-Butler, was driven south. In June 1690 William himself landed at Belfast, and on 1st July inflicted on James, reinforced though he was by French troops, a crushing defeat on the Boyne. Ireland saw no more of King James, and the Orange conquest was completed by the surrender of Limerick (3rd October 1691).

THE IRISH CAMPAIGN

William's great victory on the Boyne was dimmed, in English eyes, by the humiliating defeat of the English fleet off Beachy Head (10th July 1690). Tourville's victory gave the French the command of the Channel for two years, but it was more than avenged in May 1692 by Russell's great victory at La Hogue. In 1694 an English expedition against Brest was repulsed with heavy loss, but the English fleet retorted by the bombardment of the Channel ports, Dunkirk, Calais, Dieppe, and Havre. In 1797 Louis XIV made peace at Ryswick. All conquests made since 1678 were mutually restored—except Strasburg ; Louis

NAVAL WAR

acknowledged William as King of England, and the Princess Anne as his heir.

Larger issues were pending. Charles II of Spain was dying. Louis wanted his hands free. In 1698 he assented to a partition of the Spanish inheritance, by which the bulk of it was to go to Joseph Ferdinand, the Electoral Prince of Bavaria and grandson of the Emperor Leopold. In 1699, however, the young prince died, and by a second Partition Treaty in 1700 the bulk was to go to the Archduke Charles, the Emperor's second son: the Dauphin was to have Lombardy and the two Sicilies.

THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

England, though relieved that France was kept out of Belgium, was aggrieved at her proposed acquisitions in the Mediterranean; but the matter is of purely academic interest, as Louis XIV was anxious to secure the whole inheritance for his grandson Philip, Count of Anjou. The wretched King of Spain was accordingly tormented on his death-bed by the intrigues of rival diplomatists and the contradictory counsels of competing confessors. In the end he was persuaded not to break up his splendid inheritance, and he died having left the whole of it by will to Philip.

Charles died on 1st November 1700. Louis XIV, with a parade of hesitation surely simulated, accepted the whole inheritance for his grandson. William III, bitterly chagrined by the bad faith of Louis, was still more chagrined to discover that the English people actually preferred the will to the Partition Treaty. At this crisis, however, Louis retrieved William's position by two colossal blunders. He expelled the Dutch garrisons from the 'Barrier' fortresses of Belgium, and occupied them with French troops. Worse still; on the death of James II (16th September 1701) he recognized the Prince of Wales as *de jure* King of England.

The recognition was purely platonic, but coupled with the seizure of the Belgian fortresses it aroused bitter indignation in England. In March 1702 William died, happy in the knowledge that England was committed to the leadership of the Coalition against France.

In the long war which ensued (1702–13) the question of the Spanish throne was incidental; the real issue was the

European equilibrium. That matter was set at rest by the brilliant victories of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, and by England's supremacy at sea.

SPANISH SUCCESSION WAR

Apart from the sea, the war was carried on in the Netherlands, in Lombardy, and in Spain itself, where the Archduke Charles, supported by an English army under Peterborough, held Catalonia—but only Catalonia; Castile declared for Philip. The campaigns in the Netherlands were, however, the decisive ones, and Marlborough was clearly right to concentrate his efforts on that front. Yet the greatest battle was fought on the Upper Danube, where he frustrated the French attempt to reach Vienna by his brilliant victory over Tallard at Blenheim (13th August 1704). Just a week earlier Admiral Rooke had captured Gibraltar. Peterborough's brilliant campaign in Spain (1705–6), put the Archduke Charles temporarily in possession of Madrid (June 1706), and in the same summer Marlborough inflicted a crushing defeat on Villeroi at Ramillies (12th May). Louis was beaten, and offered to surrender everything except Italy; but the allies refused his terms. In 1707 the Whigs, now supreme in the English Parliament, resolved to make no peace so long as any part of the Spanish Empire remained in the hands of the Bourbons.

They had overreached themselves. In 1707 the war went badly for the allies, but in 1708 Minorca was captured by the English, and Marlborough, with the help of the Imperialists under Prince Eugene, defeated Vendôme at Oudenarde, and captured Lille and Tournay. Louis again offered terms, but again they were rejected. In September 1709 the French were again heavily defeated in the bloody battle of Malplaquet, and Marlborough took the great fortress of Mons.

France was in a pitiable plight. In 1711, however, two things happened: the Tories who had come into power in 1710 accused Marlborough of peculation and dismissed him from his command, and Joseph's[1] death brought the Archduke Charles into possession of the Hapsburg dominions and the Imperial throne. Were the allies to fight on to put the Emperor on the throne also of Spain? Negotiations for

[1] Emperor, 1705–11.

peace ensued, and in 1713 it was signed at Utrecht between France and Spain on the one part, and England, Holland, and Savoy on the other. In 1714 France and Austria made peace at Rastadt.


Philip V remained King of Spain, but renounced all claims on the French throne. France and Spain were not to be united under a single crown. The Dukes of Berri and Orleans [1] renounced all claims to Spain. England secured from France a guarantee of the Protestant (Hanoverian) succession, the dismantling of Dunkirk, and possession of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia (Acadie), and the Hudson's Bay Territory. The foundations of British Canada were laid. Spain ceded Gibraltar and Minorca to England: English supremacy in the Mediterranean was assured. By the *Assiento* England also obtained the profitable but infamous privilege of supplying Spanish-America with negro slaves, and other valuable commercial rights.

THE TREATIES OF UTRECHT

Austria obtained the Spanish Netherlands, but saddled with the onerous obligation of paying the Dutch troops who were to garrison a long line of strong fortresses, and thus maintain a 'barrier' against French invasion. She also got most of Lombardy, Naples, and Sardinia. Sicily and a slice of Lombardy went to the House of Savoy. The Hohenzollerns were recognized as Kings of Prussia, and got Upper Guelderland. France retained Strasburg, with the rest of Alsace, but had to restore Freiburg and other fortresses which she had taken on the *right* bank of the Rhine.

Truly a momentous settlement, yet much criticized—not least in England, where its authors were impeached. Posterity, however, can hardly condemn a peace which gave us such advantages in the Mediterranean, in North America, and in trade with South America. The Dutch were secured (at Austria's expense) against French attacks; the Austrians were dominant in Italy; the Bourbons were established on the throne of Spain; the dynasty destined to achieve independence and unity for Italy made a notable advance in 1713; the Hohenzollern entered the charmed circle of kingship; France emerged from a long series of wars exhausted internally but still pre-eminent in Europe.

[1] See *supra*, pp. 170–2.



EASTERN EUROPE IN 1580

CHAPTER XV

THE BALTIC LANDS (1648–1721)

THE RISE OF RUSSIA

Chief Dates (and for Chapters XVI and XXI)

1361. Ottoman Turks take Adrianople.
1389 Battle of Kossovo.
1453. Capture of Constantinople.
1520–66. Reign of Solyman the Magnificent.
1521. Capture of Belgrade.
1526. Battle of Mohacz.
1535. Treaty of Francis I and Sultan Solyman.
1571. Turks defeated at Lepanto
1654. Christina of Sweden resigns crown to Charles X.
1655–6. Charles X victorious over Poland.
1660. Death of Charles X.
1660. Treaties of Oliva and Copenhagen.
1661. Treaty of Kardis.
1664. Turks defeated at St. Gothard.
1675. John Sobieski elected King of Poland.
1681. Charles XI becomes absolute.
1683. John Sobieski saves Vienna.
1686. Venice conquers the Morea.
1689-1725. Peter the Great, Czar of Russia.
1697. Turks defeated at Zenta.
1697. Death of Charles XI. Accession of Charles XII.
1697. Augustus of Saxony elected King of Poland.
1700. Charles XII defeats Russians at Narva.
1702. Charles XII in Warsaw.
1703. Foundation of Petersburg.
1704. Stanislaus Leczinski elected King of Poland.
1709 Defeat of Charles XII at Pultowa.
1711. Treaty of the Pruth (Russia and Turkey).
1718. Death of Charles XII.
1718. Aristocratic revolution in Sweden.
1719. Hanover obtains Bremen and Verden from Sweden.
1721. Treaty of Nystad.
1722. Russia takes Baku.
1725. Death of Peter the Great.
1733. Augustus III (of Saxony) elected King of Poland.
1736. Turkish War *v.* Austria and Russia.
1739. Treaty of Belgrade.
1743 Treaty of Abo (Russia and Sweden).
1757. Convention of Petersburg.
1762. Catherine II succeeds Peter III.
1762. Death of Czarina Elizabeth.
1764. Stanislaus Poniatowsky elected King of Poland.
1768. Confederation of Bar.

1768. Turkey declares war on Russia.
1772. Gustavus III (1761–92) effects *coup d'état* in Sweden.
1772. First Partition of Poland.
1774. Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji.
1775. Bukovina ceded to Austria.
1781. Austro-Russian alliance.
1783. Catherine II annexes the Crimea.
1784. Russo-Turkish Treaty.
1787. Journey of Catherine II and Joseph II to Crimea.
1787. Turkey declares war on Russia.
1788. Sweden declares war on Russia.
1789. Gustavus III makes Swedish monarchy absolute.
1790. Treaty of Verela (Russia and Sweden).
1791. Monarchical revolution in Poland.
1792. Treaty of Jassy (Russia and Turkey).
1792. Murder of Gustavus III.
1792. Polish Confederation of Targowitz.
1792. Catherine II invades Poland.
1793. Second Partition of Poland.
1794. Polish rising under Kosciusko
1795. Final Partition of Poland.
1796. Death of Catherine II.

UNTIL the rise of Russia under Peter the Great (1689–1725), until the Hohenzollerns began to push westward, the Baltic countries contributed but little to the main current of European history. Poland was a great power in the Middle Ages, the Hanse towns were commercially important, but for the rest the connexion between western and northern Europe was slight. Gustavus Adolphus, though his career was meteoric, played, as we saw, a brilliant part in the Thirty Years' War, and from that war Sweden emerged with heightened prestige and substantial territorial acquisitions.[1] On the death of Gustavus at Lützen (1632) the Swedish crown devolved on his young daughter Christina, who after a reign of twenty-two years abdicated in favour of her cousin Charles X. During her reign Stockholm was the centre of a brilliant intellectual circle, Descartes and Grotius being among the great men attracted to it.

John Casimir, King of Poland, another cousin of Christina, disputed the right of Charles X to the succession, and during the whole of his brief reign Charles X (1654–60) was at war with all his neighbours. He took Warsaw after a bloody battle which lasted three whole days, and made himself master of Poland. A coalition between the Emperor, John Casimir of Poland, Brandenburg, Denmark, and Russia could not arrest the progress of this brilliant adventurer. He overran Holstein, Schleswig, and Jutland, and then crossed the

[1] *Supra*, p. 121.

Belt on the ice and threatened Copenhagen itself. But despite these startling successes his position, surrounded by enemies, was essentially precarious, and after his death (1660), his son Charles XI was fortunate in concluding (largely with French support) a series of favourable treaties.

TREATIES OF OLIVA, COPENHAGEN, AND KARDIS (1660–1)

John Casimir renounced all claims on the Swedish throne; Sweden kept all that she had gained at Westphalia, and in addition obtained Scania from Denmark (thus expelling the Danes from the eastern shore of the Sound), and Ingria, Carelia, Esthonia, and Livonia from Russia. Sweden thus touched the zenith of her territorial greatness. The Baltic was virtually a Swedish lake.

Without the help of France, Sweden could not have attained such a position, and the French alliance continued to be the pivot of Swedish policy for more than a century. The friendship was temporarily interrupted by the adhesion of Sweden to the Triple Alliance of 1668:[1] but when Louis XIV attacked Holland in 1672 Sweden reverted to her traditional alliance, and was ordered to attack Brandenburg, which was supporting the Dutch. The Great Elector, however, inflicted a crushing defeat upon Charles XI at Fehrbellin, on the borders of Brandenburg and Mecklenburg, and drove the Swedes out of Pomerania.

The defeat of the Swedes encouraged Denmark to declare war on them in the hope of recovering Scania; but though the Danes, with the help of van Tromp, drove the Swedes out of the Baltic, they could not dislodge them from Scania. Nor did Louis XIV allow Sweden to suffer. By the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (1679), Brandenburg was compelled to restore all her conquests, except a strip of land on the right bank of the Oder. Sweden lost nothing but prestige.

Nevertheless, the position of Charles XI was precarious. A succession of wars had drained Sweden of money; the finances were in hopeless confusion; commerce was decaying; the nobles were grasping, corrupt, and oppressive; the peasantry were not mute under their sufferings. In 1681–2 Charles XI, with the support of the burghers, the peasants, and the clergy, compelled the nobles to disgorge their ill-gotten wealth, deprived them of all political power, and made the Crown practically absolute.

[1] *Supra*, p. 174.

PETER THE GREAT

Not until the reign of Peter the Great does Russia come into the European picture, and then only partially. From the Rhine delta to the Ural Mountains there is no physical barrier, and of that vast European plain the greater part belongs to Russia. Except for the three great river valleys, that of the Neva draining into the Baltic, the Volga into the Caspian, and the Dnieper into the Black Sea, Russia is formless and featureless, though by no means void. Geographically there was nothing in Russia (as in Spain) to encourage provincialism or impede union; on the other hand there were no distinct frontiers, such as in Great Britain and France impelled toward national unity. United, except in a superficial political sense, Russia has never been. Nevertheless, she played for two hundred years, under the Romanoff Czars, a great part in European and world history, and may do so again.

When in 1689 Peter I became sole ruler of Russia, the country had no contact with the West. Archangel, its only ocean port, was blocked for more than half the year by ice, and was at no time accessible. From the Baltic, Russia was cut off by Sweden and Poland, from the Black Sea by the Ottoman Turks. The supreme object of Peter's policy was to Europeanize Russia, geographically, politically, and socially.

His geographical objective brought Russia into inevitable conflict with the three powers named above. Fortunately for Peter all of them were declining.

In 1696 Peter 'opened a window to the south' by the capture of Azof; but the outlook was confined, and in 1711 this window was closed, not to be permanently reopened until 1739. But the capture of Azof suggested the necessity of a fleet and facilitated its creation. Fifty young nobles were sent to study shipbuilding and naval affairs in Holland and England. Technical experts were imported from abroad; 26,000 workmen were set to work on the Don, and a fleet was constructed at feverish speed.

A year later (1679) Peter set off on his famous tour of Western Europe, in the course of which he visited Hanover, Berlin, Amsterdam, London, and Vienna. Louis XIV excused himself from a visit from this highly intelligent barbarian.[1]

[1] Peter visited Paris in 1717.

For a barbarian in manners this great ruler was. In mind, however, he was extraordinarily acute and receptive. He learnt everything the West could teach him. From each country that he visited he imported experts—soldiers, sailors, engineers, teachers, doctors, miners, metal workers, artisans belonging to every trade.

From Vienna Peter was recalled by the news of a revolt among the old Russian militia (the *Streltsi*). The revolt was symptomatic. A reforming Czar was not popular. The Church regarded Peter as Anti-Christ. The nobles declared that he was in reality the son of a German doctor, and no Russian. All classes were scandalized by his unkingly life, and were oppressed by the heavy taxation necessitated by his reforms. But the revolt of the Streltsi was crushed with merciless severity, as were the later revolts of the Cossacks. By 1709 Peter was complete master of all the military resources of the country.

OPPOSITION IN RUSSIA

They were not left idle. In 1697 Charles XI was succeeded on the throne of Sweden by his son, a lad of fifteen. Charles XII was a medieval knight pitchforked into the eighteenth century. War was his pastime, but Sweden never recovered from his indulgence in it.

CHARLES XII.

Two years after his accession, Charles found himself confronted by a coalition, between Russia, Poland, and Denmark, compassed by Reynold Patkul, a discontented Livonian noble. A three-months' campaign (May to August 1780) sufficed to knock out Denmark. Then Charles dealt with Russia. On 30th November 1700, with a Swedish army of 8,000 men, he inflicted a crushing defeat on 80,000 Russians at Narva, on the Gulf of Finland. Poland remained. From Livonia Charles marched into the heart of Poland, occupied Warsaw, and reduced Crakow. In 1703 he captured Dantzic and Thorn, and in 1704 deposed Augustus II, the Saxon king of Poland, and got Stanislaus Leczinski, a Polish noble, elected in his place. Charles then reduced Lithuania, and from Lithuania advanced into Saxony, where he established himself at Altranstadt, near Leipsic.

The war of the Spanish Succession was then approaching its most critical stage.

The young Swedish conqueror, now encamped in the

heart of Germany, seemed for a moment to have the destinies of Europe in his hand. To him the combatants on both sides eagerly turned. Louis XIV tried to persuade him to play the part of Gustavus Adolphus. But Marlborough, the most skilful of diplomatists, personally visited him at Altranstadt in the winter of 1706-7, pointed out to this zealous Protestant that it was a shame to assist the persecutor of the Huguenots, and that the true path of glory led not to the west, but to the east.

To his ruin Charles was again diverted to an invasion of Russia. In 1702 Peter, having won some success in Livonia, had founded his new capital at Petersburg, and while Charles was wasting his time in Poland and Saxony, Peter was husbanding his resources and reorganizing his army. Charles plunged into the invasion of Russia, intent, like Napoleon after him, on reaching Moscow. A series of victories at Grodno on the Niemen, on the Beresina, at Smolensk on the Dnieper, evoked an advantageous peace offer from Peter. Charles would only treat at Moscow. From that objective, however, he was diverted into the Ukraine by the persuasions of Mazeppa, the hetman of the Cossacks of the Ukraine. At Pultowa, on one of the tributaries of the Dnieper, Peter with his reorganized army withstood him, and inflicted upon him a devastating defeat.

Pultowa was a really decisive battle. Russia advanced, at a single bound, to the position of a Great Power. Sweden fell to the second rank from which it has never again risen. Charles escaped into Turkey, and for four years lived in complete retirement at Bender. Augustus II was restored to the Polish throne. Peter occupied the Swedish provinces on the Baltic and married his niece Anna to the Duke of Courland.

Meanwhile Charles, backed by Louis XIV, stirred up the Turks to attack the Czar, who incautiously advanced to the Pruth, was surrounded by the Turks, and compelled to execute the capitulation of Pruth (1711). Azof was restored, the Russian fortresses on Turkish soil dismantled, and the Russian fleet removed from the Black Sea.

CAPITULATION OF THE PRUTH

The conclusion of peace between Turkey and Russia was the final blow to the hopes of Charles XII. Prussia occupied

Pomerania; Hanover annexed Bremen and Verden; Denmark took Wismar, and Peter the Great established his supremacy in the Baltic and threatened Stockholm itself. At last Charles, roused to action, determined to try and retrieve his losses by the conquest of Norway, but in 1718 was killed in the trenches before the Castle of Friedrichshall.

The bullet which killed him was probably fired by a traitor in his own camp. The nobles undoubtedly wished to be rid of him, and on his death put his younger sister, Ulrica Eleonore, on the throne, to the exclusion of the rightful heir, Frederick of Holstein. The Crown was made elective and Sweden became in effect an aristocratic Republic, until in 1772 Gustavus III re-established absolute monarchy and saved Sweden from the impending fate of Poland.

The death of Charles XII did not immediately bring Sweden peace. Peter was determined to complete the annihilation of the rival kingdom, but in 1721 consented to the Treaty of Nystadt. Sweden had come to terms with the rest of her enemies a year earlier.

Sweden was stripped to the skin. George of Hanover (now King of England) kept Bremen and Verden, but paid a million rix-dollars for them; Prussia, on similar terms, kept Stettin, the islands of Wollin and Usedom, and a further piece of Pomerania; Denmark acquired the greater part of Schleswig, but Sweden bought back Stralsund, Wismar, and the Isle of Rugen. By the Treaty of Nystadt, Russia acquired Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, and Carelia, and a strip of Finland, and with them a firm grip upon the Baltic.

TREATIES OF STOCKHOLM AND NYSTADT

This comprehensive settlement was, for the North, the counterpart of the settlement effected at Utrecht for Central and Western Europe. It marked the dramatic rise of Russia, the steady advance of Prussia, and the fall of Sweden from the high estate attained under Gustavus Adolphus and Oxenstiern. In face of the emergence of Russia and Prussia that great position could not have been sustained. The resources of Sweden were unequal to it. The vanity and folly of Charles XII did but precipitate a transference of Baltic supremacy to Peter the Great's new creation. Four years after concluding peace, Peter himself died (1725). His son Alexis had died in 1718, probably

murdered by his father. To his widow Catherine Peter bequeathed the State which, in the face of opposition from clergy, nobles, and the old army, he had literally created.

FOR FURTHER READING (AND FOR CHAPTERS X AND XXI)

K. Waliszewski: *Les Origines de la Russie moderne; Pierre le Grand* (also E.T.); *Le Roman d'une Imperatrice* (also E.T.); *Autour d'un Trône* (also E.T.). R. N. Bain: *The First Romanovs.* Beazley, Forbes, and Birkett: *Russia* (Oxford, 1918). A. Rambaud: *History of Russia.* Geffroy: *Histoire des États Scandinaves.* Geijer: *Histoire de Suède* (E.T.). J. A. R. Marriott: *European Commonwealth* (for Poland); and *The Eastern Question.* E. Driault: *La Question d'Orient.* A. Sorel: *La Question d'Orient au 18e Siècle.* Lord Eversley: *Partitions of Poland.* Marriott: *Anglo-Russian Relations* (1944). E. Crankshaw: *Russia and Britain.*

CHAPTER XVI

THE EASTERN QUESTION (1453–1792)

THE OTTOMAN TURKS

FROM North-Eastern Europe we pass to the South-East. Russia is the connecting link between them. In the Baltic, Russia is the rival of Sweden; in the Black Sea, of Turkey.

The 'Eastern Question' has meant different things at different times. In the period now under review it means the presence embedded in the living flesh of Europe of an alien substance; the consequences arising therefrom, and the problems created by the attempt to get rid of it. That substance was the Ottoman Turk.

The Ottomans, a tribe of Asiastic nomads, had in the fourteenth century conquered the greater part of the Byzantine Empire to the south of the Straits, and had established themselves as the dominant power in the hinterland of Asia Minor. In 1353 they were summoned by the Byzantine Emperor to save his capital from the assault of the Serbians. Having accomplished their immediate task they decided to fight not as auxiliaries but as principals. They captured Gallipoli, and so got a grip, never afterwards relaxed, upon the European shore of the Dardanelles.

The Greek Empire had then reached the last stage of emasculate decay. In Europe, apart from Constantinople and Thrace, it held only the Macedonian coast, with the city of Salonika and the Eastern Peloponnesus. Hungary, Transylvania, Wallachia, Croatia, and Bosnia owned the sway of Lewis the Great; the Serbian Empire stretched from Belgrade to the Gulf of Corinth, from the Adriatic to the Aegean; Bulgaria held what we know as Bulgaria proper and Eastern Roumelia; Dalmatia, Corfu, Crete, and Euboea were in the hands of

THE BALKAN PENINSULA

Venice; the Knights of St. John were in possession of Rhodes; while the Franks still held the Kingdom of Cyprus, the Principality of Achaia, the Duchies of Athens, Naxos, and Cephalonia, not to speak of many of the Aegean islands. Little, therefore, was left to the successors of the Caesars in Constantinople. The Illyrians, who established the kingdom of Epirus in the fourth century B.C., were represented in the thirteenth century, as they are still, by the mountaineers of Albania. They have successfully resisted absorption by the Turks as they had previously resisted similar efforts on the part of Romans, Byzantines, and Slavs. The Thracians, dominant during the Macedonian supremacy, mingled with Trajan's colonists in Dacia to form the people represented by the modern Roumanians. The southern portion of what is now Roumania emerged, toward the close of the thirteenth century, as the Principality of Wallachia; the northern, a century later, came to be known as the Principality of Moldavia.

Such was the position of the Balkan peninsula when the Ottomans began their career of conquest in South-Eastern Europe. The attack was irresistible, and within two hundred years almost the whole of the varied and widely distributed dominions, enumerated above, had been swept into the net of the Ottoman Empire. Adrianople was snatched from the feeble hands of the Byzantine Emperor in 1361, and thenceforward until 1453 was the European capital of the Turkish Emir. The Bulgarians had to surrender Philippolis in 1363, Sophia in 1382, while the destruction of Tirnovo in 1393 marked the extinction, for nearly five hundred years, of Bulgarian independence. Meanwhile, a crushing defeat had been inflicted upon a great Slavonic combination. The historic battle fought upon the plain of Kossovo (1389) meant more than the overthrow of the Serbian Empire: it meant the political effacement for many long years of the Southern Slavs. Serbia was annexed to the Ottoman Empire in 1459, Bosnia in 1465. In 1453 the Imperial city itself had fallen before the assault of Mohammed, and the Greek Empire was at an end.

Whether regard be paid to historical sentiment or to political, economic, intellectual, and spiritual consequences, the capture of Constantinople by the Ottomans must, as

already observed,[1] be counted as one of the most significant events in the history of the world. The final extinction of the older Roman Empire; the blocking of the ancient paths of commerce; the diversion of trade, and, with trade, of political importance from the Mediterranean lands; the discovery of America and the Cape route to the East; the emergence of England from the economic sloth and obscurity of the Middle Ages; the new birth of Humanism; the impulse to religious questionings; the development of national polities and national Churches—all these results and others may be attributed indirectly, and many of them directly, to the Turkish conquest of the city of Constantine.

ZENITH OF TURKISH POWER

For two hundred and fifty years after the capture of Constantinople the Turks continued to be a terror to Europe. Early in the sixteenth century they extended their sway over Syria, Egypt, Arabia, and Northern Mesopotamia. Rhodes was captured in 1522, and the Knights of St. John, after a temporary sojourn in Crete, found a permanent refuge in Malta (1530). The zenith of Turkish power was reached under the great Sultan Solyman (1526–66), known to European contemporaries as the 'Magnificent' and to his own people as the 'Lawgiver.' Solyman was both a great administrator and a great soldier.

Belgrade had fallen to the Turks in 1521, and the acquisition of that great frontier fortress opened the way to the conquest of Hungary. On 28th August 1526 Solyman met and defeated at Mohacz the flower of the Magyar nobility, on 20th September he occupied their capital Buda, and in 1529 the whole of Hungary, except for a narrow strip left to the Hapsburgs, was annexed to the Turkish Empire as the Pashalik of Buda.

From Hungary Solyman advanced on Vienna, but in view of the danger to Christendom, Lutherans and Catholics closed their ranks; large reinforcements were soon on their way to Vienna, and after a fruitless siege of twenty-four days Solyman, hitherto unconquerable, withdrew baffled. The brave garrison of Vienna had interposed a definite and, as it was to prove, a final barrier between the Ottomans and Western

[1] See *supra*, p. 6.

Europe. Vienna, though again besieged in 1683, was never taken.

Short of Vienna the whole Danubian region was in Solyman's hands. The Roumans of Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia were reduced to vassalage. To the Sultanate Solyman's predecessor had added the Caliphate. Successor to the Prophet, spiritual father of the whole Moslem world, Solyman ruled as temporal lord from Buda to Basra, from the Danube to the Persian Gulf.

The astonishing success of the Ottoman conquerors was due partly to conditions external to themselves, partly to their own characteristics and institutions. The irretrievable decrepitude of the Greek Empire; the proverbial lack of political cohesion among the Slav peoples; the jealousy and antagonism of the Christian Powers; the high military prowess and shrewd statesmanship of many of the earlier Sultans—all these things contributed to the amazing rapidity with which the Ottomans overran South-Eastern Europe. But unquestionably the most potent instrument of conquest was forged in the institution of Christian child-tribute, the formation of the famous Corps of Janissaries.

After the middle of the sixteenth century the Janissaries lost some of their original characteristics. In 1566 members of the Corps were permitted to marry, and in time to enrol their sons. They began, therefore, to look with jealousy upon the admission of the tribute-children, and before the end of the seventeenth century the tribute ceased to be levied. Corruption, meanwhile, was eating into the vitals of Ottoman government, both in the capital and in the provinces. Worse still, the soldiers of the Crescent continued to fight, but no longer to conquer. The only permanent conquests effected by the Turk after 1566 were those of Cyprus and Crete. Ceasing to advance, the Turkish power rapidly receded. Success in arms was essential to vigour of domestic administration, and both depended upon the personal qualities of the rulers.

After Solyman there was hardly one man of mark among the Sultans until the accession of Mahmoud the Second in 1808. When absolutism ceases to be efficient, decadence is necessarily rapid. In the case of the Turks it was temporarily arrested by the emergence of a

THE KIUPRILIS

remarkable Albanian family, the Kiuprilis, who supplied the Porte with a succession of Viziers during the latter half of the seventeenth century. In the first half of the century the Thirty Years' War had given the Ottomans a magnificent chance of destroying the last bulwark of Western Christendom. But they missed it, and such a chance never recurs. In 1683 the Vizier Kara Mustapha carried the victorious arms of Turkey to the very gates of Vienna ; but the Hapsburgs were saved by John Sobieski of Poland, and in the last year of the century they inflicted a series of crushing defeats upon the Turk.

The tide had clearly turned. The naval defeat at Lepanto (1571) was, perhaps, a premature indication ; after Montecuculi's victory at St. Gothard (1664), and Prince Eugene's at Zenta (1697), men could no longer doubt it. The diplomatic system was also crumbling. In 1535 Francis I, King of France, had concluded with Sultan Solyman a treaty which formed the basis of an alliance which for three centuries continued to be an essential factor in French diplomacy. The loyalty of the Turk to his ally was, confessedly, more constant and continuous than that of the French. The latter were glad to avail themselves of the help of the Turk against the Hapsburgs, or other enemies, whenever it suited their immediate purpose. They did not hesitate, however, to come to terms with the adversaries of the Turk when their own interests dictated the step. Thus at St. Gothard in 1664 the French fought against the Turks, and in 1669 Louis XIV sent help to Venice. But France soon returned to her traditional policy, despite, or perhaps by reason of, the obvious decadence of the Turk. Constantinople continued, almost down to the end of the nineteenth century, to be one of the chief centres of French diplomatic activity. Meanwhile, the Venetian conquest of the Morea (1684–99), the resounding victories of the Hapsburgs, above all the entrance of Russia on the stage of European politics, announced the opening of a new chapter in the history of the Eastern Question.

In its second phase (1702–1820) the Eastern Question centred in the relations of Russia and Turkey. The Hapsburgs were frequently on the stage, but rarely in the leading rôle, and the part they played became more and more definitely subsidiary as the eighteenth century advanced.

From the days of Peter the Great to those of Alexander I Europe, not indeed without spasmodic protests from France, acquiesced in the assumption that Russia might fairly claim a preponderant interest in the settlement of the Eastern Question. This acquiescence seems to a later generation the more remarkable in view of the fact that Russia herself had so lately made her entrance upon the stage of European politics. Perhaps this fact explains the acquiescence. Russia was already pushing towards the Black Sea before Western Europe recognized her existence.

By the conquest of Azov (1696) Peter the Great 'opened a window to the South.' It was closed again as a result of the capitulation of the Pruth (1711); but the set-back was temporary, and by the Treaty of Belgrade (1739) Azov was restored in permanence to Russia.

The occupation of Azov was the first breach in the continuity of Ottoman territory round the shores of the Black Sea. Hitherto that sea had been a Turkish lake. But though Russia now touched its shores, no firm grip upon it was obtained until the war which was ended by the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774).

That famous treaty was, perhaps, the most notable achievement of the Empress Catherine II, one of the ablest women that ever occupied a throne. From the death of Peter the Great (1725) until the accession of Paul (1796) the Russian throne was, except for some four years, occupied exclusively by women. Of these Empresses, Catherine II was incomparably the greatest.

CATHERINE II

The daughter of Prince Christian of Anhalt-Zerbst, an officer in the Prussian army, Catherine was at the age of sixteen married to the Grand Duke Peter (1745), who in 1761 succeeded his aunt the Czarina Elizabeth (1741–61) as Czar of Russia. The younger daughter of Peter the Great, the Czarina Elizabeth, like a much greater Elizabeth, had resolutely refused to marry, and made her nephew her heir.[1] Purely German in sentiment, Peter III was a mischievous marionette and quite unfitted to be the husband of Catherine or any other woman. His brief reign was notable only for that sudden reversal of Russian policy which, at the crisis of

[1] Son of Anne (daughter of Peter the Great) by her marriage with Duke Newbigin of Holstein-Gottorp.

his fate, saved Frederick the Great from annihilation.[1] Peter's pro-Prussian infatuation alienated every section of the Russian people, nobles, clergy, and populace, and after reigning seven months (January–July 1762) he was dethroned by the Russian Guards; they pushed aside all other claimants and put Catherine on the throne.

Catherine II was thirty-three years old when she came to the throne, and she reigned for thirty-four years. Her reign was, with the exception of Peter the Great's, the most important in Russian history. Her domestic policy was in line with that of the philosopher-kings, the enlightened autocrats of the century; by the dismemberment and ultimate extinction of Poland she pushed Russia into the heart of Europe, and by her two wars with Turkey she established Russia's supremacy in the Black Sea and obtained for her a permanent diplomatic footing in Constantinople.

Only with Catherine's relation to the Eastern Question is this chapter concerned: but it should be read in close connexion with that on Poland.

TURKISH WAR, (1768–74)

The pact which Catherine concluded in 1764 with Frederick of Prussia (1764) had provided for common action at Constantinople with a view to averting Turkish intervention in Poland. The simplest way to effect this end was to keep the Turks busy at home. Accordingly, throughout the years 1765–7, Russian agents were constantly at work in Greece, Crete, Bosnia, and Montenegro. Both Greeks and Slavs were led to believe that the day of their deliverance was at hand; that the ancient prophecy that 'the Turkish Empire would one day be destroyed by a fair-haired people' was at last about to be fulfilled. Vergennes, the French ambassador at Constantinople, emphasized the significance of the ferment among the subject peoples, and urged upon the Porte the necessity of a counter-attack.

A pretext was found in the violation of Turkish territory by Russian troops who had pursued some fugitive Poles into Tartary. Accordingly, in 1768, the Porte demarded that the Russian troops should immediately evacuate Poland. Russia hesitated to comply; the Porte declared war (6th October).

[1] See *infra*, p. 227.

French diplomacy failed to achieve its object. It did not save Poland, but brought destruction upon Turkey.

From the first, things went badly for the Turks. In 1769 a Turkish army was surprised on the Dniester, and fled in panic before the Russians, who then occupied Jassy and Bucarest. In 1770, Catherine II made a determined effort to rouse the Greeks against the Sultan. A Russian fleet issued from the Baltic, sailed round to the Mediterranean, and made a descent upon the coasts of the Morea. But the scheme miscarried. The Russians attacked Tripolitza, but were badly supported by the Greeks, and fell back before the Turks. The latter exacted a terrible vengeance from the unhappy Greeks, both in the Morea and in the islands of the archipelago, and the Greeks, disillusioned and disappointed, cursed the fickle allies who had first roused them to rebellion and had then abandoned them to their fate.

RUSSO-TURKISH WAR (1769–74)

Meanwhile, the Russian Admiral Orloff, aided by some luck, and still more by the English officers under his command, won a notable success at sea. He attacked the Turkish fleet near Chios, inflicted heavy losses upon them, and compelled them to take refuge in the harbour of Tchesmé.

Nor were the Turkish disasters at sea redeemed by success on land. The Crimea was conquered by Russia; the fortresses on the Dneister and the Danube fell one after another before the Russian assault; and before the end of 1771 Catherine was in undisputed occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia.

But although Catherine continued to win victories in the field, she was disposed towards peace partly by a threat of Austrian intervention on behalf of the Turks, and partly by the outbreak of a formidable insurrection among the Cossacks of the Don. In July 1774 the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji was signed.

Of the many treaties concluded during the last two centuries between Russia and Turkey this is the most fundamental and the most far-reaching. Russia restored to the Porte most of the territories she had recently occupied: Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and the islands of the archipelago; but only on condition of better treatment. Russia retained

TREATY OF KUTCHUK-KAINARDJI (15TH JULY 1774)

Azov, Jenikale, and Kertsch, with the districts adjacent thereto; also Kinburn at the mouth of the Dnieper, and (provided the assent of the Khan of Tartary could be obtained), the two Kabardas. By these acquisitions Russia obtained for the first time a firm grip upon the northern shore of the Black Sea; she controlled the straits between the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea; while the possession of the two Kabardas gave her a footing on the eastern shore. The Tartars to the east of the Bug were at the same time declared independent of the Porte, except in ecclesiastical matters—a further blow to the position of the Turks on the Euxine. Thus Turkish territory, instead of encircling the Black Sea, was henceforward to be bounded on the north-east by the river Bug. To develop her trade, Russia was to be allowed to establish consuls and vice-consuls wherever she might think fit; she was to have the right of free commercial navigation in the Black Sea; and the subjects of the Czarina were to be allowed to trade in the Ottoman dominions 'by land as well as by water and upon the Danube in their ships.'

Not less significant was the diplomatic footing which Russia obtained in Constantinople. Henceforward Russia was to be represented at the Porte by a permanent Embassy; she was to have the right to erect, in addition to her minister's private chapel, 'a public church of the Greek ritual,' which was to be under the protection of the Russian minister. The Porte further agreed to permit Russian subjects, 'as well laymen as ecclesiastics,' to make pilgrimages to Jerusalem and other holy places and 'to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches.'

In regard to the territories lately occupied by Russia and now restored to the Ottoman Empire, the stipulations were even more specific. The Danubian Principalities, the islands of the Archipelago, and the provinces of Georgia and Mingrelia were restored only on condition of better government in general, and of particular privileges in regard to 'monetary taxes,' to diplomatic representation, and above all to religion.

From these stipulations Russian publicists have deduced, and not unnaturally, a general right of interference in the domestic concerns of the Ottoman Empire.

The next step toward the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was taken, not by Russia but by Austria. Directly after the conclusion of the Treaty of Kainardji, Austria helped herself to the Bukovina; and the Turks, reduced to impotence by Russia, were constrained to acquiesce. The formal treaty of cession was signed on 7th May 1775. Thus by a simple act of brigandage Austria obtained, in territory, far more than Russia had acquired by a prolonged and strenuous war. Nor did she gain only in territory. The acquisition of the Bukovina forged a fresh link in the chain of friendship between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

THE BUKOVINA

That friendship became even more intimate after the death, in 1780, of Maria Theresa. The Emperor Joseph II succumbed entirely to the seductive and dominating personality of Catherine, and cordially supported her ambitious policy in the Near East.

CATHERINE II AND JOSEPH II

In September 1782 the Czarina laid before her ally a specific plan for the complete reconstruction of the map of the Balkan peninsula, and the lands, seas, and islands adjacent thereto.

The grandiose scheme of 1782 was not destined to realization. But in the following year Catherine resolved to put an end immediately to an embarrassing situation in the Crimea. By the Treaty of Kainardji the Porte had been deprived of its suzerainty over the Tartars in political affairs, though the Khalifal authority of the Sultan remained inviolate. Difficulties naturally arose from this contradictory arrangement, and in 1783 Catherine resolved any ambiguity by annexing the Crimea. The new Russian province was rapidly transformed by Russian engineers and cultivators; it began to bristle with fortresses and arsenals, and to yield a rich harvest of agricultural produce.

ANNEXATION OF THE CRIMEA

It was not to be expected that the Porte would view with unconcern the rapid strides which Russia was making toward supremacy in the Black Sea: the annexation of the Tartars; the fortification of the Crimea; the economic development of the southern provinces; above all, the striking progress of Russian sea-power. Moreover, Russian agents had been

busy of late in stirring up discontent among the Greeks, Slavs, and Roumanians; they had even extended their intrigues to Egypt. Sultan Abdul Hamid had, therefore, ample ground for disquietude. Disquietude gave place to indignation when Catherine formulated her further demands. The Sultan was required to renounce his sovereignty over Georgia, to surrender Bessarabia to Russia, and to permit the establishment of hereditary governors in Moldavia and Wallachia. In reply Abdul Hamid demanded the immediate restoration of the Crimea, and followed up the demand by a declaration of war against Russia (August 1787).

Faithful to his alliance, Joseph II declared war against the Sultan in February 1788, but the Austrians contributed little to the success of the campaign. Not that the Turks were making much of it.

Before the close of the year 1788 Potemkin had made himself master of the great fortress of Oczakov and the surrounding district, and in 1789 the Austrians, after taking Belgrade and Semendria, made an incursion into Bosnia.

But a combination of events disposed the belligerents to peace. The Triple Alliance had been formed by Pitt in 1788 between England, Holland, and Prussia, and one of its objects was to check the advance of Russia and Austria in the Near East.[1] In April 1789 Abdul Hamid I died, and was succeeded by Selim III, a ruler who was as feeble and reactionary as Abdul Hamid had been vigorous and enlightened. The death of the Emperor Joseph (28th February 1790) and the accession of his sagacious brother, Leopold, gave a new turn to Austrian policy. Above all, the development of the revolutionary movement in France was compelling the strained attention of every monarch and every government in Europe.

Accordingly, in August 1791, Austria concluded peace with the Porte at Sistova. Serbia was handed back to Turkey, and the *status quo ante* was restored. On 9th January 1792 a 'treaty of perpetual peace' was signed by Russia and Turkey at Jassy. The Treaty of Kainardji and the Treaty of 1783 were confirmed; the Porte recovered Moldavia, but again on condition that the stipulations contained in the preceding

TREATIES OF SISTOVA AND JASSY

[1] See Marriott, *Eastern Question*, 3rd ed., p. 161.

treaties were fulfilled; the Russian frontier was advanced to the Dniester (Oczakov being thus transferred), and the Porte agreed to recognize the annexation of the Crimea.

The Treaty of Jassy brings to a close one of the most important phases in the history of the Eastern Question. When it opened Russia had hardly begun to play a part as a European Power; the Black Sea was a Turkish lake. As it closes, Russia is firmly entrenched upon the shores of the Euxine, and is already looking beyond them. Kherson and Sevastopol have been transformed into great naval arsenals; Kinburn and Oczakov, not to mention Taganrog, Azov, and the Kabardas, are secure in Russian keeping. To the north of the Euxine Turkish territory ends at the Dniester, and the border provinces between the Dniester and the Danube are retained only on sufferance. Upon the lands to the south of the Euxine the Turkish hold is already loosening. 'I came to Russia,' said Catherine, 'a poor girl; Russia has dowered me richly, but I have paid her back with Azov, the Crimea, and the Ukraine.' Proudly spoken, it was less than the truth.

CHAPTER XVII

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1715-89)

THE two preceding chapters have been parenthetical. We return to Western Europe. The Treaty of Utrecht, followed so soon by the death of the *grand monarque*, forms one of the watersheds of modern Europe. When we cross it we descend into new country, and enter upon the path that leads to the abyss of the French Revolution.

What are the outstanding features of the landscape we scan ?

(i) The first is the obvious decadence of France. All through the long reign of Louis XIV France was pre-eminent. Only gradually was the influence thus acquired dissipated by his successors; but after the middle of the century the decline was rapid, and we shall see France defeated by Prussia on the Continent, and hopelessly beaten in the great contest for world supremacy by England.

(ii) The second is the co-operation between the Bourbons of France and the Bourbons in Spain. Louis XIV had not put a grandson on the Spanish throne for nothing. The fears of the English Whigs and their opposition to the Treaty of Utrecht were to some extent justified by the ' Family Compact,' and by the co-operation of France and Spain against England, alike in the old world and the new. Not, however, until after 1731 was the co-operation discernible, and, even then, it was half-hearted. Renewed in 1743 the alliance was suspended from 1748 to 1761, and, on the whole, it exercised less influence on the international situation than might have been expected.

(iii) In Europe the centre of political gravity was shifting eastward. We note the contest between the Hohenzollern and the Hapsburgs for supremacy in Germany; the successive partitions of Poland between its three neighbours; and the advance of Russia in South-Eastern Europe.

(iv) The advance of Russia was at the expense partly of

Sweden, partly of Poland, and partly of the Ottoman Empire, whose decay, discernible in the seventeenth century, proceeded in the eighteenth with accelerated rapidity.

(v) Sweden and Holland, which had played so conspicuous and important a part in European politics in the seventeenth century, are evidently on the decline in the eighteenth. The Southern Netherlands, on the contrary, which in 1713 passed from the Spanish to the Austrian Hapsburgs, regained under Maria Theresa (1740–80) some of the industrial prosperity they had lost.

(vi) But the outstanding feature of eighteenth-century history was not primarily European; it was the great contest between England and France for supremacy in India and North America. England, having by 1763 expelled the French from India, found herself involved during the next half-century in a contest with the chief 'native' states which, like the English Company itself, had risen to prominence on the ruins of the Mogul Empire. But the Seven Years' War (1756 63), which witnessed the virtual extinction of the French power in India, dealt the death-blow also to the hopes of a great French Empire in North America.

France was quickly avenged. Within a decade of the cession of French Canada to England, the thirteen English colonies in North America were in revolt, and in 1783 we acknowledged their independence. Nevertheless, the whole North American continent was to remain predominantly English.

(vii) Defeated in India and North America, France is moving nearer and nearer to the precipice of the Revolution. By 1792 she has fallen into the abyss, to be rescued by the great soldier whose advent was from the first predicted by Burke.

(viii) Looking, however, at Europe as a whole, the most remarkable feature of the latter days of the pre-revolutionary era is the prevalence of reforming activity. The old monarchies were in almost every country, except France, making strenuous efforts to put their several houses in order. Those efforts were not, as a rule, appreciated by their subjects, and were violently interrupted by the outbreak of the revolution in France.

To these matters the chapters that follow must be directed.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT—AND AFTER (1715-40)

CHIEF DATES

1715 Orleans, Regent of France
1715. Defeat of Jacobites in England
1717. Triple Alliance — England, France, and Holland
1717. Law's Mississippi Scheme.
1717. Alberoni, Chief Minister in Spain.
1717. Spaniards conquer Sardinia
1718. Spaniards conquer but fail to hold Sicily
1718. Quadruple Alliance.
1718. England declares war on Spain.
1719. France declares war on Spain.
1720. Charles VI gets Sicily in lieu of Sardinia.
1720. Savoy obtains Sardinia.
1720 South Sea Bubble bursts.
1721. Walpole in power—1742.
1723. Louis XV attains majority, marries (1725) Marie Leczinski.
1725 Treaty of Hanover
1726 Fleury in power—1743.
1727. England at war with Spain.
1727 Siege of Gibraltar—1728.
1729 Treaty of Seville.
1731 Treaty of Vienna.
1733. Treaty of Turin (France and Sardinia).
1733 Treaty of the Escurial (Family Compact).
1733. Polish Succession War.
1735. Preliminary Peace of Vienna (France and Austria).
1736. Maria Theresa marries Francis Duke of Lorraine.
1738. Treaty of Vienna.
1739. War of 'Jenkins' ear.'
1740. Accession of Frederick the Great.
1740. Death of Emperor Charles VI.

THE years 1715-40 form an interlude between the age of Louis XIV and the age of Frederick the Great. On the stage of European diplomacy there is no 'star'; the nearest approach to one is a leading lady, Elizabeth Farnese, a princess of Parma, who in 1714 became the second wife of Philip V of Spain, and is known to history—ungallantly—as 'the termagant of Spain.' For the rest, the stage is filled by a confused crowd of sovereigns and statesmen, among whom the most clearly distinguishable, apart from Elizabeth and her ministers, Alberoni and Ripperda, are Dubois and Stanhope (whose achievements

have been underrated),[1] Cardinal Fleury and Sir Robert Walpole, the Emperor Charles VI, intent on securing, by a *Pragmatic Sanction*, the succession to his hereditary dominions for his daughter Maria Theresa, and the Prussian 'drill sergeant,' Frederick William I.

The clue to the diplomatic confusion, the shifting combinations and counter-combinations, may be found in the Utrecht Settlement—the anxiety of certain Powers to maintain that settlement, of others to overthrow it.

THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT

The Utrecht Settlement left Philip V, the grandson of Louis XIV, in possession of Spain and the Indies. To that extent the supreme ambition of Louis XIV had been attained. The Pyrenees, if not erased from the map, had been tunnelled. But from the Bourbon point of view there were several 'snags.' The crowns of France and Spain were never to be united; the Protestant succession in England was guaranteed, and the cause of the Catholic Stuarts abandoned; the Spanish Netherlands, detached from Spain, became the appanage not of France but of Austria; English susceptibilities were respected by the destruction of the fortifications of Dunkirk. England, moreover, secured a strong hold on the Mediterranean by the retention of Gibraltar and Minorca, and strengthened her position against France in North America by the acquisition of the French rights in Newfoundland, Acadie (Nova Scotia), and Hudson's Bay; she also obtained by the *Assiento* a large share in the lucrative if discreditable slave-trade, and the right of sending one ship a year to Porto Bello.

The English Whigs might grumble at a 'Tory' peace; but hardly was George I safely seated on the throne before both he and they fixed upon the maintenance of the Utrecht Settlement as the prime object of their foreign policy.

ENGLAND AND FRANCE

On the death of Louis XIV (1715) the crown of France passed to his great-grandson Louis XV, a sickly child of five years old, and not expected to live. Philip, Duke of Orleans, the great-uncle of Louis XV, became Regent, with good hopes of succeeding to the throne, provided the terms of Utrecht were respected, and Philip V of Spain—the

[1] Until the publication of Mr. Basil Williams's *Stanhope* (1932).

natural heir to the French throne—was excluded from it. A *rapprochement* between the Regent Orleans and the English Hanoverians, between Dubois and Stanhope, between Cardinal Fleury and Sir Robert Walpole, was the natural consequence of this dynastic and diplomatic situation. France and England were alike interested in maintaining intact the recent Settlement.

Spain and Austria, on the contrary, were anxious to overthrow it. The Emperor Charles VI still hankered after the crown of Spain; nor was he satisfied with his Italian acquisitions; he obtained the Duchies of Milan and Mantua, the Tuscan ports (*Stato degli Presidii*), Naples and Sardinia, but he resented the surrender to the House of Savoy of Sicily, for which Sardinia was a poor substitute. Nor did he greatly value the Spanish Netherlands; and he much disliked having to pay the Dutch troops who garrisoned the fortresses which France had given up to form a defensive barrier for Holland.

THE HAPSBURGS

Philip V was even more eager for the throne of France than was the Emperor for the throne of Spain. Moreover, the wound inflicted by the loss of the Spanish possessions in Italy was inflamed by two Italians at Madrid, his second wife, Elizabeth of Parma, and Cardinal Alberoni, the son of a jobbing gardener at Piacenza. As a lad Alberoni attracted the notice of the parish priest, who encouraged him to take Orders. Vendôme, when commanding the French troops in Italy during the Succession War, was struck by his talents and recommended him to the Duke of Parma, who sent him as minister to Madrid. From 1714 until 1719 he was the real ruler of Spain. The object of his policy was to restore to Spain its ancient grandeur, and n particular to drive the Austrians out of Italy, and to restore Spanish ascendancy in that distracted country.

ALBERONI

'Give me,' said Alberoni, 'but four years of peace, and I will make of Spain the first power in Europe.' The time he demanded was too short, but before it had elapsed Spain was at war. Meanwhile, as Mr. F. S. Oliver has truly said, 'the success of his administration was little short of a miracle. The national resources, the colonial wealth, and the spirit of the Spanish people were all turned to account. He breathed

life and hope into the decadent monarchy. Corruption and futility in the public service gave place to honesty and efficiency. Commerce, shipping, and agriculture began to flourish under his encouragement. The arsenals were filled; all day long hammers clanged in the dockyards; the army and navy were disciplined and well provided; and the Spaniards, who had always carried their heads high even in adversity, recovered confidence in their destiny.' [1]

By marrying Philip V to a princess of Parma he secured a powerful ally. He sought another in England, and offered her tempting inducements: a guarantee of the perpetual severance of the crowns of Spain and France; commercial concessions greatly exceeding those secured by Bolingbroke in the Treaty of Utrecht, and the withdrawal of all assistance from the Pretender. But England preferred the alliance of France, who not only offered the expulsion of the Pretender from Avignon, and the severance of the two Bourbon crowns, but the destruction of the fortifications of Mardyke by which France had thought to replace Dunkirk (1716). By the adhesion of Holland the Anglo-French alliance was converted into a Triple Alliance, and when in 1717 Philip V attacked the Austrians in Sardinia, the Emperor Charles VI joined the Triple Alliance, thus converting it into a Quadruple Alliance directed against Spain. Alberoni retaliated by inciting the Turks to attack the Emperor, by fomenting a conspiracy against the Regent Orleans in France, and by encouraging Sweden and Russia to send a joint expedition in the interests of the Pretender against England. But Alberoni's schemes everywhere miscarried. The victories of Prince Eugene at Peterwardein (1716) and Belgrade (1717) warded off the danger threatened to the Empire by the Turks; Charles XII of Sweden was killed while attacking Friedrichshall; one armada intended to effect the restoration of the Pretender to the English throne was dispersed by a storm; a second dispatched for the conquest of Sicily was destroyed off Cape Passaro by Admiral Byng; the legitimist plot for the supersession of the Regent Orleans was a fiasco. Alberoni himself, discredited by a crop of failures, was dismissed in disgrace. He returned to Italy, and, supported by the Jesuits, carried on his intrigues at Rome with such a measure of success that

[1] *The Endless Adventure*, ch. i, p. 220.

in the Papal election of 1724 he secured ten votes. He died in 1752.

Meanwhile, Philip V accepted the terms dictated by the Quadruple Alliance (1720). The Emperor Charles VI exchanged Sardinia for Sicily with the House of Savoy, henceforward to bear the title of Kings of Sardinia; the reversion of the Duchies of Tuscany, Parma, and Piacenza was secured to Don Carlos, the son of the Termagant. The Utrecht settlement remained substantially intact. By a subsequent agreement the infant Don Luis was to marry the daughter of the Regent Orleans; and Louis XV was to marry the eldest daughter—a child of five—of Philip V.

In 1725 the settlement was again endangered and war seemed imminent. A new set of actors had come upon the scene. Dubois had died in August 1723, and the Regent Orleans in the following December. In 1724 the control of Spanish policy passed into the hands of a Dutchman, Baron Ripperda, a protégé of Alberoni's, and like him a foreign envoy at the Court of Madrid, who saw his chance and became a naturalized Spaniard. He quarrelled, however, with Alberoni and withdrew from Madrid to Vicuna, where he accepted a pension from Prince Eugene. After Alberoni's disgrace he returned to Spain, and from 1724 until 1726 he was the chief adviser of the sovereign.

AUSTRO-SPANISH ALLIANCE

The pivot of Ripperda's policy was an alliance between Spain and the Emperor. Charles VI was still vaguely hankering after the crown of Spain, but having no male heir his immediate and overmastering anxiety was to secure the succession to his vast and varied dominions for his daughter Maria Theresa. This he hoped to do by a solemn instrument known as the *Pragmatic Sanction*. Having secured its confirmation by the Estates of Austria, Hungary, and the other provinces of the monarchy, Charles VI sought to make it still more secure by international guarantees. Prince Eugene warned the Emperor that the only effectual guarantees were an efficient army and a full treasury. Eugene proved to be right, but Charles VI made the *Sanction* the pivot of his diplomacy until his death in 1740.

This formed the basis of the treaty which Ripperda negotiated between Spain and Austria in 1725. In return for Philip's guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction and his

recognition of the Ostende Company, the Emperor promised the reversion of the Italian Duchies to Don Carlos and to help Spain to recover Gibraltar and Minorca. This sudden change in the diplomatic situation was largely due to the indignation felt in Spain when Louis XV sent back the Spanish Infanta, his destined bride, to Madrid, and married Marie Leczinski, daughter of the ex-King of Poland.

TREATY OF VIENNA (1725)

The Pyrenees were once more a barrier; once more England and France drew together in the Treaty of Hanover, and were joined by Prussia and later on by Holland, Sweden, and Denmark. Prussia was to have her Rhine Provinces (Cleves and Julich), and the Ostende Company was, in the interests of the English and Dutch East India Companies, to be suppressed.

The policy of France and England was by this time in the hands of two great ministers, Cardinal Fleury (1726–43) and Sir Robert Walpole (1721–42), who were alike bent on maintaining peace in Europe.

FLEURY AND WALPOLE

In 1727 Spain did, indeed, lay siege to Gibraltar, but got no help from Austria. Walpole retorted only by a series of naval demonstrations: one to the Spanish coast, a second to blockade Porto Bello and detain the treasure fleet, and a third to the Baltic to warn Russia not to annoy England's Scandinavian allies. The demonstrations sufficed, and after much diplomatic activity and several preliminary treaties, the peace of Europe seemed at last assured by the Peace of Vienna (1731). The Maritime Powers secured what they wanted—the final suppression of the Ostende Company, conceded by the Emperor in return for their recognition of his Pragmatic Sanction; Elizabeth Farnese had the satisfaction of seeing her son Don Carlos installed in Parma.

Peace, however, did not last long. In 1733 the death of Frederick Augustus II, King of Poland and Elector of Saxony, flung Europe again into turmoil. In 1732 Austria, Russia, and Prussia—a conjunction ominous of coming events in Poland—had concluded a secret treaty to secure the succession to a Portuguese Prince and to resist French influence in Poland. Throughout the seventeenth century, and a great part of the eighteenth, Poland was one of the main fields of French diplomacy. By maintaining their influence at Stockholm, Warsaw, and Constanti-

WAR OF THE POLISH SUCCESSION (1733-8)

nople the French could at once make trouble for their Hapsburg rivals and keep an eye on the rising power of the Hohenzollerns and the Romanoffs. An independent Poland, as the whole world has learnt since 1914, was and is a pivotal factor in French policy.

In 1733 France secured the election of Stanislaus Leczinski, father-in-law of Louis XV, to the Polish throne (September). A month later Austria and Russia, to the indignation of Prussia (which bitterly resented the union of Saxony and Poland), supported the election of Augustus III, son of the late king. A general war ensued and nominally lasted until 1738, but there was no fighting after 1735, when a basis of agreement was reached between the real principals—France and Austria. France at long last guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction; Augustus was to keep Poland, but Stanislaus Leczinski was to be compensated with the Duchy of Lorraine. Francis Stephen, Duke of Lorraine, who in 1736 married Maria Theresa, heiress to all that the Pragmatic Sanction could secure to her, was to exchange his duchy for that of Tuscany, as soon as the last Medicean grand-duke died, as he did in 1737. On the death of Stanislaus Lorraine was to revert to France. This happened in 1766, and to Alsace France added Lorraine. The 'general post' extended to Italy. Don Carlos was to have the two Sicilies, which the Spanish Bourbons retained (except during the Napoleonic régime) until 1861. The Emperor was to have Parma and Piacenza, and his son-in-law Tuscany. The House of Savoy swallowed two more leaves of the Lombardian 'artichoke.' Their advance toward Italian hegemony though slow was steady.

The war of the 'Polish Succession' closes the confused period which followed on the death of Louis XIV. Out of the confusion one or two points emerge. The most obvious is the supremacy of dynastic interests. Diplomacy is the game of princes. The peoples do not count. States are tossed from one prince to another to serve personal ambitions, or at best to maintain the European equilibrium without any regard to the wishes or interests of their inhabitants. Italy, apart from the Papal States and the House of Savoy, remains in the grip of Hapsburg and Spanish Bourbons. The Hapsburgs reveal themselves as increasingly indifferent

to German interests, more and more intent upon the promotion of their dynastic ambitions. The day of Prussia—though close at hand—has not yet dawned. England is recuperating under the sagacious treatment of Walpole. 'There are fifty thousand men slain this year in Europe and not one Englishman.' So Walpole had boasted in 1734–5; his pacific policy had a less auspicious aspect. The Peace of Utrecht remained intact only so long as England and France combined to maintain it. When in 1731 Walpole broke the Anglo-French *Entente*, he gave to the Family Compact a substance hitherto lacking, and thus broke up the Utrecht Settlement. But, in truth, forces were at work which neither Walpole nor any other statesman could control. The great duel for world-supremacy between England and the Bourbons was at hand. An outrage by the Spaniards upon an English merchant-captain announced its advent.

FOR FURTHER READING

S. Harcourt: *Alberoni*. E. Armstrong: *Elizabeth Farnese* P. Guzotte: *Louis XV and His Times*. J. Morley: *Walpole* B. Williams: *Carteret and Newcastle*.

CHAPTER XIX

THE RISE OF PRUSSIA (1618-1748)

Chief Dates

1410. Defeat of Teutonic Knights at Tannenberg.
1415 The Hohenzollern in Brandenburg.
1466 Peace of Thorn.
1525 Albert of Hohenzollern, Duke of East Prussia.
1609. Union of Brandenburg and Cleves.
1618. Union of Brandenburg and East Prussia.
1640. Accession of Great Elector—1688.
1648. Treaty of Westphalia.
1657. Treaty of Wehlau.
1675 Battle of Fehrbellin.
1701. Kingdom of Prussia.
1713. Frederick William I—1740.
1720 Stettin acquired from Sweden.
1740. Accession of Frederick the Great—1786.
1740 War of the Austrian Succession—1748.
1741. Convention of Klein-Schnellendorf.
1742 Treaty of Berlin ends First Silesian War.
1744. Union of Frankfort.
1744. Second Silesian War.
1745. Treaty of Dresden.
1748. Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

Of the political phenomena of this period, incomparably the most important was the rise of what we now call Prussia, more properly of the Hohenzollern—for modern Prussia is a purely manufactured product, and it has been made by the Hohenzollern. Geography has denied Brandenburg-Prussia any natural frontiers. The deficiencies of nature have been supplied by the genius of its rulers, by the army and the Civil Service which they created, and not least by their educational system. 'The victor in our wars,' said Moltke, 'is the schoolmaster.' The original home of

THE HOHENZOLLERN IN BRANDENBURG

this remarkable family was a castle in the Suabian Alps. In 1192 a Hohenzollern count was rewarded for his services to the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa with the Burgraviate of Nuremberg. Two centuries later (1415) the Emperor Sigismund transferred the Electorate of Brandenburg to another Frederick of Hohenzollern. That barren 'mark' is the germ of the modern kingdom of Prussia, and consequently of the modern German Empire. In the course of the fifteenth century the Hohenzollern established themselves firmly in their north German Electorate. In the sixteenth century the Elector Joachim II, though he espoused the Protestant cause, refused to join the Schmalkaldic League, thus proclaiming his loyalty to the Empire. That became an hereditary characteristic of Hohenzollern policy. The Hohenzollern, though not infrequently disloyal to the Emperor, were always loyal to the Empire.

PRUSSIA

Prussia, meanwhile, had been conquered and colonized in the course of the thirteenth century by the Teutonic Knights, and for two hundred years that famous Order ruled Prussia with great success. In the fifteenth century, however, the Teutonic Knights, like many medieval Orders, rapidly degenerated, and in 1410 they suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Poles on the historic field of Tannenberg. By the subsequent peace of Thorn (1466) Poland retained West Prussia, but restored East Prussia to the Knights, to be held by them as a fief of Poland. In 1511, Albert of Hohenzollern was elected High Master of the Teutonic Knights, and on the dissolution of the Order in 1525 became the first hereditary Duke of East Prussia holding the duchy as a vassal of Poland. In 1568 the Elector of Brandenburg concluded with his kinsman of East Prussia a compact of mutual inheritance. These compacts were a common device to prevent the lapse of territories to the Empire in the event of failure of direct heirs. In 1618 the male line of the Hohenzollern Dukes of East Prussia came to an end, and the Dukedom was thereupon united to the Electorate of Brandenburg.

Nine years earlier the Duchy of Cleves on the Lower Rhine had fallen to the Hohenzollern by marriage. The Emperor Rudolph protested against this accession of

territory to one of the princes of the Empire, and a dispute between Vienna and Berlin ensued, which was not finally settled in favour of the Hohenzollern until 1815.

CLEVES

When the Thirty Years' War broke out in 1618, we find the Hohenzollern firmly established in Brandenburg, in the Duchy of East Prussia, and with strong and eventually conceded claims on an important Rhine Duchy. But a glance at the map will show that the territories over which they ruled were far from compact or continuous. Brandenburg and East Prussia were separated by West Prussia, while between Brandenburg and the Rhine Duchy there were several intervening States. Nevertheless, the position attained by the Hohenzollern was sufficiently imposing: Brandenburg itself, though a bleak and barren land and without access to the sea, occupied an important geographical position between the two chief waterways of North Germany, the Oder and the Elbe, and had already become commercially important, thanks to the commerce of the Hanseatic League. A modern German historian, Droysen, has marked out four stages in the evolution of Prussian policy and of the Prussian State: (i) the era of territorial formation (1415–1618); (ii) the era of enlightened despotism (1618–1786); (iii) the epoch of revolution, collapse, and recovery (1786–1815); and (iv) renaissance and unification (1815–71). To these we must now add the modern era of greatness and decline from 1871–1919. Of the period of territorial formation enough has been said.

During the earlier years of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1640) Brandenburg played a sorry part, but fortunately there succeeded to the Electorate in 1640 Frederick William, rightly known as the Great Elector. He expelled the Swedes whom he found in occupation of Brandenburg; he gradually built up a well-disciplined army of 24,000 men, and used that army with such effect that at the Treaty of Westphalia Brandenburg found itself in a relatively strong position. The hold of the Swedes on Pomerania was too strong even for Frederick William to dislodge them, but though Stettin and Lower Pomerania passed into the hands of Sweden, the rest of it was ennexed to the Electorate of Brandenburg, which

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

in addition received the valuable bishoprics of Halberstadt, Camin, Minden, and part of Magdeburg.

FREDERICK WILLIAM, THE 'GREAT ELECTOR'

The Great Elector set before himself two main objects: on the one hand to get rid of those foreign influences which during the Thirty Years' War had established a stranglehold on Germany; on the other hand to consolidate and strengthen his own hereditary dominions and to fit Brandenburg-Prussia for the part which he believed it to be destined to play in the history of Germany. During the Northern War between Poland and Sweden (1654–60) Frederick William made the best of both worlds by allying himself first with Charles XII of Sweden and afterward with Poland, from whom he obtained a renunciation of the Suzerainty hitherto exercised by Poland over the Duchy of East Prussia (Treaty of Wehlau, 1657). When Louis XIV was about to launch his attack on Holland in 1672, he offered Frederick William an important share of the booty as the price of his alliance, but the tempting offer was refused on the ground that it would endanger the interests of the Empire. Consequently Louis XIV stirred up the Swedes to attack Brandenburg. The attack was not merely repelled, but the Swedes suffered a heavy defeat at Fehrbellin (1675) and were actually driven out of Pomerania. All the same, when in 1679 peace was signed, Louis XIV insisted on the restoration of Pomerania to his allies. In the course of this war the Silesian Duchies, on which the Hohenzollern had claims, fell in, but the Emperor seized the Duchies, and despite the protests of the Great Elector refused to relax his hold upon them. The Great Elector had, however, passed away by 1688. Frederick William had accomplished an enormously important work in consolidating his scattered dominions, in centralizing all power in the hands of the Sovereign, and diminishing the power of the Provincial Estates. He it was who first organized that great Civil Service which has from first to last been a main factor in the creation of Prussia. He it was who established a powerful standing army, and devised the financial system necessary to maintain it; he drained the bogs with which his territories abounded; he brought into cultivation waste land; he improved means of communication by cutting canals; above all he encouraged the im-

migration of Protestant refugees from foreign countries. No fewer than 20,000 French Huguenots found a refuge in the dominions of this enlightened Hohenzollern ruler. Not only did he give them land and build houses for them, but actually contributed toward the cost of their journey, and exempted them from all taxation for a period of ten years. Most amply did they repay the debt. They rebuilt Berlin, they taught the backward Brandenburgers the industrial arts in which they were adept, and they introduced into the social life of the land of their adoption a strain of culture which in days to come bore abundant fruit.

FREDERICK WILLIAM I OF PRUSSIA

The Great Elector was succeeded in 1688 by his son Frederick, whose only claim to remembrance is that by his support of the cause of the Emperor Leopold in the War of the Spanish Succession he obtained from the Emperor a Royal Crown, and became known to history as the first King of Prussia—taking his title, be it noted, from the non-German portion of his dominions. His son and successor, Frederick William I (1713–40), so cruelly satirized by Carlyle and others, has not received his due as a contributor to the building up of the Hohenzollern power in Germany. Personally he was an unattractive figure, yet it is certain that but for his arduous preparatory work the achievements of his great son would have been impossible. Not only did he bequeath to that son an army of 83,000 men superbly disciplined and drilled, but an administrative system perhaps the most perfect in Europe, and an overflowing treasury. Under him the Hohenzollern dominions formed a single garrison town provided against every emergency. As regards foreign policy his reign was uneventful. The great army he had amassed and drilled was too precious an instrument to be exposed to the risks of war. The only important territorial acquisition of the reign was Stettin, which was secured from Sweden in 1720.

FREDERICK THE GREAT (1740–86)

The treasure accumulated by the father, and the great army collected and drilled by him with such persistence, proved potent instruments of policy in the hands of his son and successor, Frederick the Great (1740–86). The reign of Frederick II is with one exception the most splendid in the annals of the

Hohenzollern. Lord Acton has described him as the most consummate practical genius that in modern times has inherited a throne. His father despised him as an effeminate Frenchified aesthete. He certainly composed indifferent French poetry, he was more than a passable musician, and he corresponded with Voltaire; but his real interest was in politics and war, and through a long apprenticeship he had prepared himself assiduously for the rôle which he was to play. He was the typical enlightened autocrat of the eighteenth century. The servant of the State, he was determined also to be the ruler of his people and the managing director of the business of government. He was an indefatigable worker, rising at three in the morning in summer and only an hour or two later in winter. He commanded the army, and personally supervised every detail in the domestic administration of the State. Where interests of State were concerned he knew no scruples, but he was not personally insensitive to suffering, nor would he have been faithless in his diplomacy could his end have been achieved by less dishonourable means. Like his predecessors he was loyal in principle to the Empire, and yet it was his destiny to be involved in almost continuous war against the Emperors.

The accession of Frederick II was almost exactly coincident with the death of the Hapsburg Emperor, Charles VI.

THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION (1740–8)

Charles VI had, as we have seen, devoted the greater part of his later years to obtaining the assent of his own dominions and of the European Powers to the Instrument known as the Pragmatic Sanction. That Instrument was intended to secure for his daughter and heiress, Maria Theresa, an undisputed succession to the vast hereditary dominions of the Hapsburg House. He hoped also that her husband, Francis, Duke of Lorraine, might succeed him as Emperor, as, indeed, after the brief reign of Charles VII (Duke of Bavaria), he did (1745–65). Prussia, like the rest of the Powers, was a party to the Pragmatic Sanction, but directly Frederick heard of the Emperor's death, he marched his army into Silesia on which the Hohenzollern had claims of a sort. 'Silesia meant the upper Oder valley: the lower was already in [its] hands. Silesia was the high road to Vienna and the back door to Bohemia. Silesia divided

Saxony from Poland, and [Frederick] had designs on both. Silesia could be made into a great agricultural and industrial district.' [1] Silesia accordingly he must have, but he offered to support the claim of Maria Theresa to the rest of her dominions, if only she would give up the Silesian Duchy. This proposal of robbery punctuated by blackmail was rejected with noble scorn ; the First Silesian War was the result. In that war, more generally known as the War of the Austrian Succession, the greater part of Europe was eventually involved. The Pragmatic Sanction was not worth the paper on which it was written. England and Holland were alone faithful to their engagements; the rest of the European powers acted precisely as their respective interests dictated.

England and Spain were already (1739) involved in the maritime war which takes its name from Jenkins' ear: but not until 1744 did France declare formal war upon England, though, as the allies of Bavaria and Austria respectively, their armies had already encountered each other at Dettingen (1743). Bavaria, whose Duke was hoping to obtain the Empire by French help, was on the side of France and Prussia. The King of Sardinia, in return for a slice of Lombardy, joined England in support of Maria Theresa.

With the details of the war this narrative need not concern itself. The attitude of Frederick the Great in relation to it is, however, significant. In the course of the eight years (1740–8) Frederick concluded several treaties and showed great agility in passing to and fro from belligerency to neutrality. But his policy was less shifty than his conduct. He was determined to obtain and to keep the Silesian Duchies. If that could be done by friendly arrangement with Maria Theresa, so much the better. If not, he must ally himself with France and with the enemies of Austria. England counselled Maria Theresa to come to terms with the King of Prussia, but she refused, and Frederick consequently was thrown into the arms of France. The league against Maria Theresa was further strengthened by the adhesion of Augustus III of Saxony, who was to get his share of the booty in upper Silesia and Moravia. Confronted by this dangerous combination Maria Theresa came to terms with Frederick in the Treaty of Klein-Schnellendorf, and was thus enabled to con-

[1] J. M. Thompson, op. cit., p. 338.

centrate her efforts against her other enemies. As a result, Charles Albert of Bavaria, who had been elected to the imperial office as Charles VII (1742), was driven out of his capital Munich, and Maria Theresa's success so frightened Frederick that he broke his treaty with her, plunged again into the war and conducted it with such success that in June 1742 Austria was glad to conclude peace with him at Breslau. Thus Silesia passed finally and definitely into the hands of the Hohenzollern. During the next two years (1742–4) Prussia remained neutral, but the war was still carried on between Maria Theresa and her other enemies.

Two treaties of some importance were negotiated in 1743. England and Austria concluded with the King of Sardinia, who was more afraid of Spanish designs on Milan than of Austrian ambition in Italy, the Treaty of Worms; France and Spain renewed their Family Compact in the Treaty of Fontainebleau. France promised not to make peace until Gibraltar and Minorca were restored to Spain, and until Don Philip, the second son of Elizabeth Farnese, got a substantial portion in Italy.

Maria Theresa waged the war with such success against France and Bavaria that Frederick, fearing for Silesia, formed the Union of Frankfort (1744) with Bavaria, the Elector Palatine, and the Landgrave of Hesse, and renewed his alliance with France. The Union of Frankfort is important as marking the first occasion on which Princes of the Empire united under the leadership of Prussia against Austria.

The Second Silesian War ensued. Saxony joined Austria, but suffered so severely at the hands of Frederick that at the end of 1745 peace was again signed at Dresden. Frederick agreed to recognize as Emperor, Francis of Lorraine, who in September had been elected to that office on the death of Charles VII. Maria Theresa in return was reluctantly persuaded, chiefly by England, to give up Silesia.

These terms formed the basis of the treaty finally concluded (1748) at Aix-la-Chapelle. For the rest: Sardinia recovered Nice and Savoy, and got a slice of Lombardy; Don Philip got the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza. As regards the extra-European wars between England and the Bourbons, the treaty was no more than a truce. In India France restored Madras to the English Company; in North

America England restored Cape Breton to the French; but these mutual restorations meant no lasting settlement. The great duel between England and France for world-supremacy was merely postponed.

But for the criminal intervention of France there would have been no general European war. The conflict between Prussia and Austria would have been localized in Germany; that between England and Spain might have been confined to the sea. Appropriately, therefore, France, notwithstanding the brilliant victories of Marshal Saxe, emerged empty-handed. With increased debt and diminished reputation she had taken another step toward the catastrophe of the Revolution. Frederick of Prussia was the chief gainer. He had added to his Kingdom a Duchy covering 15,500 square miles, containing 1,250,000 inhabitants, an area, moreover, of great industrial and agricultural value and providing a fine strategic bastion alike against Saxony, against Poland, and against the Bohemian and other dominions of the Hapsburgs. He had also in 1744 forestalled possible competitors, notably Hanover, and annexed East Friesland with its growing port of Emden. But, more significantly still, the acquisition of Silesia and the Union of Frankfort marked the first two steps toward the goal achieved in 1871.

FOR FURTHER READING (AND FOR CHAPTER XX)

Carlyle: *Frederick the Great.* Marriott and Robertson: *Evolution of Prussia.* L. von Ranke: *History of Prussia* (E.T.). M. Philippson: *Der Grosse Kurfürst* (3 vols.). W. F. Reddaway: *Frederick the Great.* J. F. Bright: *Maria Theresa.* Sir J. S. Corbett: *England in the Seven Years' War.* B. Williams: *Life of Chatham.* R. Waddington: *Louis XV et le renversement des Alliances* (Paris, 1896); *La Guerre de Sept Ans* (Paris, 1899). F. Parkman: *Montcalm and Wolfe.*

CHAPTER XX

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR (1756-63)

CHIEF DATES

1751. Mission of Kaunitz to Versailles.
1754. Outbreak of hostilities in North America (England and France)
1755. Treaty of Petersburg (England and Russia).
1756. Treaty of Westminster (England and Prussia).
1756. First Treaty of Versailles (France and Austria).
1756. Seven Years' War– 1763.
1756. Second Treaty of Versailles.
1757. Pitt, Minister in England—1761.
1757. Convention of Kloster-Zeven.
1757. Frederick's victory at Rossbach; Clive's at Plassey.
1759. Minden.
1759. Naval victories of England.
1759. Capture of Quebec.
1761. Pitt resigns.
1762. War between England and Spain.
1762. Peter III allies with Prussia.
1763. Accession of Catherine II.
1763. Treaty of Paris.
1763 Treaty of Hubertsburg.

THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION (1748–56).

THE Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle which formally ended the 'War of the Austrian Succession' did not really settle any of the greater issues at stake. It left the bulk of the Hapsburg States to Maria Theresa; it secured the Empire to her husband; but it did not settle the question of the leadership of Germany, as between Austria and Prussia; nor the question whether England or France should dominate the North American Continent; nor which of the rival companies, English or French, should be supreme in India. The two latter questions were decided by the Seven Years' War: the first was not finally settled until Bismarck dictated to Austria the Treaty of Prague (1866), after Prussia had crushed her rival at Sadowa.

Between the close of the late war (1748) and the outbreak of the next (1756) there took place a remarkable revolution in the diplomatic situation. Nothing could alter the essential antagonism between Austria and Prussia, or that between England and France. But there was no real opposition of interest between England and Prussia, or between Austria and France. True, France and the Hapsburgs had been outstanding rivals for a century and a half, and there were statesmen in both countries who still regarded their mutual hostility as an eternal law of diplomacy. In diplomacy there are no immutable laws. Conditions change. To changes diplomacy must accommodate itself.

AUSTRIA

Thus Austria, bent on the recovery of Silesia, drew closer to France. The brain of the new policy was Count Anton von Kaunitz, who had represented Austria in the negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle, and in 1749 became Foreign Minister. For the next forty years he directed the foreign policy of the Empire. In 1750 he went as Ambassador to Paris; but the French ministers were coy. To most of them Austria was the natural enemy.

Meanwhile, England and France were drifting into war in North America. England had by this time established her thirteen colonies on the Atlantic seaboard of America, and they extended from Maine in the north to Georgia in the south, though only in a narrow strip. France, possessing Canada, was strongly entrenched on the St. Lawrence, and, by her possession of Louisiana, on the Mississippi. Spain was in possession of Florida.

ENGLAND AND FRANCE

The object of French policy was to unite their possessions in the north and the south by building a chain of fortresses in the valleys of the Ohio and Mississippi, and thus to coop the English up between the Alleghanies and the Atlantic, and bar for ever their westward expansion. Duquesne, the French Governor of Canada, began the process by building Fort Duquesne (now Pittsburg), Ticonderoga, and Crown Point. In 1754 George Washington was dispatched in command of the Virginia militia to head off the French, but failed to do so, and in 1755 General Braddock, at the head of a regular force from home, was defeated and killed near Fort Duquesne. Still England and France were not technically at war. But

it was obvious that war could not be much longer deferred. George II, alarmed lest the French should attack Hanover, concluded a treaty (September 1755) with the Czarina Elizabeth of Russia, by which in return for an annual subsidy of £100,000 the latter undertook to send 55,000 men to the defence of Hanover if attacked.

Austria, however, refused to send a force into the Netherlands to bar the advance of France on Hanover. Relations between the old allies had of late become less cordial. Maria Theresa complained that England had supported her half-heartedly against Frederick. She regretted, also, that Austria, in order to appease the commercial jealousy of England and Holland, had been compelled to sacrifice the interests of her Belgian subjects by the suppression of the Ostende Company. So the old alliance between England and Austria was broken, and England, primarily in the interests of Hanover, turned to Prussia.

ENGLAND AND AUSTRIA

Frederick the Great, though determined at all costs to keep Silesia, did not want war. Nor did he want to break with France. But he did not want to see either a French or a Russian army in the heart of Germany. France, on her part, though conscious that in the late war Frederick had merely used her for his own purpose, and had twice deserted her when the purpose seemed to be achieved, did not want to fight Prussia. But she could attack England more easily in Hanover than at sea. This was realized by Frederick, who consequently concluded with England (16th January 1756) the Convention of Westminster. The essence of the compact was to keep both Russia and France out of Germany—if France should attack Hanover, Frederick agreed to defend it. Otherwise, in the Anglo-French quarrel, he was neutral.

PRUSSIA

Thus France was driven into the arms of Austria. Russia, deeply offended by the English convention with Prussia, also joined Austria. Sweden, Saxony, and Poland came into the same combination. Austria was to recover Silesia, and Saxony, Poland, and Sweden were all to get slices of the Hohenzollern dominions. The upstart Prussia was to be reduced to its recent position as a third-rate Power.

AUSTRO-FRENCH ALLIANCE

Frederick, girt with a ring of enemies, got his blow in first. Saxony was invaded, and an Austrian force advancing to its assistance was defeated at Lobositz; Saxony was defeated and compelled to capitulate, and its army was incorporated in that of Prussia. In 1757 Frederick inflicted a decisive defeat upon the French at Rossbach and upon the Austrians at Leuthen; but a Hanovarian force under the Duke of Cumberland was defeated by the French, who had attacked Hanover, at Hastenbeck, and Cumberland concluded the Convention of Kloster-Zeven, by which Hanover and Brunswick were surrendered to the French. In 1758, however, Frederick, though successful in repelling, at Zorndorf, a Russian advance into Brandenburg was beaten by the Austrians at Hochkirch, and the campaigns of 1759, 1760, and 1761 went so badly against Prussia that Berlin was occupied by an Austro-Russian force, and Frederick more than once contemplated suicide.

THE CONTINENTAL WAR

But the Prussian disasters were to some extent retrieved by a brilliant victory won by Ferdinand of Brunswick against the French at Minden (1759), and by English victories at sea and in North America. The war had opened disastrously for England. Braddock's defeat (1755) at Fort Duquesne was followed by the surrender of Minorca (1756). Simultaneously there came the news from India of the invasion of Calcutta by Suraja Dowlah and the tragedy of the Black Hole. The Convention of Kloster-Zeven completed the tale of disaster. In three continents England's fate seemed to have been sealed. But it is just before dawn that night is darkest. In 1757 Pitt came into power in England, 'borrowing the Duke of Newcastle's majority to carry on the government.' Pitt breathed into a disheartened people something of his own courageous temper; the whole nation responded to his call. The tide turned almost at once. The Convention of Kloster-Zeven was denounced and Cumberland superseded by Frederick of Brunswick, who won a resounding victory at Minden over the French. Clive soon retrieved the disaster at Calcutta, and on the historic field of Plassey (1757) won a victory which made the English masters of Bengal. Coote, a few years later, defeated the French at Wandewash and made the English supreme in Madras. The Peace of 1763

ANGLO-FRENCH DUEL

saw the English victorious over all European rivals in India and left them face to face with the Native Powers. The French retained Pondicherry, but only as a commercial settlement. Politically, they ceased to count in India.

A triumph equally complete was achieved in North America. The capture of Louisburg and Fort Duquesne (1758) was followed by that of Quebec (1759) and Montreal (1760). The exploits of Wolfe and Amherst on land were equalled by those of Boscawen and Hawke at sea. The year 1759 saw the destruction of Toulon by the former, while Hawke won a great victory over the Brest fleet in Quiberon Bay. Spain concluded a Family Compact with France in 1761. England, therefore, declared war on her also and captured Havana and Manila. But the war was drawing to an end. Pressure upon Frederick was relieved by the death (5th January 1762) of the Czarina Elizabeth and the succession of Peter III, who promptly withdrew from the Austrian alliance. The withdrawal of Russia enabled Frederick to recover some of his lost ground in Germany, and after the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris between England and the Bourbon Powers (15th February 1763), he quickly came to terms with Austria. The Treaty of Hubertsburg restored the *status quo ante bellum* in Germany, Frederick evacuated Saxony, but retained Silesia and Glatz. He thus emerged from his terrible ordeal without the loss of an inch of territory, and with prestige immensely enhanced by his superb resistance to the powerful coalition arrayed against him. The title of Prussia to a place among the great Powers could not henceforward be questioned.

For Great Britain the year 1763 marked the zenith of her first colonial Empire. The Peace then concluded was perhaps the most splendid in her annals; but for the enforced resignation of Pitt in 1761 it might have been even more splendid. France lost to her Canada, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton, but retained fishing rights off Newfoundland, which until 1904 were a constant source of friction. She restored Minorca, and surrendered her political position in India. Martinique, however, was restored to her, and Havana and the Philippines to Spain. Spain gave up Florida to England, but received in compensation Louisiana from France. Bute has been severely blamed for the leniency with which he treated the Bourbon

Powers, and it is true that they showed no gratitude. Frederick, on the other hand, was bitterly aggrieved by what he regarded as England's desertion. England's offence was rather in the manner than the matter: for all that, it was gratuitously stupid.

Nevertheless, when all is said, the peace registered a signal triumph for England, a triumph won by the soundness of her finance, by irresistible sea-power, and above all by the quality of her sons, Clive and Coote, Amherst and Wolfe, Hawke, Boscawen, and, not least, Pitt, by whose courage and enthusiasm they were all inspired.

CHAPTER XXI

THE PARTITIONS OF POLAND (1763–95)

AFTER the turmoil of the Seven Years' War there was a lull in the affairs of Western Europe, though farther west—on the other side of the Atlantic—a fratricidal conflict broke out between Great Britain and her Colonists. Of that more presently. In the European drama the next scene was laid in Poland. The Czarina Catherine II was the unscrupulous heroine of the piece.

Catherine's policy was directed towards two main objects: to establish the supremacy of Russia in the Black Sea, and, if it might be, at Constantinople, and to absorb Poland. The condition alike of the Ottoman Empire and the Polish Kingdom invited aggression from neighbours. Catherine would have been more or less than human—and she was neither—had she resisted the temptation. With the relation of Russia to the problem of the Near East we have already dealt. We are now concerned with the problem of Poland.

No two problems could be more sharply contrasted. The Turk was a comparatively recent intruder in Europe. Poland's place in the European polity was not only old but unique. Nature would not seem to have designed her for independence. Racial affinities pointed to her inclusion in the Russian Empire. But when in the later years of the tenth century the Poles embraced Christianity, they embraced it, unlike Russia, in the Western or Roman form. In creed, therefore, they are as much divided from Orthodox Russia as from Lutheran Prussia. Poland, however, was among the foremost Powers of Europe long before the many Russias had attained to any semblance of unity; long before the Hohenzollern had set foot even in Brandenburg much less in Prussia; long before the Hapsburgs had acquired either Bohemia or Hungary, or had even established themselves firmly in Germany. Devoid of natural frontiers, formless,

and save for its superb river system featureless, Poland at one time stretched in one great plain from the Baltic to the Black Sea. But the heart of Poland is, and always has been, the basin of the Vistula. Including, as it once did, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Pomerania, Poland might well have aspired to a place among the Powers of Western Europe, but between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries Poland lost most of her western territories, while her union with Lithuania (1386) drew her toward the north-east. There she came into conflict, as we have seen, with the Teutonic knights. The Knights were beaten, and Poland regained command of the mouths of the Vistula, and annexed the district of West Prussia including the cities of Danzig, Thorn, and Marienburg. From 1466 down to 1657 she also exercised suzerainty over East Prussia which the Knights, and after the dissolution of their Order the Hohenzollern Electors of Brandenburg, held in fief from Poland.

In 1572 the male line of the Jagiellos—the House under which Poland and Lithuania had been united and had attained so strong a position—came to an end. Henceforward Poland was in fact, as in name, an aristocratic Republic with an elective king—a constitutional arrangement which conduced largely to the decadence and ultimate extinction of the 'Republic.' At each vacancy the crown was, in fact, put up to auction by the noble oligarchy which really ruled Poland. During the two centuries which elapsed between the death of the last Jagiello and the first Partition, the dubious honour of the Polish crown was conferred by the nobles upon a Frenchman, a Hungarian, three Swedes, one or two Gallophil Poles, two Saxons nominated by Austria, and finally upon the discarded lover of the Czarina Catherine II of Russia. Not only did the Polish aristocracy elect their kings, but at each election they imposed on them a *Pact* which restricted the action of the Crown within the narrowest limits. Moreover, the *Liberum Veto* conferred upon each individual noble the right of vetoing any proposal, and so rendering hopeless any attempt at reform.

There was no administrative system; no central executive; the Saxon kings rarely visited the 'Republic'; the Diet met periodically at Warsaw or Grodno and occasionally

passed a law, but for the most part the right of veto rendered legislation impossible; each nobleman did what was right in his own eyes, and dealt as he would with his serfs.

Socially, the country was as backward as it was politically. The 'nation' consisted of 150,000 aristocratic families; the mass of the people were serfs tied to the soil; there was no native middle class; such trade as there was was in the hands of Germans and Jews, and the few towns, therefore, afforded no counterpoise to the power of the nobles, and offered no avenue of ambition to the peasants.

Rotten within, Poland could offer little effective resistance to assaults from without. That she had retained so large a part of her ancient territory intact was due, partly to the weakness of her neighbours, and partly to the fact that it suited their convenience to respect her nominal independence. But from the time when Russia put Augustus III on the throne (1733) she treated Poland as a vassal state. After the death of Augustus III, the Czarina Catherine II determined on a more active policy. Had she not been pursuing simultaneously her designs against the Turks but concentrating on Poland, Poland might have escaped partition, though only at the expense of absorption by Russia. As it was, the suggestion of partition came (in 1769) from Frederick the Great.

Frederick dreaded a renewal of the alliance—between Russia, Austria, and France—which had so nearly proved fatal to Prussia in the Seven Years' War. Might not a partition of Poland afford a basis for friendship between the two Empresses and himself? The idea had long since been mooted, notably by Peter the Great and Frederick I in 1710, and in 1764 Catherine and Frederick II came to an agreement. They were to co-operate in securing the election to the vacant throne of Stanislaus Poniatowsky, a Polish nobleman of weak character and one of Catherine's discarded lovers; to frustrate the constitutional reforms which a group of Polish patriots, led by the Czartoryskis, were advocating; and to secure toleration for the 'Dissidents'—non-Catholic sects in Poland—and thus to perpetuate religious strife. Poniatowski was accordingly elected (1764), and in 1768 a Diet, held under the eyes of a Russian army of occupation, repealed all the laws against the 'Dissidents,'

declared the *Liberum Veto*, the elective monarchy, and other weaknesses to be essential parts of the Polish Constitution, and placed that Constitution under the guarantee of Russia.

The Polish patriots, naturally alarmed, then formed the *Confederation* of Bar, with the object of putting an end to Russian domination, and of restoring the supremacy of Roman Catholicism. France, also alarmed by developments in Poland, encouraged the confederates of Bar, and stirred up the Turks to declare war on Russia (1768). The Turks brought disaster upon themselves and did not save Poland. Catherine II would greatly have preferred the existing Russian 'Protectorate' to partition. The embarrassment of a Turkish war inclined her to listen to the voice of the tempter, Frederick.

Austria, alarmed by the Russo-Turkish War on her frontier, re-occupied (1769) the County of Zips, which in 1412 had been mortgaged by Hungary to Poland; but Maria Theresa was perfectly sincere when, in 1771, she protested her friendship for Poland and repudiated the idea of partition. When, however, partition was formally proposed in 1772 her scruples were overborne, though not removed, by her minister Kaunitz and her son Joseph II, who was always greedy for territory, and was at this time hypnotized by Frederick II.

In 1772 the first Partition was consummated. The details of this nefarious transaction can be elucidated only by reference to the accompanying map (p. 272). Poland lost about one-third of her territory and more than one-third of her subjects. Austria was territorially the greatest gainer, but Prussia's acquisition of West Prussia was of the greatest significance, even though the great prize of Danzig was denied to her.

In the interval between the first and second Partitions, the Polish patriots made a determined effort to put their house in order, and in 1790 a new Constitution was actually promulgated and adopted. The English model was closely followed: an hereditary but limited monarchy, a responsible ministry, and a Legislature of two Chambers. A discontented minority, however, appealed to Russia (1792) to help them in maintaining their 'liberties': the two German Powers were already involved in war with France, and Catherine had her 'own elbows free' to deal with Poland.

A Russian army occupied Poland, and in January 1793 the second Partition was carried out. Prussia, admitted to a share of the spoils, got the district known as Great Poland, together with the long-coveted fortresses of Danzig and Thorn, while Russia got a huge slice, four times as large as Prussia's, stretching from the Dwina on the north to the confines of Bessarabia in the south. Austria, busy in Western Europe, got nothing.

The final act in the tragedy was not long delayed. In 1794 the Poles, driven to despair by the insolent tyranny exercised by the Russian minister at Warsaw, rose in revolt under the heroic leader Kosciusko, and expelled the Russian garrisons from Cracow, Warsaw, and Wilna in turn. But their triumph was short lived. The Prussians, leaving the French republicans to work their will upon the Rhine, marched into Poland. Russia sent a strong force under the famous general, Suvaroff. Poland was crushed, and in 1795 was wiped off the map of Europe. Catherine took all the country up to the Niemen and the Bug, leaving Prussia and Austria to quarrel about the rest. Prussia ultimately got the Provinces, subsequently known as South Prussia and New East Prussia, including Warsaw; Austria got Cracow and Western Galicia. Poland had ceased to exist as a State. The Polish nation lived on, and 120 years later demanded from a Europe more sensitive to the claims of nationality their re-establishment as an independent Nation-State. One of the first acts of the Peace Conference at Paris (1919) was to fulfil their aspirations.

The action of the partitioners in annihilating Poland has been very variously judged. France, too weak in the last decades of the eighteenth century to avert disaster, has consistently deplored the disappearance of a convenient ally. Edmund Burke, in 1772, regarded the partition as a most sinister transaction, flinging the political system of Europe back into that state of nature in which force was the only guarantee of security.[1] Nearly a century later, Lord Salisbury defended the partition on the ground that Polish anarchy was incurable and contagious, that the Poles had ceased to be a nation, and that her neighbours had no alternative save

[1] cf. Annual Register for 1772. The article reflects the views of Burke and was almost certainly from his pen.

between partition and perpetual tutelage.[1] If Treitschke be right and feebleness is 'the sin against the Holy Spirit of Politics,' Poland clearly deserved her fate. But subsequent events have proved conclusively that the Poles had not ceased to be a nation even though their State was betrayed by its leaders.

THE GRAND DUCHY OF WARSAW

After the destruction of Poland many Poles took refuge in France, and a Polish legion fought under the banner of the Republic. When Napoleon, after the defeat of the Prussians at Jena, marched into Warsaw (1806) he was enthusiastically acclaimed as the liberator of the country—rather prematurely, for after the Treaty of Tilsit he offered Polish Prussia to the Czar Alexander, who was shrewd enough to decline it. Consequently, all that Prussia had acquired, in the second and third partitions, was constituted the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and handed over to Napoleon's henchman the King of Saxony; Galicia, snatched from Austria, was thrown into the Grand Duchy in 1809.

Never before had the Poles enjoyed such good government as they did during the brief existence of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Serfdom was abolished; the Code Napoléon introduced; schools established; the equality of all citizens before the law proclaimed, and the army reorganized. To the 'grand army,' with which in 1812 Napoleon invaded Russia, the Poles contributed 80,000 men. Had Napoleon, instead of advancing on Moscow, listened to their petition for the restoration of the ancient Kingdom of the Poles and devoted himself to its reconstruction, all his subsequent disasters might have been avoided. But Napoleon could no longer pay even lip-homage to the liberal catchwords of his youth.

As it was, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw perished in Russian snows, and when the Czar Alexander started in pursuit of Napoleon he occupied Warsaw (February 1813) and overran the Grand Duchy. He was in possession when the Peace Congress opened at Vienna, and came to the Congress with a firm resolve to reconstitute the ancient Kingdom of Poland, and to put the crown on his own head. Prussia resisted him in vain; England would fain have seen Poland restored to independence; ultimately Prussia retained the Provinces of Posen and Gnesen with Danzig and Thorn; Austria retained

[1] *Quarterly Review*, 1863. Republished in *Essays*, 1905.

Galicia ; Cracow was set up as an independent republic and survived until it was absorbed by Austria in 1846 ; the rest of the Grand Duchy, henceforward known as the ' Congress Kingdom,' passed to the Czar as King of Poland. Russia's share in the earlier partitions remained incorporated in Russia.

During the century which elapsed between the close of the Napoleonic wars and the World-War the lot of the Poles was indeed unhappy. The Czar was sincere in his promise to grant Home Rule to his ' Congress Kingdom,' and on paper the new Constitution, modelled on the French Charter of 1814, and differing little from the abortive Polish Constitution of 1791, was all that an autonomous province could desire. But a Russian Czar was King of Poland ; the Polish nobles, mutually suspicious of each other, were united only in opposition to Russian rule, and in 1820 the liberties granted in 1815 were severely curtailed.

POLAND, 1815–1919)

The French Revolution of 1830 encouraged the Poles to imitation, though there was no parallel between the position in the two countries. In November, revolution broke out at Warsaw. Marshal Diebitsch, fresh crowned with laurels won in the Turkish war, was sent with an army of 110,000 men to suppress it ; but he found the task in Poland more tough than that in Turkey. The Poles fought with splendid courage and no small measure of success, but their leaders were characteristically jealous of each other ; there was no unity of policy or of command, and the insurrection collapsed.

A policy of Russification followed the complete collapse of the revolution. The Congress Kingdom became a Russian Province ; the Polish army was suppressed ; the Universities of Warsaw and Wilna abolished ; and the use of the Polish language prohibited. The reign of the Emperor Nicholas was, in the words of an English critic, ' one long conspiracy on the part of a monarch to denationalize a people.' Alexander II (1855–81) began his reign by reversing his father's policy : the pressure of religious persecution was relaxed ; the Universities re-established ; the serfs were emancipated and a considerable measure of autonomy conceded. But concessions failed to conciliate, and in 1863 the embers of discontent, never really extinguished, burst again into flame. The insurrection of

that year was, from the outset, hopeless, and its only result was to send thousands of the noblest sons of Poland into exile, and to give Russia a good excuse for imposing complete Russification on those who remained. Yet despite the harshness of Russian rule the economic development of Poland was remarkable. The peasant proprietors of Poland adopted co-operative methods similar to those adopted with such notorious success in Denmark, while (thanks to capital supplied by the Jews) industry showed itself not less progressive than agriculture.

Such was the fate of the Congress Kingdom. The history of Prussian Poland has run on parallel lines. In 1815 Prussia was obliged to relinquish the greater part of the acquisitions secured by her in the second and third partitions. She managed, however, to retain not only her share of the partition of 1772, but in addition Posen and Gnesen and the great fortresses of Thorn and Danzig.

PRUSSIAN POLAND

Frederick William III, like the Czar Alexander, made large promises to his new subjects in 1815. He undertook to grant them a Constitution, to respect their separate nationality and religion, to permit the use of the Polish language, to guarantee rights of person and property, and to admit Poles to public offices.

The sequel will show how far these promises were fulfilled.

For fifteen years the Prussian Poles had little to complain of. Frederick William III manifested a real desire to conciliate them. Prince Antony Radziwill, a great Polish nobleman, was nominated to the Vice-royalty of the Grand Duchy of Posen; a large share in local administration was left to the native aristocracy; the liberal policy of Stein and Hardenberg, by which the serfs of Brandenburg and Prussia had been converted into peasant proprietors, was extended to Posen in 1823, and by 1837 no less than 21,334 peasant freeholds had been created. Finally, a local legislature or Diet was established in Posen.

The consequences of the abortive risings of 1830 were hardly less grave for the Prussian Poles than for those under the rule of Russia. The vice-royalty was abolished; a policy of thorough Prussianization was initiated; the native nobles were deprived of all share in local administration; the

bureaucratic methods dear to the Brandenburger were on all sides introduced; convents and monasteries were suppressed and their property secularized; heavily encumbered properties were bought on a large scale by the government; and a deliberate policy of expropriation was initiated.

The accession of Frederick William IV (1840) brought some relief to the Prussian Poles; but the concessions announced at the beginning of the new reign did not survive the upheaval of 1848. The spirit of 1848, with its appeal to the national principle, could not leave the Poles unmoved. The outbreak of revolution in Berlin gave the signal for an insurrectionary movement in Posen. A 'national' army of 25,000 men was organized; a provisional government was set up, and a formal demand was made for the fulfilment of the pledges specifically made by Frederick William III.

The Polish cause evoked a good deal of sympathy among the German liberals and even in Prussia itself.

Little wonder, then, that the Prussian authorities should have hastened to repress the insurrectionary movement in Posen—still less that Bismarck should, from the very outset of his career, have regarded Poland with a jealous eye. 'No one can doubt that an independent Poland would be the irreconcilable enemy of Prussia, and would remain so until they had conquered the mouth of the Vistula and every Polish-speaking village in West and East Prussia, Posnania, and Silesia.' Thus wrote Bismarck as far back as 1848. His conviction was not weakened by the abortive insurrection which broke out in the Congress Kingdom in 1863. 'The Polish Question,' said Bismarck in that year, 'is a matter of life and death to us.' Not only was it a 'matter of life or death' to Bismarck that the Russian Poles should be suppressed; it was not less important that Russia should be laid under an obligation to Prussia. The fruits of the friendship then established were gathered, as we shall see, in Schleswig-Holstein, at Sadowa, and at Sédan.

Not until those fruits were safely garnered had Bismarck leisure to deal with the Prussian Poles. His ultimate aim was to Prussianize and to Protestantize the soul of Poland. He began with the schools. The inspection of schools was taken away from the clergy and placed in the hands of government officials; the German language was made the

exclusive medium for instruction. The attempt to capture the schools in the interests of 'Germanization' proved a ridiculous failure.

Economic experiments in Poland have met with no better success than educational. Between 1886 and 1914, Prussia expended some £60,000,000 in an attempt to plant Germans on the soil of Poland. But Polish patriotism was too strong for Prussian gold. The Poles countered the policy of colonization by association; agricultural unions, land banks, co-operative and credit societies were founded, enabling the Poles to outbid the Prussians, and though much land passed from Poles to Germans, still more—100,000 hectares on balance—passed from Germans to Poles. Thus did the Prussian Poles prepare for the day when their independence should be restored to them.

Between 1815 and 1848 Metternich's hand was as heavy on Poland as on other 'Austrian' Provinces, and with similar alternations of insurrection and repression. The annihilation of the republic of Cracow (1846) and its absorption into Galicia was at once a breach of faith and an affront to Polish sentiment. After the chastening of the Hapsburgs at the hands of the Italians and the Prussians there was, however, a change for the better in their Polish policy. The Poles under Austrian rule were granted virtual autonomy under their own elected Diet; they were free to use their own language; education and administration were 'native'; while every respect was, of course, paid to the creed which they shared with their rulers. The comparative leniency of Austrian rule did not eradicate the sentiment of Polish nationality; but if Russia and Prussia had followed the lead of Austria, recent events might have taken a different course.

AUSTRIAN POLAND

CHAPTER XXII

THE BIRTH OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Chief Dates

1607. Charters to Virginia Companies.
1607. Foundation of Jamestown.
1620. *Mayflower* sails.
1620. New Plymouth founded by Pilgrim Fathers.
1630. Settlement of Massachusetts.
1634. Settlement of Maryland.
1636. Rhode Island founded.
1638. Newhaven founded.
1639. Connecticut founded.
1643. New England Confederation.
1651. *Navigation Act* (and 1660).
1663–70. The Carolinas.
1664–74. New Netherlands (New York) ceded to England.
1664. New Jersey.
1681. Pennsylvania.
1713. Treaty of Utrecht.
1733. Georgia.
1739. War between England and Spain.
1744. War with France in America.
1748. Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.
1754. War on Upper Ohio.
1755. Defeat of Braddock.
1756–63. Seven Years' War.
1759. Capture of Quebec.
1763. Peace of Paris.
1764. Grenville's 'Smuggling Act.'
1765. Stamp Act.
1766. Stamp Act repealed.
1766. Declaratory Act.
1767. Townshend's revenue duties.
1770. Lord North's Ministry.
1774. Punitive measures against Massachusetts.
1775–83. American War of Secession
1775 Skirmish at Lexington.
1776. Declaration of Independence.
1777. France joins the Colonists.
1777. Articles of Confederation.
1777. Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga.
1779. Spain declares war on England.
1779. Siege of Gibraltar—1782.
1780. Hyder Ali of Mysore invades the Carnatic.
1780. England declares war on Holland.
1780. The armed neutrality of the Northern Powers.
1781. Cornwallis surrenders at Yorktown.
1782. Minorca taken by Spaniards.
1782. Rodney's victories in West Indies.
1783. Treaties of Versailles.
1787. Philadelphia Convention.

THIS book is largely concerned with the rise of the Nation-States of Europe. It must not, therefore, ignore the advent of the first Nation-State on the American Continent. The birth of the United States was on this wise.

THE ENGLISH COLONIES

Between 1607 and 1732 England had established thirteen colonies on the relatively narrow strip of land between the Alleghanies and the eastern seaboard of North America. Ten of them had their origin in settlements of Englishmen; three, New York, Delaware, and New Jersey, accrued to us (1664) by conquest from the Dutch. These colonies, extending from Maine in the north to Georgia in the south, were of the most varied origin, and greatly differed one from another in climate, in economic and social life, and in political outlook. The southern group—Virginia, Maryland, the two Carolinas, and Georgia—lived by the cultivation of rice, tobacco, and cotton, and the manual labour was largely done by slaves. Georgia was established in 1732 by General Oglethorpe, a philanthropic member of Parliament, as an asylum for debtors and other distressed persons. Parliament voted £10,000 toward the expenses of the scheme—the only direct assistance given by the State toward the establishment of any of the ten colonies. The rest of the southern group were 'Cavalier' in origin, in social texture, and, on the whole, in political affiliations.

The New England Group, of which Massachusetts was the most important, were on the other hand Puritan in origin and sympathies, and lived mostly by agriculture. Pennsylvania, the most important of the 'middle' group, was founded in 1682 by William Penn, a son of the admiral who conquered Jamaica (1655), as a refuge for his Quaker co-religionists. It offered a home, also, to a large number of German emigrants. The Dutch predominated in New York (originally the 'New Netherlands'), and there were Swedes in the colony which they had planted on the estuary of the Delaware. But taken as a whole the colonies were thoroughly English, representative of all classes, creeds, and interests. In some respects, indeed, they were, alike in their virtues and shortcomings, 'more English than the English.'

As regards government, the home-land had ridden the colonies from the first with a loose rein. The King's Sovereignty was never questioned, and the Commonwealth during the interregnum was not less tenacious of the principle than were the Stuart Kings. The Sovereignty of Parliament, if not questioned, had never been explicitly

acknowledged, and after the outbreak of the rebellion was definitely denied. Government in the several colonies conformed, with local variations, to one common type. In each colony there was a Governor representing the Crown, a Council with functions half-legislative and half-judicial, and an elected Assembly. In most of the colonies the Governor and Council were appointed by the Crown; in some they were appointed by the proprietors, in others they were locally elected. Substantially, however, all the colonies enjoyed a large measure of local autonomy, and they brought to the task of self-government the traditions and the training of typical Englishmen of that day. In particular, the founders of Massachusetts belonged to precisely the same class and type as the Pyms, the Eliots, and the Hampdens —the lawyers and country squires—who led the opposition to Charles I. There is no doubt that the Puritan Colonies, though not the others, were intent on founding a New England which should before long be independent of the Old.

THE TRADE LAWS

To the general looseness of rein there was one theoretical exception, though, in practice, it also was only a partial one. Colonies were, in those days, universally regarded as estates to be worked primarily for the benefit of the countries which founded them. Religious motives were not absent. 'We come to make Christians,' was the declaration of Vasco da Gama when he first landed in India, and the Jesuit missionaries were not far behind the conquerors in Spanish and Portuguese America; in Canada they were first. But gold was the magnet which mainly drew adventurers across the Atlantic. Commercial profit was the motive which inspired the policy of the Chartered Companies of the seventeenth century.

To that policy the Navigation Laws, passed under the Commonwealth and Charles II, gave legal expression. The English navy protected the commerce and the shores of the colonies, and in return England claimed a virtual monopoly of trade. There were exceptions, but, broadly stated, the colonies could import nothing except from England, and could export their own products only to England. Some products (e.g. grain) they might not export at all, and some nascent manufactures were throttled in infancy lest they

should compete with the export of similar goods from England. To modern ears all these regulations sound harsh and selfish, but they were not greatly resented. They harmonized with the ideas of the time; they were not one-sided: the colonies enjoyed preferential rates, and in some cases a complete monopoly, in the home market; above all, rules were not strictly enforced. Smuggling was a staple industry in the colonies. Even Adam Smith, no friend to commercial restrictions, admits that 'though the policy of Great Britain with regard to her colonies was dictated by the same mercantile spirit as that of other nations, it has, upon the whole, been less illiberal and oppressive than that of any of them.'

Moreover, so long as the French were in Canada and Louisiana, and the Spaniards in Florida, the English colonies could not afford to quarrel with the homeland which protected them.

By the Peace of Paris (1763) the colonists were, as we have seen, relieved of all apprehension on that account. Was it a blunder to have expelled the French from Canada? Vergennes, one of the most acute diplomatists of the day, had no doubt about it. 'England,' he said, 'will soon repent of having removed the only check that could keep her colonies in awe. They stand no longer in need of her protection. She will call upon the colonies to contribute toward supporting the burdens they have imposed on her, and they will reply by throwing off all dependence.' Some Englishmen shared the views of this shrewd Frenchman, but they did not prevail.

Nor, indeed, did any secessionist movement seem, in 1763, within the range of probability. Benjamin Franklin, one of the foremost actors in the drama, ridiculed the idea. 'Can it,' he asked, 'reasonably be supposed that there is any danger of (the colonies) uniting against their own nation, ... with which they have so many connexions and ties of blood, interest, and affection, and which it is well known they all love much more than they love each other? . . . Union among them for such a purpose is not merely improbable, it is impossible."

How rash is prediction in politics! In 1763 George Grenville succeeded Lord Bute as Prime Minister. Even

Burke admits that Grenville 'had a very serious desire to benefit the public,' but his outlook was that of a lawyer rather than a statesman. On taking office he found England heavily burdened with debt incurred largely in defence of the colonies; he was advised that it was absolutely necessary to maintain some English regiments in America to stiffen the colonial defence against Indian raids; and he learnt that the Colonial Assemblies had rejected a plan for voluntary contributions toward the expense of doing so. He further discovered that so prevalent was smuggling that it cost £8,000 a year to collect £2,000 of revenue.

GRENVILLE'S POLICY

Under these circumstances he decided to enforce strictly the existing trade laws, and to station 7,500 regular troops in America, and a further 2,500 in the West Indies. In 1764 he passed an Act to amend and strengthen the Trade Laws, and gave notice of his intention to raise by a stamp duty on colonial documents £100,000, being one-third of the cost of the military establishment. The Stamp Act was passed in 1765 almost unnoticed in England.

In America, on the contrary, the Stamp Act aroused such bitter opposition that in 1766 it was repealed by Lord Rockingham, who had in the meantime succeeded Grenville. The ruffled feelings of the British Parliament were, however, smoothed by the passing of a Declaratory Act affirming the sovereign authority of the British Parliament over all the possessions of the Crown, both in regard to legislation and taxation. Burke, the real author of the Rockingham policy, declared that the colonies were completely satisfied.

COLONIAL OPPOSITION

It was not so. True, the hated Stamp Act had gone: but the Trade Laws remained, and the sovereignty of the British Parliament (not merely of the King) had been explicitly reaffirmed. It was, indeed, the Stamp Act which the colonists had resisted—shrewdly, for that was admittedly an innovation, and on it they had some case. It was the Trade Laws they detested, but there they had none.

The colonists drew a distinction between internal and external taxation, between stamps and customs, but the hollowness of their contention was revealed when in 1767 the Chatham Government imposed a number of small

customs duties, estimated to produce only £40,000 a year. Massachusetts at once protested, and rioting occurred at Boston. In 1776 Lord North repealed all the Chatham duties except that on tea, retained simply to assert the principle. A league was then formed for the boycott of English goods. Short of abandoning the legal doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, Lord North did everything in his power to conciliate the colonial malcontents; but in vain. The colonial lawyers were determined to abrogate the doctrine: the merchants and people were determined to get rid of the commercial restrictions.

North attempted to confine the dispute to Massachusetts, but failed. A Congress representative of all the colonies except Georgia met in 1774 and endorsed the resistance of Massachusetts.

In 1775 a collision between British troops and the colonial militia occurred at Lexington, and in the same year a second congress, representing all thirteen colonies, decided to issue bills of credit, raise an army, and place it under the command of George Washington.

WAR OF SUCCESSION (1775–83)

In the war that ensued there are two clearly marked periods. From 1775 to 1777 it was a straight fight between Great Britain and her rebellious children in America. During that period victory was again and again in sight for the Mother-country, but it was denied to her on the one hand by the amazing incapacity of her own commanders, notably Sir William Howe, and, on the other, by the brilliant leadership of George Washington, who repeatedly redeemed almost hopeless situations.

Even so, the defeat of the colonies, unless they could obtain outside help, appeared certain. France was eager to help them and so avenge herself for her recent defeats in India and North America, but made it a condition that the colonies should first formally proclaim their independence. Accordingly, that irrevocable step was taken in the Declaration of Independence (4th July 1776).

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776)

That Declaration is one of the epoch-making documents of world-history. In the affirmation of general principles as to the inalienable rights of man the document bears traces of

French influence, but in its calm enumeration of grievances recently suffered it is as severely business-like as the English Bill of Rights. The concluding paragraph begins: 'We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States in General Congress Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the World for the rectitude of our intentions, do in the Name and by the Authority of the good people of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States. . . .'

'A new nation had arisen in the world . . . the political unity of the English race was for ever at an end.'[1] But the new nation had got to organize itself as a State. Before it could proceed to that task the war had to be brought to a successful finish. That was accomplished by a world-coalition against England. Lafayette had already gone over to America with volunteers. After Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga (1777) France formally declared war (1778). Spain joined her in 1779, and the combined fleets of France and Spain obtained, for a time, command of the English Channel. In 1780 Hyder Ali of Mysore, our most formidable rival in India and a cordial ally of France, invaded the Carnatic, and in the same year Frederick the Great of Prussia avenged himself for England's 'desertion' in 1761 by forming a League of Armed Neutrality in protest against England's enforcement of a blockade against neutrals. The league was joined by Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Naples, and even Portugal. When Holland joined it, England declared war on her. It was *Brittania contra mundum.* Gibraltar made an heroic and successful resistance to the sustained attack of France and Spain, but in 1781 Lord Cornwallis, who in 1776 had taken over the command, had to surrender before the combined attack of the American army and the French fleet at Yorktown (19th October). In 1782 Ireland extorted Legislative Independence. England, girt with enemies, was beaten. In 1783 she signed treaties of peace at Paris and Versailles. By the first, the independence of the thirteen colonies was acknowledged. By the second, France recovered Pondicherry and four other towns in India, Senegal, the islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, with certain fishing rights on the western coasts

[1] Lecky: *England in the Eighteenth Century*, iii, 460.

of North America, and acquired Tobago and Saint Lucia. Spain restored the Bahamas but recovered Minorca and the Floridas. England was not merely beaten, but humiliated. France was avenged—but had taken one more step toward bankruptcy, financial and political.

The English Colonies had achieved independence but the United States had still to be made. The war had necessitated some measure of unity, and the *Articles of Confederation*, hastily adopted by Congress in 1771, were formally adopted by the States on 1st March 1781. But the Confederation, as Alexander Hamilton said, was 'neither fit for war nor peace.' It was little more than a temporary league between thirteen independent Republics. As long as the war lasted it held together; but how badly the machinery worked we may learn from the despairing appeals of Washington. After the Peace all the vices and weaknesses of the Confederation were revealed, and the whole country drifted (in the words of a great American) 'surely and swiftly toward anarchy.' Chaos in finance, in inter-state commerce, in foreign affairs, at last broke down the opposition of the most obdurate separatists. In May 1787 a Constitutional Convention met, under the presidency of Washington, at Philadelphia, and drafted a constitution which was finally ratified and came into effect in 1788.

THE CONVERSION CONSTITUTION

The Constitution was in effect a treaty between thirteen independent Republics, and no single word of it can be altered save with the assent of three-fourths of the States (now 48 in number). To the new Federal Government only restricted powers are, by the Constitution, delegated. All other powers are vested in the States and the sovereign people. The federal instrument is concerned mainly with a description of political institutions. The Executive is vested in a President, to be indirectly elected. The function of legislation, severely separated from those of the Executive and the Judiciary, is vested in a Congress of two Houses—the Senate and the House of Representatives. The former, consisting of two representatives from each State, shares the treaty-making power and certain patronage rights with the President; the Etter has no control over, or formal contact with, the laxecutive. Immense power, including that of interpreting

THE FEDERAL STATE

the Constitution, is vested in the Judiciary, the independence of which is rigidly protected.

The Federal Constitution of the U.S.A. can be understood only if it is read in conjunction with the State Constitutions, to which it is complementary. It is enough in this place to say that America has enriched the world with an entirely new type of Democracy. Unlike the monarchical, parliamentary, and unitary Democracy of England, American Democracy is Presidential, rigid, and federal, and has proved itself, on the whole, admirably adapted to the conditions under which it works.

FOR FURTHER READING

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For American Constitution

Marriott : *Mechanism of the State,* vol. i, ch. v (Oxford, 1927). Wilson : *Congressional Government* (1896), A. de Tocqueville : *Democracy in America* (ed. 1891). F. S. Oliver : *Life of Alexander Hamilton* ; J. M. Beck : *The Constitution of the United States* (1922).

CHAPTER XXIII

THE END OF THE OLD RÉGIME

BENEVOLENT AUTOCRACY

LEADING DATES

1715 Jesuits expelled from Sicily, from Portugal (1768), from France (1763), from Naples (1768). Order abolished by Clement XIV (1773).
1720. *Parlement* of Paris exiled to Pontoise.
1734. Voltaire's *Lettres sur Angleterre.*
1735–87. Tanucci's reform in the Two Sicilies.
1743. Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois.*
1750–77. Pourbal's reforms in Portugal.
1754. Rousseau publishes *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégualité* and *Contrat Social* (1762).
1759–88. Reforms in Spain.
1763–88. Frederick's reforms in Prussia.
1765–90. Leopold reforms Tuscany.
1765–90. Reforms in Denmark.
1765–90. Reforms of Joseph II.
1771–92. Gustavus III reforms Sweden.
1771. Overthrow of the *Parlements* in France.
1774. Restoration of the *Parlements* in France.
1774–6. Ministry of Turgot.

FROM the cradle of the young nation in the new world we must return to the deathbed of the old régime in Europe. Yet the old Governments never showed more enlightened activity, or greater anxiety to promote the well-being of their subjects, than in their last hours.

It is commonly assumed that the French Revolution inaugurated the period of reform in Europe. The assumption reverses the actual order: it was reform which inaugurated revolution. The feature which distinguished the latter years of the epoch swiftly drawing to a close was, indeed, general enthusiasm

BENEVOLENT AUTOCRACY

for administrative reform. So much so that the eighteenth century has been labelled 'the age of benevolent despotism.' All the continental governments were, in fact, autocratic, and almost all of them, as this chapter will show, were eager to promote the efficiency of government, and improve the condition of the people. De Tocqueville argues that the French people were actually incited to revolt by the means taken to relieve their hardships and to improve their position economically and socially. Be that as it may, it is the simple truth that the era of revolution was, in fact, preceded by an era of reform.

For a movement so general, a common cause must be sought. It will probably be found in the influence exercised upon the minds of all educated people throughout Western Europe (and in Russia) by French philosophy. French was the universal language of courts and diplomacy. The ideas promulgated by the French philosophers were, however, largely inspired by Locke and other English writers of the seventeenth century. Montesquieu (1689–1755) was a fervid admirer of England and its political institutions. An American publicist has said, and with no more than truth, that 'the British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry.' To him England was in his own words, 'the mirror of political liberty.' What Montesquieu learnt from England he taught to the Continent.

Voltaire's (1694–1774) admiration was not less sincere and not less informed. His *Lettres sur Angleterre* (1734), publicly burnt by order of the Parliament of Paris, proved his admiration. If continental opinion was largely influenced by English philosophy, it was, indeed, mainly at second hand through Montesquieu and Voltaire. The special target of Voltaire's attack was the Church (*Ecrasez l'infame*). The 'vile thing' he wanted to crush was not Christianity, but the despotism exercised by the Church over freedom of thought and expression. For the English Quakers he had a profound admiration; for a Church which imposed manacles on thought, which burnt or suppressed almost every work of distinction produced in France during his lifetime, he had nothing but detestation and contempt.

Though an enemy to the Church, Voltaire was a firm

believer in monarchy; he looked to enlightened kings to protect the tender plant of liberty, and by wise reforms to improve the condition of the great mass of their subjects.

Nor did he look in vain. Reform was the watchword of the rulers of the eighteenth century. But it was to be reform from above: the gift of rulers to their people; and it was wellnigh universal. Between 1750 and 1777, the Marquis of Pombal carried through a series of reforms in Portugal. Charles III had begun, with the aid of his minister Tanucci (1735–77), the work of reform in Naples and Sicily, and with the help of Aranda, Campomanes, and Florida-Blanca carried it on in Spain (1759–88). Leopold, who in 1765 succeeded his father the Emperor Francis I as Grand Duke of Tuscany, embodied in a Code which bore his name the humane principles of Beccaria. A similar work was done by order of his mother Maria Theresa in Milan. Catherine II, though a German Princess and a Russian Czarina, gave practical application, even in Russia, to the advanced ideas of Diderot (1712–84) and the French Encyclopaedists. In Denmark, Struensee and Bernstorff carried through in the name of their King Charles VII (1766–1808), who was himself insane, a number of salutary reforms: they curtailed the extravagant privileges of the nobles; established religious toleration and freedom of the press; promoted education, and reorganized taxation and finance.

A great King, Gustavus III, saved Sweden (as already mentioned) from the fate of Poland. For half a century, prior to his accession, a state of anarchy prevailed in Sweden. The Crown was impotent. All real power was in the hands of a venal aristocracy. But the nobles were divided into factions: the more respectable, the *Hats*, wished to maintain the old alliance with France; the *Night-caps* looked for support to Russia. The one object of Russia in Sweden, as in Poland, was by perpetuating anarchy to keep Sweden weak, and in 1764 Catherine II concluded with Frederick II of Prussia a secret pact to effect her sinister purpose.

GUSTAVUS III OF SWEDEN (1771–92)

It was foiled by the *coup d'état* carried out by Gustavus III in 1772. Having re-established the authority of the Crown, Gustavus employed it to carry through a large programme

of reforms. He purified the public service, put an end to bribery, encouraged mining, agriculture, and industry, promoted foreign trade, improved education, fostered art, proclaimed the principle of religious toleration, emancipated the press, reformed the administration of justice, and abolished torture. By a second *coup d'état* in 1789 he sought to increase the power of the *bourgeoisie* and the peasants at the expense of the nobles, but the latter contrived a plot for his assassination, and in 1792 it was successfully executed.

JOSEPH II

Of the reforming activity of Frederick II in Prussia something has been said already. But even he was less typical of the benevolent autocrats than the Emperor Joseph II. The composite character of the Hapsburg dominions rendered the task of reform particularly difficult, and Joseph's efforts were more valiant than successful, his zeal more conspicuous than his discretion. His methods were in striking contrast to those of his brother (and successor) Leopold of Tuscany, one of the wisest of the royal reformers, and to those of his mother Maria Theresa.

FALL OF THE JESUITS

That great Queen had carried through a large scheme of ecclesiastical reform. She had abolished the Inquisition, greatly restricted clerical privileges, reduced the number of Saints' days, and had expelled the Jesuits. The Jesuit Order had been rapidly degenerating and its members had become objects of suspicion to most reformers. They had been expelled from Sicily by the Duke of Savoy in 1715, from Portugal in 1759, from France in 1763, from Spain in 1767, and from Naples in 1768. But it was of little use to expel the Jesuits from this country or that if they could find a refuge elsewhere. The Catholic Powers, therefore, brought pressure upon the Pope to suppress the whole Order. Clement XIII had sought compensation for the anti-clerical policy of the great Catholic Powers by threatening to excommunicate the Duke of Parma who had followed their lead in his Duchy. France countered this affront to a Bourbon Prince by seizing Avignon, Naples by occupying Benevento, and both joined with Spain in demanding from Clement XIII the suppression of the Jesuit Order. In 1769 Clement XIII died, and was

succeeded in the Papal chair by Clement XIV who, before election, had pledged himself to satisfy the great Catholic Sovereigns in this matter. After four years' delay the pledge was fulfilled; the Order was suppressed, and the Papacy recovered Avignon and Benevento. Curiously enough the Jesuits found a refuge in Prussia and Russia, and repaid the hospitality of their benefactors by preaching to the Catholic Poles submission to a Calvinist King and an Orthodox Empress. Joseph's ecclesiastical policy went much beyond that of his contemporaries. He ordered a new translation of the Bible; published an edict of complete toleration; admitted Protestants and even Jews to public offices; established civil marriage and legalized divorce; he suppressed six hundred convents and converted them into barracks and hospitals, and reduced by more than 50 per cent. the number of monks and nuns. Joseph boldly attacked not only the privileges of the clergy but those of the feudal nobility. The feudal system still subsisted in its integrity, but Joseph emancipated the serfs, abolished forced labour, and deprived the feudal lords of all their privileges, social, fiscal, and military. He equalized taxation, and gave to all classes equality before the law. All this was in accord with the most enlightened opinion, if not with the universal practice, of his day.

It was, however, his policy of administrative centralization that was particularly resented by his subjects in all parts of his heterogeneous empire. Each of the thirteen governments into which it was divided had its own administrative, military, and judicial system. Joseph attempted to impose upon Germans and Magyars, Czechs and Italians, Belgians and Poles, one uniform system. German was to be the only official language; Vienna the one capital of a unitary state. The attempt hopelessly failed. With the successful resistance of the Belgians a later chapter will deal. The Hungarians were not less resolute in opposition: the crown of St. Stephen, transferred to Vienna, was sent back to Buda-Pesth, and the separate privileges of Hungary were restored. Joseph II was under no illusion as to completeness of his failure. The epitaph which he composed for his tomb confessed it: 'Here lies a man who never succeeded in anything.'

The reform movement of the eighteenth century was, as

already stated, largely inspired by French philosophers. There is, therefore, irony in the fact that France herself afforded the most conspicuous exception to the universal law. Two explanations of the paradox suggest themselves. First, France had already advanced a considerable distance along the path now tardily followed by the reforming autocrats. Secondly, the advanced thinkers, whose works gave so powerful an impulse to reform elsewhere, had no influence whatever upon their own government, however much they might have upon society.

FRANCE

Richelieu, who initiated reform in France, has been charged with responsibility for the revolution. In a sense the accusation is just. He it was who made the first great breach in the defences of the feudal régime: he deprived the great nobles of their political functions; but he left his work half-done. The nobles ceased to be governors of provinces; they ceased even to be landlords, but they remained in possession of their social privileges. The feudal chiefs having degenerated into courtiers, and the peasants having become, in many parts of France, owners of the land they tilled, the survival of all the irritating incidents of feudal tenure was the more keenly felt and the more bitterly resented. If, then, revolution reached France first, it was not because there was more feudalism in France than in other continental states, but because there was less. Privilege can only be justified by power—wisely exercised. The French aristocracy had been deprived of power, but had kept their privileges.

Richelieu and Louis XIV had completed the edifice of absolutism in France. The Crown had absorbed all the powers of the State, legislative and administrative. The States-General, as we saw, was suppressed altogether; the Parlements deprived of all power of remonstrance.

Absolutism can be justified only by efficiency. Under Louis XV the monarchy ceased to be efficient. Of its failure to retain the pre-eminence of France among the nations, enough has been said. It was hopelessly inefficient also at home. During the Regency of Orleans (1715–23) there was a temporary reaction against the system of Louis XIV, but the period is chiefly remarkable for the efforts of John Law, a Scottish financier, to redeem France from the bankrupt condition to which it had been reduced by

LOUIS XV

the extravagance of Louis XIV. Law was hardly judged by contemporaries: those who have witnessed the financial chaos of Europe may perhaps judge him more leniently. His principles were not entirely unsound: his application of them was disastrous. The condition of France was desperate. Crushed under a load of debt, committed to an annual expenditure double the annual revenue, the State was bankrupt; trade languished; the people were reduced to dire poverty. Law proposed to redeem the debt, to balance the budget, and to restore prosperity to trade by a large issue of paper money, based not upon a cash reserve but upon the credit of the State. He shared the belief of his day that money is wealth. Gold and silver are wealth. Paper may serve as money so long as people have faith in the credit of those responsible for putting it into circulation, but paper money is not in itself wealth, and may become worthless.

Law began (1716) by establishing, with the sanction of the government, a private bank, which was a great success. Presently it was transformed into a State bank, and began to issue notes in ever-increasing quantity. Inflation gave, as it generally does, feverish impulse to trade, and still more to speculation. In order to reap for the State the profits of the 'boom' thus created, Law started the *Mississippi Company* to exploit the recently acquired territory of Louisiana. He then bought out several companies trading with Africa and the East Indies, and consolidated them in the *Company of the Indies*. The whole country was infected with the speculative mania. More and more paper was issued. Shares rose to enormous premiums. Then came the inevitable crash. As with the South Sea Company in England, the bubble burst. Credit collapsed. Shareholders were ruined. Had the bank been managed on business lines, had the companies been content with modest profits, all might have been well. Law had got hold of more than a half-truth; but the percentage of error was sufficient to bring ruin upon himself and upon the country. The lesson taught to France by this disaster has been learnt only too well. From that day to this the people at large have preferred the old stocking to the savings bank, and have looked askance at investments except in land.

In 1723 Louis XV, though only thirteen, was declared of age, and for the next twenty years France was ruled by

Cardinal Fleury, first as the King's tutor and then as his minister. Fleury was the French counterpart of Walpole: an economical and orderly administrator and a lover of peace. By him France was nursed back into convalescence; but after his death in 1743 the fortunes of France were committed, until 1764, to the much less capable hands of the King's mistress, Madame de Pompadour. How disastrous was her rule to the power and prestige of France abroad we have already seen. Internally interest is mainly concentrated (apart from the intellectual ferment already noticed) upon the almost continuous conflict between the Crown and the Parlements. That conflict turned upon three points: finance, religion, and the constitutional status and functions of the Parlements. After Fleury's death the public finances were thrown once more into confusion, not only by war, but by the gross extravagance of the King and the reigning mistress. The Parlement of Paris had no control whatever over finance, and could only look on helplessly as the country plunged deeper and deeper into the morass of insolvency.

FLEURY

It was on the religious question that for half a century King and Parliament were in the sharpest conflict. Jansenism, denounced by the Papacy in the Bull *Unigenitus* (1713), and persecuted by the Crown, found stalwart defenders among the magistrates of the Parlement. Their championship was at least as much political as religious, but the effect was to identify Jansenism with opposition to autocracy, and to give to its parliamentary champions a quasi-constitutional status. In the years 1730–3 the agitation was widespread. An 'opinion' drafted by Paris lawyers contained language to which the ears of French Kings were little accustomed: 'By the Constitution of the Kingdom the Parliaments are the senate of the nation; the sovereign depositors of the laws of the State. . . . Laws are essentially conventions between those who govern and those who are governed.' A 'senate' in a legislative sense the Parliaments were not, and the Council of State were on solid ground in repudiating these doctrines as 'unconstitutional.' The lawyers stuck to their guns, and the contest between the Crown and Parliament continued intermittently until in 1771 it was ended—as far as Louis XV was concerned—by a *coup d'état*. The magis-

trates refused to perform their functions, and so brought the administration of justice to a standstill. The King retorted by suppressing the Parlements—both in Paris and in the provinces—altogether, and setting up entirely new courts of justice. Burke had a high opinion of the French Parliaments. 'The noble efforts,' he wrote in 1771, 'of that faithful repository of the laws, and remembrancer of the ancient rights of the people, the Parliament of Paris, in the cause of liberty and mankind, have fatally terminated in its own final destruction. . . .'[1] The language is perhaps exaggerated, but it re-echoes contemporary opinion in England. Moreover, oligarchical and unrepresentative as the Parliament of Paris was, unconstitutional as were its pretensions, it alone stood between France and autocracy.

One of the first acts of Louis XVI was to restore the Parliaments, with results to be considered presently. At the time of his accession, Louis XVI was a young man of twenty, but he had been for four years the husband of Marie Antoinette, the daughter of the Empress Maria Theresa. The Queen was a year younger than her husband. The new King was an amiable, well-intentioned young man; he fully shared the zeal for reform characteristic of the age, and was anxious in every way to promote the welfare of his subjects. But he was devoid of dignity, irresolute in character, and though simple in his tastes and irreproachable in private life, was lacking in moral courage and political initiative. His young wife was a much stronger character, but she was as ignorant as she was obstinate, and the influence she exerted over Louis was disastrous to them both.

LOUIS XVI

Yet at the opening of the reign everything promised well. The conduct of foreign affairs was committed to Vergennes, one of the ablest and most experienced of French diplomatists; of internal affairs and finance to Turgot.

TURGOT

'Turgot,' said his colleague Malesherbes, 'has the brain of Bacon and the heart of l'Hôpital.' 'He was one of those men,' said John Morley, 'to whom good government is a

[1] Annual Register, 1771, and cf. also *French Revolution* (*Works*, ch. ii, p. 476), and the concluding passage of the speech on Warren Hastings.

religion.' A disciple of Voltaire, he was a believer in autocracy as the best instrument for reforms, but he was the disciple also of Quesnay and the Physiocrats.

It was in the school of the Physiocrats that Adam Smith also had graduated. If Voltaire preached freedom of thought, the Physiocrats preached freedom of trade. All wealth, they held, is derived from the soil; all taxation, therefore, should fall upon agriculture; secondary industries do not produce wealth, nor do the distributive processes; and to impose excise and custom duties was, therefore, both futile and mischievous; upon free exchange there should be no restraint. *Laissez-faire laissez-passer* was their formula. With these doctrines Turgot was in complete accord. Born in 1727, he had become intendant of Limoges in 1761, and had transformed the Limousin, one of the poorest provinces, into one of the richest. In 1774 he was appointed Controller-General.

Confronted by the opposition of the aristocracy, the higher clergy and the lawyers, Turgot found himself powerless to carry through the comprehensive scheme which he had outlined to a sympathetic master. He did, indeed, do something to equalize the burden of taxation, to reform fiscal abuses; he restored national credit; he broke down many of the barriers on internal commerce; he emancipated industry from medieval shackles; he abolished the *corvée* (forced labour) and reformed the *octroi*. But what he was allowed actually to accomplish was only the fragment of a comprehensive scheme. That scheme meant the curtailment of privileges and exemptions. The privileged classes were too strong for him; rather than accept reform they provoked revolution, and after two years of office as Controller-General (1774–6), the only minister who could have saved the ancient monarchy of France was dismissed, though reluctantly, by Louis XVI. 'I am,' wrote Voltaire, 'as one dashed to the ground. Never can we console ourselves for having seen the golden age dawn and perish. My eyes see only death in front of me, now that M. Turgot is gone.'

Imminent, indeed, was the death of the old régime. With Turgot the last chance for the reformers had gone. The day of revolution had dawned.

ROUSSEAU

Of revolution Rousseau was the evangelist. He was born at Geneva in 1712, the son of a watchmaker belonging a Huguenot family which had found a refuge in that free city. Geneva, a small city republic governed by a direct democracy of the old Greek type, exercised a profound influence upon Rousseau and his political speculations. An unhappy childhood in Switzerland might have been redeemed by the literary success which he quickly attained when he came to Paris. But Rousseau was too much of a misanthrope to be mellowed by success. With his *Discours sur l'origine de l'inequalité parmi les hommes* (1754) modern socialism was born. His *Contrat Social*, published in 1762, is the gospel of modern democracy, and provided a text-book for the Revolution of 1789. Voltaire described Rousseau's doctrines, not inaccurately, as a 'code of anarchy.' The influence of his teaching was, however, profound. To masses of men who felt themselves to be restricted and oppressed, socially and financially, by the relics of a feudal system which had lost its meaning and justification, men who were both credulous in temper and wholly inexperienced in affairs, Rousseau preached his doctrines of equality and liberty. Into a soil prepared by political abuses, social grievances, and economic restraints Rousseau flung broadcast the seed of philosophical speculation. It produced an abundant if unwholesome harvest.

GENERAL CAUSES OF FRENCH REVOLUTION

Preceding paragraphs should have sufficiently revealed the general causes of the revolution which broke out in 1789: an autocratic monarchy which had ceased to be efficient; an aristocracy which had lost all political power, but clung the more tenaciously to its social and fiscal privileges; a Church from which the higher classes had been alienated by the teachings of philosophy and the lower classes by the pride and luxury of the higher ecclesiastics;[1] a financial system which, while laying grievous burdens on the poor and sparing the rich, reduced the State to bankruptcy; finally, a philosophy seeking to destroy the faith of the people in the monarchy and the Church, but providing no substitute for either.

Such were the general tendencies noticeable in France

[1] The *curés* or parish priests were popular with the people whose poverty they shared.

in the eighteenth century. They laid the train of revolution.

FOR FURTHER READING

F. Rocquain: *L'Esprit Révolutionnaire.* A. Sorel: *L'Europe et la Révolution Française* (vol. i). Aubertin: *L'Esprit public au 18e siècle.* H. Taine: *L'Ancien Régime.* A. de Tocqueville: *France before the Revolution of 1789.* A. Young: *Travels in France* (E.T.). D'Argenson: *Journal et Mémoires* (E.T.). L. Say: *Turgot* (E. T. Masson). A. Cherest; *La Chute de l'Ancien Régime.* J. J. Rousseau: *Contrat Social.* J. Morley: *Voltaire.* J. Morley: *Rousseau.* C. E. Vaughan: *Political Writings of Rousseau* (2 vols.). Marriott: *France.*

PART III

CHAPTER XXIV

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Chief Dates

1776-81. First Ministry of Necker.
1783-7. Ministry of Calonne.
1787. Assembly of Notables.
1789. Meeting of States-General (5th May).
1789. Capture of Bastille (14th July).
1789. 'St. Bartholomew of Property' (4th August).
1789. 'March of the Maenads' (5th-6th October).
1791. Flight to Varennes (20th June).
1791. Declaration of Pillnitz (27th August).
1791. New Constitution accepted by King.
1791. Legislative Assembly meets (1st October).
1792. Girondist ministry (March-June).
1792. War *v.* Austria (20th April).
1792. Brunswick's Manifesto (25th July).
1792. Prussia declares war on France.
1792. Monarchy overthrown (10th August).
1792 September massacres.
1793. Execution of Louis XVI (21st January).
1793. War with England and Holland declared (6th February).
1793. Jacobins in power (June).
1793 The Terror (September to July 1794).
1793. Execution of Marie Antoinette (16th October).
1793. Execution of Girondists (31st October).
1794. Execution of Hébert, &c. (24th March).
1794 Execution of Danton, &c. (5th April).
1794. Fall of Robespierre (27th July).
1794. Thermidorean reaction.
1795. The Directory—1799.
1795. Treaty of Basle.
1795. Thirteenth Vendémiaire (5th October).
1797. Treaty of Campo-Formio.
1799. *Coup d'état* of 18th Brumaire.

'ALL the symptoms which I have ever met with in history previous to great changes and revolutions in government now exist and daily increase in France.' So Lord Chesterfield wrote in 1753. Nor was he alone in his prediction. John Wilkes was in Paris in 1764 and wrote from there to Lord Temple: 'The most sensible men here think

that this country is on the eve of a great revolution.' In the following year a General Assembly of the French clergy issued a formal condemnation of the writings of Rousseau, Voltaire, and Diderot, and declared that 'the spirit of the century seemed to threaten the State with a revolution, which was likely to result in general ruin and destruction.'

It did; but the explosion was deferred for a generation and might well have been, if not permanently averted, rendered much less serious had Louis XVI been strong enough to resist the pressure of the reactionaries, and to retain Turgot in power. After his dismissal (1776) the old régime, if not the monarchy, was doomed. (See pp. 257 f.)

The actual outbreak of revolution was due to a combination of circumstances, no one of which would perhaps have sufficed to provoke it. The first was the revolt of the English colonies in America. This reacted on France in two ways: the Declaration of Independence added fresh fuel to the fire lit by the French philosophers; participation in the war against England was the last straw which reduced France to bankruptcy. (See ch. xxii.)

IMMEDIATE CAUSES

On the dismissal of Turgot the King had appointed Necker as controller of finance. Necker, most widely known perhaps as the father of Madame de Staël, was a Swiss banker, a Calvinist, a shrewd financier, but no statesman. Rejecting the physiocratic doctrines of Turgot he reverted to those of Colbert and Law. Embarrassed by the expenses entailed by intervention in America, Necker enforced rigid economy in the Royal Household and in Public Administration. Economy, invariably belauded in theory, is always in practice unpopular. In 1781 Necker published a *compte rendu*, the first complete statement of national finance ever given to the public in France. His purpose, wholly admirable, was to show that the financial state of the country was fundamentally sound, but that rigid economy was essential, and that, in order to achieve it, certain gross abuses, mostly connected with pensions to courtiers and courtesans, must be stopped. The public, as is always the case, neglected the balance-sheet and seized on the abuses, and so loud was the outcry that Necker resigned.

NECKER

Calonne, who succeeded him, a mere courtier, whose

financial methods were those of the gambler, imagined that the crisis could be postponed, if not averted, by reckless expenditure met by loans raised at ruinous interest. By 1786, however, he was at the end of his tether, confessed the truth to the King, and sensibly advised that the only hope was to revert to Turgot's system, to abolish fiscal exemptions, and to summon the Notables and obtain their assent to the curtailment of their privileges.

THE NOTABLES AND THE PARLIAMENT

The Notables met in February 1787. They absolutely refused to abandon the privileges of the Orders to which they belonged, but by adroitly turning the tables on Calonne were acclaimed as popular heroes. Calonne was dismissed and was succeeded by Loménie de Brienne, Archbishop of Toulouse, who had led the opposition to him. Brienne could do no other than persist in the reforms proposed by Calonne.

The Parlement of Paris registered a series of decrees which embodied a large part of Turgot's programme, but refused to authorize equality of taxation, declared that the States-General alone had the right of imposing fresh taxation, and demanded that it should be convoked. After prolonged disputes the King at last gave way, and on 8th August 1788 summoned the States-General to meet in May 1789. A week later the State declared itself bankrupt. Brienne resigned: Necker was recalled.

Carlyle summarized the situation: 'It is spiritual Bankruptcy long tolerated; verging now towards economical Bankruptcy and become intolerable.' It was: but in a confused situation let this be made clear. Reckless of consequences, the Parlements had initiated revolution rather than accept reforms which would have abolished the fiscal exemptions of the privileged Orders. The King, insisting on fiscal equality as the one hope of balancing the budget, attempted to impose his will on the Parlements—and failed.

THE GENERAL ELECTION

There had been no general election in France for 175 years. The excitement caused by the convocation of the States-General was immense; so also was the confusion: and both were heightened by the prevalence of distress and famine during the winter of 1788–9. In Lyons 40,000 silk weavers were starving, and much of the violence which accompanied the

revolution must be ascribed to the fact that in Paris alone there were 120,000 persons destitute and unemployed.

THE STATES-GENERAL

The States-General was opened by the King at Versailles on 5th May 1789. It consisted of 1,136 deputies, of whom 270 represented the nobles, 290 the clergy, while the *Tiers État*, the Communes, to whom by Royal Decree double representation had been conceded, had no fewer than 576 delegates. The delegates of all the three Estates came to Versailles armed with *Cahiers*, or texts of grievances, drawn up by the Electors of all three Estates. These *Cahiers*, still extant, made it abundantly clear that autocracy and privilege were from the outset doomed. The Third Estate demanded that the States-General should henceforth meet regularly; that taxation should be readjusted, and all privileges and exemptions abolished; that feudal burdens should be removed; that personal liberty should be guaranteed, and offices be open to all classes. Nor did the noble or clerical orders offer any opposition, on paper, to these demands.

The detailed course of the Revolution may be followed in any one of a dozen text-books.[1] A bare summary must here suffice.

Hardly had the States-General got to work before the *Tiers État*, defying the King and the other Orders, declared themselves the 'National Assembly of France' (17th June), and were at once joined in their usurpation by the lower clergy, and later on, at the urgent instance of the King, by the nobles and higher ecclesiastics.

FALL OF THE BASTILLE

On 14th July the Parisian mob, having made themselves masters of the capital, attacked and captured the Bastille, the great prison-fortress of Paris, and liberated the few prisoners immured therein. The capture of the Bastille, unimportant in itself, was immensely significant as symbolic of the termination of the old order, and in particular of arbitrary imprisonment and the denial of personal freedom.

'How much it is the greatest event that ever happened in the world, and how much the best.' Thus did Charles James Fox acclaim the fall of the Bastille. Burke, on the contrary,

[1] I have some paternal preference for the account in Marriott's *Remaking of Modern Europe* (21st ed.) (Methuen, 1933), chs. ii–vii.

was confirmed in his opinion that 'the French have shown themselves the ablest architects of ruin that have hitherto existed in the world.' Louis XVI was roused to remark to the Duc d'Liancourt: 'Mais c'est une révolte.' 'Non, Sire,' answered the Duke, 'c'est une révolution.'

Revolution it was. The capture of the Bastille marked the beginning of mob rule in Paris, and the epidemic of disorder quickly spread from the capital to the provinces: chateaux were burnt, monasteries were sacked, the reign of anarchy had begun.

On 4th August the National Assembly at Versailles, in a frenzy of excitement and self-renunciation, adopted a series of resolutions abolishing the last relics of feudalism: all men were henceforward to be equal before the law; offices to be open to all; justice to be administered gratuitously and impartially; the last traces of serfdom, forced labour, customary services, and all other incidents of feudalism abolished; guilds and corporations dissolved; tithes, annates, pluralities abolished. That was the 'St. Bartholomew of Property,' the 'extreme unction day of feudalism'—in Carlyle's picturesque phrase. One night's work sufficed to complete the destruction of a social system under which France had lived for centuries.

4TH AUGUST

On 27th August the Assembly published a Declaration of the 'natural, inalienable rights of man,' among which were enumerated, 'liberty, property, security,' freedom of conscience and of person, and security of property.

THE RIGHTS OF MAN

The formulation of abstract principles is not difficult, particularly for Frenchmen. The work of destruction, also, is easy. 'Pigmies,' as Mirabeau said, 'can destroy, it takes great men to build.' But the Assembly had now to embark on the task of rebuilding, and Mirabeau himself was the only real statesman in that crowd of inexperienced and visionary enthusiasts. 'He was fitted above all men to ride the whirlwind and direct the storm.' Such is John Morley's verdict on him. 'Had Mirabeau lived,' says Carlyle, 'the history of the world and of France had been different.'

THE NEW CONSTITUTION

That is far from certain; but none can question the accuracy of Mirabeau's own prediction: 'When I am

gone . . . the miseries I have held back will burst from all sides on France. I carry in my heart the death-dirge of the French monarchy. They will fight over its corpse.' Mirabeau died on 2nd April 1791.

Meanwhile, much had happened. The Assembly had 'made' a new constitution. Arthur Young, like Burke, poured scorn upon this task. 'Making the Constitution, which is a new term they have adopted, as though a Constitution were a pudding, to be made from a receipt.' Your typical Englishman is as mistrustful of 'made' constitutions as he is of 'made' dishes. Mirabeau would fain have seen France follow the example of England and establish a Constitutional Monarchy, advised by a body of ministers responsible to the Legislature. But political philosophy, notably Montesquieu's, decreed a complete separation between the Executive and the Legislature, and accordingly the Assembly decided that ministers should be excluded from the Legislature, which was to consist of a single Chamber of 745 deputies. The judicial system was thoroughly overhauled. The old Parliament of Paris, and with it many grave abuses, were abolished; and the administration of criminal and civil justice was reorganized on excellent lines, only vitiated by the gross blunder of making the judges elective. Local government was also completely reorganized. The Provinces were abolished, and carried with them into the abyss much of the history of France. The whole country was symmetrically divided up into eighty-three Departments, and these were subdivided into districts, cantons, and communes (municipalities). In each there was to be an elective council. The Church became a department of the State; tithes were abolished, religious houses suppressed, all Church property 'nationalized,' and the clergy were compelled to take an oath of allegiance to the new order. Half of them refused, and so created the non-juror schism.

PARIS ASSUMES CONTROL OF THE REVOLUTION

Much of the work had been done under immediate pressure from the clubs and the populace of Paris. On 5th October 1789 a huge mob, headed by a band of frenzied women (Carlyle's 'March of the Maenads') had marched out to Versailles, and dragged the King and the royal family, virtually as

prisoners, back with them to Paris. The National Assembly followed the King, and thus the control of the revolution passed into the hands of the worst elements in the capital. On 20th June 1791 the King and his family attempted to escape to Metz, but were stopped at Varennes and brought back to Paris.

THE REPUBLICANS

The Republicans, led by Danton and Robespierre, demanded the deposition of the King, but, though suspended, he was reinstated on taking an oath to maintain the new Constitution (21th September). On 30th September the National (or Constituent) Assembly, after passing a renunciatory decree that none of its members should be eligible for re-election, dissolved itself.

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

The new Assembly, known as the *Legislative*, met on 1st October. The self-abrogating folly of its predecessor had once more committed the destinies of France to men—mostly young lawyers—wholly without experience. Of the several groups in the new Chamber the most prominent were the *Girondins*, thus designated because its leaders mostly came from the south-western district of the *Gironde*. Wholly lacking in experience of affairs they took classical republicanism as their model, but they were brilliantly gifted, especially with powers of oratory. In March 1792 the King formed a Girondist Ministry. They came in with the determination 'to make all tyrants tremble on their thrones of clay,' and as a first step to that end induced the King to declare war on Austria (20th April 1792).

EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION

The European Powers could not ignore events in France. Louis XVI was not merely a King, but the brother-in-law of the Emperor Leopold II. The National Assembly had asserted the rights—not merely of Frenchmen but of *man*. Ardent republicans were anxious to enforce them universally; and in the borderlands, notably in the Austrian Netherlands and the Ecclesiastical Electorates on the Rhine, the soil was well prepared for the reception of revolutionary seed. Moreover, the French nobles (the *Emigrés*) who had fled from France urged the German sovereigns to intervene on behalf not only of the French King, but of the monarchical order.

By a declaration issued from Pillnitz (August 1791), the Emperor Leopold and Frederick William II, while refusing the intervention urged by the *Emigrés*, threatened concerted action against France. In April 1792 the Girondins retorted by an attack upon the Austrian Netherlands. The French troops fled in panic and murdered their generals. 'You marched out like madmen,' wrote Dumouriez in anger, 'and you ran home like fools.' The Parisian mob, inflamed by the failure of French arms, burst into the Tuileries (20th June) and compelled the King to don the red cap of liberty. The moderates, led by the Marquis de Lafayette, rallied in defence of the King and Queen, but the attack upon them was renewed, and on 10th August the Assembly, terror-stricken in face of the mob, decreed the suspension of the monarchy.

Prussia had joined Austria on 25th June; the allies having crossed the Rhine captured Verdun and advanced on Paris.

DANTON

At least half France sympathized with the objects they came to achieve. Danton, who after 10th August became virtually dictator of France, having struck terror into the hearts of his opponents by the September massacres,[1] threw himself with splendid energy into the task of organizing the national defence. The advance of the allies was checked at Valmy (20th September); the French took the offensive, and before the winter of 1792–3 closed in, the armies of the French Republic were in possession of Belgium, Savoy, and Nice, and had established a firm grip upon the Middle Rhine.

Meanwhile, the Legislative dissolved itself and summoned a National Convention, which met on 21st September, formally proclaimed the Republic, and resolved to bring the King to trial. The Girondists would have interposed delay by taking a plebiscite on his fate, but the trial began on 11th December; by the middle of January the mob became impatient and demanded the 'death of the tyrant.' Louis was found guilty by a narrow majority on 18th January, and executed on the 21st. He was no tyrant; but though personally well-meaning he was wholly lacking in initiative, and was unequal to the crisis he was called upon to face. Robespierre, now rapidly advancing to the leader-

EXECUTION OF LOUIS XVI

[1] The number of victims was variously estimated from 2,000 to 10,000.

ship of the Jacobins, justified the judicial murder of the King on the ground that 'Louis must die in order that France may live.' The dilemma was imaginary, and posterity has endorsed the verdict of Charles James Fox: 'A most revolting act of cruelty and injustice.'

FRANCE *v.* EUROPE

On 1st February 1793 the French Republic declared war on England and Holland, and a month later on Spain. Pitt would have kept England out of the war if he could, but in the autumn of 1792 the French Republic had declared itself the enemy of all peoples who declined to dethrone their 'crowned usurpers'; had violated the public law of Europe by declaring open the navigation of the Scheld, and by the occupation of Belgium had touched England on her tenderest spot. Never has England witnessed unmoved an attack upon the Low Countries by a great continental Power. The murder of Louis XVI, though not giving England any excuse for intervention, filled up (so many Englishmen held) the cup of French iniquities.

The real ground for intervention was stated by Burke: 'No Monarchy, limited or unlimited, nor any of the old Republics, can possibly be safe as long as this strange, nameless, wild, enthusiastic thing is established in the centre of Europe. . . . It is with an armed doctrine that we are at war.'

The war between England and France continued without a break from 1793–1801, and was resumed in 1803; but not until the beginning of the Peninsular War (1808) did England play any considerable or continuous part in the military operations on the European Continent. The war at sea was continuous, and we were fighting France directly or indirectly in the West Indies and the East Indies, in Egypt, in Syria, and in South Africa. On the Continent coalitions against France were formed, broken up, and reformed; battles were fought and won; treaties concluded—but it were tedious, (except for the military historian) and for the purpose of this book unnecessary, to follow these things in detail. In 1795 the French Republic concluded at Basle a series of treaties with the Grand Duke of Tuscany, with Prussia, and with Spain. The last purchased peace by the cession of San Domingo, while Prussia ceded to France her provinces to the

west of the Rhine, and for ten years took no further part in the war. In return for the Rhine frontier France agreed to compensate Prussia, at the expense, of course, of German princes, to the east of the river.

Two years later (1797) the French Republic concluded the Treaty of Campo-Formio with Austria. Austria acquiesced in the retention of the Rhine frontier by France, and definitely ceded to her the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium), receiving as compensation, Salzburg, a slice of Bavaria, and the territories of the Republic of Venice east of the Adige, with Istria and Dalmatia. The Venetian territory west of the Adige went to the Cisalpine Republic, a new State carved out in North Italy by Napoleon, and now including the Valtellina, Lombardy, Modena, and the northern part of the Papal States. France itself retained the Ionian Isles and the Venetian settlements on the Albanian coast, for purposes presently to be revealed.

Meanwhile much had happened in France. The Republic devoured its own children one after another. 'The guillotine,' as Carlyle says, 'gets always a quicker motion as other things are quickening.' A revolutionary tribunal was set up in March 1793, and the Committee of Public Safety in April. Its leading members were Robespierre and his immediate colleagues, Couthon and St. Just; Carnot, the organizer of war; and Billaud-Varennes and Collot d'Herbois, the organizers of the Terror.

THE TERROR

France was in the grip of the Terror for twelve months, from September 1793 to September 1794. Among its earlier victims were the Queen Marie Antoinette (executed on 16th October), and the Girondist leaders — those ineffectual idealists who were executed on 31st October. The autumn of 1793 saw the Royalist rising in La Vendée stamped out in blood. Then came the turn of the various sections of the Terrorists themselves. With the help of the Dantonists, Robespierre first dealt with the extremists, led by Hébert, who with his friends was sent to the guillotine in March 1794. Having thus disposed of the extreme Left, Robespierre next turned upon Danton and the moderates, who in April shared Hébert's fate. Then at last all parties, knowing not when the next blow would fall, combined to destroy the destroyer, and at the end of July, Robespierre and his comrades fell victims to the monster they had themselves set up. The


Jacobin Club in Paris was closed in November. The terror was ended. How a small and not compact minority was for so long able to impose its will upon France is one of the enigmas of history. Its overthrow was welcomed by the vast majority of French citizens. 'Oui, il y a un Dieu,' said a Parisian artisan as he gazed upon the dead features of Robespierre. France re-echoed the sentiment.

THE DIRECTORY

In 1795 the Republic concluded peace with Prussia and Spain on highly favourable terms, and, victorious over its enemies on both wings at home, attempted to establish a settled government in France, by promulgating the Constitution of the year III. The Executive was vested in a Directory of five members, and, profiting by previous blunders, a two-chamber legislature was set up. But the Directorial Constitution had weaknesses of its own. With the help of a young Corsican gunner and his 'whiff of grapeshot,' the Republic successfully suppressed the insurrection of 13th Vendémiaire (5th October 1795), promoted by a coalition of reactionaries and extremists; but in 1799 the Directory itself succumbed to a *coup d'état* effected by the gunner who had saved it in 1795. 'We have done with the romance of the Revolution,' said Buonaparte; 'we must now begin its history.'

FOR FURTHER READING

C. E. Mallet: *French Revolution.* Aulard: *Étude et leçons sur la Révolution Française,* and other works. A. Sorel: *L'Europe et la Révolution Française.* Lord Acton: *Lectures on the French Revolution.* Carlyle: *French Revolution* (edited Fletcher). Cherest: *La Chute de l'Ancien Régime.* Willert: *Mirabeau.* Beesley: *Danton.* Morley: *Robespierre.* Burke: *Reflections on the French Revolution.* Marriott: *Remaking of Modern Europe.* L. Madelin: *The French Revolution* (E.T.).



Clarendon Press Oxford

POLAND

CHAPTER XXV

THE RISE OF NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE (1795–1807)

Chief Dates

1796. Italian campaign.
1797. Treaty of Campo-Formio.
1798. Egyptian expedition.
1798. Nelson's victory of the Nile (1st August).
1798. Roman Republic.
1799. Parthenopean Republic.
1799. *Coup d'état* of 18th Brumaire (9th November).
1799. The Consulate.
1799. Second Coalition.
1800. Battle of Marengo (14th June).
1800. Battle of Hohenlinden (3rd December).
1800. The Armed Neutrality (December).
1801. Treaty of Lunéville.
1801. The Concordat.
1802. Treaty of Amiens.
1803. Renewal of war between England and France.
1803. Hanover occupied by Mortier.
1804. Napoleon becomes Emperor of the French.
1805. Napoleon becomes King of Italy.
1805. War of Third Coalition.
1805. Mack capitulates on the Ulm (20th October).
1805. Trafalgar (21st October).
1805 Austerlitz (3rd December).
1805. Treaties of Schönbrunn and Pressburg (December).
1806. Joseph Buonaparte King of Naples; Louis of Holland.
1806. Confederation of the Rhine (June).
1806. Battles of Jena and Auerstadt (October).
1806. Napoleon in Berlin. Berlin Decree (November).
1806. Napoleon in Warsaw (December).
1807. Battles of Eylau (8th February), Friedland (14th June).
1807. Treaties of Tilsit (July).
1807. Portugal occupied by Junot (November).
1807. Milan Decrees (December).

THE *coup d'état* of 18th Brumaire was greeted with general approbation in France. It meant the overthrow of the Directory, but no one mourned its disappearance. It meant the end of the Republic; but France was not really republican at heart. It meant the advent of Imperialism, but that was not yet perceived. Almost all parties had some ground for believing that the *coup d'état* would inaugurate a new era satisfactory to their several interests,

THE 18TH BRUMAIRE

and hopeful for the realization of their divergent aims. The moderate republicans fondly supposed that it might give them the 'Liberty' repeatedly promised by one party after another in the preceding decade, but never yet realized in practice; the Royalists saw in Buonaparte a second Monk and regarded the *coup d'état* as a step toward the restoration of the Bourbons; the great mass of French citizens hoped that it might put an end to a period of turmoil and confusion, and restore order and prosperity to a distracted country. Many hopes were shattered during the months that followed. The whole harvest was reaped by the successful general whose advent Burke had with remarkable acumen predicted in 1790—'the man who, possessing the true spirit of command, shall draw the eyes of all men upon himself.' 'The moment in which that event shall happen,' added Burke, 'the person who really commands the army is your master; the master (that is little) of your king, the master of your assembly, the master of your whole republic.' Another prediction uttered at the same time by Burke is not less remarkable: 'If the present project of a Republic should fail, all securities to a moderate freedom fail with it. All the indirect restraints which mitigate despotism are removed; in so much that if monarchy should ever again obtain an entire ascendancy in France under this or any other dynasty, it will probably be, if not voluntarily tempered at setting out by the wise and virtuous counsels of the Prince, the most completely arbitrary power that ever appeared on earth.'

The rise to fame of the young soldier who thus became master of the French Republic had been astonishingly rapid. Born in 1769 at Ajaccio in Corsica, he was educated at the military schools of Brienne and Paris. He thought at one time of entering the service of the English East India Company where 'gunners were better appreciated than in France,' but he remained in Corsica until the island declared itself independent of the French Republic (1793), when he betook himself to France, posed as a Jacobin, and greatly distinguished himself as a gunner at the siege of Toulon. A post was then found for him in the War Office, and his signal service to the Republic in the insurrection of 13th Vendémiaire was rewarded by his appointment to the

command of the army in Italy. This rapid promotion coincided with his marriage to Josephine Beauharnais, but he owed it less to the social influence which his marriage gave him, than to Carnot's quick perception of the amazing military capacity of his subordinate.

In March 1796 Buonaparte arrived at Nice to take up his command. He entered Italy with the usual republican catchwords on his lips, but with no idea of 'liberation' in his mind. His avowed object was, by the spoliation of the Lombard cities, to replenish the exhausted treasury at Paris, to improve the strategical position of France in the conflict with Austria, and to attach his soldiers to his own person. To troops marching barefooted, half-starved, ill-armed, he held out glittering hopes: 'Soldiers, you are starving and in rags; Government is in arrears with your pay and has nothing to give you. . . . I am about to lead you into the most fertile plains in the world; fruitful provinces and large cities will soon lie at your mercy; there you will find honour, profit, and wealth. . . . Have you the needful courage and perseverance?'

Led by a great general they quickly proved that they had, and a brilliantly successful campaign enabled their commander to conclude a series of treaties with the King of Sardinia (May 1796), with the Dukes of Modena and Parma (May), with Ferdinand, King of the Two Sicilies, and with Pope Pius VI (June), and finally with Austria (as we have seen) at Campo-Formio in October 1797.

CONDITION OF ITALY

When Buonaparte marched into Italy in 1796 he found that country divided into a dozen separate states with little or nothing in common between them. Austrian influence was predominant in Northern Italy: Hapsburgs ruled in Lombardy (the Milanese) and in the Duchies of Tuscany, Modena, and Mantua; the Two Sicilies and the Duchy of Parma were in the possession of the Spanish Bourbons; Venice, Genoa, Lucca, and San Marino retained their republican forms; the House of Savoy ruled as Kings of Sardinia over that island and Savoy and Piedmont, while the whole of Central Italy was still in the grip of the Papacy. Buonaparte had a genuine sentiment for Italy; he was the first to conceive the idea of a United Italy. Before his first campaign was

over he had begun, by establishing client republics dependent upon France, the reorganization of that distracted country. Before his career closed at Waterloo he had accomplished a great work there.[1] Contemporary Italians may have regarded him as a scourge, but even Mazzini (much as he detested 'tyrants') saw in him a healthy scourge. For the corrupt courts he invaded, and the petty princedoms he overthrew, we can spare neither sympathy nor regrets. To Napoleon's work for Italy, however, we shall refer presently.[2]

To return to Campo-Formio. Important in virtue of its provisions, that treaty is important also as marking the entrance of Napoleon upon the political stage. He was beginning to act not as the servant of a tottering Republic, but as an independent conqueror. 'Do you suppose,' he wrote to Miot (May 1797), 'that I triumph in Italy for the glory of the lawyers of the Directory, a Carnot or a Barras? Do you suppose that I mean to found a Republic? What an idea! A republic of thirty millions of people! With our morals, our vices! How is such a thing possible? The nation wants a chief, a chief covered with glory, not theories of government, phrases, ideological essays that the French do not understand. They want some playthings; that will be enough; they will play with them and let themselves be led, always supposing they are cleverly prevented from seeing the goal toward which they are moving.'

But the pear in Paris was not yet ripe, and Buonaparte knew how to wait. Whether he was the principal author of the *coup d'état* of 17th Fructidor (4th September 1797) it is impossible to say; but there is no doubt that he approved of and promoted it, and in the end reaped from it the largest share of advantage. It prepared the way for Brumaire. Brumaire made him one of three consular triumvirs. But he heartily despised the fantastic structure built by Siéyès. 'Siéyès,' he said, 'put shadows on every side; shadows of legislative power, shadows of judiciary power, shadows of a government. It required a sub-

BRUMAIRE

[1] For details of intermediate stages see Marriott: *Matters of Modern Italy* (Oxford, 1931), ch. ii; and Driault: *Napoléon en Italie* (Paris, 1906).

[2] Vide infra, Chapter XXX.

stance somewhere, and in faith I put it there.' He did. The 'Grand Elector' of Siéyès's scheme was transformed into a 'First Consul,' with powers over both the Executive and the Legislature, which made him complete master of the State. In 1802 Napoleon (as we now begin to call him) was confirmed in the consulate for life with the right to nominate his successor, and in 1804 he assumed the Imperial Crown.

Before the establishment of the Empire many things had happened outside the borders of France. To these events brief reference must now be made.

In less than a month after the conclusion of the Treaty of Campo-Formio Napoleon was gazetted to the command of the 'army of England.' He accepted it with a mental reservation. Not that he doubted that England was the enemy, but that he had his own views as to the most hopeful method of attack. 'This little Europe,' he said to Bourrienne, 'offers too contracted a field. One must go to the East to gain power and fame. . . . I am willing to inspect the northern coast to see what can be done; but if, as I fear, the success of a landing in England should appear doubtful, I shall make my Army of England the Army of the East, and go to Egypt.'

An inspection of the northern coast confirmed his view that the blow against England should be struck in Egypt. England had never, down to that time, exhibited the faintest concern about Egypt. But Napoleon, from the first, had regarded it as the nerve centre of the British Empire. 'Really to destroy England we must make ourselves masters of Egypt.' Thus had he written in August 1797: hence his insistence on the acquisition of the Ionian Isles. 'Corfu, Zante, and Cephalonia are of more value to us than all Italy. . . . They make us masters both of the Adriatic and the Levant.' But their chief value in his eyes were as stepping-stones to Egypt. Egypt was valuable as a stepping-stone to India.

In April 1798 Napoleon was nominated to the command of the Army of the East. When his troops embarked at Toulon he addressed them thus: 'You are a wing of the Army of England.' So he regarded the expedition.

Malta was occupied without resistance from its owners the Knights of St. John (10th June 1798), and on 1st July Napoleon landed his troops in Egypt. Before the end of the month he

was master of Egypt. But Nelson and the English fleet were on his track; on 1st August the French fleet was annihilated in the battle of the Nile; Napoleon's position became exceedingly precarious, and though he made a brilliant expedition into Syria, and inflicted a series of defeats upon the Turks, he was quick to perceive that the English command of the sea made his victories barren. Moreover, news from Paris convinced him that the pear was ripe ; so, leaving Egypt to Kléber (25th August 1799), he evaded the British fleet in the Mediterranean and reached Paris on 16th October. On 9th November Brumaire made him master of France.

THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION

Meanwhile, during Napoleon's absence in Egypt, Pitt had formed the Second Coalition against France. England, Austria, and Russia were the chief parties to it, but Turkey, the Two Sicilies, and Portugal also joined. Prussia still stood conspicuously aloof. In 1798 the Directory, even without Napoleon, stood its ground in Southern Italy; Naples was organized as the Parthenopean Republic, and the Roman Republic was re-established. In 1799, however, the Austro-Russian armies compelled the French to evacuate the whole of Italy except Genoa, while on the Upper Rhine the Austrians were equally successful. But a great victory won by Masséna in September 1799 drove Russia out of the war ; in 1800 Napoleon's great victory at Marengo (14th June) entirely restored the position in Italy, and seconded by Moreau's victory at Hohenlinden brought Austria once again to her knees. In February 1801 Napoleon dictated to Austria the Treaty of Lunéville. Ferdinand of Naples, now confined to Sicily, also made his peace with Napoleon, having agreed to exclude British vessels from his harbours, and to cede to Napoleon the maritime districts of Tuscany (the *Stato degli Presidi*) for the augmentation of a future Kingdom of Etruria.

THE SECOND COALITION

Great Britain was again left alone to confront Napoleon. Moreover, the Czar Paul of Russia, an ardent admirer of Napoleon, revived the Armed Neutrality—a combination between Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark, directed against England's sea-power (December 1800). But the assassination of the Czar and Nelson's brilliant victory at Copenhagen (2nd April 1801) combined to break up this

dangerous league; in September 1801 the French agreed to evacuate Egypt, and in 1802 England and France concluded the Treaty of Amiens—the only peace-treaty concluded between the two Powers during the whole series of wars from 1793 to 1814. The terms of the treaty were, on balance, highly favourable to England, but as the peace proved to be no more than a brief and hollow truce, it is superfluous to enumerate them. In May 1803, on Napoleon's refusal to meet the demands which in the interests of Europe, no less than in her own, England made upon him, England again declared war.

Napoleon, meanwhile, had taken in hand the stupendous task of reorganizing the institutions of France, and building up afresh the fabric of social order. The lines on which France was rebuilt afforded further proof of the accuracy of Burke's prediction. Nor was Burke alone in his sagacity. Mirabeau, too, had expressed the view that 'several years of absolute government could not have done so much for royal authority as this one year of Revolution. . . . This equal surface facilitates the exercise of power.' Napoleon used those facilities to the full. All power was concentrated in his own hands. The wholesale application of the principle of election had landed France in chaos. It was now abandoned. The control of local government, of education, of the press, was vested in a centralized State. By the Corcordat of 1801 Napoleon made peace with the Church which, with the goodwill of the Papacy, took its appropriate place in the ordered autocracy of Napoleon. All the taxes were levied by controllers appointed from Paris, to the material advantage of the taxpayers and the Treasury. The establishment of the Bank of France restored financial confidence. The new University of France gave to education the uniformity and rigidity which still characterize it. The Judiciary, like the Legislature, was subordinated to the Executive, and the laws of France were embodied in a series of Codes, which, based upon the most enlightened ideas of the prerevolutionary reformers, have supplied models to a great part of continental Europe. Thus did France exchange the 'Liberty' of the Republic for efficiency under the Empire. With the principle of 'Equality' Napoleon had less quarrel. Recognizing that even equalitarians are not averse to decora-

THE NAPOLEONIC CODES

tions, Napoleon instituted the Legion of Honour, but he was scrupulously careful by insisting on 'equality of opportunity' to keep all careers open to talent, and thus to enlist the best brains in the service of the State.

Meanwhile, the renewal of the war compelled him to concentrate all his energies upon a final attempt to bring England to her knees. He thought to accomplish this in two ways: by the direct invasion of England, and by ruining her trade. To effect the former object he mobilized a great army at Boulogne during the winter of 1804–5, and constructed a flotilla of flat-bottomed boats to transport it to the English shore. But to do this he must obtain at least temporary command of the Channel. The great naval campaign of 1805 was designed to this end. Sir Robert Calder's victory over Villeneuve off Cape Finisterre on 22nd July 1805 dissipated all hope of achieving it. The elaborately planned campaign ended with Nelson's great victory at Trafalgar on 21st October. That victory was finally decisive; it destroyed the French and Spanish fleets, established the complete ascendancy of Great Britain at sea, and, above all, compelled Napoleon to fall back upon a policy which ultimately united the whole of Europe against him, and brought about his final defeat.

TRAFALGAR

Napoleon's assumption of the Imperial Crown of France (December 1804), and still more the assumption of the Crown of Italy (May 1805), gave bitter offence at Vienna, and hardly less at St. Petersburg. Pitt, therefore, was able in 1805 to bring both Austria and Russia into the Third Coalition with England. Gustavus IV of Sweden also joined it. But before the end of the year, Napoleon had broken it into fragments. He had instantly apprehended the significance of Calder's victory. All idea of invading England was abandoned, and before the end of August the Boulogne army was on the march toward Vienna. On 2nd December Napoleon inflicted a crushing defeat upon the combined armies of Austria and Russia at Austerlitz in Moravia, and on the 28th he dictated to Austria the terms of the Treaty of Pressburg.

THIRD COALITION

Hitherto Napoleon had spared Austria. He now determined to crush her. She was compelled to recognize Napoleon as King of Italy, and cede to him Venetia, with the Adriatic

Provinces in Istria and Dalmatia; large territorial concessions were also made to Napoleon's allies, Bavaria and Würtemburg, elevated by Napoleon to the rank of kingdoms, and to the Grand Duchy of Baden. In all, Austria lost 3,000,000 subjects, and was geographically cut off from contact with Italy and Switzerland and from access to the Rhine.

More than that. Napoleon had now decided to complete the reconstitution of Germany. It was overdue. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era constitutes a stage in the evolution of modern Germany not less important than in the evolution of modern Italy or modern France. Modern Germany is, indeed, even more directly than modern Italy, the creation of Napoleon.

NAPOLEON AND GERMANY

In 1792 when France declared war on 'the King of Hungary and Bohemia,' Germany consisted of about 360 Sovereign States—Kingdoms, Duchies, Electorates, Archbishoprics and Bishoprics, Free Cities, and what not. The Treaties of Basle, Campo-Formio, and Lunéville had revealed the naked truth of a 'rotten' situation. The two leading Powers—the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollern—intensely jealous of each other, showed themselves equally indifferent to the fate of Germany as a whole. Each was intent solely on promoting its own territorial and dynastic interest: if France obtained its Rhine frontier the Austrian and Prussian Sovereigns must find compensation at the expense of the lesser States and princes. The secondary Powers, such as Bavaria and Baden, were equally intent upon territorial aggrandizement, and quite ready to obtain it by the help of France, and to accept the suzerainty of France in place of that of the Emperor. Napoleon's policy was to accentuate the jealousy of the leading Powers, to pose as the champion of the lesser princes, and having secured a 'scientific frontier' for France, and given the *coup de grace* to the phantom Empire founded by Pope Leo III, to stand forth himself as a second Charlemagne.

The first stage in this process was marked by the *Act of Mediation* (1803). By this Act the States of the Empire were reduced in number by more than half. The Imperial Cities were reduced from fifty-one to six, and all

the Ecclesiastical States, except one, were suppressed. Prussia, having been compelled to relinquish about 1,000 square miles of territory to the west of the Rhine, gained nearly 5,000 square miles to the east of it, mainly at the expense of the bishoprics of Münster, Hildesheim, and Paderborn, and several free cities. Bavaria similarly surrendered 4,000 square miles on the west of the Rhine and gained 6,000 miles in the heart of South Germany—mostly ecclesiastical lands. And so on.[1]

THE CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE

The terms imposed upon Austria in the Treaty of Pressburg, and upon Prussia in that of Schönbrunn carried the process a stage further. The time had now come for Napoleon's crowning act in the reconstitution of Germany. On 17th July the Treaty of the Confederation of the Rhine was signed in Paris. The Kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg (Kings by grace of Napoleon), the Elector of Baden, the Archbishop of Regensburg (Ratisbon), the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, with nine lesser princes, definitely renounced their allegiance to the Empire, accepted the protection of Napoleon, as President of the Rhine Confederation, and pledged themselves to support him with an army of 63,000 men, trained by French officers. To all intents and purposes Napoleon had become Emperor of Germany.

Only the final step remained. On 1st August the Emperor of the French announced that he 'no longer recognized the existence of the Germanic Constitution, while acknowledging the absolute sovereignty of each of the (German) Princes.' On 6th August, the Emperor Francis formally renounced the title of Holy Roman Empire, and thus, after an existence of 1,006 years, that hoary anachronism at last came to a dishonoured end. With an intelligent anticipation of coming events, Francis had in 1804 assumed the brand-new but not inappropriate title of Emperor of Austria.

Then came the turn of Prussia. After ten years of shameful neutrality Prussia was at last stung, by the humiliations heaped upon her by Napoleon, into a most ill-timed demonstration of independence, and on the eve of Austerlitz

[1] Details will be found in Fisher: *Napoleonic Statesmanship, Germany* (Oxford, 1903), chs. ii, iii, and more briefly in Marriott and Robertson: *Evolution of Prussia* (Oxford, 1915), ch. vi.

presented an ultimatum to Napoleon. But she was too late to fight. After dictating the Treaty of Pressburg to Austria, Napoleon dictated that of Schönbrunn to Prussia. Prussia was compelled to cede Anspach to Bavaria, to accept Hanover from Napoleon, and to close the ports of North Germany to English ships and commerce. Thus did Napoleon bring Frederick William of Prussia into the humiliating position of an unwilling receiver of stolen goods.

THE DOWNFALL OF PRUSSIA

Then, without a word to Prussia, Napoleon tossed back Hanover to England. This culminating insult was too much even for King Frederick William. On 1st October 1807 he declared war on France, and a fortnight later (14th October) Napoleon inflicted a crushing defeat upon one Prussian army at Jena, and Davoust defeated another at Auerstadt. At a single blow, the field army of Prussia was annihilated: strongly garrisoned fortresses, one after another, capitulated with hardly a show of fight to the French, and, on 27th October, the Emperor made a triumphal entry into Berlin.

From Berlin (21st October) Napoleon issued the first of the series of Decrees establishing the Continental Blockade, a device designed to bring England to her knees. From Berlin he marched into Poland, where he was enthusiastically acclaimed as the liberator of the country, and from Warsaw marched on to dispose of Russia, who was still keeping the field despite Austerlitz. After a severe defeat at Friedland (14th June) the Czar Alexander asked for an armistice. Napoleon granted it, and on 25th June the two Sovereigns met in a floating pavilion moored in the middle of the Niemen, and there the bargain was struck. Prussia was to be dismembered; England to be crushed and ruined; Napoleon and Alexander were to divide the world between them. The details were embodied in the Treaty of Tilsit (7th July) by which Russia agreed to recognize the Napoleonic Kingdoms of Naples, Holland, and Westphalia, the Confederation of the Rhine, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, under the King of Saxony. Prussia (who was no party to the treaty) was to be deprived of her Polish acquisitions made since 1772, and all her provinces west of the Elbe. Russia was also secretly promised

THE BERLIN DECREES

Finland (from Sweden) and Moldavia and Wallachia (from Turkey). Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal were to be forced into war with England.

Prussia incidentally was to be humbled and dismembered: but the war *à outrance* was to be against England. The issue of that duel must form the subject of the next chapter.

FOR FURTHER READING (AND FOR CHAPTER XXVI)

J. H. Rose: *Life of Napoleon; Napoleonic Studies.* A. Fournier: *Napoleon I* (E.T.). J. R. Seeley: *Napoleon.* J. R. Seeley: *Life and Times of Stein.* E. Driault: *Napoleon en Italie; La Politique Orientale de Napoléon.* Vandal: *Napoléon et Alexandre Ier.* Marriott: *The Eastern Question; The Makers of Modern Italy; Cambridge Modern History* (vol. ix). Heckscher: *The Continental System.* Duff Cooper: *Talleyrand.* Buckland: *Metternich and the British Government.* Cecil: *Metternich.* Fisher: *Napoleon* and *Napoleonic Studies* (Germany). Marriott and Robertson: *The Evolution of Prussia.* A. Vandal: *L'Avènement de Bonaparte.* Tolstoi: *War and Peace.* Marriott: *France* (Appendix II for books).

CHAPTER XXVI

THE DOWNFALL OF NAPOLEON

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA; THE SETTLEMENT OF 1815

CHIEF DATES

1807. Treaty of Tilsit.
1807–10. Reforms in Prussia.
1808–14. Peninsular War.
1809. Treaty of Vienna.
1812. The Moscow Campaign.
1813 The war of German liberation.
1814 Abdication of Napoleon.
1814. First Treaty of Paris.
1814. Congress of Vienna.
1815. The 'Hundred Days.'
1815. The Waterloo Campaign.
1815. Second Treaty of Paris.
1815. Treaties of Vienna.

TILSIT marked the zenith of Napoleon's fortunes. Emperor of France, King of Italy, virtually Emperor of Germany, Napoleon was truly Emperor of the West —a second Charlemagne. Nor had the new Charlemagne neglected to surround himself with client Kingdoms and vice-Royalties: his brother, Joseph Buonaparte, reigned in Naples; the Batavian Republic was transformed into the Kingdom of Holland for another brother, Louis (1806); and a new Kingdom of Westphalia was carved out of North Germany at the expense of Prussia, Hanover, Hesse, and Brunswick, for a third brother, Jerome (1807). Belgium, the Western Rhinelands, Savoy, and Nice had long ago been incorporated in France, whose frontiers at last corresponded with the dreams of Richelieu. Napoleon would have made the Vistula the boundary between the French and Russian Empires, but the Czar shrewdly pre-

THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE

ferred to have a buffer State, however eviscerated, interposed between himself and his ally.

Yet Tilsit proved to be a dangerous peak. Napoleon was supreme on the Continent, but England, though embarrassed by the defeat and falling away of allies, was essentially unhurt. Moreover, after Trafalgar Napoleon had no means of injuring her except such as must recoil on his own head. By a series of Decrees he built up the 'Continental System.' He declared an absolute boycott of English goods throughout the Continent. Every port in Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea was to be hermetically sealed against their importation. But to make this blockade at all effectual it was necessary for Napoleon to obtain control of the navies of the few States which still maintained their 'neutrality.' Denmark was the first victim indicated in the Tilsit agreement. But Canning, then Foreign Minister of England, got wind of these secret agreements, and promptly forestalled Napoleon. An English fleet was sent to Copenhagen to request the 'deposit' of the Danish fleet for the period of the war. After all, England could offer much better security for its safe custody than could Napoleon. But Denmark, not unnaturally, resented the demand, and England was under the regrettable necessity of bombarding Copenhagen, and taking by force the ships Denmark refused to deposit with her. Nothing but a unique situation could justify conduct so high-handed; but Napoleon had declared that he would no longer tolerate any neutrals. 'It is a contest of life or death between France and England.' So he wrote to Junot. 'Choose between cannon-shot against the English vessels which approach your shores, and the confiscation of their merchandize, or an immediate war with France.' Such was his arrogant message to Sweden. It is clear, then, that in the coercion of Denmark, Canning merely forestalled Napoleon.

THE CONTINENTAL BLOCKADE

Portugal was another neutral. After Tilsit, Napoleon required her to adhere to his *Continental System*; to imprison all English subjects, and confiscate all English property in Portugal, and to declare war on England. As Portugal hesitated to comply, Junot was dispatched at the head of a large army to enforce Napoleon's orders. The Royal Family escaped, under the protection of an English fleet, to

Brazil (30th November 1807), and on the following day Junot entered Lisbon and announced that the 'House of Braganza had ceased to reign.'

But as in Denmark so in Portugal, England, with her command of the sea, was able to frustrate Napoleon's object. The Portuguese fleet was saved, and the attack on Portugal, characteristically insolent and unprovoked, was destined to open a new chapter in the Napoleonic wars.

THE PENINSULAR WAR

Spain, like Prussia, had broken away from the First Coalition in 1795, and under its feeble King, Charles IV, and his corrupt and traitorous minister Godoy, had for twelve years been practically a vassal State of France, content to register the edicts issued from Paris. After Tilsit, however, Napoleon decided on more drastic action. He deposed Charles IV and put his brother Joseph on the throne, nominating his brother-in-law, Joachim Murat, to succeed Joseph on the throne of Naples.

But Spain was not an Italy, nor even a Germany. Despite the fierce and deep-rooted provincialism which has been for many centuries the outstanding characteristic of the Spanish people, they are also inspired by intense nationalism. Joseph might establish a precarious hold on Madrid, but that did not make him master of Spain. In province after province the Spaniards blazed forth into angry resistance. England, thanks to the command of the Portuguese ports, could send succour to Spain, as she could never send it to Germany, while in Italy there was no one to whom to send it except the Kings of the two Sicilies and Sardinia, who owed the retention of Sicily and Sardinia respectively to the presence of the English fleet.

Spain, however, gave the British Army an opportunity which it was quick to seize. The Peninsular War started none too well under Sir Harry Burrard and Sir John Moore, but in the spring of 1809 Sir Arthur Wellesley was appointed to the command. For six long years he held Napoleon at bay, and, through good fortune and bad, he kept alight the fire of insurrection, supporting with his disciplined troops the more spasmodic but not less gallant efforts of the Spaniards and Portuguese.

The Peninsula did more than offer a field for the display of

Wellesley's generalship and the splendid temper of British troops. Napoleon himself confessed that it was the ulcer which ultimately sapped his strength; it proved to Europe that, even on land, Napoleon was not invincible; and, most of all, it gave an immense impulse to the new spirit of nationalism on the Continent and taught the peoples of Europe, apart from their rulers, to regard Napoleon as the great foe to national independence. True it is that in the long run Napoleon's destructive work, notably in Italy and in Germany, tended to a higher integration and gave an immense impulse to national unity. But that was the deferred and undesigned result of his conquests, nor could it have been achieved at all had Germany and Italy continued to form part of a Napoleonic Empire. The new Charlemagne had to be smitten to the earth before the new nations could emerge. The Spanish rising first gave the signal of national revolt. As Southey sang (*Carmen Triumphale*, 1813):

> From Spain the living spark went forth:
> The flame hath caught, the flame hath spread!
> Behold the awakened Muscovite
> Meets the tyrant in his might;
> The Brandenburg, at Freedom's call,
> Rises more glorious from his fall;
>
> See Austria from her painful trance awake!
> The breath of God goes forth—the dry bones shake!

The flame reached Austria first. Ever since the humiliations heaped upon her by Napoleon, in the Treaty of Pressburg, Austria had been waiting for the opportunity of revenge, and steadily preparing to make it effective. With 300,000 French troops shut up in Spain, with England ready to help at any point, with a new national spirit manifesting itself in North Germany, it seemed that in 1809 the moment had come. An appeal inspired by a wholly new spirit was made to the patriotism of the people (April 1809). 'Soldiers! the freedom of Europe has sought refuge under your colours, your triumphs will loose her fetters, your German brethren, still in the ranks of the enemy, await deliverance by you.'

AUSTRIA

Austria declared war on 15th April 1809; but though the Tyrolese peasants fought with splendid courage, the

strategy of the Austrian generals was no match for that of Napoleon, and in less than a month Napoleon was again in Vienna. He suffered, it is true, a severe repulse at Aspern on the Danube, below Vienna (21st to 22nd May), and for six weeks his position was highly critical, but on 5th to 6th July he inflicted a decisive defeat upon the Austrians at Wagram, and once more the Hapsburg Emperor had to conclude a peace on humiliating terms. He had to surrender Western Galicia to Napoleon's Grand Duchy of Warsaw, where the King of Saxony had been installed as ruler; Eastern Galicia to Russia; Trieste and the Illyrian Provinces to Napoleon himself; large slices of territory, including the Tyrol, to his vassal King of Bavaria. In all, Austria lost 4,500,000 subjects; she had to pay a large indemnity and promise strict adherence to the Continental Blockade.

TREATY OF VIENNA (1809)

Austria got no help in this campaign from her allies: the English expedition to the Scheldt, though brilliantly conceived, was a disastrous failure (July), and the risings in North Germany came to naught.

To all appearance the power of Napoleon was, on the continent, unbroken; but England was still unconquered, and was keeping the flame of insurrection alight in Spain. All the more necessity, therefore, for tightening the grip of the blockade upon the Continent. But the tighter the grip, the greater the humiliation imposed upon the continental sovereigns, and the greater the sufferings of their people, cut off from all that England could supply. Napoleon, however, had no option but to enforce his system. To abandon it was to confess defeat at the hands of England. Nor could he tolerate half-hearted allies. Pope Pius VII refused in 1809 to shut his ports to English ships. Thereupon the Papal States were annexed to the Kingdom of Italy, and the Pope, reduced to the rank of a Bishop, found himself a prisoner at Savona. Louis Buonaparte, finding the yoke intolerable, resigned his crown, and Holland was incorporated in France (1810). The whole German coast as far east as Hamburg suffered a similar fate.

Sweden, now virtually under the rule of one of Napoleon's favourite Marshals, Bernadotte, was getting restless. To Bernadotte, therefore, he wrote (11th November 1810):

'You tell me that you wish to remain at peace with France, but I say, let me have proofs of this disposition. Foreign commerce is the present *cheval de bataille* of all nations. I can immediately cause you to be attacked by the Danes and Russians; and I will instantly do so if within fifteen days you are not at war with England. I have been long enough the dupe of Sweden as well as of Prussia; but the latter power has at last learned by the catastrophe of Holland that it was necessary to take a decided line. I cannot reckon always on the alliance of Russia. I loved the King of Holland, but nevertheless I confiscated his dominions because he would not obey my will. I did the same with the Swiss. They hesitated to confiscate the English goods; I marched my troops into their dominions, and they soon obeyed. On the fifteenth day from this, war must be declared, or my ambassador has orders to demand his passports. Open war, or a sincere alliance. These are my last words.' Bernadotte evidently had no option. Against his will he was forced into war with England, but England well aware of the position did not resent it; the war was hardly more than nominal, and in July 1812 Sweden made peace with England and opened her ports again to English goods. In April, Bernadotte had concluded a treaty with Russia, by which in return for the co-operation of a Swedish force in North Germany, Sweden was, on the conclusion of a general peace, to acquire Norway.

Thus Russia secured her right flank. Anxious to secure her left flank also, the Czar about the same time concluded with Turkey the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), by which he agreed to evacuate the Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia) and to accept in full settlement of all immediate claims the Province of Bessarabia. For Russia, also, was suffering in the grip of the *Continental System*, and had begun tentatively to abandon it. Napoleon would not permit, nor could in fact afford, the slightest relaxation. 'A puncture at any one point must,' as Dr. Rose well says, 'produce a general collapse of the experiment.'

War with Russia was, therefore, inevitable; and Napoleon realized it. 'I shall have war with Russia on grounds which lie beyond human possibilities, because they are rooted in the case itself.' And, like Russia, he was preparing

for it by securing his flanks. In April 1810 Napoleon, having divorced his devoted wife Josephine, married the Archduchess Marie Louise of Austria. Hitherto the new Charlemagne had had no heir, but in 1811 the new Empress bore him a son—the King of Rome. His father-in-law undertook, in return for Galicia, to protect Napoleon's right flank on the march into Russia. His left flank was protected by a treaty with Prussia.

Everything was now ready for the attack on Russia. On 12th April 1812 Napoleon declared war, and on 24th June crossed the Niemen at the head of an army of 680,000 men. The Russians retreated before him, devastating their country and burning their towns. Before reaching Moscow, Napoleon, however, had to fight a great battle at Borodino. When he reached Moscow he found it ablaze. Nevertheless, he tarried there for more than a month (15th September to 19th October). By mid-October the position had become unendurable. Russia was no more conquered than on the day when Napoleon crossed the Niemen: his army was decimated by disease, and the survivors were starving. On the 19th the retreat began: the retreat, perpetually harassed by the Russians under Kutusoff, became, after Beresina (26th to 28th November), a rout; Napoleon deserted the army on 5th December and made for Paris; on the 13th, a ragged remnant of some 100,000 men recrossed the Niemen.

THE MOSCOW CAMPAIGN

Was the Russian disaster fatal to Napoleon? The question cannot be positively answered. The loss of a great army did not shake his position. Within three months he had raised a new one; France remained loyal to him, so did the Rhenish Confederation. Both the Czar and the Prussian King hesitated to take the offensive against him. Austria did not move. In Spain, Wellington could take Madrid, but could not hold it. But on 13th January, just a month later than Napoleon, the Czar Alexander crossed the Niemen, and on 28th February concluded with Prussia the memorable Treaty of Kalisch, by which he promised not to lay down arms until Prussia was restored, as regards area and population, to the position she had enjoyed before Tilsit.

That treaty was the undoing of Napoleon, and the making of Prussia. Its conclusion was due to the great

German statesman Baron von Stein, now high in the confidence of the Czar.

The defeats she had suffered at Jena and Auerstadt, the humiliation inflicted upon her at Tilsit, marked for Prussia the nadir of degradation, but also the beginning of regeneration. The Prussians, as Queen Louise truly said, 'had fallen asleep upon the laurels of Frederick the Great.' They were awakened by Napoleon; and on their awakening were fortunate in finding a group of great men ready and anxious to lead them into new paths. The work achieved by Stein and Hardenberg, Fichte and Humboldt, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, cannot be described in detail; it can barely be summarized here.[1] But it is a story of surpassing interest. Stein indicated the spirit in which the work was undertaken. 'We started from the fundamental idea of rousing in the nation a moral, religious, patriotic spirit; of inspiring it anew with courage, self-confidence, readiness for every sacrifice in the cause of national independence and dignity.'

REFORMS IN PRUSSIA

Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation* sounded a clarion call. Delivered in Berlin while the French army was actually in occupation of the capital, during the winter of 1807–8, they created a profound impression. 'Nothing but education can rescue us from the miseries that overwhelm us.' Such was the text. Humboldt's reforms, which reorganized the whole scheme of Prussian education from elementary school to university, formed the practical commentary on Fichte's text. What Fichte and Humboldt did for education, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau did for the Prussian army, and Stein and Hardenberg for financial administration and social reform. The land system was completely reorganized. The serfs were emancipated and converted into peasant owners. By the efforts of these six great men Prussia was remade.

The new Prussia, with the help of Russia, and, in the later stages, of Austria, drove Napoleon out of Germany, and finally helped England to drive him out of Europe.

THE WAR OF GERMAN LIBERATION

The history of the War of German Libera-

[1] Cf. Marriott and Robertson: *Evolution of Prussia* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915), ch. vii.

tion falls into two clearly defined stages. The first lasted from the declaration of war by Prussia (17th March 1813) down to the armistice proposed by Napoleon at the beginning of June. During this stage it was a war waged by the people of Germany, under the leadership of Prussia, on principles proclaimed by Stein.

The second period lasted from August 1813 down to the entry of the allies into Paris (31st March 1814). The adhesion of Austria gave to this period of the war, and still more to the settlement which concluded it, a definitely dynastic character. Leadership had passed from Stein to Metternich.

Austria had not at first joined Prussia and Russia. The Emperor Francis had no wish to exalt his rivals, Russia and Prussia, at the expense of his son-in-law Napoleon. But Napoleon having foolishly neglected to accept, before the expiry of the time limit, the terms offered by Austria, the latter declared war (12th August) The suggested terms would have left Napoleon in possession not only of the French Crown but the Presidency of the Rhenish Confederation and Belgium. The Illyrian Provinces were to be restored to Austria, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw suppressed, and North Germany restored to pre-Tilsit conditions. Whether Napoleon could have afforded to make peace on these terms without risking his crown is matter of controversy. He preferred to stake his all on the wager of battle. At last fortune turned against him. The great battle of Leipsic (16th–19th October) shattered his military power. He recrossed the Rhine on 2nd November, and the edifice he had erected in Germany collapsed like a house of cards. Even after Leipsic, however, Napoleon might have had peace on terms which would have left him the crown and a France enlarged to the extreme limit of its 'natural frontiers' —the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. He refused, and at the end of December the allies entered France. For nine weeks Napoleon, by superb strategy, held them at bay; but Paris opened its gates to them on 30th March. After some hesitation, and consideration of various alternatives the allies decided to recall the Bourbons, and on 3rd May Louis XVIII re-entered Paris, after an absence of twenty-three years. On 30th May the first Treaty of Paris was signed.

METTERNICH

Napoleon had abdicated on 13th April and retired to Elba, with large pensions for himself and his family, and the promise of three Italian Duchies for his Austrian Empress. France was treated with extreme leniency, not to say generosity, by the allies; the Pope was restored to Rome, and the 'legitimate' rulers to their respective capitals, and in November the leading Sovereigns and Ministers of Europe assembled at Vienna to draw up the terms for the resettlement of Europe.

This long and complicated business was not concluded before Napoleon, already tired of his contracted sovereignty in Elba, reappeared in France (1st March 1815) and marched on Paris. The Bourbons fled on his approach, and before the end of March Napoleon was again master of his capital and Emperor of the French.

Once more Europe flew to arms. The war of the 'Hundred Days' ensued, and on 18th June Napoleon at last met his fate at the hands of Wellington on the historic field of Waterloo. The defeat of the French, already assured, was turned into a rout by Blücher and his Prussians; on 7th July the allies for the second time entered the French capital, and on the 15th, Napoleon, having in vain attempted to escape to America, surrendered to Admiral Hotham of H.M.S. *Bellerophon*. He was deported to St. Helena, and there died a prisoner and an exile in 1821.

The deliberations at Vienna were hardly interrupted by the Hundred Days. The results were embodied in no fewer than twenty-eight treaties concluded at Vienna, besides twenty-two signed at Paris and elsewhere. Only a brief summary of the main points can be attempted here.

THE SETTLEMENT OF 1815

France, despite the Hundred Days, was still treated leniently, chiefly in order not to prejudice the principle of 'legitimacy' as represented by Louis XVIII, who was, for a second time, restored to the throne, after Waterloo. France was reduced to the frontiers of 1790; compelled to disgorge the art treasures stolen by Napoleon from all the continental capitals; to pay an indemnity of 700,000,000 francs, and to leave eighteen of her fortresses in the occupation of an allied army until the indemnity was paid. But to the great chagrin of Germany,

FRANCE

and especially of Prussia, she was permitted to retain Alsace and Lorraine.

The Grand Duchy of Warsaw passed to the Czar as King of Poland and was reconstituted as the 'Congress Kingdom.'

RUSSIA AND POLAND

His Prussian and Austrian allies fought in vain against this arrangement. But the Czar Alexander had set his heart on it, and his will, backed by his army, prevailed. 'Avec 600,000 hommes on ne negocie pas beaucoup.' Austria regained part of Galicia, and Prussia retained the province of Posen and the great fortresses of Danzic and Thorn. Cracow was constituted an independent Republic, only, however, to be absorbed into Austrian Galicia in 1846. Russia, besides the practical acquisition of Poland, retained Finland and Bessarabia.

Prussia, disappointed of Poland, having surrendered Bayreuth and Anspach to Bavaria, and various territories to Hanover, had to seek compensation elsewhere.

PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA

She found it in the acquisition of the northern half of Saxony, of Lower Pomerania, and, more important still, of a great province on both sides of the Rhine, including Westphalia, Cleves, Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, Bonn, Coblentz, and Treves. These acquisitions, though geographically separated from Brandenburg-Prussia, proved immensely significant for the political future of the Hohenzollern, not to add for the industrial and economic development of their subjects.

Austria also was well compensated. She gladly surrendered the Netherlands (Belgium), which was united with Holland as the kingdom of the Netherlands under the House of Orange. This arrangement, though it had much to recommend it from the point of view of European diplomacy, did not work, and only lasted until 1830, when Belgium was established as a separate Kingdom. Austria, which had long been anxious to exchange Belgium for Bavaria, was far more than compensated for its loss in 1815 by the acquisition of Venetia, which, with Trieste and the Venetian Dependencies on the east coast of the Adriatic, was added to Lombardy. She thus became dominant, not merely in North Italy, but in the Adriatic.

Italy, partially unified by Napoleon, was again broken up into a dozen states. The Bourbon King Ferdinand reigned

once more over Naples and Sicily; the States of the Church were restored to the Pope; Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia regained Piedmont and Savoy, with the important addition of Genoa (thus finally extinguished as a republic); the ex-Empress Marie Louise was installed in the Duchy of Parma; Austrian cadets were also replaced in Modena and Tuscany. Metternich became, virtually, master of Italy.

ITALY

There was much discussion at Vienna as to the future constitution of Germany, and it was ultimately decided that its thirty-nine states should unite in a loose federal bond under the hereditary presidency of Austria. The jealousy between Austria and Prussia, and the anxiety of the Middle States like Bavaria, Saxony, and Baden to lose no vestige of the sovereignty which they had nominally enjoyed under the presidency of Napoleon, prevented any settlement more consonant with the wishes of German patriots like Stein.

GERMANY


Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington, who represented Great Britain at Vienna, were primarily anxious to secure for Europe an equitable settlement with some promise of enduring tranquillity. They obtained considerable support for the abolition of the slave trade, but Heligoland and the protectorate of the Ionian Isles represented the sum of England's acquisitions in Europe. Her substantial gains were extra-European. All the colonial possessions of France, Spain, and Holland had for years been at her mercy, and were mostly by 1815 in her hands, but she retained only Ceylon, the Cape Colony, which, twice conquered, was in 1815 purchased from Holland, Trinidad (from Spain), and the Mauritius, St. Lucia, and Tobago (from France).

GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN EUROPE

In Scandinavia, Norway, torn from Denmark, was united to Sweden, which in turn surrendered Finland to Russia and Western Pomerania to Prussia. Switzerland, enlarged by the addition of three French cantons, was neutralized under the guarantee of the Powers.

Such was the settlement of 1815. It was severely criticized at the time, and has incurred much censure from historical critics. But the diplomatists were faced by a difficult task. They were called upon to reconstruct the

shattered edifice of Europe, but they had to rebuild on ancient sites, and their hands were tied by a number of specific promises and treaties made between this Power and that before the final stages of the war. It may well be that they took too little account of the constructive forces, which, emerging from the destructive work of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, were destined to mould the future of Europe. The Vienna diplomatists paid more heed to the dynastic interests and the convenience of rulers, than to the well-being of their peoples and the emerging principle of nationality. But, apart from the Balkans, always a centre of unrest, the settlement of 1815 gave to Europe at large a long period of repose, marked by rapid recuperation. Only the great settlements of 1648 and 1919 compare with it in magnitude. With neither need it fear comparison.



CENTRAL EUROPE IN 1810

CHAPTER XXVII

RESTORATION, REACTION, AND REVOLUTION (1815–30)

CHIEF DATES (AND FOR CHAPTER XXVIII)

1815. The Holy Alliance formed.
1815. Louis XVIII again restored in France.
1816. Reaction in France, Spain, Italy, &c.
1818. Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Foreign troops evacuate France.
1819. Carlsbad Decrees to repress revolution in Germany.
1820. Revolutions in Spain, Portugal, and Naples.
1820. Congress of Troppau.
1821. Insurrection in Piedmont.
1821. Congress of Laybach.
1821. Peru declares independence of Spain.
1822. Congress of Verona.
1822. Portugal recognizes independence of Chile.
1822. Greek insurrection.
1823. France intervenes in Spain.
1823. President Monroe's message to Congress.
1824. Charles X succeeds Louis XVIII.
1825. England concludes commercial treaty with Mexico and Colombia.
1829. German Zollverein.
1830. Revolutions in France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy.
1830. Louis Philippe King of the French.
1831. Treaty of London (Belgian independence).
1832. Reform Act (England).
1832. Marriage of Leopold of Belgium and Marie Louise of Orleans.
1846. The Spanish marriages.
1848. Revolutions in France, Hapsburg Empire, Germany, and Italy.
1848. Second French Republic.
1848. Louis Napoleon elected President.

IN their attempt to reconstruct the shattered states-system of Europe the diplomatists of 1815, like those of 1918, looked for a sign. The Vienna Congress found it in the doctrine of 'legitimacy.' The Paris Conference built their new edifice on the foundations of 'nationality' and 'self-determination.' 'Legitimacy' proved to be but a feeble prop to the

Viennese structure. Whether the foundations laid at Paris will prove more stable it will be for the future historian to say.

RESTORATION AND REACTION

The restoration of the legitimate sovereigns, in 1814–5, was effected without difficulty. Unfortunately the noisy enthusiasm with which they were welcomed back to their several capitals deluded them into the belief that their peoples were anxious to return to the *status quo ante* 1789. Accordingly the sovereigns plunged into an orgy of reaction.

THE HOLY ALLIANCE

The reactionary movement common to most of the States of continental Europe has frequently been ascribed to the influence exerted by the Holy Alliance. That is true when, at a later stage, the Holy Alliance was dominated by Prince Metternich, the masterful minister of the Austrian Emperor; but in its origin the Holy Alliance was as purely benevolent as is the League of Nations.

For the last three centuries, no great war has ended without an attempt being made to end war by the formal organization of peace.[1] During the negotiations in Paris after Waterloo, the sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and Prussia signed a solemn agreement (26th September 1815), alike in their domestic government and in their foreign relations, to 'take for their sole guide the precepts of the Holy Religion' revealed in the New Testament, to 'protect religion, peace, and justice,' and recommend their peoples to 'strengthen themselves every day, more and more, in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind.'

The author of the alliance was the Czar Alexander, whose lofty idealism and mystical piety was curiously blended with Muscovite cunning and calculating shrewdness; but that the Holy Alliance represented in its origin a genuine attempt to secure to Europe the blessing of perpetual peace there can be no doubt. It quickly degenerated, however, into a mere league of autocrats for the suppression of revolution, whenever and wherever it might break out.

After 1815 reaction was almost universal. In France Louis XVIII, a man of moderation and good sense, did his

[1] For these attempts cf. Marriott: *European Commonwealth* (Oxford, 1918), chapters i, ii, and xv.

best to restrain it, and attempted to reconcile 'legitimacy' with a 'constitutional' monarchy as defined and guaranteed in the liberal *Charter* which he issued on his first restoration (4th June 1814). But the returned *émigrés*, the 'ultras' among the clergy, and his brother the Count of Artois, forced his hand, and France was given over to the 'White Terror' by which the second restoration (1815) was disfigured. Marshal Ney, one of the most popular of Napoleon's marshals, was shot. Some adherents of the late *régime* were executed, others were murdered, and 7,000 Buonapartists were imprisoned or exiled. So long as he lived, Louis XVIII was faithful to the terms of the Charter, but in 1824 he died, the Count of Artois succeeded as Charles X, and gave full rein to the passions of his friends. In 1830 he attempted what was virtually a royalist *coup d'état*: the Charter was superseded by a series of *Ordinances* issued from St. Cloud; Paris bristled into resistance; a group of liberal journalists led by Thiers and Guizot coalesced with the veteran republican Lafayette; and Charles X was pushed aside in favour of a younger branch of the Royal house, represented by Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans.

FRANCE

Such was the 'Revolution of July' (1830). The experiment of 'legitimacy' came to an untimely end, and for eighteen years France tried another experiment—a 'constitutional' or, as the French called it, a 'citizen monarchy,' under the direction of statesmen like Guizot and Thiers.

Constitutional monarchy, a characteristically English product, is not suited to the genius of France. Legitimacy France can understand, or republicanism. A constitutional monarch who, in the classic phrase of Thiers, reigns but does not govern, represents too much of a compromise for the acute logic of Frenchmen. Two other things contributed to the failure of the July monarchy: in foreign affairs Louis Philippe found himself almost everywhere countered by Palmerston, and in the affairs of the Spanish marriages his policy was not merely inglorious but discreditable; at home, the introduction of machinery was evoking discontent among the weavers and making them receptive of the socialistic teaching of Louis Blanc. In 1848 the Orleans

monarchy collapsed, and France for the second time tried the experiment of a republic.

Neither Germany nor Italy escaped reaction, but in those countries it took a course different from that pursued in France. Both in Germany and Italy the French Revolution and the Napoleonic occupation had stimulated two ideas: that of liberty in the several small states; that of nationalism in the country as a whole. The restorations of 1815 involved a setback to both forces. The weak Confederation established in Germany gave no satisfaction to those ardent nationalists who longed to see Germany united, while in most of the States the princes, belying the promises given at Vienna, delayed the grant of 'constitutions' to their subjects. The result was that in 1830 echoes of the Parisian revolution were to be heard in some of the smaller States, but the influence of Prince Metternich was still all-powerful, and in his hands the machinery of the Confederation was employed solely for the purpose of repressing every liberal movement, and stiffening the wills of the ruling princes against any substantial concessions to their subjects.

GERMANY (1815–48)

As for 'nationalism' the only movement in that direction was the formation of a Customs Union (*Zollverein*), which eventually embraced all the German States except German Austria. The *Zollverein* was important in four ways: it gave a much-needed impulse to German commerce by breaking down the innumerable custom-barriers between State and State; and it brought the States into friendly association under the presidency of Prussia; it taught them to look for leadership no longer to Vienna but to Berlin, and it marked the first stage in the exclusion of Austria from the Germanic body. Not, however, until 1848 did the growing discontent in Germany manifest itself in violent revolution. The events of the revolutionary years must receive more detailed attention presently.

THE ZOLLVEREIN

In Italy, as in Germany, Napoleon had planted the seeds of unity, but the tender plant was plucked up by the diplomatists of Vienna, and Italy lacked even that semblance of unity given to Germany by the Confederation (*Bund*). Nor was the idea of liberty more

ITALY

flourishing than that of nationalism. The influence of Metternich was even more pervasive in Italy than in Germany. But the subjects of the Italian States were, as we shall see, more restless than those of Germany.

The revolutionary contagion reached Naples, where conditions were exceptionally bad, from Spain. In Spain the reaction was seen at its worst. Of all the Spanish Bourbons, Ferdinand VII was perhaps the most contemptible: a miserable blend of sensualism and superstition, bigotry and cruelty. On his restoration he tore up the Constitution adopted by the Cortes in 1812, reinstated in all their privileges the nobles and the clergy, restored the exiled Jesuits, gagged the Press, and persecuted the Buonapartists. Reaction provoked revolution; Ferdinand made an abject surrender, and in 1820 the Constitution of 1812 was restored and the power of the Crown reduced to a shadow.

SPAIN

For some time past the Holy Allies had been regarding with growing uneasiness the insurrectionary movements in Southern Europe, and in October 1820 the sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and Prussia met in conference at Troppau. From there they issued a protocol setting forth the doctrines of the Holy Alliance with startling explicitness. 'States which have undergone a change of government due to revolution,' so it ran, 'the result of which threaten other States, *ipso facto*, cease to be members of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees for legal order and stability. . . . If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other States, the Powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance.'

THE TROPPAU CONGRESS

France expressed, in general terms, adherence to the protocol, but Castlereagh protested that the principle set forth therein was 'in direct repugnance to the fundamental laws of the United Kingdom.' Nevertheless, a mandate was given to Austria to suppress the insurrectionary movements in Italy, a mandate which, as we shall see, she executed to the complete satisfaction of herself and her allies.

While Austria found congenial occupation in Italy, France was eager to go to the succour of Bourbon absolutism in Spain.

FRANCE AND SPAIN

To that intervention Great Britain was strongly opposed, and Canning, who on Castlereagh's death (1822) succeeded to the Foreign Office, lost no time in announcing her attitude to the Powers. Wellington, who represented Great Britain at the Congress of Verona (1822), was instructed to declare that 'while England was no friend to revolution, she did emphatically insist on the right of nations to set up for themselves whatever form of government they thought best, and to be left free to manage their own affairs, so long as they left other nations to manage theirs.' France, however, had already seized the excuse of an outbreak of yellow fever in Spain to mass an army of 100,000 men on the frontier for the purpose of establishing a *cordon sanitaire*. Canning's protest was too late to stop the intervention of the French, who in April 1823 marched an army into Spain under the Duc d'Angoulême, and re-established the absolute authority of King Ferdinand. France remained in military occupation of Spain until 1827.

Powerless to avert the French occupation of Old Spain, Canning was all the more determined to prevent the extension of French interference to the Spanish colonies in South America.

NEW SPAIN

For some years Spain had experienced increasing difficulty in governing her American dependencies. In 1817 she had purchased peace with the United States by selling Florida to them for $5,000,000. But the improvement thus effected in the general situation was merely temporary. Meanwhile, the trading interests of Great Britain suffered severely from the prevailing anarchy in South America. For outrages unnumbered upon British ships no redress could be obtained from Spain. In 1823 Canning appointed consuls to the Spanish colonies for the protection of British trade, and France was at the same time bluntly informed that though Spain might subdue her revolted colonies if she could, no other Power should do it for her. Finally on the 1st of January 1825 the Powers were informed that Great Britain had recognized the independence of Buenos Ayres, Colombia,

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

and Mexico. The Powers protested, but nothing came of the protest; Canning held on his way, heedless of the Holy Allies, and found a powerful ally in the United States. On 2nd December 1823 President Monroe had declared 'that any interference on the part of the Great Powers of Europe for the purpose of oppressing or controlling the destiny of the Spanish American States, which had declared their independence, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, and would be considered as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards them.' Such was the origin of the famous 'Monroe doctrine.' The action of Great Britain and the United States was decisive. By 1830 the Spanish Empire in South America had ceased to exist, and the following independent republics had come into being: Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Rio de la Plata or Buenos Ayres.

PORTUGAL

Canning's action in Portugal was equally decisive. In 1807, as already mentioned, the Portuguese royal family had transferred the seat of government to Brazil. After the restoration, the former regent, now John VI, preferred, wisely perhaps, to remain there. He appointed as regent Lord Beresford, the former commander of the English troops in Portugal, and proclaimed the union of the Portuguese dominions under the title of the 'United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves.' Portugal was thus virtually reduced to a position of a dependency of Brazil. The position was resented at Lisbon, where insurrection, stimulated by Spain, broke out (1820). The regent was deposed, and John VI was persuaded to return reluctantly to Europe. Don Pedro, his son, was left as regent in Brazil, but the Brazilians declined to recognize the orders of the Cortes any longer, declared their country independent, and proclaimed Don Pedro as Constitutional Emperor. In Portugal itself the political pendulum swung violently from side to side. In 1821 John VI accepted complacently a liberal Constitution, but in 1823, under pressure from Spain, from his Spanish Queen, and his second son Don Miguel, the King, with equal complacency, accepted a reactionary ministry.

Thenceforward, Portugal was important only as a pawn in the diplomatic battle between the Powers. The Miguelists

looked for support to France and the Holy Allies, the liberals to Great Britain. Canning welcomed the opportunity of striking a blow indirectly at the Holy Allies, and dispatched a British squadron to the Tagus 'to confirm the intimacy and goodwill subsisting between the two Crowns.' Miguel seized the excuse for superseding his father; John VI from the vantage deck of an English man-of-war was emboldened to reassert his authority, but was induced by Canning to recognize the independence of Brazil under the sovereignty of his son Don Pedro. This was another step in Canning's policy of calling 'into existence a new world to redress the balance of the old.' As a fact, he frustrated the Holy Allies both in the old Portugal and in the new. In 1826, however, John VI died, and factions once more broke out in Portugal. Spain and France were eager to intervene on behalf of the Miguelists, but once again they were frustrated by the prompt action of Canning and, thanks to him, Portugal preserved its liberal constitution.

Canning, by a succession of shrewd blows, had given the *coup de grace* to the Holy Alliance. The Czar Alexander, the author of the Alliance, had died in 1825. Metternich, who had 'supplied the soul of the Alliance with a body,' continued indeed to direct Austrian policy until 1848 with a success but little interrupted by the revolutions of 1830; but the ideals of the Czar had long since been dissipated, and to Metternich's policy of mere repression Castlereagh and Canning had opposed an alternative which though, for the moment, only partially successful, ultimately achieved a complete triumph. The principles of Nationalism and Liberalism, though they suffered a temporary setback in the restorations of 1815, steadily gained ground. To those principles Great Britain adhered throughout; France espoused them after 1830; and from 1848 onward their triumph was assured.

The effect of these ideas upon the Near East and upon Italy will be illustrated later on. A more immediate illustration was provided by Belgium.

FOR FURTHER READING (AND FOR CHAPTER XXVIII)

Débidour: *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe.* W. Alison Philipps: *The Confederation of Europe.* C. K. Webster: *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh.* H. W. V. Temperley: *Foreign Policy of Canning.* W. Muhlenbeck: *Études sur les origines de la Sainté Alliance.* J. A. R. Marriott: *Commonwealth or Anarchy?; Life and Times of Canning; Castlereagh; History of Europe 1815–1939; England Since Waterloo.* A. Herman: *Metternich.* G. L. Dickinson: *Revolution and Reaction in Modern France.* H. van der Linden: *Belgium.* Cecil: *Metternich.* Duff Cooper: *Talleyrand.* See also pp. 351, 352.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE BIRTH OF BELGIUM

THE SPANISH NETHERLANDS

OF the working of the new leaven of Liberalism and Nationalism, modern Belgium affords a striking illustration. To its genesis, therefore, some pages must be devoted. After the Northern Netherlands—subsequently known as the United Provinces, and more commonly as Holland—had wrested their independence from Spain, the Southern Provinces continued to form part of the Spanish monarchy until 1713. By the Treaty of Utrecht, Belgium, as we have seen, was handed back to the Austrian Hapsburgs, through whom it had originally come to Spain.

THE SPANISH NETHERLANDS

No violence was thus done to the sentiments of the inhabitants. It might, indeed, have seemed more natural had the negotiators of the Treaty of Utrecht united Belgium with Holland; but between the Northern and Southern Provinces there were sharp differences of religion, race, and tradition which had been accentuated since the formation of the United Provinces. The Belgians adhered strongly to Catholicism, the Dutch to Calvinism; the Dutch were Teutonic in origin and language, the Belgians, less homogeneous in both respects, were mainly Flemings or Walloons; Holland was interested primarily in commerce, Belgium in industry and crafts. Moreover, by the closing of the Scheldt, on which in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) the Dutch had insisted, a severe blow was struck at the trade of the Southern Netherlands, and commercial supremacy passed from Antwerp to Amsterdam.

Consequently, there was little love lost between the Belgians and the Dutch, and the question of their union was not even mooted in 1713. Relations were not improved by the obligations imposed upon Belgium by the Treaty of

Utrecht. For the protection of Holland against France a long line of fortresses on the Franco-Belgian frontier were to be garrisoned by Dutch troops, but the upkeep of them was to be charged to Belgium.

The rule of the Austrian Hapsburgs was no more popular in Belgium than that of the Spanish Hapsburgs had been.

THE AUSTRIAN NETHERLANDS

Even in an Empire as heterogeneous as that of Austria, Belgium was an excrescence, and the Hapsburgs repeatedly endeavoured to exchange that distant province either for Bavaria or for some other more accessible territory. The Emperor Charles VI did, however, attempt to revive Flemish commerce by founding (1722) an East India Company at Ostend.

This aroused the jealousy both of the Dutch and the English East India Companies, and in order to secure the friendship of the Maritime Powers, the Emperor was eventually compelled to suppress the Ostend Company.

There was some revival of industrial prosperity under Maria Theresa (1740–80), but the reforming zeal of the Emperor Joseph II threw everything into confusion.

JOSEPH II

The reforms which he attempted to impose upon the Netherlands were cut to the same pattern as those intended for Bohemia, Hungary, and the rest of his dominions. That they were particularly resented and resisted in Belgium was due to several reasons. The Emperor was almost a stranger to the Belgians; and the fact that he had attempted to get rid of an encumbrance by exchanging Belgium for Bavaria did not increase their affection for a ruler who treated their cities and provinces as mere chattels. Moreover, though personally religious, Joseph was very modern in his views as to the relations of Church and State, and was opposed to ecclesiastical control over education and social life. The Belgians were as much devoted to Roman Catholicism as to their constitutional rights. Every province, every important city, had its own peculiar customs and its own special privileges, guaranteed for the most part by ancient charters. A philosophical Radical like Joseph II was as hateful to the Belgian Conservatives at the end of the eighteenth century, as was a Spanish tyrant to the Dutch Protestants at the end of the sixteenth. Over all their privileges, prejudices,

immemorial customs, and chartered rights, Joseph would have passed the steam-roller of benevolent autocracy.

The Belgians would have none of it; province after province bristled into resistance (1789), and in 1790 they declared their independence as the United States of Belgium. In the same year Joseph died, and his successor, Leopold II, after successfully reasserting his authority over the whole country, cancelled all his predecessors' reforms, and restored the system of government as carried on by Maria Theresa.

In 1792, however, Leopold followed his brother to the grave, and his son and successor, Francis II, was at once involved in war with revolutionary France. The Netherlands naturally became one of the main battlefields, and after an initial repulse the French armies entered Brussels (14th November), and a French squadron sailed up to Antwerp. The French attack upon Belgium brought England into the field against the invaders, as an assault upon Belgium always does, and with her help the Austrians reoccupied the country. But the French recaptured it in 1794, and from that time until 1814 it was absorbed in France.

BELGIUM AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The opposition to Joseph II and his reforms had proceeded wholly from the privileged orders: the clergy, the nobles, the municipal oligarchies, and the guilds. But there was another and more numerous party which had imbibed the principles of the French Revolutionists, and consequently little opposition was in 1794 offered to the French invaders. From France the Belgian Conservatives had perforce to accept the reforms so bitterly resented when imposed by Joseph II.

To Napoleon, the possession of Belgium was indispensable; and he kept his grip upon it to the bitter end. But if Napoleon realized the importance of the Low Countries, not less clearly did Castlereagh, and he would make no peace which did not provide for their complete independence of France. But Castlereagh went farther: he desired to see the Low Countries not merely independent but strong, and by the First Treaty of Paris, Belgium was united with Holland in a Kingdom of the Netherlands under the House of Orange-Nassau.

The intention was to form a strong barrier-state between

France and Germany. But it was frustrated by the tactless policy of the Hague. The Dutch treated Belgium almost as a conquered province, imposing upon it disproportionate burdens of taxation, and denying it equal privileges. Consequently, the ill-assorted union was speedily dissolved. In 1830 as in 1790 the Belgian clericals and other privileged orders combined with the Democrats; denounced the union with Calvinistic Holland, and elected as their King the Duc de Nemours, the second son of Louis Philippe of France.

The Belgian revolution of 1830 was, thus, the most important by-product of the July Revolution in Paris. But Lord Palmerston, then at the English Foreign Office, was not the man to allow France virtually to annex Belgium. He firmly declined to allow a French Prince to wear the Belgian Crown, which after some hesitation was accepted by Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg. King Leopold was a German by blood but an Englishman by residence and sympathies, the sometime consort of Princess Charlotte, heiress-presumptive to the English throne, and the favourite uncle of the Princess Victoria who, in 1837, did actually ascend that throne.

Thus was born into the European Polity the first of those new nation-states which were destined to give to the nineteenth century its differentiating characteristics.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE EASTERN QUESTION (1800–78)

THE KINGDOM OF GREECE

CHIEF DATES

1821. Greek risings.
1824. Egyptians capture Crete.
1825. Nicholas I succeeds Alexander in Russia.
1826. Fall of Missolonghi.
1827. Fall of Athens.
1827. Navarino (20th October).
1828. Russia declares war on Turkey.
1829. Treaty of Adrianople.
1830. Treaty of London Kingdom of Greece.
1832. Turco-Egyptian War.
1833. Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi.
1840–41. Treaties of London
1852. Franco-Turkish Treaty (Holy Places).
1853. Russo-Turkish War.
1854. The Crimean War.
1855. Fall of Sebastopol.
1855. Intervention of Sardinia.
1856. Treaty of Paris.
1861. Union of Moldavia and Wallachia as Roumania.
1864. George of Denmark becomes King of Greece.
1864. Ionian Isles ceded by England to Greece.
1875. Balkan insurrections.
1876. Conference at Constantinople.
1877. Russo-Turkish War.
1878. Treaty of San Stephano.
1878. Congress and Treaty of Berlin.

THE birth of modern Greece was practically coeval with that of Belgium. The diplomatists were actually in Session (1821) at Laybach, discussing the best means of dealing with the revolutionary movements in Southern Europe, when the news reached them that Prince

Alexander Hypsilanti, the son of a Phanariot[1] Greek who had been Governor of Moldavia and then of Wallachia, had raised the standard of Greek independence.

The news came as a bolt from the blue. The Ottoman Turks had now been established in Europe for nearly four hundred years, but their conquests had, from the first, had this peculiar characteristic: the conquerors had neither absorbed nor been absorbed by the peoples they conquered. They had superimposed upon them a military government, but beneath the surface there were live roots, which, when watered by the genial showers of liberty, pushed their tendrils through the superincumbent crust.

THE OTTOMAN CONQUEST

The French Revolution of 1789 and the upheaval that followed it had a distinct repercussion on the Balkans. Of the submerged nationalities, the Serbians were the first to emerge. They raised the standard of revolt in 1804, and waged with gallantry an intermittent struggle, until in 1817 they extorted from the Turks a measure of local autonomy under an hereditary prince of the native Obrenovitch house.

THE SERBS

Four years later the Greeks rose under Prince Alexander Hypsilanti. Though the Greek insurrection took Europe by surprise, the forces which produced it had for some time been operating. If the Turks had suppressed the Greek nationality, they had made great use of individual Greeks in civil government. Moreover, the Greeks had never lost the memory of their former greatness; they kept their language, their religion, and their culture. Greek merchants made large fortunes, and Greek sailors manned the Turkish fleet. Secret societies also multiplied. By 1820 the most famous of them, the *Philiké Hetaireia* (Association of Friends), counted 200,000 members.

GREEK INSURRECTION

The rising of 1821 was not, then, unprepared. In the hope of help from Russia, Hypsilanti, himself an aide-de-camp of Capo D'Istria the Foreign Minister of Alexander, raised his flag in Moldavia. But the Czar, the founder of

[1] The Phanariots were Greeks in high official positions who practically 'ran' the Empire for the Turks. So called from the *Phanar*, the quarter of Constantinople where most of them lived.

the Holy Alliance, could not encourage revolution even against his traditional enemy the Turk. Hypsilanti was left to his fate, and the rising in the north collapsed.

Far different was the fate of the insurrection in the Morea, the Greek islands, and continental Greece. For nearly seven years (1822–9) the war was waged, on both sides, with terrible ferocity; and the Greeks, despite an heroic resistance, were at their last gasp when they were saved by the intervention of England, France, and Russia.

The Sultan had called in to his aid his powerful vassal Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt. The Egyptian troops, commanded by Mehemet Ali's son Ibrahim, had devastated the Morea and put its inhabitants to the sword. His atrocities were performed almost under the eyes of the English and French fleets in the Levant. A large Turco-Egyptian squadron was anchored in the Bay of Navarino, and when a Turkish ship was foolish enough to fire on a boat from H.M.S. *Dartmouth*, a battle ensued, and by sunset (20th October 1827) not a single Turkish or Egyptian ship remained afloat.

NAVARINO

The Western Powers were not formally at war with Turkey, but both in England and France there was keen sympathy for the Greek cause, and though the British Government apologized to the Porte for the 'untoward event' of Navarino, the battle practically saved the Greeks. In 1828 Nicholas I, who in 1825 had succeeded his father Alexander, declared war on the Porte; by August 1829 the Russian army had, not without difficulty, reached Adrianople, and a month later peace was signed there. By the Treaty of Adrianople the Turks virtually acknowledged the independence of Greece; Moldavia and Wallachia were also to enjoy practical autonomy under the protection of Russia. Russia obtained certain privileges for her merchants in Turkey, and the Black Sea and the Danube were to be open to all neutral vessels.

THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE

The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in Europe had evidently begun. The affairs of Greece were settled in a series of Treaties concluded in London. Greece was established as an independent state, under the protection of Great Britain, France, and Russia. Its government was to be a 'constitutional monarchy.' But

THE KINGDOM OF GREECE

for that purpose a 'constitutional monarch' had to be found. The first selection was a German princeling, Prince Otto of Bavaria, who in spite of an insurrection in 1843 managed to keep his seat, somewhat unsteadily, in the saddle until 1862, when a second insurrection finally unseated him. The Greeks were then anxious to import a King from England; but Queen Victoria would not allow her second son, Prince Alfred, to accept so precarious a Crown, and ultimately Great Britain secured for Greece the services of a Danish Prince, who in 1863 ascended the Greek throne as King George I.

Meanwhile, the luckless Turk had to face another danger. During the War of Greek Independence the Sultan had, as already mentioned, sought the aid of his powerful vassal, Mehemet Ali of Egypt. This Albanian adventurer, almost wholly uncultured but brilliantly gifted, was the real ruler of Egypt from 1805 to 1849. He reorganized the whole administration of his Pashalic, refashioned the army and navy, established the supremacy of Egypt over Arabia and the Sudan, and made it virtually independent of the Sultan. But his ambition was still unsatisfied. Crete, handed over to him in 1829, seemed an inadequate reward for the services rendered to his suzerain in the Morea, so in 1831 he sent an army into Syria which after a series of brilliant victories advanced through Asia Minor and threatened Constantinople itself.

MEHEMET ALI OF EGYPT

The Sultan, in panic, appealed for help to the Powers. Russia only was willing to send it; she landed an army at Scutari and dispatched a powerful squadron to the Bosphorus. This alarmed France and England, who brought pressure to bear on both combatants. Mehemet Ali was unwillingly bought off by the cession of Syria and part of Mesopotamia; but Russia's bill had still to be paid.

It was discharged in the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (1833), which marked the zenith of Russian influence at Constantinople. The Treaty placed Turkey under the military protectorship of the Czar, guaranteed to Russian warships free passage through the Straits, and closed them to all other Powers.

TREATIES OF UNKIAR-SKELESSI AND LONDON

Lord Palmerston at once made it clear that at the first convenient opportunity this dangerous treaty should be torn up; nor was either the Sultan or Mehemet Ali content to

abide by the terms imposed on them in 1833. The Turkish army was reorganized by a Prussian soldier, destined to fame as the conqueror of Austria and France, Helmuth von Moltke, and in 1839 the Sultan launched an expedition for the recovery of Syria. It was a complete fiasco, but though France encouraged Mehemet Ali, the other Powers intervened, and with the powerful assistance of the British fleet compelled Mehemet Ali to submit to their will. He was confirmed in the hereditary Pashalic of Egypt, but compelled to restore Arabia and Syria to the Porte. Much more important was the promise of the Porte to close the narrow Straits to *all* ships of war so long as Turkey was at peace.

The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was torn up; Russia was not to pose as the exclusive protector of the Porte, nor France as the single friend of Egypt. The solution of the Eastern Question was a matter for Europe as a whole.

For twelve years (1841–53) that question was allowed to slumber. It was reawakened by Napoleon III, who in 1848 had been elected President of the French Republic and in 1852 had converted his Presidency into an hereditary Empire. For many years there had been quarrels between the Greek (Eastern) and Latin (Roman Catholic) monks about the guardianship of the Holy Places in Palestine. Hoping thereby to conciliate the French clericals Napoleon ardently espoused the cause of the Latins: Russia was the protector of the Greek Church. The other Roman Catholic Powers supported the demands made on behalf of the Latin monks by Napoleon III, and those demands were in substance conceded by the Sultan to whom Palestine belonged.

THE CRIMEAN WAR

These concessions were bitterly resented by Russia, and the Czar Nicholas not only required the Sultan to rescind his concession to the Latins, but to concede to him a formal protectorate over all the Christian subjects of the Porte. This demand roused the susceptibilities of Great Britain, always jealous of any extension of Russian influence in the Near East.

The Czar Nicholas had long held the opinion that England and Russia, as the two Powers most nearly interested, should settle the Eastern Question between them. He was convinced that the 'sick man' (as the Turk came to be known) was on

his death-bed, and that the only way of avoiding a general war over the distribution of his estate was for England and Russia to come to terms. Accordingly he suggested in 1853 that England should annex Egypt and Cyprus and leave Russia a free hand in the Balkans. England's only vital interest in the Eastern Question was to make her communications with India and the Far East secure. The possession of Egypt would secure it.

England, however, thought it indecent to dispose in this cynical way of the sick man's inheritance before the breath was out of his body, and refused to consider the Czar's proposal.

Her refusal brought on the Crimean War. England and France held that the Czar was making inadmissible demands upon Turkey, and encouraged the Porte to refuse them. Russia was determined to enforce them at the point of the sword, and in 1854 refused an ultimatum presented to her by the two Western Powers. The Crimean War had begun.

England sent a fleet to the Baltic, but that expedition had little practical effect upon the war. The main field of battle was in the Crimea, where the allies laid siege to the great fortress of Sebastopol. The preparations for the campaign, and particularly for besieging a great fortress, were miserably inadequate, and the sufferings of the British troops during the 'Crimean Winter' (1854–5) were terrible. Brilliant victories had been won in the autumn on the Alma, and on the heights above Sebastopol at Balaclava and Inkerman, but with the fortress untaken they had little result.

In January 1855 Count Cavour, Prime Minister of Sardinia, induced his master King Victor Emmanuel to send a contingent to the help of the western allies, and the Italian troops contributed materially to an allied victory on the Tchernaya (15th to 16th May 1855). That victory sealed the fate of Sebastopol, but not until September did it surrender. The siege had lasted 349 days. The Czar Nicholas had died in the previous March: his successor Alexander II was anxious for peace. Napoleon III was tired of the war. Peace, accordingly, was concluded at Paris on 30th March 1856. The Powers agreed to guarantee the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and not to interfere in its internal affairs; the Sultan

TREATY OF PARIS (1856)

promised to ameliorate the condition of his subjects 'without distinction of race and creed'; Russia recovered the Crimea but ceded Southern Bessarabia to Moldavia, and renounced her protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia which were to become virtually independent under the suzerainty of the Sultan. The 'Black Sea Clauses' were of special concern to England. The Black Sea was entirely neutralized; its coasts demilitarized, and no ships of war allowed on its waters. Russia, naturally enough, deeply resented these clauses, and in 1871, with Bismarck's assistance, tore them up.

The broad result of the war, now generally condemned as a blunder, if not a crime, was to deprive Russia of almost everything she had gained by two centuries of diplomacy and war: to thrust her back from Constantinople; to repudiate her quasi-protectorate over Turkey, and to close the Black Sea to her ships of war; and to give the Turks another chance of putting their house in order and coming to terms with the rising nationalities in the Balkans.

The Turks took no advantage of the respite secured to them by their western allies, and twenty years later the condition of the Christian peoples of the Balkans was no whit better than it was at the close of the Crimean War.

In 1875 the whole Eastern Question was reopened by the outbreak of insurrection among the Southern Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whence it spread to their kinsmen in Serbia and Montenegro. Russia was eager to interfere on behalf of her co-nationals and co-religionists, but, remembering the Crimean War, joined with Austria and Germany in demanding prompt reform from the Sultan. But this effort came to nothing, partly because the Balkan insurgents refused to lay down their arms on the strength of a 'paper' promise from the Sultan, partly because England refused to join the three Emperors in their demands on Turkey.

BALKAN INSURRECTIONS

The Balkan insurrection spread from the Southern Slavs to Bulgaria, where it was suppressed with terrible cruelty by Turkish irregulars, and all Europe rang with Mr. Gladstone's denunciation of the 'Bulgarian atrocities.' Russia then (April 1877) declared war on Turkey; Moldavia and Wallachia (since 1859 united in a single principality under the title of Roumania) joined Russia, and though checked by the

gallant defence of Plevna (July–December 1877) the Russians drove the Turks back on to Constantinople, and in March 1878 dictated to them the Treaty of San Stephano.

Great Britain, under the government of Lord Beaconsfield, now intervened, refused to allow Russia to dictate terms to Turkey without the assent of the other Powers, and demanded that the treaty should be submitted to a European Congress. Russia demurred: England insisted; war between the two Powers seemed imminent when Russia gave way, and the Congress demanded by England met at Berlin in June, under the presidency of Bismarck.

The Treaty of Berlin (1878) was the result. Russia retained Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan, captured in the recent war, and recovered (from Roumania) the strip of Bessarabia retroceded in 1856; England (by a separate agreement with Turkey) obtained Cyprus; Bosnia and Herzegovina were handed over, not in absolute possession but for 'administration' to Austria; Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, with some additions to their territories, secured their absolute independence. Bulgaria was less fortunate. It was henceforward to be an independent State under the suzerainty of the Sultan, but was deprived of the large accession of territory promised to it by the Treaty of San Stephano. Greece put forward large claims, but was told that she could afford to wait. In 1881, however, she secured Thessaly and part of Epirus. Greece was not too well pleased, but probably neither Greece nor Serbia would be where they are to-day if Lord Beaconsfield had not prevented the formation of the 'Greater Bulgaria' mapped out at San Stephano. In 1885, however, Bulgaria was allowed to annex Eastern Roumelia—a large, if not complete, compensation for what she had been compelled to give up at Berlin.


TREATY OF BERLIN

The most significant outcome of the Berlin Congress remains to be noticed. Bismarck, acting as 'the honest broker,' was reluctantly compelled to choose between his two friends, Austria and Russia, whose rivalry in the Balkans was becoming more and more acute. He chose Austria. Closer and closer alliance with Austria was the keynote of German policy from 1878 to 1914. Between Germany and Russia there was on the contrary ever-deepening antagonism.

Thus the Berlin Congress foreshadowed the World War. As Russia drew away from Germany, she moved toward France. But long before the outbreak of the World War, another phase of the long-drawn-out Eastern Question had opened. If friendship cooled between Petersburg and Berlin, it was cemented between Berlin and Constantinople. With that phase a later chapter must deal.

FOR FURTHER READING (AND IN PART FOR CHAPTER XXXIV)

E. Driault: *La Question d'Orient.* J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question.* W. A. Phillips: *The Greek War of Independence.* T. Gordon: *History of the Greek Revolution.* S. Goriainow: *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles.* R. Pinon: *L'Europe et L'Empire Ottoman.* Lane Poole: *Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.* R. W. Seton Watson: *Rise of Nationality in the Balkans.* P. Dehn: *Deutschland und der Orient.* R. Pinon: *L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie.* A. Chèradame: *L'Europe and la Question d'Autriche.*



R.V. Tooley sc. Oxford, 1906.

ITALY, 1789–1871

CHAPTER XXX

THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY (1815-71)

Chief Dates

1796-1814. Napoleon's conquest and reconstruction of Italy.
1815 Restorations.
1820. Insurrection in Naples.
1821. Insurrection in Piedmont.
1821. The Carbonari.
1821. Austria suppresses insurrections.
1831. Insurrections in Italy.
1831. Mazzini founds 'Young Italy.'
1831. Austria occupies Romagna.
1832. France occupies Ancona.
1843. Neo-Guelphic movement.
1846. Pius IX elected Pope.
1848. Revolutions in Italy.
1848. The Venetian Republic under Manin.
1848. Austro-Sardinian War.
1849 Roman Republic.
1849. Victor Emmanuel succeeds Charles Albert of Sardinia.
1849. Austria dominates Italy.
1852. Cavour, Prime Minister.
1855. Intervention of Sardinia in Crimea.
1858. Pact of Plombières.
1859. Italian War of Independence.
1860. Kingdom of Italy.
1860. Savoy and Nice ceded to France.
1860 Garibaldi's conquest of Two Sicilies.
1860. Naples and Sicily annexed to Kingdom of Italy.
1861. Death of Cavour.
1862. Defeat of Garibaldi at Aspromonte.
1864. Capital transferred to Florence.
1866. Austro-Prussian War.
1866. Venice annexed to Italy.
1867. Garibaldi's attack on Rome.
1867. Garibaldi's defeat by French at Mentana.
1870. Franco-German War.
1870. Italy enters Rome.
1871. Rome the capital of Italy.
1929. Lateran Treaties.

TWO great forces dominated European politics in the nineteenth century—Liberalism and Nationalism. But the operation of these forces was not uniform. In Germany and Italy they made for unity—the creation of two great States in the place of many small States; in the Ottoman Empire and in the Empire of the Hapsburgs they tended to disintegration, the breaking up of two great Empires into a number of small nation-states.

Of all the national movements of the century the Italian is the most romantic. The Italian movement was, as Mr. Lecky wrote in 1896, 'unlike any other of our time. It was the one movement of nineteenth-century history when politics assumed something of the character of poetry.' To sketch in brief outline the story of that movement is the purpose of this chapter.[1]

The story really begins with the conquest and reconstruction of Italy by Napoleon. When in 1796 General Buonaparte invaded Italy he found it, as we have seen, a congeries of a dozen States. In a few years not one of them, save Naples, remained; to Naples he sent first his brother Joseph and then his brother-in-law, Joachim Murat, as King; over the rest of the country he ruled, either as Emperor of France or King of Italy, in person. He foresaw and predicted that Italy was 'surely destined to become one sole nation,' and he contributed largely to the fulfilment of his own prediction. He broke down ancient barriers; he built bridges and made roads; in place of a hundred conflicting jurisdictions he introduced a unified code of laws; he abolished feudal privileges and spread the burden of taxation over all classes; he greatly improved education and centralized administration. Above all, he taught the Italians to think of themselves as Italians and to fight like men.

RESTORATION AND REACTION (1815–48)

The diplomatists of 1814–15 did their best to erase all traces of Napoleon's handiwork. Save for the extinction of two ancient republics, Venice and Genoa, the *status quo ante* 1796 was restored. Venice with its dependencies on the Adriatic was joined with Lombardy, which as the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom took its place in the heterogeneous Empire of the Hapsburgs. Genoa was given to the House of Savoy, which recovered Savoy and Piedmont and reunited them with the Kingdom of Sardinia. For the rest, the States of the Church were handed back to the Papacy; Ferdinand IV, a Spanish Bourbon, reunited Naples to his island Kingdom of Sicily; Tuscany was restored to the Grand-Duke Ferdinand III of

[1] I have told the story at greater length in *Remaking of Modern Europe* (Methuen, 20th ed.); in still greater detail in *A History of Europe*, 1815–1923 (Methuen, 1931); and my *Makers of Modern Italy* (Clarendon Press, 1931), is a monograph on the subject.

Hapsburg-Lorraine; Parma and Piacenza were given for life to the ex-Empress Marie Louise—a Hapsburg princess, but on her death were to revert to the Spanish Bourbons; and Francis IV, also a Hapsburg, was reinstated in the Duchy of Modena. For the next twenty-five years Italy was practically ruled by Prince Metternich from Vienna. But though Metternich might put back a Hapsburg on this throne and a Bourbon on that, though at all the petty courts reaction might ensue on restoration, the Italy of 1815 was not the Italy of 1796. Mazzini, while detesting Imperialism and especially Napoleonic Imperialism, confessed that to Napoleon I Italian nationality owed a heavy debt. The seed sown by Napoleon eventually took root and yielded an abundant harvest.

Not, however, until 1848 did the reaping really begin. From 1815 until the 'Year of Revolution,' Italy was a prey to reaction, periodically interrupted by the outbreak of sporadic insurrections. In 1820 the revolutionary contagion spread from Madrid to Naples; Ferdinand IV temporarily conceded all the demands of the insurgents, who demanded a parliamentary constitution. In 1821 the movement spread to Piedmont. In both cases it was largely inspired by the secret society of the *Carbonari* (Charcoal-burners). The Carbonari were active also at Milan, where Metternich's vigilance frustrated an outbreak. In Naples and Piedment the insurrections were suppressed without difficulty by Austrian troops.

These and similar outbreaks were the work of a small, enlightened, and patriotic minority; the mass of the people were wholly untouched by the idea of nationality or even of liberty. The French Revolution of 1830 had repercussions in Italy; but only in Central Italy—in the Papal States, Modena, and Parma—did discontent issue in open insurrections, and Austrian troops soon restored order.

The pitiable failure of these scattered outbreaks had one important result. They led Joseph Mazzini, a young Genoese student, to denounce the methods of the Carbonari and found the association of *Young Italy*. The new organization spread throughout all parts of Italy with remarkable rapidity. Its objective was the independence and liberty of Italy; its

MAZZINI (1805–72)

watchwords were: 'Education and insurrection to be adopted simultaneously'; its immediate aim was to expel the Austrians by force of arms from Italy. Mazzini himself was compelled to go into exile, but directed the affairs of the Association from England where he found a second home.

Apart from the Mazzinians, there were two other parties in Italy working for liberty and independence, if not, like Mazzini, for unity. One, known as the *Neo-Guelphs*, looked to the Pope to lead the Italian movement, to promote constitutional reform in the several states, and bring them together into a federation under his own presidency. The election, in 1846, of Pius IX as Pope served, for a short space, to encourage the hopes of the Neo-Guelphs, but the new Pope's zeal for reform was speedily quenched by the events of 1848–9.

THE NEO-GUELPHS

A third party looked to the House of Savoy to take the lead in a war of independence, in the concession of domestic liberties, and the formation of an Italian federation. Thus, on the eve of the year of Revolution, there was a general ferment of ideas, though there was disagreement, both as to the goal of reform, and the route by which it was to be reached.

THE PIEDMONTESE PARTY

In many parts of continental Europe the opening weeks of 1848 were marked by an outburst of revolution. In France the July monarchy collapsed, and the Second Republic was proclaimed in February; before the middle of March the whole Hapsburg Empire was in ferment, and Metternich, driven from Vienna, was on his way to England as a refugee; in Italy 'constitutions' were conceded to their respective peoples by the Pope and the rulers of the Two Sicilies, of Tuscany, and of Piedmont; Venice declared its independence and proclaimed itself again a republic under Daniel Manin; Lombardy, also, broke free from Austria; Charles Albert of Piedmont declared war on Austria; and Tuscans, Romans, and Neapolitans flew to his support. But the military power of Austria was irresistible: Charles Albert was forced to his knees; the support of the Pope and the other rulers, less than lukewarm from the first, was quickly withdrawn; the anti-Austrian war collapsed. Venice, however, held out, and in Rome. whence the Pope had fled, a republic was

THE YEAR OF REVOLUTION (1848–9)

proclaimed. But in 1849 France came to the assistance of the Pope, and despite an heroic defence, inspired by Mazzini and Garibaldi, Rome was compelled to surrender and receive back the Pope. In August 1849 Venice, after a siege of 146 days, capitulated to Marshal Radetsky.

Once more the Austrian yoke was imposed on Italy. Yet the struggle of 1848–9 had not been fruitless. The Hapsburgs triumphed indeed over the disunion of their several subjects—Germans, Czechs, Magyars, Slavs, and Italians. The condition of Italy was, to all outward seeming, as hopeless as ever. Not so in reality. A divided Italy was, in a military sense, no match for Austria; but the peoples of the different States had felt on their brows the breath of liberty; Venice and Rome had made a gallant resistance, and in the young King Victor Emmanuel, who on the abdication of Charles Albert succeeded to the throne of Sardinia (1849), Italy found a leader who, before the end of his reign (1849–79), was to unite the whole of Italy under a single sceptre.

The events of 1848–9 had concentrated the hopes of all Italian patriots upon the House of Savoy. The conduct of Pope Pius IX had shattered the neo-Guelphic ideal; Mazzini's republicanism had proved itself equally ineffective. All parties, therefore, began to look to young Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia as the one hope for Italian liberation.

VICTOR EMMANUEL

Victor Emmanuel's first task was to equip his own subalpine kingdom for the leadership of the Italian movement. In this task he was fortunate enough to enlist the help of one of the greatest statesmen of the nineteenth century, Count Camillo di Cavour. By birth a Piedmontese noble, Cavour had made a close study of English politics, of social and economic reform, and, above all, of the art of parliamentary government. On his appointment as Prime Minister of Piedmont he carried through a series of drastic domestic reforms, embracing every branch of administration—ecclesiastical, civil, fiscal, naval, and military.

CAVOUR

Having re-equipped Piedmont, he induced his sovereign in 1854 to take a bold step. The Crimean War was in progress. England and France were supporting the Ottoman Empire

against Russia. The task the Western Powers had undertaken in the Crimean War proved no easy one. Had Italy no interest in the Eastern Question? Italy, in fact, did not exist. Cavour, however, was determined to make Italy, and the Italy he would make should be a great Mediterranean Power. As a first step to that end little Sardinia should send a contingent to fight side by side with English and French troops in the Crimea.

The contingent was sent; the troops fought well; the stain of recent defeats at the hands of Austria was wiped out; friendship was established with France and England; Cavour took his place in the Peace Congress at Paris: 'out of the mud of the trenches before Sebastopol modern Italy was built.' At the Congress of Paris Cavour brought before the European Powers the pitiable condition of Italy, and openly denounced Austria as the cause of all her sufferings. The attention of the English people had been lately drawn to the hideous misgovernment in Naples by two letters addressed (1852) by Mr. Gladstone to Lord Aberdeen. As a protest against that misgovernment the English minister had been withdrawn from Naples. The English Government, therefore, was cordially sympathetic with Cavour.

SARDINIAN CONTINGENT IN CRIMEA

The Emperor Napoleon III was more than sympathetic. He undertook, on certain conditions, to help Cavour to expel the Austrians from Italy.

Of that undertaking the Italian War of Independence was the outcome. On 30th January 1859 Prince Napoleon, son of Jerome Buonaparte, was married to Princess Clothilde, daughter of King Victor Emmanuel. The King sacrificed favourite daughter with a heavy heart, for the bridegroom was not youthful, nor was his reputation unstained. But the marriage was part of the bargain concluded by Cavour. On 13th May a great French army, led by the Emperor in person, landed at Genoa. Cordial was the greeting to a generous ally who had come 'to liberate Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic': even more bitter was the disappointment, when in the full tide (as it seemed) of victory Napoleon III suddenly stopped short and concluded an armistice with the Austrian Emperor at Villafranca. Napoleon's motives for this *volte face* have been

ITALIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

endlessly discussed. They are now fairly clear. He hated bloodshed, and there had been much; his victories, if unchecked, might have carried him farther than he intended—perhaps even as far as Rome, and an attack upon Rome would have greatly distressed the French clericals, his best supporters, and not least the Empress, an ardent Roman Catholic; but the compelling reason for the armistice—to both parties—was the news that the Prussians were mobilizing on the Rhine. Both Emperors were uneasy. Hence the armistice. But the war none the less marked an important stage in the unification of Italy. Venice was left to Austria, but Lombardy was annexed to Piedmont, and the States of Central Italy, Tuscany, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and the Romagna (the northern part of the Papal States) expelled their former rulers and united themselves to Piedmont. The union of North and Central Italy under the House of Savoy was achieved. The Kingdom of Italy came into being, and on 2nd April 1860 the first Parliament of the new Kingdom met at Turin.

But these gains involved a painful sacrifice. Napoleon had bargained for the cession of Savoy and Nice as the price of his promised assistance. The price was reluctantly paid.

The union of Northern and Central Italy was the fruit of Cavour's diplomacy. The next stage in unification was accomplished under the intrepid leadership of Garibaldi. Born at Nice in 1807, Garibaldi, like Cavour and Mazzini, was by birth a Piedmontese subject.[1] After a life of adventure in South America he returned to Italy in 1848 to take his part in the 'year of revolution.' To his defence of the Roman Republic reference has already been made. In the war of 1859 Garibaldi added greatly to his reputation as a brilliant leader in guerilla warfare, and on its sudden conclusion he was hailed as a national hero from end to end of Italy.

GARIBALDI AND HIS THOUSAND

Recent events in North Italy had repercussions in the south. Not that the provoking causes were the same. The northern movement was directed against alien government; the southern against a government which though not alien

[1] In 1807 Nice was actually French, but Piedmont regained it in 1814.

was incredibly bad. Discontent against Bourbon rule in the Two Sicilies came to a head in April 1860, when an insurrection stimulated by Francesco Crispi broke out in Sicily. Garibaldi had long been in touch with the insurgents, and having collected a band of volunteers—the famous 'Thousand'—sailed with them from Genoa on 6th May. Victor Emmanuel and Cavour were in complete sympathy with the objects of Garibaldi's expedition, but would have postponed it if they could. Garibaldi waited for no leave, and before the end of July he was master of Sicily. Thence he crossed to the mainland, and in the first week of September was marching on Naples. On 6th September Francis II ('Bombino'), who had succeeded his father in the previous year, fled from his capital, and on the 7th Garibaldi entered Naples and proclaimed himself Dictator. A curious and delicate situation supervened. The European Powers were all, with the exception of England, horrified at Garibaldi's freebooting enterprise. Cavour and his master dare not flout the Powers; but were anxious for the union of the Two Sicilies with the Northern Kingdom. Garibaldi, however, refused to hand over his conquests to Victor Emmanuel until he could proclaim his sovereign King of Italy in Rome itself. Cavour was as anxious as Garibaldi that Rome should become the capital of a united Italy. But an attack upon Rome at that moment would have brought all the Catholic Powers of Europe about the ears of the young Italian Kingdom. Meanwhile Austrian and Irish troops, employed by the Papacy, were holding Umbria and the Marches for the Pope, and were threatening the Romagna recently annexed to the Italian Kingdom. Cavour called on the Pope to dismiss his foreign levies, and on his refusal sent an army south with the twofold object of defending the Romagna against the Pope, and defending the Pope from Garibaldi.

Fortunately for Cavour the Neapolitans held Garibaldi back for a fortnight, and when at last he dispersed them on the Volturno he found himself face to face with his own King Victor Emmanuel. He at once laid his dictatorship at the King's feet, and on 7th November the knight-errant and his master rode into Naples side by side.

The Two Sicilies united themselves by plebiscite to the Northern Kingdom, and on 18th February a Parliament

representative of the whole of Italy, save Venetia and Rome, met at Turin. A month later the last stronghold of Bourbon rule surrendered; Francis II took refuge in Rome.

UNION OF NORTH AND SOUTH

At this critical moment Italy lost her great statesman. Cavour died on 5th June 1861, leaving unsolved the Roman question. Garibaldi was determined to solve it by force. With the cry, 'Rome or death!' he reappeared on the mainland and again threatened Rome. The Government interposed; the 'Red-shirts' were scattered at Aspromonte, and Garibaldi was made prisoner.

But besides Rome there was another gaping wound in the side of Italy. In 1865 a conflict between Austria and Prussia was clearly imminent. Victor Emmanuel offered his assistance to Austria in return for the cession of Venetia. The Emperor Francis Joseph refused, and Italy then accepted the bargain offered by Prussia. In the 'Seven Weeks' War' (1866) Italy played a sorry part; but Austria, defeated by Prussia at Sadowa, was compelled to cede Venice to Italy. The new frontier was drawn, however, with a niggardly hand; Bismarck could not refuse the 'pound of flesh,' but not an ounce more would he give.

VENICE

But to return to 1866. After Venice, Rome: Garibaldi made his last attempt to take Rome in 1867, but it was frustrated by a French army which was sent to defend Rome against the Red Shirts. The outbreak of the Franco-German War (1870), however, compelled the French finally to evacuate Rome; the Pope, despite a touching appeal from Victor Emmanuel, refused to accept the inevitable; the Italian troops occupied the city, after a show of resistance; a plébiscite showed virtual unanimity for the union of Rome with Italy; and on 2nd June 1871 Victor Emmanuel made his formal entry into the city, henceforth to be the capital of a united Italy.

ROME

But there was much tribulation in store for the young nation. Not until the establishment of the Fascist régime (1919) did it really emerge from it. The pace between 1850 and 1870 had been too rapid. North and south, though politically united, were not socially or economically assimilated. Nor did the

TRIALS AND TROUBLES

parliamentary constitution, copied by Italy from England, work satisfactorily. To the genius and traditions of Italy, 'direct' is probably better suited than 'representative' democracy. Personal rule is perhaps better suited than either, while the young nation is going through its political apprenticeship. Anyhow, the parliamentary system in Italy was disfigured by gross corruption; taxation, inevitably heavy if the new State was to be built up on modern lines, was the heavier by reason of widespread malversation; grave social disorders threatened the life of the young kingdom; a premature attempt to follow older nations into the colonial field was attended by disaster; the relations between Italy and France were almost continuously strained, and consequently Italy, though friendly with England, was drawn by Bismarck into the Triple Alliance. But that which more than all else poisoned the life of the young State was the tension between the Kingdom and the Papacy.


THE LATERAN TREATY

After the occupation of Rome by Victor Emmanuel the Popes withdrew into the Vatican, and there for sixty years they remained self-interned 'prisoners.' For Italians who wished to be at once good citizens and good Catholics the situation was most distressing. Loyalty to the State involved disobedience to the Church. Repeated attempts were made by the Italian Government to effect a compromise with the Pope; but until 1929 they were in vain. In that year, however, an agreement was reached between Signor Mussolini and Pope Pius XI, and was embodied in the Lateran Treaties. The Pope still reigns over a much restricted territory, the 'Vatican City,' and so preserves 'international sovereignty,' but for the first time he acknowledges the Italian sovereignty of the King of Italy. The Lateran Treaty is the crown of Italian unity.

FOR FURTHER READING

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Cavour. W. R. Thayer: *Dawn of Italian Independence; Life and Times of Cavour.* G. M. Trevelyan: *Manin and the Venetian Revolution of 1848; Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic; Garibaldi and The Thousand; Garibaldi and the Making of Italy.* T. Sillani (ed.): *What is Fascism and Why?* Goad: *The Corporative State* (1932).



GROWTH OF PRUSSIA

CHAPTER XXXI

THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY (1815–71)

CHIEF DATES

1815.	Germanic Confederation (Bund).
1815–30	Reaction in Germany.
1818–41.	The *Zollverein.*
1848.	Revolution in Hapsburg Empire.
1848.	Revolution in German States.
1848–9.	Frankfort Parliament.
1849.	Restoration of the Confederation.
1863.	Insurrection in Poland.
1863–4.	Schleswig-Holstein affair.
1864.	Danish War.
1866.	Seven Weeks' War.
1866.	Prussian victory at Sadowa.
1866.	Dissolution of Germanic Confederation
1867.	North-German Confederation.
1870.	Franco-German War.
1870.	Sédan.
1871.	New German Empire.

ITALY and Germany attained the goal of unity in the same year (1871). In both cases the Franco-German War gave the final impulse to forces which had long been operating. Bismarck and Cavour were the chosen instruments of nationalism. But the parallel between the two movements was not complete; Bismarck's task was much less arduous than Cavour's

BISMARCK AND CAVOUR

Germany had never lost the idea of unity so completely as had Italy. The Holy Roman Empire was indeed less an institution than an ideal. But so long as it subsisted, Germany had a King. Sovereignty had long ago passed in reality to the territorial Princes, but nevertheless a Saxon or a Bavarian felt himself to be a German. Bismarck, then, had much more to start from than had Cavour. But

after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire (1806) there was no German State even if there was still a German nation; it was the business of a German Committee at the Congress of Vienna to re-create one. What form should it take? The War of Liberation (1813–14) had evoked a new national spirit in Germany, as the work of Stein and Hardenberg, of Fichte and Humboldt, of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had evoked a new national spirit in Prussia. Could the statesmen at Vienna create an appropriate body for the new soul of Germany?

It is significant that no one proposed to revive the old Empire. Stein favoured the separation of North from South Germany, and the creation of two federal States under Austria and Prussia respectively, but to this solution Austria was inflexibly opposed, and it was eventually agreed to establish a loose confederation of thirty-nine Sovereign States to be represented in a Federal Diet sitting at Frankfort under the presidency of the Austrian Emperor. The powers of the Diet were in theory considerable, but in practice proved almost wholly ineffective. The Diet was, in fact, a Congress of plenipotentiaries; all its important decisions required a unanimity never attained; there was no real federal Executive, and the judicial authority was devoid of sanctions. The Federal Act also provided for the adoption of a representative constitution in each State.

CONGRESS OF VIENNA

Metternich was well pleased with his handiwork; the machinery of the 'Bund' could be used to maintain 'internal order'; it could not hamper the reactionary policy of Austria. The Secondary Princes were glad to be left in possession of the sovereign rights they had previously enjoyed. Prussia cared little more for German interests than did Austria.

The period between 1815 and 1848 was in Germany as in Italy a period of reaction broken only by sporadic insurrections in the several States—notably when sparks reached them from the French conflagration of 1830.

REACTION

To the general reaction one important and constructive movement offered an exception. Commercially and fiscally, as well as politically, Germany was hopelessly divided.

But between 1818 and 1841 all the States except Austria united in a Customs Union (*Zollverein*) under the presidency of Prussia. All fiscal barriers between State and State were thrown down; internal free trade was combined with external Protection based on a common tariff; roads, canals, railways were constructed; postal communications were improved, and thus an immense impulse was given to German commerce. And not to that only. Commercial union marked an important step towards political unity. Austria only was excluded; the rest of Germany began to look for leadership to Berlin.

THE ZOLLVEREIN

In 1848 the spirit of unrest, which for thirty years Metternich had so effectually repressed, found vent. The movement in Germany as in Italy had a twofold objective; constitutional reform in the several States; unity for Germany as a whole. Parliamentary constitutions, with 'responsible' Executives, were granted in Baden, Würtemburg, Bavaria, Saxony, and in most of the smaller States. But it was in the Hapsburg dominions that the revolutionary temper was most violent. Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, not to mention Italy, blazed out simultaneously into insurrection. Metternich was driven into exile, and the 'ramshackle' Empire of the Hapsburgs was ultimately saved only by the lack of unity between the subject provinces. Between Magyars and Czechs, between Slavs, Germans, and Italians, there was indeed nothing in common save dislike of Hapsburg rule. The old Emperor Francis II abdicated in December 1848, in favour of his young nephew Francis Joseph, who, at the age of eighteen, assumed the burden of a crown which he bore until his death in 1916. The crisis produced a great statesman in the person of Felix Schwarzenberg, who, with the aid of a fine army gallantly led, gradually reduced the whole Empire to obedience. Except for the loss of Lombardo-Venetia (in 1866) it survived practically intact until the *débâcle* of 1918.

THE YEAR OF REVOLUTION

Thus autocracy was re-established at Vienna; but Frederick William IV of Prussia accepted a representative Parliament for Prussia, though he did not concede a 'responsible' Executive. Nor did the liberal movement in the smaller States wholly evaporate.

How fared it with the national movement—the movement toward German unity? In May 1848 a Constituent Assembly, consisting of 576 representatives, elected on the basis of universal suffrage from every State in the Germanic Confederation, met at Frankfort.

THE FRANKFORT PARLIAMENT

The 'Frankfort Parliament' proceeded to draft a constitution, and despite bitter opposition between the 'Great Germans,' who wished to include all the provinces of the Hapsburg Empire, and the 'Little Germans,' who wanted a glorified Zollverein, which should exclude the non-German provinces of Austria, eventually reached agreement. Germany was to be a Federal State under an hereditary Emperor, with a representative Parliament of two Chambers, and an Executive responsible thereto. The Imperial Crown was offered to Frederick William IV of Prussia, but the Prussian King, partly out of respect for, perhaps partly from fear of, Austria, and still more in distrust of the democratic spirit which pervaded the Frankfort Parliament, declined the crown. A proud Hohenzollern was not prepared to proclaim himself the 'serf of the revolution.' His refusal rendered abortive all the labours of the Frankfort Assembly; the Confederation of 1815 was restored, and for nearly two decades survived. The failure of the Frankfort Parliament was an event of first-rate significance for Germany, and indeed for the world. Had it succeeded, Prussia would have been merged in Germany; German unity would have been antedated by twenty years; it would have been achieved, not by the Bismarckian instruments of 'blood and iron,' but by peaceful and parliamentary methods; Bismarck's wars against Denmark, Austria, and France might never have occurred; the catastrophe of 1914 might have been averted.

The Frankfort fiasco was a triumph for Austria; but to no one did it give greater satisfaction than to a Prussian subject, the man destined to fame as the creator of German unity, Count Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck, the scion of an old Junker family in Brandenburg, was at this time a young man of thirty-three. Destined for a diplomatic career, he was appointed Prussian envoy to the restored Federal Diet in 1851, and

BISMARCK

though deeply imbued with reverence for the House of Hapsburg, he was convinced by his sojourn at Frankfort that Austria was implacably hostile to Prussia. He decided, therefore, that Prussia must cut herself off from the Bund, and sooner or later must fight Austria for the headship of Germany. The period which immediately followed on the fiasco of 1848–9 was marked, however, by a strong reaction in favour of Austria. Until his death in 1852, Schwarzenberg carried all before him. Prussia and the patriots who looked to her leadership were humiliated by Austria at Olmütz; constitutions conceded in 1848 were torn up; reaction reigned supreme. In 1861, however, William I succeeded his brother as King of Prussia, and in 1862 appointed Bismarck as his Minister. In the meantime Bismarck had not only gained much experience of German affairs at Frankfort, but as ambassador at St. Petersburg from 1859 to 1862, and for a few months at Paris, had acquired first-hand knowledge of the main lines of European diplomacy.

At Paris he had taken the measure of the Emperor Napoleon III; his experience at Frankfort had made him realize Austria's bitter hostility to Prussia; his sojourn at St. Petersburg had convinced him that 'Prussia must never let Russia's friendship grow cold,' and that, as Russia's interest was concentrated on the east, she was the natural ally of Prussia.

The Polish insurrection in 1863 gave him the opportunity at once of manifesting his friendship for Russia, and of frustrating the attempt of the Poles to regain their independence. 'No one could doubt,' he said in 1848, 'that an independent Poland would be the irreconcilable enemy of Prussia.' That conviction, consistently held, continued to inspire his policy throughout his career.

In 1863 the death, without male heirs, of Frederick VII, King of Denmark and Duke of Schleswig and Holstein, raised the question of succession to the Duchies.

THE DANISH DUCHIES

On his death Prince Christian of Glücksburg succeeded without dispute to the throne of Denmark: but Holstein was a German Duchy, held by the Danish King as Hanover was held by the King of England; nor was the law of succession in the Duchies the same as that in the Kingdom. The matter is a complicated one

and details must be sought elsewhere.[1] It must suffice to say that Bismarck, principally with a view to the acquisition of the fine harbour of Kiel, was determined to get the Duchies for Prussia. Von Roon had fashioned the instrument by which Bismarck could effect his purpose. 'What I see in history,' said von Roon, 'is force. . . . The Schleswig-Holstein question is not a question of law or of pedigrees; it is a question of force, and that force we (Prussians) possess.' But Bismarck was resolved not only to get the Duchies, but to induce Austria to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for him.

All went according to plan. Denmark could offer little resistance to the combined armies of Austria and Prussia; Russia by a benevolent neutrality repaid a portion of the debt incurred in 1862; England, pledged by the Treaty of London (1852) to maintain the 'integrity of the Danish monarchy,' addressed homilies to Bismarck on the sanctity of scraps of paper, but Bismarck had taken the measure of Lord John Russell, and knew that he preferred sermons to the sword; France was equally pledged with England, but Napoleon had his own difficulties (notably in Mexico), and had no mind to fight for Denmark.

So Bismarck had his way. A quarrel was easily fastened upon Austria. Bismarck came to terms with Napoleon at Biarritz (1865) and promised Venetia to Victor Emmanuel of Italy (1866).

In June 1866 Prussia seceded from the Germanic Confederation; war broke out between Prussia and the Germanic Confederation, with Austria at its head. Within six weeks, not Austria only but the whole of Germany lay crushed under the rapid series of blows which Prussia, armed by von Roon with the new needle-gun, inflicted on them; and after the decisive victory (3rd June) of Königgrätz (Sadowa) the Austrian Emperor accepted terms of peace. The Germanic Confederation was dissolved. Austria was expelled from the Germanic body and gave up Venetia to Italy; Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, the fine city of Frankfort-on-the-Main, together with the Danish Duchies, were annexed to Prussia; and in 1867 all the German States north of the Main—twenty-two in all—formed themselves into a North German

SEVEN WEEKS' WAR (1866)

[1] They will be found in Marriott: *History of Europe*, 1815–1923.

Confederation under the hereditary presidency of Prussia. The ruling princes retained certain sovereign rights, but half Bismarck's task was achieved: North Germany was virtually merged in Prussia.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

After Austria, France. 'It is France which has been conquered at Sadowa.' So said Marshal Radom. 'After Sadowa,' said Bismarck, 'a war with France lay in the logic of history.' Napoleon III had fallen on troublous days. His participation in the Italian War of 1859 had alienated the French clericals; his failure to avert the expulsion of the Bourbons from the Two Sicilies greatly distressed the Legitimists; the murder of the 'Emperor' Maximilian, his nominee, in Mexico dissipated any credit he might have hoped to derive from that disastrous adventure. Bismarck, after his easy victory over Austria, conveniently forgot all his hints of possible compensation for France, and Napoleon had to face his subjects empty-handed, while Prussia got 5,000,000 new subjects and 25,000 square miles of territory.

From a successful war with France, Bismarck might not only expect a restoration of Alsace and Lorraine, but the completion of the Imperial edifice of Germany and the transference of European hegemony from Paris to Berlin. But France must be the aggressor. How was she to be provoked? The Spanish throne was vacant. A Hohenzollern of the Sigmaringen branch was put forward as a candidate, and in 1870 accepted the proferred crown (4th July). But on the advice of his Prussian kinsman he revoked his acceptance (13th July). *La Prusse cane* was the exultant cry in Paris. Bismarck was in despair. But France played into his hands. She required from King William of Prussia (then at Ems) a further renunciation. The King, stung by the insult, refused; and telegraphed in that sense to Bismarck. Bismarck converted the King's innocent telegram into defiance of France, and published his defiance to Europe.[1] The French Cabinet, by a majority of one vote, decided to take up the challenge. On 19th July war was declared.

Napoleon well knew that France was unprepared for war; his own health was failing; the rash declaration of war was due largely to the conviction of the Empress that

[1] Details in Marriott: *History of Europe*, pp. 255 seq.

only a taste of 'la gloire' could save the Empire, and guarantee the succession of her son. Bismarck, Von Roon, and Moltke, on the other hand, were ready. The goodwill of Russia was assured; relations, commercial and military, between the South Germans and Prussia were increasingly cordial and close; as regards the army it was only necessary to touch a button. On 2nd August 500,000 Germans were in the field: on 2nd September the first phase of the war ended with the surrender of Napoleon and a great French army at Sédan.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

Sédan brought the Second Empire with a crash to the ground: the Emperor was a prisoner in Germany; the Empress and the Prince Imperial were refugees in England; on 4th September the Republic was proclaimed. Paris, invested by the Crown Prince of Prussia, capitulated after four months' terrible siege (28th January 1871). Strasburg and Metz had already fallen; on all sides the Germans were triumphant, and could impose their own terms on France. The Treaty of Frankfort (10th May 1871) gave them an indemnity of £200,000,000, all Alsace, except Belfort, and Eastern Lorraine, together with Metz and Strasburg.

But victory meant more than this to Germany. Bismarck could consummate his life's work. Terms of union between North and South Germany had already been arranged, and on 18th January 1871 King William of Prussia accepted the Imperial Crown from his fellow Princes, and was proclaimed at Versailles as first German Emperor.

The North German Confederation was enlarged by the inclusion of all the German States, except Austria, and was transformed into a Federal Empire under the hereditary presidency of the Prussian King. Bismarck became the first Imperial Chancellor. Thus was German unity at last triumphantly achieved.

THE GERMAN EMPIRE

FOR FURTHER READING

Marriott and Robertson: *Evolution of Prussia.* Sir C. Grant Robertson: *Bismarck.* E. Dénis: *Fondation de l'Empire Allemande.* Bismarck: *Reflexions and Reminiscences* (E.T.). E. Ludwig: *Bismarck.* Sir A. Malet: *Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation.*

CHAPTER XXXII

THE SECOND EMPIRE AND THE THIRD REPUBLIC

Chief Dates

1808. Louis Napoleon born.
1836. Attempt on Strasburg.
1840. Descent on Boulogne.
1840. Imprisonment at Ham.
1848. Revolution in France. Second Republic.
1848. National workshops in Paris.
1848. 'Days of June.'
1848. Louis Napoleon elected President.
1851. (December) First *coup d'etat.*
1852. Plébiscite for Empire.
1852–9. Social reforms in France.
1854. Crimean War.
1859. War of Italian Independence.
1860–9. Constitutional Reforms in France.
1863. Insurrection in Poland.
1864. War of Danish Duchies.
1866. Seven Weeks' War.
1866. Prussian victory at Sadowa.
1867. Maximilian shot in Mexico.
1869. *L'Empire Liberal.*
1870. Franco-German War.
1870. Fall of the Empire.
1870. Third Republic.
1871. Commune in Paris.
1871. Treaty of Frankfort.
1872. The *Dreikaiserbund.*
1873. MacMahon succeeds Thiers as President.
1873. Death of Napoleon III.
1875. Republican Constitution established.
1875. Franco-German Crisis.
1879 Dual Alliance (Germany and Austria).
1881. French Protectorate in Tunis.
1882. British occupation of Egypt.
1888. Death of William I.
1890. Dismissal of Bismarck.

THE student of Politics has reason to be particularly grateful to modern France. Since the fall of the Old Monarchy in 1792 she has been a laboratory of political experiments. The Constitution of 1792 lasted only three years. In 1795 it gave place to the Directorial Constitution. This was overthrown by the *coup d'état* of 18th Brumaire (9th November 1799), and a military dictatorship veiled under the name of a Consulate took its place. In 1804 Napoleon assumed the Imperial Crown, and the Consulate was converted into the Empire. The First Empire lasted for ten years (1804–14).

CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENTS (1792–1830)

In 1814 Napoleon abdicated and France recalled the Bourbons in the person of Louis XVIII. In 1815 Napoleon returned from Elba; the Bourbons fled. Napoleon essayed the experiment of the 'Hundred Days,' but Waterloo put an end to it. The victorious allies restored Legitimacy, limited by a Charter. Louis XVIII respected the limitations: Charles X did not; and in 1830 the issue of the Ordinances of St. Cloud provoked the 'Revolution of July.'

THE JULY MONARCHY

For eighteen years France tried the experiment of 'Constitutional Monarchy.' Louis Philippe did his best, with his white tall hat and his green silk umbrella, to play the part of a Citizen-King. But the keen logic of Frenchmen detected in a 'Citizen-King' a contradiction in terms. The Englishman loves compromise and finds it embodied in the English Constitution. The Frenchman wants one thing or the other—a Monarchy or a Republic: he has no use for a mixture.

To the starving artisans of Lyons and other manufacturing towns, Louis Blanc preached the gospel of 'The Right to Work,' and his essay bearing that title was the text-book of the Revolution of 1848.

A movement in favour of parliamentary reform had, for some time, been gaining ground, and the reformers had planned for 20th February 1848 a banquet, monster demonstration, and procession. The Government, fearing disorder, vetoed them. The organizers decided to abandon them, but the mobs refused to disperse. A political crisis supervened. Guizot's ministry resigned: Thiers and Odilon Barrot, an advanced Radical, formed a new one. But to starving artisans these changes meant nothing but the substitution of one group of place-hunting politicians for another. Rioting began on 23rd February; some eight people were killed or wounded, and on the 24th Louis Philippe abdicated in favour of his young grandson the Comte de Paris. But the blood of the republicans was now up. The Comte de Pāris was pushed aside, and a Provisional Republican Government established; Louis Philippe and his Queen fled to England. The Second Republic was inaugurated.

In the new government there were, however, two parties: the political Republicans, led by the silver-tongued Lamartine, and the Socialists, led by Louis Blanc. The latter dominated

the situation, and resolved to establish national workshops, in which work was to be found for the unemployed. But it is one thing to proclaim the doctrine of the right to work, another to organize industry.

The new government decreed the establishment of 'national workshops.' But the workshops did not exist. Louis Blanc did, indeed, set 2,000 tailors to work at Clichy, and employment was found for some 6,000 men as navvies; but the number of applicants for relief rose by tens of thousands: there was no work for them, and in lieu of work the Government soon fell back upon doles.

THE SECOND REPUBLIC

The Republic was soon threatened with bankruptcy. But on 23rd to 24th April a General Election gave the 'Moderates' a large majority in the new Parliament. The Government took courage and decided to reorganize the dole, send home the provincials who had poured into Paris, and bring the experiment to an end as soon as possible. Terrible riots broke out; Paris resembled a shambles: but after four days of street-fighting and immense loss of life, General Cavaignac, who had been appointed Dictator, at last quelled the disorder; the Republic triumphed over Socialism, but in destroying Socialism it destroyed itself.[1]

A new constitution drafted in 1848 provided for the election of a President by direct election on the basis of manhood suffrage. In the election which took place in December Lamartine, the hero of February, received 17,910 votes; Cavaignac, who had saved the Republic, got 1,448,107; a third candidate, who declared that his name was the symbol of 'order, nationality, and glory,' received 5,434,226.

Prince Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, the son of Louis, King of Holland, was born in Paris in 1808. From 1815 to 1848 he was an exile from France. He played with revolution in Italy in 1830–1; after 1832, by publishing a series of works on economic, political, and military topics, he kept his name before the French public. In 1836 and 1840 he advertised himself by dramatic but futile attempts to excite the French to revolt against the Citizen-King. The descent on Boulogne (1840)

THE SECOND EMPIRE

[1] For details cf. L. Blanc, *Droit au Travail*, and E. Thomas, *Ateliers Nationaux* (ed. with Introduction by J. A. R. Marriott, Oxford, 1913)

led to his imprisonment in the fortress of Ham, but in 1846 he escaped to England, and on the fall of the Orleans Dynasty he hastened to Paris and offered his services and his sword to France. Both were declined, and he was bidden to leave France within twenty-four hours. Nevertheless in September 1848 he was elected in absence by no fewer than five Departments; on 26th September he was allowed to take his seat, and in December was elected President by the direct vote of the people.

The Assembly elected in 1849 contained few Buonapartists, but by its policy of reaction played into the President's hands. In 1850 he declared for drastic revision of the Constitution. The Assembly opposed it, and on 1st–2nd December 1851 the President carried out his first *coup d'état*. France as a whole undoubtedly approved it. The Constitution was amended in the sense desired by the President; his term was prolonged for ten years; and his powers greatly increased. In November 1852 a Plébiscite pronounced in favour of an hereditary Empire, and on 2nd December the Prince President was proclaimed Emperor as Napoleon III. Two months later he married Eugénie Countess de Téba, a Spanish lady of great beauty, but not of royal birth. A son was born to them in 1856. The charities of the Empress were munificent, but her heart was cold; except among the clericals she made few friends in France.

L'Empire c'est la paix. In a famous speech on the eve of the Plébiscite which gave him the Empire, Napoleon thus referred to the tradition of the First Empire, and announced the policy of the second. The record of the Second Empire was, as already described, a record of almost continuous war —in the Crimea, in Italy, in Mexico, on the soil of France. But war by no means exhausted the activities of the new ruler of France. If his government was autocratic, it was benevolent. The first ten years of the Empire were years of recuperation and prosperity for France. An alliance was concluded between the throne and the altar, and the Church regained, to a great extent, control over education. Social order was restored, and the forces of anarchy repressed; every kind of encouragement was afforded to industry; means of communication were improved; roads, canals, and harbours were constructed, and the railway system of France, hitherto

inchoate, was completed from north to south, from west to east. The credit resources of the country were mobilized in support of commerce, industry, and agriculture. Two great central banks, the *Crédit foncier* and the *Crédit mobilier*, were established; and land-banks were set up both in Paris and in the provinces. Commerce and industry quickly responded to the stimulus. In twenty years industrial production doubled. The number of agricultural societies was increased; horse breeding was encouraged; land was brought into cultivation by draining the marshes. Paris was rebuilt, and made more spacious, more sanitary, and more splendid, if not more beautiful; schemes were promoted for the provision of workmen's dwellings, for insurance against old age and accidents; labour associations were legalized; thrift was encouraged by the formation of benefit and co-operative societies; industrial exhibitions were promoted on an imposing scale, and by the conclusion of the Cobden treaty a long step was taken—not to the entire satisfaction of French manufacturers—toward freedom of commercial intercourse between England and France. In all this the Emperor himself was the prime instigator, and it was all to the good. The results of the Emperor's foreign policy were more questionable. The Crimean War brought him, undoubtedly, great prestige. After 1856 he was the foremost figure on the Continent, and a hero to his own people. But the alliance with Sardinia was a shock to the clericals in France; the Legitimists could not forgive the expulsion of the Bourbons from the Two Sicilies; the democrats resented the punishment inflicted on the Garibaldians at Mentana. Even the acquisition of Nice and Savoy, though flattering to French pride, could hardly atone.

Worse was to come. France was the traditional friend of Poland. The Polish insurrection of 1863, therefore, gave Napoleon an admirable opportunity of reviving a policy steadily pursued by France in her great days, and of rallying all domestic parties in support of it and of himself. He addressed a strong remonstrance to the Czar Nicholas, but the Czar, confident of Bismarck's support and contemptuous of English opinion, ignored it. Poland was left to its fate.

So were the Danish Duchies when attacked in 1864 by Bismarck. For this desertion Napoleon blamed England.

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with some justice. But his failure to honour the bond given by France was no less damaging to his prestige.

There followed the disastrous Mexican adventure. Mexico, which owed large sums to France, was in a state of chronic disorder and civil war. The clerical and monarchical party appealed for help to the great Catholic Powers of Europe, and Napoleon responded by sending them an Emperor in the person of Maximilian, brother of the Austrian Emperor and son-in-law of King Leopold of Belgium. The choice of Maximilian was intended to gratify Hapsburgs, Saxe-Coburgs, Orleanists, not to mention the French clericals; but it took 40,000 French troops to put Maximilian on the throne, and as soon as they withdrew he was taken prisoner and shot (1867). The tragic ending of the Mexican adventure was a terrible blow to Napoleon's prestige, and Bismarck was determined to destroy what remained of it.

Meanwhile, important changes had been effected in the internal Government of France. From 1852 to 1859 all opposition to the Emperor was quenched, and the administration, though benevolent, was purely autocratic. But Napoleon was shrewd enough to see that autocracy could not continue indefinitely, and he determined, therefore, while his prestige was still undimmed, to liberalize the Constitution.

L'EMPIRE LIBERAL.

In 1859 he issued an unconditional amnesty for all political offences. This brought back to France many republicans and more Orleanist Liberals. A small but organized opposition appeared in the Legislative Body under the leadership of Jules Favre, and at the election of 1863 largely increased its numbers. Substantial instalments of reform were given in 1860, 1861, and still more in 1867, but the Emperor hesitated to concede a 'responsible' ministry in the English sense. He, the elect of the people, must still have exclusive control over the Executive. After the election of 1869, however, this last remnant of autocracy was surrendered. Ollivier was charged with the task of forming a ministry responsible to a Parliament which was to have complete control over finance and legislation. The edifice of a 'Constitutional Monarchy' was completed.

Napoleon did not stop there. A comprehensive scheme for the decentralization of administration, the modification of

the powers of the Senate, and the democratization of Local Government, was passed through Parliament and approved by Plébiscite. The Plébiscite was taken on 8th May 1870. Four months later the Empire fell.

Its overthrow was precipitated by a great military disaster. In 1870 Bismarck lured Napoleon into war. He had been playing with him for years. He had secured his neutrality in the Seven Weeks' War by dangling before his eyes, in the event of Prussia's victory, the bait of large territorial compensations—perhaps Belgium, perhaps Luxemburg, or it might be, the Palatinate. After Sadowa these hints were conveniently forgotten, and attempts made by France to refresh Bismarck's memory were adroitly used to embitter relations between France and England, and to bring the South German States into line with Prussia in the Franco-German War.

BISMARCK AND NAPOLEON.

The story of that war, its origin and results, has already been told. On the fall of the Empire the Republic was re-established, but before it could ratify the peace terms arranged with the external enemy, it had to confront an insurrection in Paris. The Germans were still at St. Denis; the Government of National Defence was installed at Versailles; the Commune was in possession of Paris. Paris, having stood out for four months in the autumn of 1870 against the Germans, was, after less than three months' interval, again besieged for six weeks by the French army under MacMahon. On 21st May 1871 MacMahon forced an entry, but only after seven days of street-fighting was he master of the capital. Massacres on one side were followed by reprisals on the other. Some 20,000 persons were put to the sword; 40,000 were arrested. Not until 1876 did the Court Martial complete the work of trying them. On the top of the defeat at the hands of Germany, it was a terrible ordeal for the Republic; but the Republic survived; France was saved.

THE THIRD REPUBLIC.

The recovery of France after the twofold disaster was amazingly rapid. Nominated as Head of the National Executive in February 1871, Thiers had, in August, become President of the Republic. The enthusiasm and energy of this veteran of seventy-four infected the whole nation.

The war and the Commune had cost France £614,000,000 in money, and 491,000 lives; 1,597,000 citizens had been transferred from the French to the German flag. The German indemnity of £200,000,000 was paid off in three years, and at the end of that time not a single German soldier remained encamped on French soil. Bismarck was so disgusted at his failure to 'bleed France white' that he actually contemplated, in 1875, a renewal of the war. But Queen Victoria, who learnt of Bismarck's design from her daughters, made a personal appeal to the Emperor William; the Czar Alexander seconded her appeal, and warned Germany that in another attack on France he must not count on Russian neutrality. So the plan did not materialize.

THE RECOVERY OF FRANCE.

In the same year the Republic was definitely established in France. In 1873 Marshal MacMahon, an avowed monarchist, had been elected President in place of Thiers, and if the Legitimists and Orleanists could have composed their differences, 'Henry V' (the Comte de Chambord) would probably have been restored, and, being childless, have left the crown to the Comte de Paris, the grandson of Louis Philippe. Napoleon III had died in England in 1873, and the Prince Imperial was not yet of age. But the obstinate refusal of Henry V to acknowledge the tricolour wrecked the chances of the Legitimists; and a series of 'Constitutional' Laws established the Republic in its present form. The President, elected by the two Chambers sitting together as a National Assembly, is a 'Constitutional' Head of the State. The Ministry is responsible to the Legislature, which consists of a Senate (now wholly elected—though indirectly) and a Chamber of Representatives. Only by a vote of the National Assembly can this Constitution be amended.

THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION.

The Franco-German War left Bismarck master of Prussia, Prussia mistress of Germany, and Germany dominant in Europe. Until 1890 Bismarck remained in power. His domestic policy was a skilful admixture of high Protection and State Socialism. Germany, at last unified under Prussia, rapidly advanced in population and industry. With incredible rapidity she was transformed from an agricultural into

BISMARCK AND EUROPE.

an industrialized State. Population began to press on the native means of subsistence, and her citizens began to emigrate in large numbers, mainly to the United States and Brazil. Her manufacturers had to import raw material from oversea, and sought oversea markets for their own surplus products. Germany, consequently, began to look around for colonies. She found them, as we shall see, in Africa and the Pacific Islands.

Bismarck's main interest, however, was not in expansion, but in preservation. His anxiety was to make secure for all time the great edifice he had erected. To this end he cemented an alliance between the three Emperors (Germany, Austria, and Russia). But while Germany had no quarrel either with Vienna or Petersburg, her two allies were in conflict in the Balkans. At the Congress of Berlin Bismarck, as already indicated, had virtually to choose between them. He refused to ' cut the wire between Berlin and Petersburg,' but after 1878 the friendship of Germany and Russia sensibly weakened, and friendship with Austria became more and more the mainstay of Germany diplomacy.

Bismarck then endeavoured to keep the neighbours of Germany at loggerheads with each other. Accordingly, in 1881 he encouraged France to declare a Protectorate over Tunis. This estranged France from Italy, and drove Italy into the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria (1882). That alliance lasted until 1915. In 1882 and onward, Bismarck encouraged England to remain in occupation of Egypt knowing that it would estrange England and France. Russia he pushed on toward Central Asia, hoping thus to embroil her with England. This policy was markedly successful. But in 1888 the old Emperor William I died, and in 1890 his successor William II dropped the old pilot. Bismarck's long reign was over ; and on his fall there ensued a diplomatic revolution destined, a quarter of a century later, to involve the world in war.

FOR FURTHER READING (SEE ALSO pp. 307 AND 321)

E. P. G. Guizot: *La Democratie en France.* A. Thiers: *La Monarchie de 1830.* L. Blanc: *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848.* F. A. Simpson: *The Rise of Louis Napoleon*; and *Louis Napoleon*

and the Recovery of France. P. Guedella: *The Second Empire.* Earl of Kerry: *The Coup d'État.* P. de la Gorce: *Histoire du Second Empire* (7 vols.). A. Sorel: *Histoire Diplomatique de le Guerre Franco-Allemande.* J. A. R. Marriott: *The French Revolution of 1848* (2 vols.), with texts of Blanc's *Droit au Travail* and Thomas's *Ateliers Nationaux.* Lord Normanby: *A Year of Revolution in Paris.* A. de Tocqueville: *Souvenirs.* Marriott: *France* (*op. cit.* and References). R. Poincaré: *How France is Governed.* W. L. Middleton: *The French Political System* (1932).

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE (WELTPOLITIK) (1871-)

Chief Dates

1869. Opening of the Suez Canal.
1871. Basutoland annexed to Cape Colony.
1871. Griqualand West annexed.
1873. Ashanti War.
1875. Queen Victoria proclaimed Empress of India.
1875. England purchases Khedive's shares.
1876. Transvaal annexed.
1879. Zulu War.
1880. Boer War.
1881. Retrocession of Transvaal.
1881. French occupy Tunis.
1882. Rebellion of Arabi Pasha.
1882. England occupies Egypt.
1883. *Die Deutsche Kolonial-Gesellschaft* founded.
1883. Sudan rebellion.
1884. Gordon at Khartoum. His death (1885).
1884. Germans in Africa.
1884. Conference of Berlin: Partition of Africa.
1884. Germans in the Pacific.
1885. Italian colony at Massowah.
1888. British East Africa Company.
1888. British Protectorate over North Borneo and Sarawak.
1890. Final Partition of Africa.
1893. Matabele War.
1894. Uganda Protectorate.
1895. Jameson raid.
1895. Venezuela Boundary Question
1898. Fashoda crisis.
1898. Spanish-American War.
1898. Occupation of Kiauchow, Port Arthur, and Wei-Hai-Wei by Germany, Russia, and England.
1898. Partition of Pacific Islands.
1899. South African War—1902.
1899. Anglo-French Agreement (Africa).
1899. Boxer Rising in China.
1902. Anglo-Italian Agreement (North Africa).
1902. Anglo-Japanese Treaty.
1904. Russo-Japanese War.
1910. Union of South Africa.

PRECEDING chapters have brought the narrative down to the seventies of the nineteenth century. Three of them actually stopped at 1871, and a fourth at 1878. That was no accident. The seventies mark the point at which one important era closes and another begins. In 1871 two great Powers, Germany and Italy, reached the

goal of national unity, while a third, France, brought to an end a long series of constitutional experiments, and established a Conservative and Parliamentary Republic which has already enjoyed a life twice as long as any of the experiments since the outbreak of the first Revolution. The year which witnessed the entry of Italy into Rome witnessed also the meeting of the first General Council of the Catholic Church held since the Council of Trent, and the issue of the famous Decree of Papal Infallibility. That Decree, as Dr. Fisher has significantly remarked, was 'the cordial which the Roman Church administered to itself in the hour of defeat, its defiance of the modern world, its protest against the sacrilege of Italian patriotism.' Before the decade closed, the Congress of Berlin registered the definite beginning of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, and the resurgence of the Balkan nations destined to fill the void created by the expulsion of the Turks from Europe.

A NEW ERA

Thus Europe, or the greater part of it, was at last parcelled out among a number of States with frontiers roughly corresponding with national distinctions, and acutely conscious of the differences which divided them from their neighbours. Nationalism was *in excelsis*. But hardly were these political formations completed, hardly had the States of Europe attained to national unity and become conscious of national identity, than they felt the urge for expansion beyond the boundaries of Europe. The scramble for oversea dependencies began.

The impulse came from national self-consciousness: the opportunity was offered by a series of scientific inventions and developments. Railways, steamships, telegraphs, and telephones, Bessemer's invention of cheap steel, the improvements effected in the surface condenser, the invention of the internal combustion engine, cold storage and refrigeration—these are only a few of the inventions which have caused a shrinkage of the globe, and have thus revolutionized the conditions of world-politics. 'The result,' as General Smuts once observed, 'is that problems which a century ago, or even fifty years ago, were exclusively European now concern the whole world.'

The industrialization of the countries of the old world

has tended in the same direction. A wonderful series of mechanical inventions, and in particular the utilization of steam and electricity, have given an immense impulse to the arts of production ; but so fierce is competition between individuals and nations that production is profitable only if it is conducted on an immense scale. The commodities produced under these conditions have to be sold ; hence the competition for oversea markets. Nor does the struggle end or even begin there. The machines have to be fed. Hence the competition for a supply of the raw materials, many of which—cotton for instance, and rubber, sisal, jute, and palm oils—can only be obtained from tropical or semi-tropical lands. Thus, industrialism has led to imperialism, a desire for trade to a demand for territory.

Most of these changes have been gradual, not catastrophic. Nevertheless, the seventies of the last century do form one of the great watersheds of modern history. When we have climbed to it, new vistas open before us.

THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA

The first leads us to Africa. From the fifteenth century onward, points on the African coast had been occupied—mostly as ports of call—by the maritime nations of Western Europe. But the real scramble for Africa only began, under the impulse of the forces just analysed, in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Dates are, in this connexion, more eloquent than words. In 1869 the Suez Canal was opened. Its construction was due almost entirely to the genius and persistence of M. Ferdinand de Lesseps. England contributed neither brains, nor money, nor encouragement. From the first, however, she reaped a large part of the benefits accruing from the enterprise, and in 1875 she purchased from the Khedive Ismail of Egypt his 176,602 shares in the Canal. This shrewd stroke of policy was due to the imaginative genius of Disraeli, and was financially facilitated by his connexion with the Rothschilds, who found the greater part of the purchase money (£4,080,000). No better investment, political or financial, was ever made. The capital value of the shares has increased more than tenfold, and they produce a dividend of nearly 40 per cent on the original purchase money. But the financial aspect is the least important. The Canal is the spinal cord of the British Empire.

The financial embarrassments of the Khedive which had led to the sale of the shares led shortly afterward (1876) to the establishment of a Dual Control by France and England, his two principal creditors.

THE ENGLISH IN EGYPT

By 1879, Ismail's extravagance and misgovernment had become so intolerable that his suzerain, the Sultan of Turkey, was persuaded by the Powers to procure his abdication. His successor, Tewfik, could not cope with a military revolt led by Arabi Bey, nor with the disorders in Alexandria, provoked by a murderous attack by Arabs on the European population. The French refused to co-operate with Great Britain in the task of restoring order; we had, therefore, to do it single-handed. France soon bitterly regretted her pusillanimity, and did everything she could to hamper us in our work.

Nor did England much relish the task imposed on her. The Canal is a vital Imperial artery. Whether military domination in Egypt is essential to the safety of the Canal is a disputed point. Apart from the Canal, England is not specially concerned with Egypt: yet in formal occupation of Egypt we remained from 1882 to 1922—and our troops are there still. In the meantime much happened. In 1883 an insurrection broke out in the Sudan headed by an Arab sheikh who announced himself as the Madhi (Messiah). An expeditionary force under English officers, dispatched to quell it, was cut to pieces. General Gordon was appointed Governor-General of the Sudan, but was himself besieged in Khartoum. Months of valuable time were wasted by the Gladstone Government, and when Lord Wolseley was at last sent out to rescue Gordon it was too late. The relieving force reached Khartoum two days after Gordon had been killed.

The Southern Sudan was then (1885) abandoned; but in 1896 General (afterwards Earl) Kitchener led the Egyptian army, which he had entirely reorganized, on an expedition to reconquer it. A great victory at Omdurman (2nd September 1898) broke the power of the Madhi for ever; Khartoum was retaken; Gordon was avenged.

Hardly had Kitchener reached Khartoum when a French expedition, brilliantly led across Central Africa by Major Marchand, arrived at Fashoda on the Upper Nile. The French had been previously warned that their presence on

the upper Nile would be regarded as an 'unfriendly act,' but Marchand refused to give way. In the autumn of 1898 England and France were on the brink of war, but Lord Salisbury, by mingled firmness and tact, induced the French at the eleventh hour to recall Marchand, and in 1899 a comprehensive agreement between the two countries was concluded. Since 1882, when France declined to share responsibility with England, Egypt had been literally remade by a band of English administrators under the leadership of Sir E. Baring, afterward the Earl of Cromer. It was an achievement of which any nation might be proud. France at last (in 1899) accepted the logic of facts, recognized the rights of Great Britain over the whole basin of the Nile from the source to the estuary, while France was confirmed in possession of a great West African Empire. Thus England and France were at last made friends; Fashoda had paradoxically prepared the way for the Entente of 1904.

FASHODA

British activities in Africa were not confined to the north. From 1652 to 1796 Cape Colony was occupied by the Dutch, who used it as a port of call for their ships on the voyage to and from the East Indies. In 1795 the French Republic annexed Holland, and the Stadtholder, a refugee in England, suggested that England should occupy the Cape peninsula lest it too should fall into the hands of the French. Accordingly, we occupied it; but restored it in 1802, only to reconquer it after the war with Napoleon was renewed, and at the Peace of 1814 finally retained it, albeit on payment of £6,000,000 'compensation' to the Dutch.

BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA

Between the British Government and the Dutch colonists of the Cape there was, however, persistent friction, and in 1836–40 the Dutch farmers (Boers) resolved to quit Cape Colony: they 'trekked' to the north and established there independent Republics in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In 1856 Natal, a predominantly British colony, an offshoot from Cape Colony, also declared itself independent of Cape Colony, though not of Great Britain. But Britons and Boers were alike threatened by warlike native tribes. In 1877 the Boers of the Transvaal were in serious danger of being 'eaten up' by their Zulu neighbours. As the best means of averting that

BRITONS AND BOERS

fate the Transvaal was annexed by the British Crown. Then the British had to fight the Zulus (1879), but not until after several reverses was the power of that brave tribe broken. As soon as it was broken, the Boers reclaimed their independence at the point of the sword. A war with them ensued (1880–1), and the disaster at Majuba was followed by the retrocession of the Transvaal to the Boers.

The arrangement then concluded was not destined to permanence. The era of European expansion in Africa was at hand. Forces were operating which politicians might retard but could not finally obstruct. The policy of *laissez-faire* which during a period of thirty years had been followed by the British Government in South Africa, as elsewhere, had for a decade or more been abandoned. In 1868 the Boers on the Orange River became involved in a dispute with the Basutos, a native tribe to the east of them. The Basuto chief begged Great Britain to take his people under her protection, and in 1868 British sovereignty was proclaimed over Basutoland. For a time it was annexed to Cape Colony, but from 1884 onward it has been a British Colony under the direct control of the Crown. In 1871 Griqualand West, a native territory to the west of the Orange Free State, valuable only for the diamond fields of the Kimberley district, was annexed.

After the retrocession of the Transvaal to the Boers the latter were in almost constant difficulties with their native neighbours, both to the west and the east of them, and to avert further complications British sovereignty was extended over Bechuanaland in 1885, over Zululand in 1886, and in 1889 the British South Africa Company was incorporated by Royal Charter and accepted the administration of Mashonaland. In 1894 the Company was involved in war with the Matabeles and in that year Matabeleland was annexed. That great territory is now known to the world as Rhodesia.

EXPANSION

Meanwhile, gold had (1886) been discovered in great profusion on the Witwatersrand in the Transvaal, and the discovery attracted the usual crowd of adventurers, financiers, engineers, and miners, who introduced into the social, economic, and political life of the South African Republic a new, most unwelcome and most

THE BOER WAR

incongruous strain. The Boers deeply resented their intrusion, but under the terms of the Convention of 1884 could not prevent it. By 1895 Johannesburg, the capital of the new mining district, contained 100,000 inhabitants,[1] whereas in 1877 the total white population of the Transvaal did not exceed 8,000 to 10,000.

The rapid growth of a European population precipitated an acute crisis. The newcomers (the 'Uitlanders') demanded political rights commensurate with their contribution to the wealth of the community and the revenue of the State. The Boer Government refused to grant them, and in 1895 the 'Uitlanders' foolishly attempted to take by force what was denied to argument. Dr. Jameson, the administrator of the British South Africa Company, led a raid into the Transvaal. The raid was easily crushed; its leaders were taken prisoners, and punished by the British Government to whom they were handed over.

The fiasco of the 'Jameson Raid' naturally accentuated the tension between Boers and Britons; in 1899 21,000 British subjects resident in the Transvaal petitioned the Queen to inquire into their grievances and secure them a remedy. Sir Alfred (afterwards Viscount) Milner, who in 1897 had become High Commissioner for South Africa, conferred with President Kruger, but the conference proved abortive, and in October the two Boer Republics declared war on Great Britain.

The war opened disastrously for Great Britain, but in January 1900 Lord Roberts arrived at Cape Town to take over the command from Sir Redvers Buller, and with Lord Kitchener as his chief of staff quickly improved the situation. Having occupied Pretoria (June) Roberts handed over to Kitchener, who gradually wore down the guerilla tactics of the Boer generals, and concluded peace in May 1902. Roberts had returned home, only just in time, to report to his Sovereign, whose long and glorious reign of sixty-three years was closed by death on 22nd January 1901.

The two Boer Republics were annexed to the British Crown, but after the conclusion of peace things settled down so quickly that responsible self-government was conferred upon the Transvaal in 1906, and upon the Orange Colony in

[1] The European population now (1933) exceeds 170,000.

1907. There were, however, many difficult problems facing the South African Colonies—notably the problem of tariffs, of railways, and most of all the relations between the two white races and the natives. Sir George Grey (Governor of Cape Colony, 1853–1861) had long ago perceived that the only path of safety for South Africa lay in some form of federation between the four separate colonies. Lord Carnarvon (Secretary of State, 1874–7) was of the same opinion, and did his best to promote it; but without success. After the final annexation of the Boer Republics, and still more after the concession to them of self-government, the question again became urgent, but after prolonged conferences (1908–9), the four colonies decided to come together not in a federation but in a Union, and in 1909 the Imperial Parliament gave legal expression to their wish in the *South Africa Act*. That *Act* established a single Parliament of two Houses, with an Executive responsible thereto, and South Africa has thus taken its place as a unit among the Dominions of the British Crown.

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

England was not the only European Power interested in Africa. The French had conquered Algeria and proceeded to organize it as a French Colony (1830–47), and in 1881, at the instigation of Bismarck and with the assent of Great Britain, established a Protectorate over Tunis as well. France is also the paramount power in Morocco. Twice in recent years, in 1905 and again in 1911, the unsettled condition of Morocco, combined with the efforts of Germany to secure a footing in that country, brought Europe to the brink of war. But by the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 1912 France established a general Protectorate over the country and represents the Sultan in relation to foreign Powers. The Shereefian Empire, however, still subsists, on French sufferance, and besides the special French zone, there is a Spanish zone, and an International Tangier zone. But the Spanish zone contains only 700,000 inhabitants, as compared with 6,000,000 in the French zone. To all intents and purposes Morocco is a French possession. France also possesses under the Partition Treaties of 1884, 1890, and the Peace Treaty of 1919, a vast block in the west and centre of Africa, which together with French Somaliland on the east coast, and the island of Madagascar, brings

THE FRENCH IN AFRICA

the total of French Africa to nearly 4,000,000 square miles.

The area of British Africa exceeds the French by about 650,000 square miles (4,652,000), but while much of French Africa is desert, Great Britain by her possession of Gibraltar, Sierra Leone, Socotra (opposite Aden), Zanzibar, St. Helena, Walfisch Bay, Mombasa, Cape Town, and Dar-es-Salaam, not to mention Port Said, controls practically all the strategic lines of first-rate importance. She also possesses almost all those portions of Africa (except the Mediterranean coast) which are suitable for white colonization.

Portugal was far ahead both of France and England in African enterprise. Being the first of European nations to reach India by sea, she was the first also to establish herself on the African Continent, and still retains, on the south-east coast, Mozambique, with the coveted harbour of Lorenzo Marques on Delagoa Bay, and on the west coast a slice of Guinea as well as Angola, a large tract of not very valuable territory lying between the Belgian Congo and Damaraland.

THE PORTUGUESE IN AFRICA

The Belgians began their occupation of the Congo in 1879; the Congo State was recognized by the *General Act* of the Berlin Conference (1884–5) as an independent State under King Leopold, and in 1908 was transferred to the Belgian Kingdom. After the Great War Belgium obtained part of German East Africa, and holds it as a 'Mandated Territory.'

Italy, not having achieved national unity until 1871, was naturally late in embarking on colonial enterprise. Nor has her history as a colonizing Power been unchequered. In 1882 the port of Assab, on the Abyssinian Coast, was transferred from a private trading company, which had purchased it in 1870, to the State, and in 1885 Massowah was occupied by Italy and developed into the colony of Eritrea. Four years later Italy added to her possessions in East Africa a strip of Somaliland, but her efforts to penetrate the fertile uplands of Abyssinia were stoutly and successfully resisted by the Abyssinians, and after coming to terms with France in the Conventions of 1900 and 1902, Italy, as will be shown later, concentrated her attention upon Tripoli.

ITALIAN COLONIES

GERMAN COLONIZATION

Germany, like Italy and for the same reason, was similarly a late comer in the colonial field. As late as 1884 she possessed not a foot of territory outside Europe. But between 1884 and 1890 her colonial expansion was rapid. Bismarck to the end of his days confessed himself to be 'no colony man.' He was content to maintain, in security and integrity, the fabric of his handiwork in Europe. But economic if not political forces were too strong for him. Germany needed an outlet for her rapidly increasing population, and for her still more rapidly expanding commerce; like other industrialized countries she wanted foodstuffs and raw materials from overseas, and she wished to control the supply of them. She needed overseas markets also; and she sought an increase of man-power. Most of all, perhaps, she lusted after the possession of strategic points which might be useful were she ever involved in a war with the World-Empire of Great Britain.

Such points she found in West, South-West, and East Africa, and later on, in Mesopotamia. In December 1882 the German Colonial Society was founded at Frankfort, and the enthusiasm of the nation was stirred by a vigorous Press campaign. Publicists began to ventilate the idea that Germany was entitled to carve out of Africa a 'German India,' which should stretch from the Atlantic right across equatorial Africa to the Indian Ocean, involving large annexations at the expense of France, Portugal, Belgium, and Great Britain. 'We are fighting,' wrote Hermann Oncken during the Great War, 'for an Empire in Central Africa.' 'If,' wrote Emil Zimmerman, 'we have a position of strength in *Mittel-Afrika* we can compel India and Australia to respect our wishes in the South Seas and in Eastern Asia, and we thereby drive the first wedge into the compact front of our opponents in Eastern Asia.'

German discoverers had for many years taken their full share in African exploration, and in the early eighties the discontent among the Dutch in South Africa seemed to offer Germany an opportunity for territorial acquisitions. Attempts were made without success to obtain a footing in Delagoa Bay, at St. Lucia Bay, and in Pondoland, but in

1884–5 her persistent efforts were rewarded by the establishment of a Protectorate over Damaraland and Namaqualand, a territory of some 330,000 square miles, immediately contiguous to Cape Colony. That territory, known as German South-West Africa, passed by conquest to Great Britain in 1915, and in 1919 was assigned, under Mandate, to the Union of South Africa. But that is anticipating the sequence of events. Meanwhile, a second German colony on the west coast was established by the annexation of Togoland and the Cameroons, and a third, most important of all, known as German East Africa, on the east coast. Thus in the course of six years (1884–90) Germany had advanced to the third place among the European proprietors of Africa. The Partition of 1890 left France in a territorial sense the largest of African Powers, with nearly 4,000,000 square miles of territory. British territory, before the World War, occupied (not including Egypt and the Sudan) something less than 3,000,000. Germany came third with rather less than 1,000,000.

Nor were German activities confined to Africa. In 1884 she acquired the northern coast of New Guinea, and the group of islands subsequently known as the Bismarck Archipelago. She divided Samoa with the United States in 1900. The Colonial Empire of Germany, alike in Africa and in the Pacific, came into being with the complete assent of the British Government. There were, indeed, loud protests against her 'intrusion' from Englishmen on the spot, but those protests were unheeded by the Home Government, which, in Mr. Gladstone's words, welcomed Germany's advent to the colonial field as that of 'our ally and partner in the execution of the great purposes of Providence for the advantage of mankind.' The peaceful partition of Africa in 1890 was primarily due to the skill and tact of Lord Salisbury, at that time Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of England. Had the German Powers not plunged the world into war in 1914, Germany would still be in possession of all that she had thus acquired.

THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

But there were other factors to be considered in the problem of the Pacific. Of these undoubtedly the most important was due to the astoundingly rapid development

of Japan. This factor may, however, be more conveniently considered in the next chapter.


THE U.S.A.

Another factor in the problem of the Pacific was supplied by the United States. Down to the last decade of the nineteenth century the United States had adhered rigidly to the maxims laid down by Jefferson in 1801: (1) 'Never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe'; and (2) never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with Cis-Atlantic affairs. The second maxim was further enforced by President Monroe's famous Message to Congress in 1823, and from then onward the Monroe doctrine became the sheet-anchor of American diplomacy. In 1895, however, President Cleveland abruptly demanded that Great Britain and Venezuela should submit to American arbitration the disputed question of the boundary between the latter and British Guiana. But for the good-tempered attitude of Lord Salisbury, this insolent demand might easily have led to war between the two English-speaking peoples. Lord Salisbury, however, refused to take the matter too seriously. In the event the British claim was in the main substantiated, and in 1897 a General Arbitration Treaty between Great Britain and the U.S.A. was signed, though not until 1914 was it ratified by the U.S. Senate.

The Venezuelan affair, not in itself of first-rate importance, was significant as putting an end to American isolation. It was indeed quickly followed by the outbreak of war (1898) between Spain and the U.S.A., as a result of which Cuba virtually became an American protectorate, and the Philippine Islands passed definitely into the possession of America. In the same year (1898) the Sandwich Islands, in which for half a century America had manifested an interest, were annexed to the Republic and formally constituted the territory of Hawaii. In 1899 the Samoan Islands were divided between Germany and the U.S.A. Plainly, the U.S.A., which in the course of a century had expanded continentally from the Atlantic to the Pacific seaboard, were beginning to take their place alongside the Great Powers of Europe as a factor in world-politics. The shrinkage of the world had indeed left them no option.

FOR FURTHER READING

C. de Freycinet: *La Question d'Égypte.* Lord Cromer: *Modern Egypt* and *Abbas II.* Lord Milner: *The English in Egypt.* J. A. R. Marriott: *England since Waterloo,* and *Europe* (1815–1939), and *The British Empire and Commonwealth.* G. M'C. Theal: *South Africa in the Nineteenth Century.* J. S. Keltie: *The Partition of Africa.* Lord Lugard: *The Dual Mandate in Africa.* Lord Hailey: *Survey of Africa.* A. C. Coolidge: *The United States as a World-Power.* G. L. Beer: *The English-speaking Peoples.* O. Hammann: *The World Policy of Germany* (E.T.). Hancock: *The Argument of Empire.*


British
French
Belgian
Italian
Portuguese
Spanish
German
Turkish
European Possessions 1876
AFRICA
POLITICAL
DIVISIONS
1893
Sultanate of MAROCCO
ALGERIA
TUNIS
TRIPOLI (Turkish)
EGYPT (Tributary to Turkey)
Cairo
Egyptian Territory in revolt under Mahdi
SENEGAL
Timbuktu
GAMBIA
SIERRA LEONE
TOGO
R. Niger Co.
Ka-merun
GOLD COAST
Lagos
O.R.P.
CONGO FREE STATE
Prot. of ABYSSINIA
BR. E. AFR. PROT.
ITAL. SOMALI
IBEA
GERM. EAST AFR.
Zanzibar
BRIT. CENTRAL AFR. PROT.
ANGOLA
B.S.A.C.
S.A.R.
MADAGASCAR
Cape Town
CAPE COLY
BOUNDARIES laid down by International Treat.
B.S.A.C. British South Africa Company
O.R.P. Oil Rivers Protectorate
S.A.R. South African Republic
T. Transvaal
O. Orange Free St
E. Eritrea
L. Liberia
MAROCCO
ALGERIA
TUNIS
TRIPOLI
EGYPT Tributary to Turkey
Gambia
Sierra Leone
Lagos
GOLD COAST
GABUN
PORT. W AFRICA
Walfish B.
British
Cape Town
Sultanate of ZANZIBAR
PORT. E. AFR.
B V Jacksons

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION (1890–1911)

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

CHIEF DATES

1890. Fall of Bismarck.
1890. Final Partition of Africa.
1890. England cedes Heligoland to Germany.
1891. Franco-Russian *rapprochement.*
1894. Armenian atrocities—and 1896.
1894. Chino-Japanese War.
1895. Treaty of Shimonoseki.
1895. Kiel Canal opened.
1896. Franco-Russian Alliance published.
1897. Graeco-Turkish War.
1897. Crete united to Greece.
1898. Fashoda crisis.
1898. Kaiser visits Constantinople and Jerusalem.
1898. Spanish-American War.
1898. Chinese ports seized by Powers.
1901. Death of Queen Victoria.
1902. Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Renewed 1905.
1904. Anglo-French Entente.
1904. Russo-Japanese War.
1905 Surrender of Port Arthur. Treaty of Portsmouth.
1905. Kaiser at Tangier.
1906. Algeçiras Conference.
1908. Young Turk Revolution.
1908. Bulgarian Independence.
1908. Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina.

GEORGE III, on coming to the English throne in 1760, found Pitt installed in power. In 1761 Pitt, who in four years had put England on a pinnacle of power, was dismissed. George was 'determined to be king' and could not share the throne with a minister. In 1888 his great-great-grandson succeeded to the thrones of Prussia

and Germany. He found Bismarck in power, but in 1890, following ancestral precedent, dismissed him.

WILLIAM II

For the next twenty years the Kaiser William II was the dominating personality in Europe, if not in the world. But in that time he had destroyed the diplomatic edifice so carefully built up by Bismarck, and had brought his country into a position of almos plete isolation. In 1890 Austria and Italy were unite Germany in the Triple Alliance, while the rest of the Powers were isolated each from the other. Germany already beginning to lose the friendship of Russia, but France had not yet gained it.

Italy was estranged from France, France from England, England from Russia. Twenty years later the Triple Alliance, already weakening as regards the third partner, was confronted by the Triple Entente of England, France, and Russia. Germany, thanks to her own blundering diplomacy, found herself 'encircled' by Powers which, if not hostile to her, were friendly with each other. Other significant changes had also occurred; the following paragraphs will disclose them.

GERMANY AND ENGLAND

In 1890 there was every promise of increasingly friendly relations between Germany and England. In that year Lord Salisbury effected the final partition of Africa without the shedding of blood—a truly remarkable achievement. Germany's share was a large one, and in addition she received Heligoland from England. Nowhere did the interests of Germany and England clash. On the other hand, friction between England and France (notably in regard to Egypt), and between England and Russia (especially in Central Asia), was still acute. Germany was still nervous about her western frontier, and (as already mentioned) her relations with Russia were less cordial than in the years 1860 to 1878.

What more natural, under these circumstances, than an alliance between the two great Teutonic nations? Bismarck, deeply as he mistrusted the English system of Parliamentary Government, had made several overtures in that direction; they were renewed by the young Emperor in 1895, though that 'double-minded man' followed them up, characteristically, by a foolish telegram of congratulation to President

Kruger.[1] Just after the outbreak of the Boer War the German Emperor visited England (November 1899) and again discussed the idea of an alliance, which was cordially embraced by Mr. Chamberlain, then Colonial Secretary. Lord Salisbury, more experienced and more cautious than his colleague, frowned upon it, but Lord Lansdowne, who succeeded Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office (1900), shared Chamberlain's views as to the dangerous isolation in which we stood. He it was who by his treaties with Japan (1902), France (1904), and his negotiations with Russia brought that isolation to an end. But the significant feature of the diplomatic situation is that at least as late as 1902 England inclined toward the orbit of Germany, though the latter's blundering conduct of foreign affairs finally drove her into the opposite camp.[2]

FRANCE AND RUSSIA

While Germany was courting England, France concluded an alliance with Russia. One of the first statesmen in France to proclaim the necessity of better relations with Russia was General Boulanger, who in 1886 became Minister of War in the Freycinet Cabinet. In 1887 war between Germany and France again (as indicated below) seemed imminent.[3] On 20th February *Le Nord*, the organ of the Russian Foreign Office, published a remarkable article which contained these words: 'The interests of Russia forbid her in the event of another Franco-German war to observe the same benevolent neutrality which she previously maintained. The Cabinet of Petersburg will, in no case, permit the further weakening of France.' In 1888 Russia was alarmed by the terms of the Triple Alliance which Bismarck thought it well to publish, and was offended by the refusal of Berlin to lend her money. France stepped in, and from 1888 onward a series of Russian loans were floated on favourable terms in Paris. Paris is still bemoaning its generosity, but it enabled Russia to convert the whole of her external debt, to improve the equipment of her

[1] See *supra*, Chapter XXXIII.

[2] On this see Brandenburg: *From Bismarck to the World War*.

[3] 'She [France] is an insupportable neighbour,' wrote Lord Salisbury (3rd July 1887); and on the 20th, 'Can you wonder that there is, to my eyes, a silver lining even to the great black cloud of a Franco-German War?' Cecil: *Life of Salisbury*, vol. iv, pp. 48–9.

army and navy, and to extend her railway system, notably toward Siberia and toward Central Asia.

France and Russia exchanged naval visits in 1891, and these official courtesies were followed in 1892 by a military convention, and in 1893 by a commercial treaty. The terms of a comprehensive alliance were published in 1896. This alliance was a natural one. Both countries went in fear of Germany: both had their quarrels (fomented by Bismarck) with England.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The external policy of Russia has been pursued, for at least two centuries, with singular consistency. Free egress from the Black Sea into the Eastern Mediterranean is absolutely essential to her position as a European Power. Without it she is virtually landlocked. Whether she can command the Straits without actual possession of Constantinople is an open question. If it be answered in the negative the possession of Constantinople becomes essential to her. Three times in the nineteenth century Constantinople was within her grasp. Thrice she was headed off from it by England. But if England headed her off from Constantinople she could threaten England in Central Asia, and could also push forward to the Pacific. Her progress in Central Asia was rapid and sustained. In 1868 she annexed Samarkand, she occupied Khiva in 1873, and Merv in 1884. These conquests were consolidated by the construction of the Trans-Caspian Railway (1880–99). The conquest of Merv brought Russia within 200 miles of Herat, and created alarm in regard to the north-western frontier of British India. Alarm was accentuated when in 1885 Russia seized Penjdeh, a village 100 miles due south of Merv. War between England and Russia was narrowly averted in that year, but the further advance of Russia toward Afghanistan was checked by an agreement reached in 1887. The Russians, however, continued their advance northward and eastward, and in 1895 annexed the Pamirs. The Russian frontier thus came to march with that of Chinese Turkestan to the east, and on the south with that of the British North-West Frontier Province.

Meanwhile, from 1839 onward, Russia had been steadily pushing her way toward the north Pacific Ocean. By 1860 the Amur, protected by a line of fortresses, had become a

Russian river, while the Trans-Siberian Railway, begun in 1891, was eventually carried across Manchuria to its eastern terminus at Vladivostock. Vladivostock, occupied in 1860, gave Russia a firm grip upon the Northern Pacific, which in 1902 was connected by the railway, over 5500 miles in length, with Petersburg.

RISE OF JAPAN

In the Far East there was, by this time, another great Power to be considered. Down to 1868 Japan was entirely medieval in social, economic, and political structure, and had maintained almost complete isolation, despite the efforts of the U.S.A. and other Powers to intrude upon it. In world-politics she did not count. But in the last quarter of the nineteenth century Japan was completely transformed. In 1870 she began to construct railways; she imported textile machinery and technicians from Lancashire; she borrowed German soldiers to train her army, and under the supervision of English sailors constructed a powerful navy. The results of reconstruction were demonstrated to the world when in 1894–5 she inflicted a crushing, and unexpected, defeat on China. Russia, France, and Germany intervened to rob her of the fruits of victory. In 1896 Russia concluded a secret treaty with China, obtaining thereby large concessions; Germany took a ninety-nine years' lease of Kiauchow (1898), and in the following year Russia occupied Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, which she had denied to Japan in 1895. China then invited England to take up a lease of Wei-hai-wei (then occupied by the Japanese), and England (1898) agreed to hold it as long as Russia held Port Arthur. Thus did the Western Powers maintain the integrity of China, and keep Japan out.

Japan had not long to wait for her revenge. Meanwhile, as we have seen, the U.S.A. became a great Pacific Power.

ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY

The progress of America in the Pacific alarmed Japan only less acutely than Russian advance in China. Japan badly needed a friend. She found one in England, and in 1902 concluded with her a treaty which, though defensive in character, was of immense diplomatic significance. Hitherto England had gloried in her 'splendid isolation.' Recent events, notably the South African War, had convinced her that under the

changing conditions of the world the isolation was more obvious than the splendour. But that she should abandon isolation only to engage in alliance with an Oriental power which had so recently emerged from medievalism caused a great sensation both at home and abroad. The new departure was, however, completely justified. The alliance was renewed and strengthened in 1905 and 1911; it proved its value to Japan in her conflict with Russia (1904–5), and even more conspicuously its value to the British Empire in the World War. Without the help of the Japanese Fleet the transport of Australasian contingents to Europe would have been difficult, if not impossible. At the Peace Treaty Japan obtained Kiauchow and the Pacific Islands formerly belonging to Germany north of the Equator. The islands south of the Equator went to Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, to be held, like the northern group, under mandate.

The Anglo-Japanese Treaty was in 1922 denounced in order to soothe the susceptibilities of the U.S.A., and was replaced by a Quadruple Treaty which, it is hoped, will secure the peace of the Pacific.

Meanwhile a conflict, inevitable since 1895, broke out between Japan and Russia (1904). To the amazement of the world the 'colossus with the feet of clay' com-

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

pletely collapsed before the attack of the island-Empire. Both on land and at sea Japan won decisive victories, and her victories were reflected in the Treaty of Portsmouth which in 1905 brought the war to an end. Russia and Japan mutually agreed to evacuate Manchuria, but Russia recognized Korea as falling within the Japanese sphere of influence, and ceded to her Port Arthur and the Liao-Tung Peninsula, and the island of Sakhalin seized by her in 1875. Korea was definitely annexed to Japan in 1910.

The war had important reactions. Throughout Asia, and most noticeably in India, the victory of Japan was hailed as a blow to the 'white intruders.' China hastened to Europeanize her institutions on the Japanese model, overthrew her ancient dynasty in 1912, and almost ever since has been in a condition of anarchy. In Russia itself the defeat gave a powerful impulse to the revolutionary party, and the autocracy so far surrendered as to bring a representative Legis-

lature (the Duma) into existence. The Czar did not part with the control of the Executive, but the Duma, though it encountered many difficulties, carried through a comprehensive programme of administrative reforms. The Great War proved, however, that reform had been deferred too long.

Of one source of embarrassment Russia, in 1907, was relieved. In 1904 England had followed up her treaty with Japan by the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement with France. For twenty years or more Anglo-French relations had been consistently bad, but after the Fashoda incident, as we have seen, they rapidly improved, and in 1904 a comprehensive agreement was concluded. The agreement cleared up a number of outstanding points which had caused friction between the two countries in every quarter of the world: in Newfoundland (where there had been fishing disputes ever since 1713); in the New Hebrides and Siam; in Madagascar and West Africa. But the core of the agreement was North Africa. France recognized England's paramount position in Egypt, England that of France in Morocco

THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

Thus England and France were made friends. France and Russia had been friends since 1891; in 1907 the *Triple Entente* was completed by an agreement between England and Russia. The agreement covered all outstanding questions in Central Asia. Both parties agreed to respect the integrity of Tibet; Persia was mapped out into three spheres of influence, the northern to be Russian, the southern British, and a neutral zone between them; Afghanistan was recognized as 'outside the sphere of Russian influence,' but Great Britain was to respect its independence.

Hardly were matters satisfactorily adjusted in the Middle East before a grave crisis supervened in the Near East. Things had changed in the Balkans since 1878. The arrangements embodied in the Treaty of Berlin were manifestly artificial. The Turks were reprieved, but their power was evidently waning; that of the young nation States was waxing. In 1885 the Bulgarians of Eastern Romelia resolved that they would no longer be severed from their brethren in Bulgaria proper, and a united Bulgaria came into being. But the

THE NEAR EAST

new Bulgaria, so far from being a cat's-paw of Russia, opposed a powerful bulwark against her advance towards Constantinople. In 1886 the Sultan, under pressure from the Powers, particularly Great Britain, recognized the *fait accompli*. Russia, however, compelled her former protégée, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, to resign, and after some delay a German princeling, Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, was elected by the Bulgarian *Sobranje* in his stead.

The Greeks, who had come away from Berlin empty-handed and disappointed, were excited by the aggrandizement of Bulgaria; Crete ardently desired to unite itself to continental Greece, and declared its independence from Turkey. The 'Thirty Days' War,' on which in 1897 Greece embarked against Turkey, virtually secured the independence of the 'great Greek island,' but not until 1908 was its union with Greece achieved.

Meanwhile, a new factor had entered into a problem already sufficiently complicated. Bismarck had always ostentatiously disclaimed any interest in Balkan questions. But William II, almost from the day of his accession, took an entirely different line. In 1889 he paid a ceremonial visit to Sultan Abdul Hamid at Constantinople. The visit was repeated in 1898. The Kaiser had shrewdly perceived that there was a diplomatic vacancy at Constantinople. England and France were alike out of favour with the Sultan. William II decided to fill the vacancy. Baron von der Goltz, a great soldier-scholar, had lately spent twelve years in reorganizing the Turkish army, with results which were demonstrated by the defeat of Greece in 1897. German financiers and traders followed in the wake of German soldiers. A branch of the Deutsche Bank of Berlin was established at Constantinople. German commercial travellers penetrated into every corner of the Ottoman Empire. In 1902 a convention was concluded for the construction of a railway from Constantinople to Bagdad. That railway was only a link in a long chain intended ultimately to connect Hamburg with Basra on the Persian Gulf. By this great enterprise Germany hoped to turn the flank of the Sea Empire. The Kaiser's plans developed merrily.

GERMANY AND TURKEY

In 1908, however, there occurred in the Near East a series of events fraught with the gravest consequences to the Balkans and indeed to the whole of Europe.

CRISIS OF 1908

First came the 'Young Turk' Revolution. A committee composed mainly of young Turks, with a veneer of Western education, had for some time been working on a scheme for giving Turkey a parliamentary constitution, and transforming the Ottoman Empire into a modern Europeanized State. In 1908 they deposed Abdul Hamid and set up their Constitution. Liberal Europe, notably England, applauded the change. The Kaiser feared that the revolution might interrupt his schemes, but the new Government, headed by Enver Pasha, proved as friendly as the old to Berlin.

The revolution was not confined to Constantinople. On 5th October Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria and assumed the ancient title of Czar of Bulgaria. In April 1909 the Turkish Parliament formally recognized its independence. On 12th October the Cretan Assembly voted the union of the island with the Kingdom of Greece. In the interval, on 7th October, the Emperor Francis Joseph startled the diplomatic world by announcing the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This step, though startling to Europe, was in fact the climax of a policy which the Hapsburgs had been steadily pursuing for forty years. Excluded from Germany and expelled from Italy by Bismarck, Austria had been at last obliged to come to terms with the Hungarians, who had been reconquered for her by Nicholas of Russia in 1849. For the timely help of Russia, Austria had shown no gratitude during the Crimean crisis. Schwarzenberg had, indeed, boasted that Austria would 'startle the world by her ingratitude.' Subsequent events justified his insolent words. The crisis of 1848–9 was followed, in all the heterogeneous dominions of the Hapsburgs, by a policy of autocratic centralization. The discredited policy of Joseph II was revived. Czechs, Magyars, the Croats and other Slavs were all to be 'Germanized.' The proud and ancient Kingdom of Hungary

DRANG NACH OSTERN

was to be reduced to the status of an Austrian province.[1] But after the humiliation of Austria in 1866 this hopeless policy was abandoned: under the *Ausgleich* of 1867 Hungary was recognized as a kingdom with its own King and Constitution, and on 8th June 1867 Francis Joseph was crowned in Buda-Pesth.

Thenceforward until 1914 *Dualism* was the accepted policy of the Hapsburg Empire. 'Take care of your barbarians, we will take care of ours,' so Count Beust, the Austrian Minister, remarked to his Hungarian colleague. A German-Magyar despotism was, in effect, imposed upon the congeries of nationalities of which the Hapsburg Empire was composed. But one of the 'barbarian' races was restless under 'Dualism.' The Slavs outnumbered Germans and Magyars combined.[2] Of the Slavs about 7,000,000 belonged to the Serbo-Croatian or Southern Slav branch. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina added an extra 2,000,000 to the latter, and accentuated the difficult problem already confronting the Hapsburgs. Austria had been in 'occupation' of these provinces ever since 1878, but since then the spirit of nationalism had developed rapidly in the Balkans, not least among the Southern Slavs. The formal absorption of two Slav provinces into the Austro-Hungarian Empire was at once a flagrant violation of the Treaty of Berlin and the deathblow to the hopes of a greater Serbia. The Serbians made an indignant protest against the annexation and invoked the help of Russia. Russia was hardly less indignant than Serbia, but she had by no means recovered from her defeat at the hands of Japan. Moreover, Austria had a powerful ally. The German Emperor was gravely displeased that Austria should have taken so important a step without his sanction, but the Triple Alliance was the corner-stone of German foreign policy, and though Italy was profoundly perturbed by the action of Austria, the 'knight in shining armour' announced from Potsdam that if Russia went to the help of Serbia, Austria might count on Germany. Russia recoiled from a war with Germany; Austria had her way.

DUALISM


[1] For details cf. Marriott, *Europe from 1815–1923*, chapters xiii and xxii.

[2] Out of 51,000,000 (1910) at least 26,000,000 were Slavs.

Only for the moment. The Dual allies, intoxicated by their success, thought they could repeat it in 1914. Their attempt to repeat it involved the world in war.

FOR FURTHER READING (AND FOR CHAPTER XXXV) SEE CHAPTER XXXIII

P. Leroy-Beaulieu: *La Rênovation de l'Asie.* V. Chirol: *The Far Eastern Question.* Sir R. K. Douglas: *Europe and the Far East.* H. Wickham Steed: *The Hapsburg Monarchy,* and *Through Thirty Years.* A. F. Pribram: *Austrian Foreign Policy* and *Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary.* C. Seymour: *Diplomatic Background of the War.* E. Brandenburg: *From Bismarck to the World War* (E.T.). A. Tardieu: *France and the Alliances* (E.T.), and *La Conférence d'Algeçiras.* J. A. R. Marriott: *The Eastern Question; History of Europe, 1815–1939; France;* and *Anglo-Russian Relations.* P. Albin: *Le Coup d'Agadir.* Barclay: *The Turco-Italian War.* L. Villari: *The Expansion of Italy.* J. G. Schurman: *The Balkan Wars.* R. W. Seton-Watson: *Serajevo.*


FAR EAST. POLITICAL DIVISIONS AFTER RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
Nikolayevsk
SAKHALIN
Irkutsk
MANCHURIA
AMUR
Harbin
MONGOLIA
Mukden
Vladivostok
JAPAN
PEKIN
Tientsin
KOREA
Seoul
TOKIO
Port Arthur
Liao-Tung Pen.
Tsushima
Wei-hai-wei (Br.)
Kiaochow (Germ.)
HWANG-HO
Nagasaki
NANKIN
SHANGHAI
Ningpo
YANG-TSE-KIANG
Foo-chow
Amoy
CANTON
FORMOSA
Macao (Port.)
HONG KONG (Br.)
TONQUIN
Hanoi
ANNAM
SIAM
BANKOK
CAMBODIA
Saigon
Manila
PHILIPPINE Is.
500 MILES
CHINA
JAPAN
SIAM
BRITISH
FRENCH
RUSSIAN
U.S.A.
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CHAPTER XXXV

ON THE BRINK OF ARMAGEDDON (1906–14)

Chief Dates

1905. The Kaiser at Tangier (3rd March).
1905. Delcassé resigns.
1906. Algeçiras Conference (January to April).
1907. Second Peace Conference at the Hague.
1911. The *Panther* at Agadir (1st July).
1911. Italian expedition to Tripoli.
1912. The Balkan League.
1912. Treaty of Lausanne (Italy and Turkey), 18th October.
1912. First Balkan War (October to December).
1912. London Conference (December).
1913. Balkan War renewed (February).
1913. Treaty of London (30th May).
1913. Balkan War of Partition (June to July).
1913. Treaty of Bucharest (10th August).
1914. Kiel Canal reopened (23rd June).
1914. Archduke murdered at Serajevo (28th June).
1914. Austrian-Hungarian note to Serbia (23rd July).

BISMARCK, shortly before his death, predicted that the Great War would come from the Near East. He was right; but the Balkans were not the only storm centre. Among the immediate antecedents of the war, Morocco was hardly less important.

MOROCCO

The significance of the Moroccan question can be understood only by a glance at the map. 'The northern coast of Africa,' it has been truly said, 'from Morocco to the peninsula of Sinai and Syria where it joins the continent of Asia geographically belongs to the Mediterranean area and system. The history of this portion (of Africa) is primarily European.' With the partial exception of Egypt it is now (1932) entirely under the control of European Powers. Morocco, the largest of the Barbary States, occupies the north-western corner of the vast continent

from whose hinterland it is cut off by a girdle of mountains and deserts. Immediately to the east of it is Algeria, which since 1830 has passed gradually under the control of France, whose North and West African dominion now extends continuously from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Guinea. Since 1847 Algeria has become virtually a French 'Department,' returning members to the French Chamber. To the east of Algeria is Tunis, which passed under the Protectorate of France, as already indicated, in 1881. East of Tunis is Tripoli, which is now Italian.

After the death in 1894 of Muley Hassan, accounted, and justly, 'one of the strongest Sultans Morocco had ever known,' Morocco rapidly lapsed into a condition of anarchy. Sir Arthur Nicolson (Lord Carnock), who in 1895 was appointed British Minister in Morocco, reported that he found the country 'a loose agglomeration of turbulent tribes, corrupt governors, and general poverty and distress.'[1] Anarchy in Morocco was naturally a matter of grave concern to the French, whose Algerian frontier was to the south ill-defined. English traders also complained of the looting of their goods by Riff pirates. 'The country,' wrote Nicolson to the Foreign Office, 'is going backward and backward, and commerce languishing. . . . Merchants find it impossible to collect debts. It is rapacity, treachery, intrigue, and misgovernment. I have been in most Oriental countries, but I have never seen such darkness as reigns here. . . . From what I hear the Moors would welcome any European invader.' Four years later (1900) he again reported: 'I do not believe that it is possible to reform this country from within.'

The condition of Morocco formed the subject of serious conversations between English and German diplomatists from 1899–1901, and from 1901 onward it became plain that France, despite repeated disclaimers, had serious designs upon it. French susceptibilities were undoubtedly excited by the fact that for the last ten years or more the most influential man at the Sultan's court was a Scotsman, Kaid Sir Harry Maclean, Commander of the Moorish Army.

[1] H. Nicolson, *Life of Sir A. Nicolson* (p. 112). This excellent biography contains much the best account of the Moroccan problem known to me, and the following paragraphs owe much to it.

Upon Morocco, however, England never had any designs, and Nicolson constantly advised the Sultan to give no cause of offence to France.

In 1902 France proposed to Spain a scheme for the 'contingent partition' of Morocco; Spain suggested consultation with England, but Lord Lansdowne deprecated the attempt to deal prematurely with the 'liquidation' of Morocco. The Sultan, however, was seriously alarmed, and intimated that failing the 'protection' from England, for which he begged, he must apply to Berlin. In 1903 France informed the British Government that she could not be indifferent to the prevalence of anarchy in Morocco 'or admit that it was the business of any other Power but France to undertake the task of regenerating the country.'

That claim, as already indicated, was frankly and fully conceded in the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904. To that Agreement Germany 'made no objection,' but in March 1905 Prince Bülow insisted that his master, quite against his own judgement, should visit Tangier. King Edward characterized the incident 'as the clumsiest bit of diplomacy he ever heard of and an egregious blunder,' and the blunder was accentuated by the Kaiser's announcement that his visit was paid to 'an independent sovereign.' It was followed up by a demand for the summoning of a Conference and for the repudiation by France of the 'Minister who had made the trouble.' France, conscious of her unpreparedness for war, yielded for the moment to this arrogant demand, and on 12th June 1905 Delcassé resigned.

THE ALGEÇIRAS CONFERENCE

The Conference met in January 1906 at Algeçiras, near Gibraltar. Germany hoped that the Conference would make clear to the world her right to a voice in the Moroccan question, and would demonstrate the hollowness of the Anglo-French *Entente*. The actual effect of it was, on the contrary, to strengthen and solidify England's friendship with France; to hasten on her agreement with Russia; and—not least important—to weaken the adhesion of Italy to the Triple Alliance. Conscious of her defeat at Algeçiras, Germany sought for diplomatic compensation elsewhere. She found it in the humiliation inflicted on Russia in 1909. The Kaiser, however, was uneasy, and in 1909 made a friendly agreement about

Morocco with France, and in 1910 came to an understanding with Russia.

The Franco-German Agreement was, however, so vague, and the anarchy in Morocco so appalling, that on 11th April the French were compelled to land troops in Morocco to restore order, and in May occupied Fez, the Moroccan capital. The French, disclaiming any desire to impugn the independence of the Sultan, began to retire from Fez in June, but on 1st July Germany informed France that a German gunboat, the *Panther*, had been sent to Agadir, an open roadstead on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, to protect German interests in Morocco.

AGADIR

The Agadir incident is still wrapped in some mystery, but Germany's action was evidently intended to inflict humiliation upon France; and, to a thinly veiled demand for the partition of Morocco between Germany, France, and Spain, France hotly retorted that she was the paramount Power in Morocco, and had been recognized as such. Great Britain supported France. War seemed imminent, but at the eleventh hour Germany gave way, and in November concluded a comprehensive treaty with France, by which Germany virtually acknowledged a French Protectorate over Morocco, and France ceded to Germany half the French Congo. The wrath of Germany, diverted momentarily from France, was now turned full upon England. A conflict with her was now declared by the *Germania* (29th November) to be 'more than ever inevitable.' It was postponed by events in the Near East.

To some minds it may seem ironical that between the two Moroccan crises a Second Peace Conference should have met at the Hague. The first had met on the initiative of the Czar Nicholas II of Russia in 1899. Since 1815 there had been an increasing resort to arbitration for the settlement of international disputes of relatively trivial character. In 1899 the Czar made a serious effort to secure the adhesion of the Powers, not only to the principle of arbitration, but to the practice of disarmament. Twenty-six States, including all the Great Powers, were represented. Toward disarmament no progress was made, but an Arbitration Court was established, though recourse to it was not made obligatory.

THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE

The Czar renewed his efforts in 1907, and forty-five States accepted his invitation. Since 1899 armaments had greatly increased, and Germany in 1907 successfully obstructed any serious discussion of the subject. The Conference affirmed, however, the principle of compulsory arbitration 'in certain disputes,' and decided to meet again in 1914. It did not meet in 1914, but the Conference did give a real impulse to the conclusion of arbitration treaties.

Nevertheless, from 1911 to 1918 wars were almost continuous in Europe. Italy set the ball rolling. Italy, as already indicated, had achieved her national unity in 1871, and naturally aspired to a place among the Great Powers. The half-century that followed unification was, however, a period of trial and tribulation for the young Kingdom. The pace between 1859 and 1871 had perhaps been too rapid. Italy was committed by Cavour to a parliamentary régime on the English model for which she was, if not congenitally unfitted, certainly unready. Between the death of Cavour (1861) and the advent of Signor Mussolini (1919) Italy produced no statesman of the first rank with the possible exception of Francesco Crispi, and Crispi's genius was not of the parliamentary order. Backward in education; with a large proportion of absolute illiterates; greatly retarded by poverty and lack of industrial equipment and resources; burdened with heavy taxation; and with an administration, central and local, permeated by corruption, Italy seemed to have purchased liberty and unity at too great a price.

ITALY (1870–1911)

Nor was her external position free from embarrassment. On the one hand, there was the problem of the Adriatic; on the other, the problem of the Mediterranean. The first rendered a conflict with Austria inevitable; the second embittered the relations of Italy and France.

ITALIA IRREDENTA

'Unredeemed' Italy was a constant thorn in the flesh of ardent nationalists, the *Irredentists*. They held that Italian unity was incomplete without the Southern Tyrol or Trentino, without Görz and Trieste, without Istria and Dalmatia, all of which Austria had retained after the war of 1866. In fact, the Irredentists desired to see Italy, as Venice had been of old, mistress of the Adriatic.

Mistress of the Mediterranean Italy could hardly hope to become, but she was not disposed to concede that position to France. Despite the debt which modern Italy unquestionably owes to both Napoleons, France was profoundly mistrusted. Nor can it be denied that French policy after 1859 went far to justify suspicion. Bismarck, as we have seen, fomented it. In 1881 he encouraged France to take Tunis. Italy feared lest Tunis should be a prelude to Tripoli, and that France would 'presently encircle her with a ring of iron.' That fear drove her (1882) into the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Greatly to her advantage as regards France, the Triple Alliance closed the door to ambitions which she could fulfil only at the expense of Austria. Meanwhile, she cultivated the most cordial relations with England, and in subsequent renewals of the Triple Alliance, always stipulated that friendship with Germany should not involve her in hostilities with England.

Great Britain she desired to emulate not only in the parliamentary but also in the colonial field; her attempts to do so in North-East Africa and Abyssinia were, however, uniformly unfortunate. The advance of the French in North Africa greatly alarmed her, though her reversionary rights on Tripoli were tacitly recognized in the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, and again at Algeçiras.

THE TURCO-ITALIAN WAR (1911–12)

Those rights were, however, threatened from another quarter. For years past Italy had been pursuing a consistent policy of economic penetration in Tripoli. Formal annexation was, it was generally assumed, only a matter of opportunity. But after the Young Turk Revolution (1908) every species of insult was heaped on the Italian merchants, bankers, and engineers who formed the advance-guard of the Italian occupation. They found themselves thwarted at every turn by newly-appointed Turkish officials. Simultaneously, German archæologists and geologists manifested increased zeal in their scientific investigations in Tripoli. Could there be any connexion between the activities of Moslem officials and those of Teutonic professors? Anyway, Italy was alarmed.

In October 1909 the Czar Nicholas of Russia paid a

ceremonial visit to King Victor Emmanuel, and promised not to obstruct Italy's designs on Tripoli, while Italy accepted Russian views as to the future of the Straits. England and France subsequently adhered to these agreements. Turkey was thus isolated; in September 1911 Italy demanded her consent to an Italian occupation of Tripoli, and two days later declared war.

The Italians occupied the coast towns of Tripoli without much opposition, and also Rhodes and the Dodecanese Archipelago, but made little progress against the combined resistance of Turks and Arabs in the interior of Tripoli. The war seemed likely to drag on indefinitely, when the Turks, threatened by a new danger, suddenly concluded peace with Italy at Lausanne (18th October 1912). Italy kept Tripoli, and, pending the fulfilment of other conditions, Rhodes and the islands as well.

The Ottoman Empire was already involved in another and far more serious conflict. A miracle had happened.

THE FIRST BALKAN WAR

The patience and skill of two statesmen, M. Venizelos of Greece and M. Gueshoff of Bulgaria, had brought their respective States into a League with each other, and with Serbia and Montenegro against the Porte. In view of their conflicting interests in the Peninsula, and of ancient enmities,[1] this was a remarkable achievement. A still greater was the sequel. On 8th October 1912 Montenegro declared war upon Turkey; on the 14th Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece presented their ultimatum at Constantinople. By the 18th the Porte was at war with the four confederates.

Within the brief space of one month, as M. Gueshoff triumphantly wrote, 'the Balkan Alliance demolished the Ottoman Empire, four tiny countries with a population of 10,000,000 souls defeating a Great Power whose inhabitants numbered 25,000,000.' On 3rd December the belligerents accepted an armistice proposed to them by the Powers, but from it the Greek fleet was excluded, as its activities in the Aegean were too important to the League to permit even temporary interruption.

Ten days after the signature of the armistice, delegates

[1] For details cf. Marriott: *The Eastern Question* (4th ed., Oxford, 1940), chapters xv and xvi.

from all the belligerents met in London, where Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, had been working assiduously, first to avert the war, and then to bring it quickly to an end. Terms had just been arranged when (23rd January 1913) the Young Turks effected a *coup d'état* at Constantinople, and this brought the negotiations in London to an abrupt conclusion.

RESUMPTION OF WAR

War in the Balkans was resumed on 4th February and continued until late in April; negotiations were reopened in London in May, and peace was signed on 30th May. The Porte gave up Crete and all its European possessions beyond a line drawn from Media on the Black Sea to Enos on the Aegean. Save for the city of Constantinople and its environs, Turkey in Europe was virtually at an end.

THE WAR OF PARTITION

But how were the spoils to be divided among the victors? About that the Treaty of London was silent. That treaty merely affixed the common seal of Europe to a deed for winding up the affairs of the Ottoman Empire in Turkey. But how were the assets to be divided among the creditors? Bitter disputes between them ensued, so bitter that on 2nd June 1913 Serbia and Greece concluded an offensive and defensive alliance against Bulgaria, and on the 29th the Bulgarians attacked the Serbians. The Serbians and the Greeks drove the Bulgarians before them, horrible cruelties being committed, in this war between allies, on both sides. Bulgaria was then attacked on another front. On 9th July the Roumanians came in, seized Silistria and marched on Sophia. The chance was too good for the Turks to miss. On 12th July they also fell upon the hard-pressed Bulgarians, and recaptured Adrianople. Beaten to the earth, the Bulgarians cried for mercy; an armistice was concluded on 30th July, and on 10th August Peace was signed at Bucharest. Bulgaria had to cede to Roumania a large strip of the Dobrudja, including the important fortress of Silistria, and also to surrender her claims on almost the whole of Macedonia, which was divided between Serbia and Greece. The latter also obtained Epirus, while Serbia and Montenegro divided Novi Bazar between them. The Turks recovered Adrianople from Bulgaria, but in the three wars she had lost, on balance, over 4,000,000 population, and was reduced in area from 65,350

square miles to 10,882. Serbia was increased about 50 per cent in population and still more in area. Greece was the greatest gainer. She was nearly doubled in area and population, as was Montenegro. Crete was finally assigned to Greece, as were all the Aegean islands (except Imbros and Tenedos) of which the Porte could dispose. Italy held on to the Dodecanese including Rhodes. Roumania and Serbia also reaped a rich harvest, but the German Powers still denied Serbia access to the Adriatic, while Greece cut her off from the Aegean.

The settlement was not, however, a lasting one. On the day before the Treaty of Bucharest was signed Austria-Hungary communicated to Germany and Italy her intention of taking action against Serbia, and claimed that as that action was 'defensive' it would bring into operation the *casus fœderis* of the Triple Alliance. Italy refused to recognize the contemplated aggression of her ally as coming within the terms of the Triple Alliance. Berlin also exercised a restraining influence upon Vienna. Accordingly, the Hapsburgs postponed their attack upon Serbia; but only for eleven months.

Serbia had committed two unpardonable crimes: she had strengthened the barrier between Austria-Hungary and Salonika and she had also immensely enhanced her own prestige as representing Jugo-Slav, not to add Pan-Slavist aspirations. Nor did Serbia stand alone. Greece firmly planted in Salonika barred the access of the Hapsburgs to the Aegean. Roumania also was in the way. The dream of a Greater Roumania could be realized only at the expense of Hungary. Nor was Germany uninterested in Balkan affairs. Belgrade blocked the road not only to Salonika but to Constantinople. It lay on the route of the projected Berlin to Basra Railway. The Power which held Belgrade must be crushed. Bismarck's prognosis was not at fault; the world-war would come from the East. In order to displace the 'Guardians of the Gate' Europe was to be involved in the greatest war it had yet known.

In 1914 events moved rapidly.

On 12th June 1914 the Kaiser, accompanied by Admiral von Tirpitz the head of the German Admiralty, paid a visit to Konopischt in Bohemia, the castle of the Archduke Franz

Ferdinand, the heir to the Hapsburg Empire. The Archduke was credited with strong anti-Magyar and pro-Serb sentiments. What passed between the host and his visitor is still largely a matter of conjecture.[1]

THE WORLD WAR

On 23rd June the Kiel Canal was reopened after a reconstruction which, by allowing the largest battleships to pass through it, doubled the fighting strength of the German fleet. On 28th June Franz Ferdinand, after attending the Bosnian manœuvres as Inspector-General of the Army, paid a visit with his consort to Serajevo, the Bosnian capital, and husband and wife were there assassinated. The murderers, though Bosnian subjects, were by birth Serbs. That it was an act of political revenge for the annexation of the Slav province by Austria cannot be questioned; but apart from that, the circumstances of the crime were and are mysterious.[2]

Austria-Hungary not unnaturally held Serbia responsible for a crime committed by Serbs and planned at Belgrade. On 23rd July she addressed to Serbia an ultimatum,[3] and gave Serbia only forty-eight hours for a reply. Serbia made abject submission, accepting promptly eight out of the ten chief points, and not actually rejecting the other two. England, ever since the Archduke's murder, had made earnest endeavours to avert a war, and even after 23rd July did not abandon them. On 28th July Austria declared war on Serbia. Serbia applied to Russia for help. On the 29th Great Britain still urged arbitration by any method acceptable to Germany. Germany replied by a demand for the 'unconditional neutrality' of Great Britain. To promise that was to abandon France. England could not give the promise. Russia, meanwhile, had begun to mobilize. Germany declared war upon her on 1st August, on France on the 3rd, and on the 4th sent an army into Belgium. At midnight of that day Great Britain and Germany were at war.

[1] A report by Baron Trentler who was Prussian Minister in attendance on the Kaiser at Konopischt is the most authoritative account we possess. It was published in *Deutsche Politik*, of 14th May 1920. Cf. also for a more sensational story, W. Steed: *Through Thirty Years*.

[2] cf. and for references to authorities, Marriott: *Europe 1815–1939* (1944), chap. xxvi.

[3] Text in Marriott: *Eastern Question* (4th ed.), pp. 477–81.

RESPONSIBILITY

Who was responsible for this catastrophe? Austria was the immediate criminal. The war party in Vienna evidently meant to use the crime as an excuse for removing the outstanding barrier to the access of Austria to the Aegean. Berlin may or may not have approved the action of Vienna, but by twenty years of clumsy diplomacy had got itself involved in a situation from which there was no escape.[1] Germany was as much bound to support Austria as was Russia to support Serbia. France did not want war, but was bound to Russia. England detested the idea of war, but could not in honour allow Germany to destroy France. *Hinc illae lacrymae.* Not for many a long day were those tears staunched.

FOR FURTHER READING
SEE CHAPTERS XXXIII AND XXXIV

[1] For proof of this statement see Brandenburg, *op. cit. passim.*

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE WORLD WAR (1914–18)

Chief Dates

1914.

July 28. Austria declares war on Serbia.

Aug. 1. Germany declares war on Russia; on France (3rd August); on Belgium (4th August).

4 Great Britain declares war on Germany.

16 British Army landed in France.

23 Japan declares war on Germany.

Sept. 5 First Battle of the Marne begins.

Oct. 9 Fall of Antwerp.

Nov. 5 Great Britain declares war on Turkey.

Dec. 8 Sir D. Sturdee's victory off the Falklands.

1915.

Feb. 18 U-boat blockade of England.

25. Naval attack on Dardanelles.

April 25. Allies land in Gallipoli.

May 7. *Lusitania* torpedoed.

23. Italy declares war on Austria.

July 9. Botha conquers South-West Africa.

Oct. 5. Allies land at Salonika.

9. Austro-Germans occupy Belgrade.

12. Bulgaria at war with Serbia.

Dec. 19. Withdrawal from Gallipoli.

1916.

Feb. 18. Cameroons conquered.

April 29. Fall of Kut-el-Amara.

May 31. Battle of Jutland.

June 5. Lord Kitchener lost at sea.

Aug. 27. Roumania enters the war.

Dec. 7. Mr. Lloyd George succeeds Mr. Asquith as Premier.

15. French victory at Verdun.

20. President Wilson's Peace Note.

1917.

Feb. 1. Unrestricted U-boat war begins.

Mar. 12. Revolution in Russia.

April 6. America declares war on Germany.

1918.

Feb. 9. Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Mar. 21. German offensive in the West begun.

April 14. General Foch Allied Generalissimo.

July 18. Allied counter-attack.

Sept. 27. Hindenburg line broken.

Sept. 29. Bulgaria surrenders; King Ferdinand abdicates (4th October).

Nov. 4. Austria surrenders.

9. Berlin Revolution; the Kaiser abdicates.

11. Armistic terms accepted

THE war, initiated by the Austrian attack on Serbia, presently engulfed the whole world. The actual fighting was on no fewer than seven 'Fronts.' To each of these vast and widely distributed theatres of war only a few words can be devoted.

THE WAR
THE WESTERN FRONT

The German plan was to march through Belgium, peacefully if it might be, forcibly if necessary, to thrust rapidly at Paris, and having captured Paris, and (perhaps) the Channel ports, to impose terms on France. The plan was frustrated by the heroic resistance of the Belgians and by the prompt dispatch to France of the British Expeditionary Force—perfectly trained and equipped, but tragically inadequate in numbers. The refusal of Belgium to give free passage to the German Army brought upon it every imaginable horror at the hands of the exasperated Germans. Liége surrendered on 7th August; the Germans entered Brussels on the 20th; on the 24th Namur surrendered; and Antwerp on 9th October. The British troops which landed in France on 16th August were driven back from Mons, and the Aisne was then forced by the Germans who, by the end of August, were within striking distance of Paris. But at the great battle of the Marne (6th to 12th September) the tide turned, the Germans were driven back to the Aisne; there they dug themselves in, and for four long years the Germans and the Allies faced each other in a series of trenches which extended from the Channel to the frontier of Switzerland. Great and bloody battles were fought at Ypres (October–November 1914); a second at Ypres (22nd April to 24th May 1915); around Verdun, which made an heroic and successful resistance against heroic attacks (February–October 1916); on the Somme, where the biggest battle, up to that date, in all recorded history, was fought from July to November 1916; and a third battle round Ypres (August–November 1917), where the British lost nearly 250,000 men and the Germans perhaps nearly as many. The best opinion is that Sir Douglas Haig (who in December 1915 had succeeded Sir John French in the chief command of the British forces) would have won through in 1917 had he not been obliged to send off five divisions to Italy, and had not the Russian Revolution enabled Germany to concentrate all her forces on the Western Front.

By 1918 troops from America (who had declared war on Germany in April 1917) were beginning to come to the assistance of the war-worn Allies. Between March and July 1918 the Germans launched four terrific attacks on the Franco-British Front, and their advance was stayed only before Amiens. The French Marshal Foch had been made Generalissimo of all the allied forces in April. He allowed the Germans to cross the Marne, but at last on 18th July counter-attacked, and the Germans were driven back with immense loss. On 8th August the British counter-offensive began, and the victorious advance of the British did not stop until on 11th November the Germans accepted the terms of an Armistice dictated to them by the Allies. By that time Germany was in revolution; the Kaiser had abdicated on 9th November, and was a fugitive in Holland.

The war was decided on the Western Front, but in six other theatres momentous scenes had been enacted. Russia, having mobilized rapidly, had rendered valuable service to the Allies in the early months of the war, and in 1916, under the Grand Duke Nicholas, she won a series of victories against the Turks and raised the hope that she might give effective help to us in Mesopotamia. But her troops were ill equipped; she lacked guns and munitions, and the efforts in the field were paralysed, if not by actual treachery, by gross maladministration. She gave no help to Roumania who, in reliance upon her, had joined the allied cause in August 1916, and in 1917 the Russian edifice, rotten to the core, collapsed. The Czar Nicholas, a pathetic figure, abdicated on 15th March, and was subsequently with the Czarina and their children foully murdered. 'The moderates,' who had made the revolution in March, were, in November, pushed aside by Lenin, Trotsky, and their Bolshevist followers. The Russian fleet mutinied and murdered their officers; the half-starved and ill-armed peasants rushed back from the Front to secure the loot promised by the Bolshevists; the latter abandoned the 'capitalists' war' in December, and in March 1918 concluded peace with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. The collapse of Russia compelled Roumania also to conclude Peace (at Bucharest, May 1918).

RUSSIA

Italy had for some time been increasingly embarrassed

by her membership of the Triple Alliance. Germany strove to prevent an actual rupture of the Alliance, and urged Austria to concede the claims of Italy. The claims, as ultimately formulated, were such as Austria could not be expected to concede unless and until she was beaten to her knees. Consequently, on 24th May 1915, Italy declared war against Austria, and shortly afterward against Bulgaria and Turkey, but not until August 1916 against Germany.

ITALY

A week before the declaration of war on Austria, Italy had concluded with Great Britain, France, and Austria the (Secret) Treaty of London. She undertook to put 'all her strength' into the war, and in return was to receive the Trentino, the Southern Tyrol up to the Brenner Pass, Trieste, half Istria and its archipelago, Dalmatia, most of the Adriatic islands, and she was to retain Valona and the Dodecanese and (contingently) to get some 'compensations' in Africa.

Italy was ill prepared for war, and did not possess the material resources which facilitated improvisation in England. In the campaigns of 1915–16 she repulsed the Austrian offensive in the Trentino, but made little progress in her own attack upon the Austrians on the Isonzo front. In 1917 the collapse of Russia enabled Austria to concentrate her efforts on the Italian front; she was also reinforced by six German Divisions, and was thus enabled to inflict a crushing defeat on the Italians at Caporetto (October–November 1917). Fortunately a stand was made on the Piave; French and British reinforcements were sent to the succour of Italy; the Austrian attack, tardily renewed in June 1918, was repelled, and in a brief but brilliant campaign (known as the battle of Vittorio Veneto) the Italian and British forces chased the Austrians out of Italy. On 4th November Austria begged for an Armistice.

Italy had also sent considerable forces to Albania and Salonika. It still remains a question whether, had their diplomacy been less inept, the Allies would have had to fight in the Near East or in the Middle East at all. Turkey would have been a valuable ally to us; to the success of the German plan of campaign against the British Empire, Turkish co-operation was indispensable. Germany spared no efforts to secure it, and on 5th November

THE NEAR EAST

Great Britain and Turkey were for the first time at war.

GALLIPOLI

In February 1915 a combined British and French fleet attempted to force the passage of the Straits and capture Constantinople; but it soon became clear that the Navy alone could not do it, and in the course of the summer armies, totalling over 300,000 men, were poured into the Gallipoli peninsula. They included, in addition to British troops, mainly Territorials, some magnificent troops sent from Australia and New Zealand (now immortalized as Anzacs). The troops displayed heroic courage, and once at least the expedition was within sight of a brilliant victory, which, if achieved, would have shortened the war by at least two years. But the conditions were impossible, and after much debate at home it was decided to abandon the attempt. The task of evacuating an untenable position was assigned to Sir Charles Munro who, by the end of December, by a miracle of organization, performed it with the loss of only one life. Nearly all the guns, stores, and mules were also saved. No incident in the war produced such a painful effect in England as the Gallipoli fiasco. The loss of life was terrible, but it was not wholly wasted; the Turkish efforts in other theatres of war were greatly weakened.

SERBIA

Meanwhile Serbia had twice repulsed Austrian attacks, but on 19th October 1915 she was invaded by a powerful Austro-German army under Field-Marshal von Mackensen, which captured Belgrade (9th October 1915), and inflicted such a terrible chastisement on the Serbians that by the end of November Germany officially declared the Balkan War to be at an end. Bulgaria had come in on the side of the German Powers, and two days after the surrender of Belgrade, fell on the Serbians at Nish, which had to be abandoned on 5th November. Greece was still maintaining a neutrality more than benevolent toward Germany, but early in October—too late to save Serbia—an Anglo-French force was landed at Salonika, and the British Navy occupied various Greek islands. In the autumn of 1916 M. Venizelos, repudiating the authority of his King (Constantine), set up a provisional Government at Salonika, and joined the Allies.[1]

In June 1917 King Constantine was deposed, and Greece

[1] See note p. 402.

at last took its place in the Grand Alliance. Not, however, until September 1918 was an energetic advance made from Salonika. A fortnight's fighting sufficed for the Bulgarians, who on 30th September made an unconditional surrender. On 12th October the Serbians had the satisfaction of occupying their old capital, Nish, and so cut the Berlin-Constantinople Railway at a vital point. An advance on Constantinople was arrested only by the conclusion of an Armistice with the Turks (30th October).

GREECE

Four days before the Armistice, the war had been brought to a brilliantly successful conclusion in another theatre. The Suez Canal is 'the spinal cord' of the British Empire, and as soon as the Turks had definitely come down on the side of the Central Empires it was deemed wise to depose the Khedive of Egypt, Abbas II, and to establish a formal British Protectorate over Egypt. Cyprus was, at the same time, formally annexed to the British Crown (November–December 1914). In February 1915 the Turks made the first of several attempts on the Suez Canal, but they were all repulsed with heavy loss, and in March 1916 Sir Archibald Murray advanced into Palestine. He suffered a serious defeat at the hands of the Turk at Gaza (April 1917), and was replaced by Sir Edmund (Viscount) Allenby. Allenby, reinforced from India and Salonika, quickly retrieved the position, and on 9th December crowned a brilliant campaign by the capture of Jerusalem. Early in 1918 he established communications with the Arabs and the King of the Hedjaz, whose allegiance had been secured by 'Lawrence of Arabia' and captured Jericho on 21st February, but some of his best troops were then drawn away to meet the German offensive on the Western Front, and he was not ready to resume and complete his Palestine campaign until the autumn. On 20th September, however, he occupied Nazareth, and then in rapid succession Damascus, where he took 60,000 prisoners, Beirut, Sidon, Tripoli, and Aleppo. By the end of October Palestine and Syria had passed into English keeping.

EGYPT AND PALESTINE

The Mesopotamian campaign, the course of which had been more chequered, was simultaneously brought to an equally successful conclusion. In order to protect the wells which supplied oil for our ships, Basra had been occupied by an Indian Division in

MESOPOTAMIA

November 1914. Reinforced from India, the troops advanced in 1915 up the Tigris, and having inflicted one or two heavy defeats on the Turks, occupied Kut (28th September 1915). From Kut, General Townshend, who was in command, advanced, against his own better judgment, toward Bagdad, but having fought a brilliant action at Ctesiphon (22nd to 25th November) was compelled by lack of ammunition to fall back on Kut, with the loss of half his force. There he was besieged for five months, and had to surrender on 29th April 1916.

This disaster had a damaging effect on our prestige in India whence most of the troops had been drawn, but prompt steps were taken to retrieve it. A fresh expedition, well organized and well equipped, was dispatched to Mesopotamia under the command of Sir Stanley Maude, who made a skilful advance, recovered Kut (24th February 1917), completely defeated the Turks, and entered Bagdad on 11th March.

AFRICA

Germany, generously treated in the partitions of Africa (1884–1890), was in 1914 in possession of South-West Africa (Damaraland and Namaraland), of Togoland the Cameroons on the Gold Coast, and of a great dominion in East Africa.

Within a month after the outbreak of the war, Togoland was captured by a Franco-British force, and at the Peace was divided between the captors. In the south-west, General Botha, having first suppressed a rebellion headed by De Wet in his own country, led an army into German South-West Africa, and captured its capital, Windhuk, on 12th May 1915. The Germans made an unconditional surrender in July, and the South-West passed into the hands of the Union of South Africa, and at the Peace was retained by it under mandate.[1]

The conquest of the Cameroons proved a tougher job, but by February 1916 it had been captured by French and British forces. At the Peace it was divided between Great Britain and France, to be held under mandate.

Of all the African campaigns much the most arduous and prolonged was that fought for possession of German East Africa. In the natives of the territory the Germans had some excellent fighting material, and they trained them with their customary thoroughness and skill. A British attack on Tanga was repulsed in November 1914, and not until General

[1] See *infra*, p. 415.

Smuts took over the command of the British forces at the beginning of 1916 was any effective progress made. Dar-es-Salaam was captured in September 1916, but another fourteen months of hard fighting were required before the Germans were cleared out of the colony. They took refuge in Portuguese East Africa, and thence in the autumn of 1918 made their way into Northern Rhodesia; nor did they surrender until compelled to do so by the terms of the Armistice.

From Africa it is an easy transition to the Indian Ocean and thence to the Pacific. When the Great War broke out, Australia and New Zealand showed not a moment's hesitation. Britain's war was their war: the whole British Empire was necessarily involved in it. Before the war ended Australia and New Zealand, out of a population of 6,000,000 had contributed 500,000 men to the Imperial Forces; India had contributed 1,000,000. That we were able to transport this vast force across thousands of miles of ocean in comparative safety was due to the Japanese alliance and to the protection afforded by the Japanese Navy. In the first weeks of the war much damage was inflicted upon British merchantmen by the German cruiser *Emden*, and not until 10th November was this gallant enemy vessel hunted down and sunk off Cocos Island by the Australian cruiser *Sydney*. The main body of the German Pacific squadron, *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Leipzig*, *Nuremberg*, and *Dresden*, commanded by Admiral von Spee, not only inflicted an immense amount of damage on our commerce, but won a spectacular victory off the coast of Chile (whence it was liberally supplied with coal) against *Good Hope*, *Monmouth*, and *Glasgow*. *Glasgow*, a swift little cruiser, was sent off to warn the Falkland Isles; the other two cruisers were sunk in less than an hour; the admiral went down with 1400 officers and men. Such was the 'Battle of Coronel.'

THE WAR AT SEA

The German triumph was short-lived. The Admiralty promptly sent out a powerful squadron under Sir Doveton Sturdee, who making all speed reached the Falkland Islands on 7th December. On the very next day he fell in with von Spee, and after a gallant fight, *Gneisenau*, *Scharnhorst*, *Leipzig*, and *Nuremberg* were sunk. The British loss was only seven men killed. *Dresden* escaped for the moment, but was caught and sunk three months later off Juan Fernandez.

The Pacific was cleared. But how we should have fared had Japan been a member of the Triple Alliance or even a neutral can easily be imagined.

Meanwhile, the German possessions in the Pacific and the Far East had been swept up in the first months of the war. German Samoa was occupied by a New Zealand force on 29th August, the Bismarck Archipelago and German New Guinea fell to the Australians in September, the Marshall and Caroline Islands to the Japanese, who also joined with us in a successful attack upon Kiauchow (17th November).

The results of the war at sea were, then, as regards the 'outer Empire' highly satisfactory. Nearer home the victory was ultimately won by pressure, unrelaxed but for the most part silent, in the North Sea, and by vigilant watch in the Channel, the Mediterranean, and the eastern Atlantic. In the meantime, however, our insular position and our almost complete dependence for the food of our people and raw material for our factories upon supplies from overseas, caused grave anxiety to those who knew the facts.

THE INSULAR STATE

The first months of 1915 were marked by the opening of a new phase in the war at sea. On 15th February a blockade of the British coasts was declared by Germany, and was to some extent enforced by her submarines. On 7th May 1915 Germany committed one of the greatest crimes and perhaps the greatest blunder of which even she has ever been guilty. Her submarines torpedoed the great Atlantic liner the *Lusitania*, with the loss of over a thousand non-combatants, men, women, and children. Had Germany's ultimate fate ever been in doubt, that great crime had sealed it. From that moment the conscience of the American people was aroused, and it was only a matter of time how soon moral indignation would translate itself into effective military action.

THE SUBMARINE MENACE

During the first twenty months of the war little was heard of the Grand Fleets either of England or of Germany. Our own Grand Fleet, commanded by Admiral Jellicoe, and based on Scapa Flow in the Orkneys and Rosyth, was mostly patrolling the North Sea. The German Fleet was safe in harbour, but at length it resolved to try conclusions, and on 31st May 1916 the fleets

JUTLAND

of England and Germany met in the mighty conflict which to all time will be known as the Battle of Jutland. One hundred and forty-five British ships and 110 German ships were engaged. Of Dreadnoughts we had 28 against 16; of cruisers of various types, 40 against 16; of destroyers, 77 against 72; but Germany had in addition 6 pre-Dreadnought battleships. As to the result of the battle, experts are still disputing.

We hoped that Jutland had done its work. Yet in the spring of 1917 the allied position was unspeakably grave. Germany carried out her threat of 'unrestricted' submarine warfare—the sinking of unarmed merchantmen, hospital ships, anything afloat, without warning. For many months the new method proved terribly effective. By April 1917 British ships had carried, in comparative safety, no less than 8,000,000 troops overseas; they had kept open the allied lines of communication in the Channel, in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean (with the help of French, Italian, and a few Japanese ships), in the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific; they had brought to the Allies food and munitions. But they had accomplished this wonderful task at a high cost in lives and ships, and the strain upon them was intense.

THE SITUATION IN 1917

In the early summer of 1917 the strain came perilously near the breaking-point. The losses of British, Allied, and neutral ships increased from 181 in January to 423 in April. In April, writes Mr. Churchill, 'the great approach to the south-west of Ireland was becoming a veritable cemetery of British shipping, in which large vessels were sunk day by day about 200 miles from land.' [1] One ship out of every four that left British shores never came home, but as Mr. Churchill proudly and justly adds: 'No voyage was delayed for lack of resolute civilian volunteers.' [2] The facts were known in Germany, where it was calculated that the end must come in July or at lastest by 1st August. Unless the submarine peril could be countered, surrender, according to the official view of the British Admiralty, could not be postponed beyond November.

Happily for the world, countered it was by the adoption of the 'convoy' system and the advent in rapidly increasing numbers of American destroyers. The aid they rendered

[1] *The World Crisis*, iv, 362. [2] *Ibid.*, iv, 351.

to the Allied cause came at a critical moment, and its value can hardly be overestimated.

THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE WAR

Due appreciation of the American effort must not, however, be permitted to disguise the plain fact that the victory at sea was, in the main, the superb achievement of the British Navy and the British Mercantile Marine. Words cannot express the debt which the Allies owed to the latter no less than to the former. The losses suffered by the Merchant Service were relatively the highest in the war. No less than 9,031,000 tons of British merchant shipping were sunk, and more than 44,500 men were killed, drowned, or severely wounded. The naval casualties amounted to 27,175, of whom no fewer than 22,258 were killed or drowned. The heroism of the men of the Mercantile Marine is attested by the fact that before the close of the war many men had been torpedoed five or six times, and yet there is no single instance on record of a man having refused to ship.

When all did such magnificent service it is almost invidious to mention particular units or individual exploits; but a French Admiral has not hesitated to describe the raid on Zeebrugge as 'the finest feat of arms in all naval history of all times and all countries.' This was the work of the 'Dover Patrol,' and was accomplished by a flotilla—mostly very light craft—of 142 ships, under the command of Sir Roger Keyes. The night selected for this daring exploit was St. George's Day (23rd April 1918); the object of it (largely attained) was to seal up the most important of the German submarine bases. From that moment the submarine attacks rapidly decreased.

THE 'DOVER PATROL'

The defeat of the submarines was, however, only a fraction of the task accomplished. To have kept inviolate (save for a few tip-and-run raids early in the war) the coasts of Great Britain; to have transported across thousands of miles of ocean millions of men from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, South Africa, the West Indies, and the United States; to have carried them to and from the half-dozen theatres of war; to have safeguarded the commercial routes, and to have kept Great Britain and her Allies supplied with food, with raw materials, and munitions; to have kept open the long lines

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE BRITISH NAVY

of communication in the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean—such was the superb achievement, largely silent and half unperceived, of the British Navy and Merchant Service.

GERMAN SURRENDER

To Britain, therefore, it was fitting that after the Armistice the German Navy should be surrendered. The first batch of the surrendered submarines reached Harwich on 19th November; two days later the High Seas Fleet was handed over at Rosyth. On that day (21st November) Admiral Beatty signalled to the Fleet: 'The German flag will be hauled down at sunset to-day, and will not be hoisted again without permission.'

BOOKS FOR FURTHER READING

The Official History of the War. C. R. L. Fletcher: *The Great War* (1920) (a short and graphic narrative). Earl Jellicoe: *The Grand Fleet, 1914–16* (1920), and *The Crisis of the Naval War* (1920). Admiral Sims: *The Victory at Sea* (1921). A. S. Hurd: *A Merchant Fleet at War*, 1920. E. Ludendorff: *My War Memories, 1914–18* (2 vols. 1919); *The General Staff and its Problems*, 1920. W. S. Churchill: *The World Crisis* (4 vols.).

Note to p. 395. Roumania had, after some natural hesitation, declared for the Allies in August 1916, but, after a vigorous campaign against the Bulgarians, was before the end of the year crushed by Germany. For details see Marriott: *Eastern Question*, pp. 500 seq.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE PEACE TREATIES

Chief Dates

1919.		
Jan.	12.	Meeting of Peace Conference at Paris.
	12.	Independence of Czecho-Slovakia recognized.
May	7.	Greeks occupy Smyrna.
June	2.	Triune Kingdom of Yugo-Slavia recognized by England and France.
	28.	Peace Treaty with Germany signed at Versailles.
	28.	Anglo-French-American Alliance signed.
July	10.	Kemal Pasha establishes Turkish Government at Angora.
	10.	Germany ratifies Peace Treaty.
Sept.	10.	Peace Treaty with Austria signed.
Nov.	19.	U.S. Senate fails to ratify Treaty.
1919.		
Nov.	27.	Peace Treaty with Bulgaria signed at Neuilly.
1920.		
Jan,	16.	First Meeting of Council of League of Nations at Paris.
June	4.	Hungarian Treaty signed
Nov.		Venizelos defeated. King Constantine recalled.
	12.	Treaty of Rapallo (Italy and Jugo-Slavia).
1922.		Kemalist defeats Greeks.
1922.		King Constantine abdicates (*d.* 1923).
1922.		Chanak Crisis.
1923.		
July	24.	Treaty of Lausanne.
Oct.	29	Turkish Republic proclaimed.
1924.		
Jan.		Treaty of Rome (Italy and Yugo-Slavia).

THE Great War was ended by a series of armistices crowned, later on, by a still longer series of definitive Treaties of Peace. Bulgaria was the first of the satellite States to surrender (29th September). Turkey signed the Armistice of Mudros on 3rd October; to Austria Italy granted an armistice on 6th November; on 11th November the terms dictated by Marshal Foch and Admiral Sir Wester Wemyss

ARMISTICES AND PEACE TREATIES

to the Germans were accepted, and in all cases the terms involved unconditional surrender. The Germans made a fight to get the Armistice based upon Mr. Wilson's 'Fourteen Points.' Foch would have none of it. At 11 a.m. on 11th November the 'cease fire' was sounded. The Great War was over.

The Peace Conference, at which twenty-seven States (but no belligerent enemies) were represented, opened at Paris on 12th January; the Peace Treaty with Germany was signed at Versailles on 28th June 1919, and later on treaties were also dictated to Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey.

Most of these Treaties possess to-day (1943) no more than an academic interest, but without a summary of their contents the course of events between 1919 and 1939 cannot be understood.

Before the Allies met in Paris the 'ramshackle' Empire of the Hapsburgs had already been dissolved into its constituent elements. On its ruins there had arisen the entirely new and somewhat artificial State of Czechoslovakia, consisting of the historic kingdom of Bohemia, together with Moravia and part of Slovakia. Subsequently recognized by the Peace Treaties, this new Republic contained some 14,000,000 people, of whom nearly half were Czech, and 3,000,000 were Germans. Republics had also been proclaimed in Austria and Hungary, and were subsequently recognized by Treaties.

THE SUCCESSION STATES

Austria proper was left in a pitiable plight; a State of some 6,000,000 people, but still saddled with the maintenance of a capital once the gayest and always one of the loveliest in Europe and containing 2,000,000 inhabitants. Forbidden by the Treaty to unite with Germany, cut off from access to the sea; encompassed by a ring of small states, all self-contained and highly protectionist, and none too friendly; deprived of her supplies of coal and iron, of her munition factories and of her only important industrial district in Bohemia; of her natural sources of agricultural supplies in Hungary, and of all access to external markets, Austria excited the pity, and presently evoked the financial assistance of a Europe which forgave, if it could not forget, Austria's

AUSTRIA

large share of responsibility for the outbreak of the world war.

HUNGARY

Hungary proclaimed itself an independent Republic on 17th November 1918, but not until 1920 did the Allies dictate the terms of the Treaty of Trianon which was signed on 4th June. Since that Treaty Hungary has represented only a shrunken fragment of an historic kingdom. Hungary was compelled to cede a large district to Czechoslovakia, to give up Transylvania to Roumania and another large district to Yugoslavia. Thus was Hungary torn in pieces, her population was reduced to 8,000,000, and her territory to 36,000 square miles.

In the meantime, important events had occurred in Hungary. Regarded as peculiarly favourable soil for Communist propaganda, Hungary was the object of Bolshevist attentions in the autumn of 1918. A certain Béla Kun, a Galician Jew of ill repute, was entrusted by Moscow with a mission to Hungary. Posing as a Hungarian patriot Béla Kun raised a Red army to turn Czechoslovak and Roumanian intruders out of the doomed Hungarian provinces. Alarmed by these developments the Allies sent off General Smuts from Paris to Buda-Pesth to straighten out a menacing situation (April 1919). 'Curious business,' comments Sir Henry Wilson in his diary, 'a Welshman sends a Dutchman to tell a Hungarian not to fight a Roumanian.' General Smuts could do nothing. The Roumanians, however, having defeated Béla Kun, who fled the country, themselves occupied Buda-Pesth and wrought terrible devastation, stripping Hungary bare of everything on which they could lay hands. But in November (1919) the bandits tardily obeyed repeated orders issued from Paris and withdrew from Hungary.

In 1920 Hungary formally declared itself to be a Monarchy, but nevertheless twice defeated the attempts of the Archduke Charles to regain the throne, abrogated the rights of the Hapsburg dynasty, while asserting the right of the Hungarian nation to elect a king by its own free choice. That right it has not exercised. During the decade 1921–1931 Count Stephen Bethlen was Premier, and in co-operation with the Regent Admiral Horthy gradually restored order and a measure of prosperity to a mutilated and stricken kingdom.

Meanwhile the delegates had been hard at work in Paris, hammering out a settlement, for the terms of which the 'Big Four,' M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, President Wilson and Signor Orlando, were mainly responsible. Only the broad results of their labours can here be summarized.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

Germany was compelled to acknowledge her responsibility for the war; to pay a large indemnity (ultimately fixed at £6600 millions) and was virtually disarmed, at sea, on land, and in the air. The right bank of the Rhine was to be permanently demilitarized, and the left bank was occupied by the Allies for fifteen—subsequently reduced to ten—years. France was compensated for the wanton destruction of her coal-mines by the Saar coal-fields, and the whole of the Saar basin was left under the administration of the League of Nations for fifteen years. Germany had to surrender all her over-sea possessions; to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France, and Prussian Poland to Poland. But the victors gave signal proof of their adherence to the principle of 'self-determination' by allowing the inhabitants of East Prussia, Upper Silesia, and Northern Schleswig to decide for themselves by plebiscite their own ultimate adherence. The plebiscites gave East Prussia to Germany, divided Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland, and Northern Schleswig between Germany and Denmark; Holstein and Southern Schleswig were restored to Germany.

GERMANY

Did these terms err on the side of severity? The 'War Guilt Lie' was indeed bitterly resented in Germany; whether it was worth while to affirm it is doubtful, its truth is not. The indemnity was denounced as 'grotesque'; but Germany escaped payment by almost complete and fraudulent repudiation, and spent upon rearmament not only all that France and the other Allies failed to extort, but in addition most of the loans of £40,000,000 raised in London and New York under the 'Dawes' Plan (1924). Disarmament was at first fairly complete, but the only ultimate result of it was to destroy obsolete equipment and to give Germany the opportunity—which Hitler did not neglect—of rearming Germany with the most up-to-date weapons which modern science could invent. The plebiscite to decide the fate of the Saar

basin was taken as required by the Treaty in 1935 and resulted in its restoration to Germany.

POLAND

Poland presented an almost insoluble problem. An independent Poland had long been the pivot of French diplomacy. France was determined to restore it, all the Allies were deeply pledged to its restoration, but they could fulfil the pledge only by depriving the criminals who had partitioned it of their ill-gotten spoils.[1] About the shares respectively of Russia and Austria there was little difficulty. The difficulty was how to do justice to Poland without wounding Prussia so deeply as to provoke another war. Dantzic was the core of the problem. Dantzic had become predominantly Prussian, but without Dantzic Poland could not have access (as promised by President Wilson) to the sea. An awkward solution was found by making Dantzic a Free City and vesting its administration in the League of Nations. To secure access to Dantzic a strip of territory cleverly misnamed *The Corridor* by the Germans was assigned to Poland. Unfortunately the 'Corridor' divided East from West Prussia, consequently Poland's acquisition of it was deeply resented by Germany, and combined with the loss of Dantzic to supply the occasion if not the cause of the renewal of the World War in 1939. Poland's position during the inter-war period was never easy nor was its policy always prudent. The Poles were intoxicated by a restoration effected not by their own efforts but by the solicitude of their friends, not unmingled (on the part of France) by the promptings of self-interest. In 1920 the Poles invaded Soviet Russia, but having twice refused terms offered by the Bolsheviks, were in turn invaded and driven back in confusion to the very walls of Warsaw. The Poles despairingly appealed to the Western Democracies, but the 'Hands Off Russia' movement was in full swing among the Socialists both in France and England, and all that the British and French Governments could do was to send to Warsaw (July 1920) a mixed civil and military mission headed by Lord D'Abernon and General Weygand, who had served as Chief of Staff to Marshal Foch. Having with General Weygand's invaluable help driven back the Bolsheviks in headlong flight from the gates of Warsaw, Marshal Pilsudski imposed upon the

[1] See *supra*, pp. 210 f., 229 f., 236 f., 295 f.

Russians in the Treaty of Riga terms by which Poland recovered its frontier of 1793.

Pilsudski did more than save Poland from the Bolsheviks. He saved Poland from herself. Although, like the other dictators, Pilsudski had started his career as a revolutionary socialist, he perceived that the ultra-democratic constitution adopted by the Poles in 1921 was wholly unsuited to a people inexperienced in the art of parliamentary government. Consequently he resigned his position as head of the Executive in 1921, only to emerge again in 1925 and to put an end to the confusion by a *coup d'état* which virtually established him as dictator. Pilsudski retained power, and with it the affection of a grateful people, until his death in 1935. Thus the Poles, who had never ceased to be a nation, even in dispersion, were once again established as an independent Nation-State.

FRANCE

France rejoiced in the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, in the acquisition of the Saar coal-field; it looked forward hopefully to getting (as was its due) the lion's share of reparations from Germany, but was apprehensive about the security of its eastern frontier. Foch insisted that the Rhine frontier was essential to effective defence. That was denied to France by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Wilson, but in default Great Britain and the United States agreed to guarantee France against a German attack. The American Senate refused, however, to ratify that agreement and the joint agreement consequently lapsed. The mood of France, then, was a mixture of elation and apprehension. The settlement as a whole, combined with her own armed strength and the disarmament of Germany, to give her hegemony on the Continent, but she lived in perpetual fear lest the recovery of Germany would some day again deprive her of her primacy and threaten her security. Hence she was anxious to 'bleed Germany white' as Germany had attempted to bleed her white in 1871.

Great Britain, on the contrary, realizing that Germany could not pay reparations to her without injuring British trade, was anxious to nurse her 'best customer' into convalescence. The result was that by 1923 the Anglo-French accord had sensibly weakened, while both countries were justly exasperated by the refusal of the United States to honour the signature appended by their President to the

Peace Treaties, or to adhere to the League of Nations, for which he was largely responsible.

BELGIUM

Belgium obtained from Germany some 400 square miles of territory, designed to strengthen her eastern frontier. She also, in accord with her own ambitions, achieved 'complete independence and full sovereignty.' The treaties of 1839 were abrogated: henceforward she was neither neutralized or protected. Luxemburg was, at the same time, emancipated from the economic control of Germany and, like Belgium, abrogated the status of neutrality.

ITALY

Italy was far from satisfied with the results of the Peace Treaties, asserting that she 'had been robbed by her allies of the fruits of victory.' That was not true. She obtained the Trentino, the Southern Tyrol up to the Brenner Pass, Trieste, the Istrian peninsula, including Pola, and the Istrian Archipelago, a great part of Dalmatia, and most of the Adriatic Islands; she also retained Valona, as well as Rhodes and the rest of the Dodecanese. Italy had, however, been further promised that 'in the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa, Italy might claim . . . a settlement in her favour of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya.' Not only did she fail to get anything in Africa, but what she still more resented was that Smyrna and a large district in Asia Minor, provisionally assigned to her by the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne (1917) was given in 1919 to Greece.

Another grievance was only partially remedied by the partition of Fiume between Italy and Yugoslavia. President Wilson had championed with some passion the claim of Jugoslavia to a port admittedly of great importance to the Triune State, but Italy pressed her claims. Not, however, until 1924 was the question of Fiume eventually settled by direct negotiation between the two countries immediately concerned. By the Pact of Rome (1924) the region of Fiume was divided between them.

Fiume offers an easy transition from Italy to the Balkans.

Bulgaria had to pay the penalty for her adhesion to the Central Empires by territorial concessions to Greece and

Yugoslavia. Roumania, on the contrary was like Yugoslavia, rewarded by large acquisitions. She acquired Bessarabia (from Russia) as well as Hungarian Transylvania, the Bukovina (from Austria) and part of the Banat of Temesvar. She was thus more than doubled in area and population, and with a population of 17,000,000 (increased to 19,000,000 by 1939) emerged from the first World War as the largest but the least homogeneous, perhaps the most vulnerable (as events have proved), of the Balkan States.

THE BALKANS

Enlarged by the acquisition of Bosnia, the Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia, parts of Styria, Carinthia, the Banat and practically the whole of Dalmatia, Yugoslavia with a population of 14,000,000 came next to Roumania in size. In flattering but rash emulation of Great Britain the young Yugoslavia adopted a parliamentary constitution under a limited monarchy. For peoples so recently united, lacking the conditions of cohesion and still more conspicuously the traditions and experience essential to a success in that difficult form of government, the experiment was foredoomed to failure. Croatia threatened to secede, and to avert disruption King Alexander in 1928 suspended the democratic constitution and established a Royal dictatorship.

Racial passions, never far from the surface in the Balkans, were revealed when, in 1934, King Alexander was assassinated during a visit to France ; and though Prince Paul, as Regent, has done his utmost to assuage internal dissension and to protect his country against external aggression, his success has been only partial. Six and a half million Orthodox Serbs are bitterly opposed by 3½ million Roman Catholic Croats ; the Triune State is also distracted by its German, Italian, and Magyar minorities whose loyalty is given not to the State, in which they are unwillingly incorporated, but to its enemies. Yet Yugoslavia remains officially a proud member of the Anti-Axis alliance, and hopes to share in the fruits of the victory awaiting it.

The question of Turkey remained. In the vain hope of inducing the United States to take over the derelict estate of the sick man at Constantinople, the Allies deferred until 1920 the conclusion of peace with Turkey. The Sultan was then in no hurry to ratify the

TURKEY

Treaty of Sèvres. Too late the Allies realized the dangers of procrastination. By 1920 the whole situation was transformed. On 15th May 1919 the Greeks, supported by the warships of Great Britain, France, and the U.S.A., had occupied Smyrna. That Smyrna should fall to the despised and detested Greeks aroused the deepest resentment among the Turkish 'nationalists,' a party that was coming rapidly to the front under the vigorous leadership of the 'Saviour of the Dardanelles,' the most brilliant soldier in the Turkish army, Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

KEMAL PASHA

Kemal's moment had come. Four days after the Greeks had landed at Smyrna, Kemal left Constantinople to take up his work as Inspector-General of the Turkish forces in Eastern Anatolia. But outlawed for disobedience to the orders of the Sultan, he appealed to the new spirit of Turkish nationalism. Meanwhile, a National Assembly summoned by Kemal met at Erzeroum and established the Nationalist headquarters at Angora, then a wretched little town in the Anatolian highlands.

At Angora the Grand National Assembly was inaugurated in April 1920 and elected Kemal as its President.

GREECE IN THE TOILS

At that moment the Greeks were advancing from triumph to triumph. They occupied Brusa, the ancient capital of the Ottomans (5th July); they then made good their position on the opposite shore and on 26th July the young King Alexander of Greece made a triumphal entry into Adrianople. A fortnight later the Sultan signed the Treaty of Sèvres.

In 1921, however, the tide turned against the Greeks. Italy and France came to terms with the Angora Government, and Kemal, appointed to the command in chief of the Turkish army, not only arrested the advance of the Greeks towards Angora, but, taking the offensive, chased the whole Greek army into the sea. Smyrna was delivered over to fire and plunder, and the Kemalists, flushed with victory, advanced towards the Straits and threatened the British garrison which, encamped at Chanak, held the southern shore of the Dardanelles. The position at Chanak quickly became critical. Great Britain, deserted by the French and the Italians and opposed by the Turks, appealed to the Dominions, but their response was uncertain, and that war was averted was due almost

entirely to the firmness and tact of Sir Charles Harington the Allied Commander at Constantinople.

Meanwhile, about 1,000,000 Greek refugees from all parts of Asia Minor had escaped on board Greek and allied ships; but the débacle of the Greek army was complete; their dream of an Ionian empire was shattered; King Constantine who, amid signs of exuberant enthusiasm, had been recalled to his throne in December 1920, was after the disaster in Asia Minor again expelled and replaced by his son George II. But King George kept his uneasy seat on the throne only until 1924, when a Republic was proclaimed. In 1928 Venizelos emerged from his retirement to resume office as Prime Minister and for four years ruled Greece with eminent success.

But the Greek royalists were gathering strength. Venizelos became involved (1933) in a revolutionary movement, fled the country, and under sentence of death, died in 1936 in Paris. King George II, after an absence of nearly twelve years, was restored to his throne and re-established constitutional monarchy. But parliamentary government has never taken root in Greece, and in 1936 General Metaxas substituted for it a monarchial dictatorship.

Meanwhile, events of historic significance had taken place. On 1st November the National Assembly at Angora issued an edict abolishing the office of Sultan; on the 17th, Mahommed VI, the last of the Ottoman Sultans, left Constantinople on board a British warship; and in March 1924 the Caliphate also was abolished by the National Assembly. In the previous October Turkey had been proclaimed a Republic with Mustapha Kemal Pasha as its first President, and Angora as its capital.

TURKEY

The brilliant victories of Mustapha Kemal gave the *coup de grâce* to the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, and on 20th November a Conference for the conclusion of a definitive Peace met at Lausanne. The atmosphere at Lausanne was 'difficult.' If the Turk had in the past so often managed to evade the consequences of defeat, he was unlikely to forego, in the day of his triumph, the fruits of a victory as dramatic as it was complete. And at Lausanne he held all the trump cards, diplomatic as well as military. He could count on the traditional hatred of Italy

THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE

for Greece, and could turn to his own advantage the increasing tension between England and France. What wonder then if his tone was lofty to the verge of insolence. Peace was nevertheless signed on 24th July 1923.

The Greeks had perforce to pay the penalty for overweening political ambition and a disastrous military defeat. They lost to Turkey Eastern Thrace with Adrianople and the important islands of Imbros and Tenedos, but were allowed to retain the rest of the Turkish islands, and Western Thrace up to the Maritza. Turkey retained Smyrna and the rest of the Anatolian peninsula but gave up all claims upon Cyprus (retained by Great Britain), Egypt and the Sudan, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia. The problem of minorities had been to a great extent solved by the simple method of extermination, but for survivors the Turks agreed to follow the lines laid down in the Peace treaties. Provision was also made for a vast interchange of Greek Moslems and Turks of the Orthodox Church between Eastern and Western Thrace. Two questions remained. The 'capitulations' which, though humiliating to Turkish pride, had ever since the sixteenth century afforded protection to foreigners in Turkey were abolished. Constantinople, in default of an alternative tenant, was left to the Turks, though abandoned by them as a capital; the narrow Straits were neutralized, demilitarized, and placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations.

The Treaty of Lausanne completed the series which constituted the Peace Settlement. For the Settlement as a whole the cement was provided by the League of Nations; to each Treaty the Covenant of the League was prefixed.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

For four centuries every great war had been followed by a project for the organization of peace. But from the Great Design of Henry IV onwards those projects[1] were merely on paper. With the exception of the Holy Alliance (1815) the League of Nations was the first project actually to be brought into operation. Fifty-six Sovereign States ultimately joined the League, which was designed to organize peace and avert war. The Government of the League was vested in a small Council, and

[1] See Marriott: *Commonwealth or Anarchy* (1940) and references therein.

a General Assembly, representing all the States ; day to day administration was entrusted to a permanent Secretariat. The Assembly set up several technical organizations and advisory commissions, the most important commissions being those dealing with mandates and with the reduction of armaments. The League also set up a Permanent Court of International Justice, which sat annually at the Hague, and within its prescribed unity functioned in the main satisfactorily.

Its primary functions the League hoped to fulfil by a limitation of armaments, by a mutual agreement not to resort to arms until an attempt had been made to settle the dispute by peaceful means, and by a mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and independence. In particular no member of the League might make war upon another member without submitting the dispute to arbitration, and without an interval of three months, after the announcement of the award. Should any State break this central article of the Covenant, all the other members were pledged to break off all relations, including commercial and financial relations, with the offending State, and to resort if necessary to armed force. It was a fatal flaw in the Covenant that it did not specify how force was to be applied, but in any case the League was doomed from its birth by the refusal of the United States to honour the signature of President Wilson. Thus, in General Smuts' biting words, 'the father of the League left the baby on Europe's doorstep.'

MANDATES

The boldest innovation in the Covenant was the device (suggested by General Smuts) for dealing with the colonial possessions of the defeated Powers. By Articles 118 and 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany renounced in favour of the 'Principal Allied and Associated Powers' all her rights over her oversea possessions. To whom should they pass ? According to Wilson's formula there were to be 'no annexations' ; accordingly, Article 22 laid it down that to confiscated colonial territories 'which are inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves . . . there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization,' that their tutelage should be entrusted to 'advanced nations' conveniently situated and well equipped for the

discharge of this responsibility, and that such trustees should act as 'Mandatories of the League.'

The Mandate for 'German' South-West Africa was accordingly assigned to 'His Britannic Majesty,' to be administered on his behalf by the Union of South Africa. German East Africa was divided between Great Britain and Belgium, and German West Africa between Great Britain and France, to be held in all cases under Mandates. At Paris, Mr. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, made a great fight to obtain for Australia the direct control of all the Pacific islands surrendered by Germany, but ultimately the islands north of the Equator went (with Kiaochow) [1] to Japan, those south of the Equator to Australia and New Zealand—except Nauru which went to the British Empire—in all these cases under Mandate. How much trouble might have been averted had more heed been paid to Mr. Hughes in 1919 it is easy to conjecture but impossible to prove.

The Turkish Vilayets of Palestine, Mesopotamia and Syria were also surrendered, but they were obviously not 'backward' countries in the same sense as the African and Pacific colonies. Consequently the Mandates for the first two were assigned to Great Britain, and for Syria to France, in a form which clearly contemplated 'the complete and final enfranchisement of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments' therein. In Syria and Palestine the paths of the Mandatory Power proved difficult, and the consummation anticipated in 1919 has not yet been attained. In Mesopotamia (Iraq) the Mandate expired in 1932 when that country was admitted as a Sovereign and independent State to the League of Nations.

The League of Nations came formally into being on the same day as the Treaty of Versailles, of which, indeed, it was an integral part. Was the League from the first a failure, or is Lord Cecil justified in claiming that for the first ten years of its existence the League was a success? Unquestionably the League and its creature, the Hague Court, settled a good many disputes, but all, with one exception, between the

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smaller States; in a few cases it averted war; it successfully administered the Saar district until its reunion with Germany; through various subsidiary organizations—notably the International Labour Office at Geneva—it collected and disseminated valuable information on economic matters; it supervised the Mandates experiment; it saved the children from starvation in more than one European capital; and it promoted—internationally, social and humanitarian legislation, as, for instance, in regard to the 'White Slave' traffic, the sale of noxious drugs, etc. Certain gaps in the Covenant were stopped by the Locarno Pact (1925) and by *the General Act* of 1928, and the U.S.A. made some amends for its major defection by joining with France to promote the Pact of Paris—familiarly known as the Briand-Kellog Pact—renouncing war 'as an instrument of national policy.' To this Pact fifteen States including Germany adhered (1928). Nevertheless the League failed to achieve its fundamental object. There was unfortunately too much truth in the bitter aphorism of Señor de Madariaga: 'The Powers are intent on seeing that the path to international hell is paved with good intentions.'

FOR FURTHER READING

H. W. V. Temperley (ed.): *The Peace Conference of Paris*, 8 vols. (ill-arranged but valuable). A. Tardieu: *La Paix*. A. Toynbee (ed.): *Survey of International Affairs* (annual). G. Hanotaux: *Le Traité de Versailles*. J. M. Keynes: *Economic Consequences of the Peace*.

For further references, see Marriott: *Europe, 1815–1939* (Chapter xxviii).

CHAPTER XXXVIII

UNREST AND CONVALESCENCE, 1919–1931

Chief Dates

1918 20. Civil War in Russia.

1919.

Feb. 6. The Weimar Assembly.

Mar. 4. *Comintern* formed.

4. *Fasci di Combattimento*

Sept. 27. Archangel evacuated by British.

Diarchy in India.

Nov. 27. U.S.A. Senate refuses to ratify Peace Treaty.

Labour Unrest in England.

1920.

Jan. Retirement of Clemenceau.

'Triple Alliance' in England.

Aug. 1920 to June 1921. *Little Entente* formed.

Nov. 15. First Assembly of League of Nations at Geneva.

1921.

Jan. 17. Briand Prime Minister in France.

N.E.P. in Russia.

May "Reparations" fixed.

Wirth Cabinet in Germany

Dec. 6. Anglo-Irish Treaty.

1922.

Jan. 15. Poincaré Prime Minister in France.

Unemployment in England.

Feb. 6. Washington Treaty.

Mar. 16. Independence of Egypt.

April 16. Russo-German Treaty.

1922

Oct. 10 Iraq Mandate ended.

13. Turkish Capital at Angora.

19. Mr. Lloyd-George resigns

20. Kemal President of Turkish Republic.

30. Fascist march on Rome: Mussolini Prime Minister.

Nov. 14. Wirth Cabinet resigns.

1923.

July French occupy Ruhr (July 1925).

24. Treaty of Lausanne.

31. Italians occupy Corfu.

Aug. Stresemann Chancellor of Germany.

Sept. Primo di Rivera Dictator of Spain.

28. Abyssinia admitted to League of Nations.

Oct. 2. Allies leave Constantinople.

21. 'Rhine Republic.'

1924.

Jan. 21. Death of Lenin.

Jan.-Oct. First Labour Government in England.

Mar. Republic in Greece.

Herriot and *Cartel des Gauches* in power in France.

Great Britain and France recognize U.S.S.R.

1925. Depression of Trade in England.
Political and financial confusion in France.
Oct. 27. Locarno Treaties.
1926. Germany admitted to League of Nations.
Russo-German Treaty.
1927. Poincaré resumes office and stabilizes franc.
1928. Aug. 27. Briand-Kellogg Pact.
Zog King of Albania.
1929. Feb. 11. Lateran Treaties.
'Five Year Plan' in Russia.
Financial Crisis in U.S.A.
Death of Stresemann.
1929. Trotsky exiled from Russia
Stalin established in power.
1930. June Royal dictatorship in Roumania.
Military occupation of Germany ends.
1931. Customs-Union between Germany and Austria vetoed.
April 14. Alphonso XIII leaves Spain.
May Failure of Vienna Credit-Anstalt.
June 20. Hoover Moratorium for Debts.
Aug. Financial Crisis in England.
Statute of Westminster.
Sept. 19. Japan attacks Manchuria

IN 1919 there were high hopes that after four years of destruction and carnage without a parallel in modern history, the world would enter upon a period of gradual recovery and prolonged repose. The 'Great War,' it was anticipated, would really end war. The two decades that ensued provided, on the contrary, a period of disillusionment, of disappointment and of deterioration—rapidly increasing in velocity.

BETWEEN TWO WARS

Yet the anticipations were not fantastic. For a century Europe had been, on the whole, steadily advancing towards the realization of liberty and the recognition of nationality. The three Great Empires of Central Europe had, it is true, been based upon a negation of those principles. The Great War had, however, resulted in their overthrow. The peacemakers at Paris redrew the frontiers of the European States—old and new—as nearly as possible in accord with the principle of nationality. It has been reckoned that in 1914 there were 45,000,000 people living under an alien yoke, and that by 1919 the

THE PEACE TREATIES

number was reduced perhaps to 16,000,000. No readjustment of frontier could, indeed, entirely eliminate ethnical anomalies, but in 1919 every precaution was taken to protect minorities, and the League of Nations was specially charged with this duty. Above all, the world was to be made safe for 'democracy,' and democratic governments would, it was anticipated, prove much more observant than autocracies of the claims of alien subjects.

For the disappointment that ensued the peacemakers of Paris have been held mainly responsible. On the whole, unjustly. But two charges against the peacemakers cannot be rebutted. One is that they were pedantic in adherence to principles, or rather that they relied too much upon 'slogans,' such as 'self-determination,' 'genuinely democratic,' and so forth. Another is that they passed severe sentences without providing the means for executing them.

Things might have turned out very differently had the American Senate not failed to honour Mr. Wilson's signature to the Peace Treaties, had they not refused to join the League of Nations, had they ratified the agreement made with France and Great Britain to guarantee the former against aggression on the part of Germany. Had the U.S.A. been a member of the League Italy would not have dared to defy it in respect of Corfu or Abyssinia; the Washington Treaties should have been superfluous; Japan—still allied with England—could hardly have attacked China; Germany and Italy might have secured from the League a revision of the Treaty of Versailles with as little trouble to themselves and as little disturbance of European peace as Kemal secured the revision of the Treaty of Lausanne.

THE U.S.A.

And Russia? For twenty years after the Bolshevik revolution the Allies kept Russia at arm's length. From 1918–1920 Great Britain and France made a half-hearted attempt to support the counter-revolution in Russia, but the 'Red Army,' superbly organized by Trotsky, proved too strong for the small body of aristocrats who formed the bulk of the 'White Armies'; foreign troops were withdrawn in the course of 1919, and the Bolshevik triumvirate—Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin—remained undisputed masters of the vast territories included in the Union

THE U.S.S.R.


of Socialist Soviet Republics (U.S.S.R.). Lenin and Trotsky were convinced that Communism could not be firmly established in a 'world half capitalist and half communist.' Capitalism and its ally imperialism must, therefore, be eliminated. To this end the Third Communist International (the *Comintern*) was established in March 1919.

GENERAL UNREST

None of the Great Powers was, in fact, in serious danger of a Communist revolution. Nevertheless much of the unrest which in the post-war years manifested itself among certain sections of the wage-earners in Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany was undoubtedly stimulated by the subterranean activities of the *Comintern*. The Triple Alliance formed between the miners, the railwaymen, and the General Transport Workers Unions in England (1920) was perhaps primarily industrial, but in 1920, and still more clearly in the General Strike of 1926, it definitely attempted to substitute 'Direct Action' for parliamentary methods and to usurp the functions of the State. The decisive defeat of the General Strike cleared the air, and the supremacy of Parliament has not since then been challenged. In Italy and in France Syndicalism—another aspect of 'Direct Action'—was a more potent force than in England. In Italy it was one of several predisposing causes of Fascism, though paradoxically Fascism, when organized as the 'Corporative State,' contained an element of Syndicalism, and, like the latter, involved the supersession of parliamentary government. In France, as in Germany, Socialism was proof against Communist infection. Nevertheless, until Stalin's decisive victory over Trotsky (1924), the *Comintern* was ceaselessly active in promoting international revolution. Nor was it until the formal dissolution of the *Comintern* in 1943 that the Soviet Union satisfactorily cleared up its dubious association with the Third International.

RUSSIA AND EUROPE

That this dualism should have rendered the democratic Allies suspicious of the Soviet Union was, if unfortunate, perfectly natural. But with all this, the international position of the Soviet Union rapidly improved from 1922 onwards. In 1922 Germany accorded *de jure* recognition to the Soviet Union, and this example was followed by Great Britain and France (1924), by Italy and most of the smaller States of Europe, and finally


Clavis
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LUXEMBOURG
SAAR BASIN

(in 1933) by the U.S.A. Russia adhered to the Briand-Kellogg Pact in 1928, and in 1934 was at last admitted to the League of Nations.

Meanwhile, significant changes had taken place in Russia. In 1921 Lenin, recognizing the failure of pure Communism, adopted a new economic policy (N.E.P.), virtually conceding, to some extent, the principles of private property and private enterprise, the remuneration of (foreign) capital and a money economy. In 1928 Stalin who in 1924 had become, on Lenin's death, secretary to the Communist Party, launched the 'Five Year Plan' which started the industrialization of Russia. So rapid was its progress that by 1937 a Second Plan was completed and a Third was to have been begun in 1938.

DOMESTIC N.E.P.

In 1923 a new pyramidical constitution, based on peasant, workers, and regimental councils, came into being and in 1937 was 'democratized' by 'Stalin's Magna Carta.' In fact, however, these constitutions were merely the façade of government; the motive power of the whole machine continued to be vested in the Communist Party. The agricultural system was also revolutionized on the basis of collectivization —a compromise between nationalization, co-operation and individualism. Thus was Russia completely transformed, nor has the new Russia failed under the sternest of tests to justify itself.

To the onlooker of 1919 France appeared to enjoy the hegemony over continental Europe. But Frenchmen were not the less uneasy. Foch had failed at Paris to get the Rhine frontier which was in his judgment essential to the security of France. The defection of the U.S.A. knocked the bottom out of the Guarantee offered by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd-George in substitution for the Rhine frontier. The more strongly did France press for the payment of 'Reparations,' at last fixed in 1921 at £6,600,000, of which France was to get 58 per cent. In 1920 Clemenceau had resigned: the *Père à victoire* had already become the *Perd à Victoire*: nor was Briand, who in 1921 had, for the seventh time, become Prime Minister, the man to extort payment from a fraudulent bankrupt. For a short time, under Dr. Wirth and Dr. Rathenau (1921–22), Germany did,

FRANCE

seemingly, make some effort at 'fulfilment'; but the effort did not survive the assassination of Rathenau (1922).

In the same year Raymond Poincaré came into power in France. He detested Germany, and suspected England of being anxious to make things easy for her 'best customer.'

POINCARÉ

When Germany formally defaulted, Poincaré, supported by Belgium, but opposed by England, occupied the Rühr district, the industrial heart of Germany. The enterprise was a failure and in 1925 was abandoned. Nor was the project of setting up an independent 'Rhineland Republic' more successful.

Poincaré was turned out in May 1924, and in 1925 Briand returned to the *Quai D'Orsay*. Either as Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister he remained in power until his death in 1932. Briand was equally anxious to promote the security of France and the peace of Europe. Accordingly, in conjunction with Gustav Stresemann, who in 1923 had come into power in Germany, and with Austen Chamberlain, who in 1924 became Foreign Secretary in England, he negotiated the Locarno Treaties (1925).

THE LOCARNO TREATIES

These treaties were intended as a substitute for the gaps which experience had revealed in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Belgium undertook 'collectively and severally' to guarantee the inviolability of the frontiers between Germany, France and Belgium, as defined by the Treaty of Versailles, and the three Powers mutually agreed not to make war on one another. Under the chairmanship of two American bankers plans were devised in 1924 and 1930 to enable Germany to make some payment on account of 'Reparations,' and under the earlier (Dawes) plan some payments were made largely out of loans made to Germany by the U.S.A. and Great Britain. Before the second (the Young) plan could come into operation, the whole world was overtaken by a financial and commercial blizzard of unprecedented severity.

But between the conclusion of the Locarno Treaties and this onset there had been amid the political clouds a glimpse of blue sky. A treaty had been concluded (on Locarno lines) between Russia and Germany in 1926; in 1926 Poincaré had returned to power in France and had succeeded in arresting

the alarming fall in the value of the franc by stabilizing it at 124 to the £; the Pact of Paris (Briand-Kellogg) had been recommended (May 1930) to a critical and even sceptical Europe; the Preparatory Commission to promote disarmament had, at long last, actually met, and in 1930 the military occupation of Germany was ended.

But the spell of sunshine did not last. Stresemann died in 1929; Austen Chamberlain retired from official life in the same year; in October an unusually severe financial crisis occurred in New York; a proposal for a Customs-Union between Germany and Austria was strenuously opposed by Czechoslovakia, by Italy, and in particular by France, and its legality was in September denied by the Hague Court of International Justice (though only by a single vote). Selfish interests in France were mainly responsible for the withdrawal of a project which might indeed have precipitated an Anschluss, but might on the other hand have averted the absorption of Austria into Germany. The French financiers also refused to sustain the Vienna Credit-Anstalt which failed in May 1931. In June President Hoover proposed a Moratorium on all inter-State debts; in August, to the consternation of the business world, Great Britain reversed the banking policy which had made London the financial capital of the world and abandoned the Gold Standard. Only the prompt and courageous action of King George V in insisting on the formation of a National Government averted still graver disasters.

On 19th September 1931 Japan launched an attack upon Manchuria, and within six months had established a firm hold upon that great province.

That was the first step towards the political Avernus.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE DESCENT TO AVERNUS

Chief Dates

1931.

April 14. Alphonso XIII leaves Spain.
Statute of Westminster.

Sept. 19. Japan attacks Manchuria.

1932.

Feb. 2. Disarmament Conference meets (June 8, 1934).

July 18. Turkey admitted to League of Nations.

Oct. Iraq admitted to League of Nations.
Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa.
Great Britain adopts Protection.

1933.

Jan. 30. A. Hitler Chancellor of Germany.

Feb. 24. Japan, condemned by League of Nations, withdraws

June German *Enabling Act.*
12. World Economic Conference in London.

Oct. 14. Germany withdraws from Disarmament Conference and League of Nations.

1934.

Jan. Stavisky scandal in France.

Feb. 9. Balkan Pact.

June 30. Hitler's 'Clean Up.'

July 29. Chancellor Dollfuss murdered. K. von Schuschnigg Chancellor.

1934.

Aug. 2. Death of President Hindenburg.
19. Hitler's dictatorship approved.

Sept. 18. U.S.S.R. admitted to League of Nations.

Oct. 9. King Alexander of Yugoslavia and M. Barthou assassinated at Marseilles.

1935.

Jan The Saar district votes for reunion with Germany

Mar. Great Britain's Rearmament Programme.
France extends Conscript service.
Germany reintroduces Conscription.

April 'Stresa' Front.

May 2. Franco-Soviet Pact.

June Naval Agreement between Great Britain and Germany.

Oct. 3. Italy attacks Abyssinia

Nov. 18. League of Nations applies *Sanctions* against Italy
Peace Ballot in Great Britain.

Dec. Hoare-Laval Peace Plan.

1936.

Jan. 20 Death of King George V

Mar. 7. Germany occupies demilitarized Rhineland.

May 9. Italy annexes Abyssinia

July 18. Spanish Civil War.

1936.
July 20. Straits Convention signed at Montreux.
Oct. Rome-Berlin Axis.
Dec. 11. Edward VIII abdicates.

1937.
May Neville Chamberlain succeeds Mr. Baldwin as Prime Minister.
Sept. 14. Nyon Agreement.

1938.
Mar. 12. Germany annexes Austria. Agitation in Sudetenland.
Sept. 29. Munich Agreement.
Oct. 1–10. Germany occupies Sudetenland.

1939.
Feb. 27. Great Britain and France recognize Franco as ruler of Spain.
Mar. 15. Germany occupies Czechoslovakia.
23. Germany occupies Memel.
Mar. 30. Anglo-French pledge to Poland; to Greece and Roumania (April 26th).
April 7. Italy occupies Albania. Great Britain adopts Conscription.
Aug. 23. Russo-German Pact.
Sept. 1. Germany invades Poland.
3. Great Britain and France declare war on Germany.

AFTER Japan's attack upon Manchuria the international situation rapidly deteriorated. Paradoxically, however, the League of Nations was afforced by the admission of Turkey (July 1933), of Iraq (October) and of Russia (September 1934). But this afforcement was more than offset by the withdrawal of Japan and Germany (1933), and by the defiance with which (1935) Italy met the League's condemnation of the attack upon Abyssinia. Another blow to recovery was dealt by the failure of the World Economic Conference which met in London in June 1933. The Conference, impressively staged, might, it was hoped, find a solution for the prevailing chaos in international finance, but the proceedings were sabotaged by the attitude of President Roosevelt and were in consequence brought abruptly to an end. In January Adolf Hitler had come into power in Germany.

DETERIORATION

The Weimar Constitution represented a genuine attempt to establish parliamentary government in republican Germany. It failed. Nor are the reasons far to seek. Assailed from the first by both the extreme parties—the co-Prussian militarists and the Communists—the Constitution itself smelt too much of the lamp; it was the product not of gradual evolution, but of doctrinaire

HITLER

creation. Parliamentary government, in the complete sense, depends for its success upon the party system. That system can hardly co-exist with proportional representation which, adopted at Weimar, resulted in the return of many groups insufficiently coherent to sustain a strong executive. Parliamentary government also presupposes a politically minded electorate, with long experience in local self-government, and based upon a reasonable measure of economic stability. These conditions did not exist in post-war Germany. Their absence gave a chance to a young Austrian house-painter who, lacking means or friends, was endowed with vision and more than a modicum of education, enthusiasm and magnetic personality.

Having fought in a Bavarian regiment in the World War, Adolph Hitler migrated from Vienna to Munich, worked as a house-decorator, joined the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartie* (Nazis), then consisting of seven members, and transformed it into a powerful and menacing organization.

Associated (oddly enough) with General Ludendorf, Hitler took part (1923) in an abortive rising in Munich, directed against the Weimar Government, and on its failure suffered a short imprisonment in a fortress. His imprisonment gave Hitler the opportunity of thinking out a philosophy of politics, and of formulating in *Mein Kampf* a programme (1925–26). By great powers of organization and mob oratory he secured for the Nazis a predominant position in the Reichstag, and in January 1933 imposed himself upon President Hindenburg as Chancellor of the Reich. Fastening upon the Communists the crime of burning down the Reichstag buildings, Hitler won the support of the alarmed industrialists, and then induced the Reichstag to vest absolute power in the Chancellor and destroy the Weimar Constitution. The rights of the *Lande*—the old States—were transferred to the Reich and put under governors responsible only to the Chancellor. Thus did Hitler complete the work of Bismarck—unify Germany under the heel of Prussia. By a drastic purge on 30th June, he struck terror into the hearts of all possible rivals or opponents, and when on 2nd August Marshal von Hindenburg died, the offices of Reich Chancellor and Reich President were promptly united in the person of Adolph Hitler. With the help of Dr. Joseph Goebbels the programme

of *Mein Kampf* was then systematically carried through; the *Gestapo* or Secret Police destroyed every vestige of personal liberty; education was reorganized on lines designed to produce a nation of Nazis; 6,000,000 unemployed were absorbed into the armed forces or munition factories; Jews were ruthlessly eliminated; all who could not prove their devotion to the New Order were rounded up into concentration camps; Germany was rearmed, and page by page the Treaty of Versailles was torn up.

REARMAMENT

Nor was Germany the only country to rearm. In 1934 the Disarmament Conference after sitting for two years finally adjourned, its complete failure confessed; in 1935 the British rearmament programme was announced, France extended the period of Compulsory Service, and Germany reintroduced Conscription.

ANNEXATION OF AUSTRIA

Austria was the first country to give a warning of the coming storm in Europe. In 1932 Dr. Dollfuss, the leader of the Christian Socialists in Austria, had in the 'Fatherland Front' united all the conservative elements against the Austrian Nazis; in 1932 he succeeded to the Chancellorship in 1933, he established himself as a dictator, and in February 1934 he inflicted a crushing, though far from bloodless, defeat on the Viennese Socialists. Whether the Socialists brought this heavy chastisement upon themselves or were provoked to insurrection by the Austrian Fascists is uncertain, but certain it is that the conflict cost Dollfuss his life. On 29th July 1934 he was foully murdered by the Austrian Nazis. They reaped no advantage from their crime. To meet a threat from Berlin, Mussolini, the friend and patron of Dollfuss and the protector, at that time, of Austria's independence, sent three divisions up to the Brenner. If Hitler was contemplating the immediate annexation of Austria he decided to defer it. With Kurt von Schuschnigg, the friend of Dollfuss, and successor to his policy, Hitler came to an agreement (11th July 1936) by which he guaranteed the independence of Austria, though Austria 'acknowledged herself to be a German State' and Schuschnigg imprudently agreed to sanction the existence of Nazi organizations in Austria.

French politics were at this time falling into ever deepening confusion. In January 1934 a Russian Jew, who had

been involved in a number of financial scandals, committed suicide in order to avert arrest. The 'Stavisky Scandal' revealed that the French administration—the police, the civil service, even the Legislature—was honeycombed with corruption, and Gaston Doumerge (President, 1924–31) was recalled from his retirement to save the State. But Doumerge's strong policy raised a suspicion that he meant to establish a dictatorship, and after six months he was replaced by a much weaker man, M. Flandin, with M. Barthou at the Foreign Office. In October 1934 Barthou was assassinated at Marseilles along with King Alexander of Yugoslavia, the guest of the French Republic.

FRANCE

Italy, however, though probably as much responsible for the crime as the Hungarian assassins who actually perpetrated it, escaped censure, owing perhaps to the ripening friendship between M. Laval (Barthou's successor) and Mussolini. Italy was at the moment about to start her attack on Abyssinia. Hailé Selassie, the ruler of Abyssinia, invoked the intervention of the League to which, on the initiative of Italy, Abyssinia had been admitted, but in vain (March 1935). In April Ramsay MacDonald and Sir John Simon met Laval and Mussolini and established the 'Stresa Front' (so called from their *rendezvous*) with the object of restraining the threatened attack of Hitler upon Austria. But in June France was dismayed to learn that Great Britain, without notifying her Stresa allies, had concluded with Germany an agreement for the limitation of naval armaments. In October Mussolini, convinced by the conversations at Stresa that neither England nor France was seriously concerned about Abyssinia, and not deterred by the condemnation of Italy pronounced, at the instance of the two Western Democracies, at Geneva, launched his attack upon Hailé Selassie.

ITALY

Although the League of Nations promptly passed a sentence of outlawry ('Sanctions') against Italy, it soon became obvious that the responsibility for enforcing the sentence would fall solely upon Great Britain. In December Laval and Sir Samuel Hoare (British Foreign Minister) agreed to propose to the belligerents a compromise which would have saved Mussolini's honour and Hailé Selassie's throne. The plan went awry; it was, perhaps

SANCTIONS

by Laval's calculated 'indiscretion,' prematurely disclosed, and Sir Samuel Hoare was sacrificed to the clamour which the disclosure aroused in England. The sole beneficiary was Hitler, who on 7th March 1936 occupied the demilitarized Rhineland. It is now known that if France and England had 'called Hitler's bluff' Germany would have withdrawn. Hitler's bluff was not called; England and France acquiesced in his flagrant violation of the Locarno Treaty. Hitler had won the first round. In May Italy annexed Abyssinia; in July 'Sanctions' were formally lifted; in October Italy formed with Germany the Rome-Berlin Axis.

THE SPANISH VORTEX

In the previous July a rehearsal of the European tragedy had begun in Spain. Unable or unwilling to follow the example of Portugal, where in 1928 Salazar had set up a dictatorship conspicuously beneficent and unaggressive, Spain was falling into dire confusion. The Spanish Parliament was dominated by gangs of politicians as corrupt as they were inefficient; Morocco was a running sore, and in 1923 Primo di Rivera, supported by the army, set up a monarchical Dictatorship. During the next six years he regenerated his country: he crushed the urban Communists; he resisted the Separatist movement of which Barcelona—always disaffected—was the centre; he encouraged agriculture; he restored the financial and industrial equilibrium; and delivered Spain from the millstone which Morocco had so long threatened to hang round her neck. But in 1930 King Alphonso XIII weakly dismissed his loyal but dictatorial minister, whose reforms had aroused the hostility of the all-powerful army. The dismissal of Primo di Rivera sealed the fate of the monarchy, and in 1931 King Alphonso preferred to leave Spain rather than plunge his country into civil war.

Civil war, however, was only deferred. It broke out in 1936 and raged until 1939. The issue was somewhat confused; but General Francisco Franco, a distinguished soldier who, having done some good service in Morocco, had in 1935 returned to Spain at the head of a large body of Moorish troops and legionaries, had by 1939 gradually overcome the resistance of the parliamentary republicans. To Franco's victory Mussolini claimed to have contributed 100,000 Italians, completely equipped and including a large air force. Germany

made a similar if smaller contribution. To the Republicans Soviet Russia gave all possible support. France and Great Britain persevered to the end, despite the pressure of their respective socialists, and despite some impudent submarine attacks upon British ships, in a policy of non-intervention. As no one dared to confess to the ownership of the offending submarines, an agreement, signed at Nyon sufficed to put an abrupt end to these attacks. Both France and England were, in truth, desperately anxious to prevent the extension of the area of the conflict. They succeeded; but only for a time. In the interval there was one symptom of sanity in a mad world.

THE NEW TURKEY

Between 1923 and his death in November 1938 Kemal Atatürk accomplished for new Turkey a work to which there are few parallels in modern history. Under his rule Turkey was literally reborn. Upon the new nation which he created on Asiatic soil he imposed a wholly new culture. In government, in agriculture, trade, industry, law, education, social customs (notably those affecting women), central and local administration, sanitation and public health, and indeed in every conceivable respect the Ghazi transformed Turkey. To Turkish foreign policy he gave a new orientation: Turkey was admitted to the League of Nations in 1932, negotiated a Balkan Pact in 1934, and concluded an agreement with Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan in 1936. But the crown of Kemal's diplomatic activities was the negotiation of the Straits Convention at Montreux (1935). By a procedure strictly 'correct' Turkey regained the right to fortify the narrow Straits and for the first time since 1833 became entirely mistress in her own house.[1]

THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND COMMONWEALTH

The new Turkey will, we may hope, contribute an element of stability to the new world. But the most important elements have for long past been the United States of America and the British Empire and Commonwealth. Of the former little may be said in a sketch of the evolution of Europe. The position of the latter is more pertinent to the present theme.

In the years immediately following the Paris Conference

[1] For details cf. Marriott: *The Eastern Question* (4th ed. 1940), pp. 559–575.

the infelicitous slogan ' Self-Determination ' did not leave the British Empire unaffected. A rebellion had broken out in Southern Ireland in 1917, and, though promptly crushed, it was followed by an outbreak which from 1919–21 assumed the aspect of civil war. A deferred Home Rule Act passed in 1920 provided for the setting up of subordinate parliaments in Belfast and Dublin. The six predominantly Protestant counties of Northern Ireland reluctantly accepted the scheme, and with considerable success have continued to work it while retaining their representation in the United Kingdom Parliament. Southern Ireland repudiated the offer, and continued to fight for independence. Savage outrages upon the persons and properties of loyalists evoked reprisals which greatly shocked the sensibilities of Britons, nor could 60,000 British troops reduce Southern Ireland to submission. War-wearied Britain surrendered: in 1921 a ' treaty ' conceded to Ireland full ' Dominion Status.' Ulster exercised the option to ' contract out ' of the Treaty. Southern Ireland has consistently broken its conditions, and by declaring its neutrality in the Second World War, and in other ways, has virtually seceded from the British Empire and materially assisted the German U-boat campaign.

EGYPT

Egyptian nationalists also hoisted the flag of ' Self-Determination ' and raised an insurrection against the British Protectorate. The insurrection was easily suppressed, but in 1922 Great Britain determined the Protectorate, and, subject to certain reservations, declared Egypt to be an ' independent Sovereign State ' under its own King. Not, however, until 1938 did Egypt agree by Treaty to accept the continued presence of a British garrison to guard the Suez Canal and (virtually) to guarantee Egypt against foreign aggression. The value of that guarantee has been demonstrated in the present war (1943).

INDIA

Indian ' nationalism ' is entirely the product of the beneficent policy pursued for a century in India by the British Government. On its more violent side it was, however, greatly stimulated by the events of the First World War and by the widespread agitation for ' Self-Determination ' ensuing thereon. Since the war England has made repeated efforts, by Commissions

and Enquiries, by legislation (in 1919 and 1935), and by administration, to meet every reasonable, and many unreasonable, demands made by Indian 'nationalists.' But all those efforts have been frustrated by the intransigence of the extremists and a deadlock continues.

THE DOMINIONS

Far different is the story of the relations between Great Britain and her self-governing Dominions. Not that the latter were wholly unaffected by the atmosphere that prevailed at and after the Paris Conference. The status of 'Nationhood' claimed at Paris was, however, promptly conceded by the 'Mother Country,' and embodied in the historic Report of 1926 and by legislation (so far as legislation could do it) by the *Statute of Westminster* (1931). That Statute, instead of paving the way (as many feared) to Dominion independence, demonstrated its cohesive force during the Abdication Crisis in December 1936. A determined effort was also made to meet the fiscal views of the Dominions by the Budget of 1932, by the Imperial Economic Conference which met at Ottawa in the autumn of the same year.

The British Empire, then, has, with the United States of America, stood for stability in an unstable world. Those great Powers still stand for it. The hope is that when the battle of the nations has been fought out and crowned by a just and lasting Peace, their efforts to evolve order out of chaos may be seconded by Russia and by a liberated China.

Meanwhile the world is still involved in a mighty conflict between the powers of darkness and light. To the proximate causes of that conflict brief reference must now, after this digression, be made.

ANNEXATION OF AUSTRIA

On 12th February 1936 Hitler summoned Dr. Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor, to Berchtesgaden, and in an 'agonizing' interview inflicted moral and mental torture upon his inoffensive and sensitive victim. Hitler then revealed himself as a bully and a cad if not a maniac.[1] Poor Schuschnigg, reduced to a condition of complete collapse by the violence of his tormentor, agreed to hand over the control of domestic affairs

[1] A vivid description of this interview is in *Fallen Bastions* (1939), chapter xx, by G. E. R. Gedye.

to Dr. Seyss-Inquart, the leader of the Austrian Nazis, and to conduct foreign affairs under Hitler's own dictation.

On his return to Vienna, however, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite to be taken on 13th March on the whole question of Austrian independence. This order aroused uncontrollable fury in Hitler. On 12th March he sent a German army into Austria, and on the 14th he himself drove through the be-flagged streets of Vienna to receive the plaudits due from the populace to their deliverer.[1] It may well be that ten years earlier the Austrians would have welcomed an *Anschluss* with republican Germany. The plebiscite, which approved it on 10th April, was a pure farce. Austria ceased, after its annexation, to be even a province of the Reich: like the rest of Germany it was cut up into districts.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

After Austria, Czechoslovakia. The surrender of Austria exposed the flank of Bohemia, but its northern frontier, naturally almost impregnable, and also scientifically fortified, still formed both the strongest bastion of Central Europe and the most formidable obstacle to Hitler's domination of the Balkans. Between the Czechs and Germans in Bohemia there had, however, long been friction. How far the existing agitation among the Bohemian Germans was spontaneous is disputable; that it was stimulated by Hitler as a prelude to annexation is certain. Nor could there be much doubt as to Hitler's intentions. Russia and France were pledged to the assistance of Czechoslovakia; Great Britain, though unpledged, and still averse to any co-operation with Russia, had made it clear that she would act with France. But neither France nor England was prepared for war, and made desperate efforts to avert it. Twice in September 1938 Mr. Chamberlain flew to Germany for personal interviews with Hitler, and on 30th September, when war seemed inevitable, Mr. Chamberlain, with M. Daladier, Prime Minister of France, and Mussolini, met Hitler at Munich and reached a solemn agreement with the Führer. The whole world acclaimed the British Prime Minister as an heroic peacemaker.

There was no peace. Hitler soon threw off the last remnant of his mask. Czechoslovakia suffered the fate

[1] Of Dr. Schuschnigg nothing more has been heard.

of Austria. In October Germany occupied the Bohemian Sudetenland; the Poles seized Teschen; the Magyars also got a share of the booty, but the bulk, Bohemia and Moravia, of course, went to Germany. On 15th March 1939 the German Führer himself made a triumphal entry into Prague. Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist.

After Czechoslovakia, Memel, which was surrendered to Germany without a struggle by Lithuania—on 23rd March.

MEMEL

After Memel, Poland. On Hitler's demand for the restoration of Dantzic and the 'Polish Corridor,' Mr. Chamberlain announced that Great Britain would, in the event of a German attack, give Poland all the support in her power, and similar pledges were given to Greece and Roumania. France joined in these pledges.

POLAND

What were such pledges worth? On Good Friday (7th April 1939) Italy suddenly swooped down upon Albania and occupied it with 100,000 men. This was a direct threat to Greece, but the execution of it was deferred until 1941.

The rapid sequence of tragic events at last convinced England that Russia held the key of the situation and that it was expedient to make an agreement with her. Negotiations to that end were carried on at Moscow throughout the spring and summer of 1939. But Marshal Stalin was only playing with England. On 23rd August the world learned with amazement that the Soviet Union had concluded a Non-aggression Pact with Germany. Great Britain and France had been completely fooled by Marshal Stalin. Was Marshal Stalin fooled by Hitler? Or Hitler by Stalin? Some day perhaps the world will learn.

GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA

Meanwhile there is no obscurity about the immediate sequel.

Hitler was free to attack Poland without fear of a war on two fronts. He attacked it at dawn on 1st September. On 3rd September Great Britain and France declared war on Germany, but direct help to Poland neither could give. Japan announced its neutrality on 4th September. Italy had already declared that she would take no initiative in military operations.

Thus the Second World War began. It still (1944) rages.

But the conditions have already vastly changed. Poland, after an heroic but vain resistance, was annihilated, and Hitler shared the booty with Stalin. For a time. But in 1941 the partitioners fell out. Meanwhile Hitler had occupied Denmark and Norway, Holland and Belgium; France collapsed at the first blows of Germany (May–June 1940); the British Empire fought on alone and not only frustrated the threatened invasion of the homeland, but achieved an almost miraculous victory over Germany in the air.

But the story of the Second World War cannot be written until it has been fought to a finish with results that only the future can reveal. The present narrative must be content to record the outbreak of a war clearly destined to affect profoundly the whole future of mankind.[1]

[1] It is being told in instalments (down to date 1943) by P. P. Graves in Hutchinson's *Quarterly Record of the War*, and in brief outline down to 1943 in Marriott: *History of Europe*, 1815–1939, 4th ed., Methuen 1944.

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